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FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE



FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

IN THREE PARTS

BY

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The Social root of the Ethical consciousness. Exclusive claims for the social. Spencer's account of the genesis of Obligation. The internal sense of obligation. Idea of the tribal consciousness—its value. Egoism and Altruism—theory of Benjamin Kidd. Huxley's antinomy between Natural Selection and the Moral consciousness. Why natural selection is unethical. Natural Selection not purely egoistic. Unconscious conservation of kind. The principle of Obligation in the Moral and Jural spheres. Its ultimate grounding. The *assent* of the egoistic will to the claim of the objective will. Rests on recognition of objective will as organ of larger and including whole. Identity of the principle of Authority here developed with that of the highest Rationality. Assent to the demand of will as obligatory involves assent to it as *right*. And this will be resolvable into two propositions: (1) that the idea of Right involves conformity to some nature taken as an ultimate standard; (2) that this nature can be no other than the Absolute. Right involves, therefore, the highest Rationality. Necessity of the metaphysical basis of Ethics; (1) in order that the *absoluteness* of obligation may be intelligible; (2) that the fundamental objective categories of Morality, the Right and the Good, may be completely valid. Ethical assent to Obligation, and the assent of the Socio-Political consciousness. Absoluteness of the Ethical. Relation of Ethics and Religion. Common root in the personal nature of the Absolute. But personal root of Religion is the feeling of dependence, while that of Ethics is the feeling of individual freedom. Correlation of the two moments. Conclusion, pp. 502-517

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ERRATA.

PAGE 11. *For Hutchinson Sterling read Hutchison Stirling.*
PAGES 27, 86. *For Récégac read Récéjac.*
PAGE 81. *For Foulleé read Fouillée.*
PAGE 201. *For transeant read transeunt.*
PAGE 273. *For individual or the read individuating.*
PAGE 321. *For vigorous read rigorous.*

PREFACE.

IT is not the aim of this preface to relieve the body of the work of the responsibility of making itself clear. Nevertheless there are two or three topics on which a preliminary observation or two may not be amiss. In the first place, it scarcely needs saying that the work is meant as a first rather than a final word on the topics with which it deals. Completeness has not, therefore, been one of its aims. This should be borne in mind in making out the list of sins of omission and commission of which the author is to be held guilty. Again, while the work aims to be broadly experiential in the sense that the notion of experience is to be regarded as all-comprehensive, yet the application to it of the term empirical in any narrow or partisan sense may fairly be resented. For as regards the ordinary issues between empiricism and rationalism or intuitionism, they are simply transcended by the inclusion of reason and intuition among the functions of experience; for it is clear that experience cannot dispense with intuition, and it is no less obvious that the supreme intra-experiential test is that of rationality.

One of the points of theory insisted on as cardinal is the place assigned to the notion and function of experience. That knowledge is an intra-experiential term and that philosophy must be an interpretation of experience in the broad sense, are taken to be propositions that are not open

to serious dispute. Again, the doctrine of the internal complexity of being must be regarded as one of fundamental importance. For if being is conceived to be in the last analysis, internally simple and structureless, it follows that it will be opaque to knowledge and that philosophy must give it up in despair. If, on the contrary, being is to be conceived as internally complex, then a real manifestation of its internal nature becomes possible, and our world lies open to knowledge and philosophy. Furthermore, this doctrine of internal complexity supplies a point of view from which the subject and object distinction in consciousness becomes primary, and on this basis is developed what is doubtless one of the principal features of the book; namely, the distinction between the subjective and objective consciousness of the absolute and the relating of the absolute through its objective consciousness, in a constitutive way, to the world of finite individuals. That the objective consciousness of the absolute is constitutionally individuating, in the sense developed in the discussions, is taken to be a truth of cardinal importance for philosophy, inasmuch as it supplies a non-partizan principle on which both the individual and the universal may be conserved.

Of course, the doctrine of the categories is fundamental, and in this field Kant is still the great teacher. While admitting this and giving due respect to Kant, the author has not been restrained from attempting a fresh construction of the category, and one that it is hoped will be found more responsive to the demands of contemporary thought. The second division of the treatise in which the category is central, is the part that is most closely related to the foundations of science. In regard to this branch of the discussion, it is perhaps needful to say that the aim is not to define the concepts of science—an over-presumptuous task for a layman—but rather to investigate, and as far as possible define, the processes and types of consciousness which underlie these concepts, and through which man becomes, in the first instance, intelligibly related to his world. No

attempt, for example, is made to lay down the law to the mathematician in his own sphere, but it is believed, nevertheless, that something important is said regarding the psychic grounds out of which mathematical conceptions arise.

The bearing of the discussions on some of the fundamental questions of religion will be obvious. It is believed that the distinction which is made and insisted on between the subject- and object-activities of the absolute, supplies an adequate basis for a theory of individuality, in which the finite individual may be at the same time included and conserved in the consciousness of the absolute. The danger of pantheistic absorption is thus escaped. Furthermore, the method of approximation which is developed and applied to intra-experiential terms in order to reach an intelligible conception of the transcendent, will, it is believed, solve the difficulty of anthropomorphism by evincing how the self-analogy may be used in a valid way in the development of the idea of a being that is at once intelligible and transcendent of finite limits.

Aside from general debts which are acknowledged here, special obligation is confessed to my friend and colleague, Henry B. Fine, for helpful criticisms and suggestions on several points where mathematical conceptions were involved; although for the views expressed, and especially for the mistakes, I, of course, claim full and unshared responsibility. I am also indebted to my friend and sometime pupil, Alexander Pringle, for valuable assistance rendered while these sheets were going through the press. I can only regret in conclusion that the text of this work was completed before I had the privilege of reading Ladd's *Theory of Reality*, Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, or Royce's *The World and the Individual*. Otherwise their important suggestions would no doubt have modified my own work.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

LOOKING back over the last half of the century that is just closing, it becomes evident from the survey that some fundamental reconsideration of the whole problem of Philosophy will be one of the first duties of the century upon which the world is about to enter. The rise and speedy triumph of the doctrine of Evolution, bearing with it a transformation of the whole traditional conception of the world, could not but exercise an important influence on the conditions of the problem of knowledge. This effect is most marked in the form which in recent thought has been taken by the old issue between Empiricism and Rationalism which supplied the leading motive of Kant's thinking. Through Kant's own work, together with the transforming influence of evolutionary conceptions the old question has taken a new form and has been raised to a higher plane. In the reflection of Kant the two moments, empirical and rational, which had played separate roles in the movements of pre-Kantian thought, giving rise to mutually exclusive and antagonistic developments, were brought together, and it was the aim of Kant to lay the foundations of a concept of knowledge that should be at once true to experience and just to the rational presuppositions which experience seemed to involve. Into the details of the Kantian theory it is not necessary at this point to enter. Recognizing the fact, however, that the two moments of experience and rational presupposition are everywhere

immanent in the system of Kant, and that his concept of their relation led to the postulate of an ultra-experiential term that is at the same time essential to experience and yet inaccessible to knowledge, we will not be at a loss to account for the great lines of cleavage that mark the post-Kantian movements. We have only to deny the dualism between knowledge and the world of rational presupposition in which Kantism culminated, in order to realize the motive of the great idealistic outburst that followed and reached its conclusion in the thought of Hegel. And we have only to affirm that dualism, at the same time putting the supreme emphasis on the moment of experience, to be able to understand the great reaction from the standpoint of Kant toward that of Hume which was characteristic of the movements that arose outside and antagonized idealism. We cannot enter into details here, but if we take the thought of Kant as the immediate source of the intellectual movements which followed and characterized the first six or seven decades of the nineteenth century and recognize the duality of experience and rational presupposition as constituting its dialectical centre, it will become obvious that in this dialectical centre will be found the spring of the great post-Kantian schism, into which the thinking of the century was at length driven. It was only necessary, on the one hand, to deny the dualism and emphasize the notion of reason, and, on the other, to affirm the dualism in connection with the accentuation of the notion of experience in order to break the vital bond of Kantism and set the imprisoned elements free as independent motives in new movements of thought.

We do not take into account here the work of mediating thinkers of which there have been a few, but are aiming simply to characterize the great trends of the thought of the century and the influences which were mainly instrumental in determining its great epochs. The idealistic reaction first ran its course and reached its final expression in the splendid and, in many respects, enduring system of Hegel. Now, in relation to Kant we get the central thought of

Hegel if we suppose the imprisoned moment of reason to be set free and conceived to be the unitary heart of reality. This was doubtless the first step. Then let us conceive the dialectic, which to Kant was largely external, as internal to this moment of reason and as expressing itself in incessant pulsations of position, antithesis, and synthesis, we thus arrive at the developed notion of Hegel, what he conceived to be the inner pulse, the living heart of reality. Hegelism is thus, motived and informed by an unmodified and absolute principle of rationality to which the activity of experience must be subordinated, and within which, so far as it is to obtain recognition at all, it is to be an included moment. There is in Hegelism no distinctive point of view that may be called experiential but the world is first and primarily rational, and the notion of experience is everywhere mediated by reason. It was inevitable that Hegelism should be rebelled against as a deification of reason at the expense and even in defiance, of experience, and that this result should take the form of a one-sided emphasis of the experience moment in Kant and the practical reinstatement of the empirical standpoint of Hume. We are not attempting to write a history of philosophy here and shall have little to say of the post-Hegelian movements in German thought, important as they are and including as they do the work of that great mediating thinker Lotze, for it becomes evident that the reinstatement of the notion of experience shifts the pole of thinking and reconnects it with the traditions of Hume. The result that followed this change was that at about the same period, the latter half of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, German thought ceased to be constructive and began to devote its main energies, outside of pure science, to history and criticism, while in English thought there arose a constructive impulse that created a new era and led to the most characteristic results of the century.

The vital centre of constructive thinking in the latter half of the century is English, therefore, rather than German, and it is on English soil that we will have to trace

the empirical reaction from Kant which re-established its historic continuity and its characteristic tradition in the reinstatement of Hume. The first step in that reaction was taken by the school of Sir Wm. Hamilton whose characteristic position may be described as English-Kantism, and whose central motive was a desire to incorporate the Kantian dualism with the traditions of English thinking. Hamilton and his school were in truth engaged in the somewhat visionary enterprise of transferring bodily to English soil that dialectic of experience and transcendent rational pre-supposition, which in Kantian thinking had been a fruitful mother of negative offspring, and it required no large gift of prescience to anticipate the result. The school soon degenerated, on the one hand, into a sort of jargon of empty dialectics, while, on the other, it was forced to acknowledge its utter incompetency to deal with any of the most fundamental issues of thinking. The Hamiltonian experiment ended in a morass, and in its helpless plight loudly proclaimed the futility of knowledge. Historically, the Hamiltonian attempt to naturalize the Kantian dualism in English soil would be unimportant were it not for an echo of it that has survived in that vestibule to the synthetic philosophy of Herbert Spencer, *The Unknowable*.

A much more important step was taken when, in the early sixties, through the instrumentality of J. S. Mill, a marriage was effected between the Humian school of experience, of which he and his father, James Mill, had been the most prominent English exponents, and the principles of Positivism as embodied in the system of its founder, Auguste Comte. The first note of the union was struck in Mill's *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, in which the remarkable system of the French philosopher was first made known to English thinkers. The seed thus sown found a fruitful soil, and English Positivism soon attained a more vigorous growth than the parent stem from which it was taken. A great defect in original Positivism was its refusal to recognize its psychological groundwork, and its

insistence that only objective phenomena in space and time are knowable. The grafting of Positivism on the Humian branch, which was effected by Mill and his compeers, corrected this defect and infused new vigour into the movement. For the completion in English thought of the foundations of the Positivistic theory in its new form, we must have recourse to the work of George Henry Lewes, a thinker whom it is too much the fashion just at present to treat with neglect. Lewes, whose first impulse to philosophize came from the side of physiology, and at a later stage from general biology, made two important contributions to the Positivistic theory. Starting with the Comte-Hume synthesis which Mill had effected, Lewes first incorporates this general movement of empirical thinking with the fundamental concepts of biology. This marks an apparent return to the earlier stand-point of Comte, and we find Lewes putting forth the claim that psychology does not, in fact, possess the status of an independent science, but must be regarded as a specialized branch of the larger science of life. The lapse was only apparent, however, and Lewes makes it evident in his little treatise on the *Study of Psychology* that what he is really aiming at is such a concept of the fundamental categories of consciousness as will bring psychology into harmony with the principles of biology. The first characteristic contribution of Lewes to the completion of the Positivistic theory is, therefore, a proposed and in a certain measure achieved, marriage of biological and psychological categories. The second and most important step was taken, however, in his incorporation of the concepts of evolution into the basis of empiricism, through the substitution of the notions of race experience and heredity for that of individual experience motived by associations, which had been central from Hume to Mill. In this we must admit that Lewes was anticipated by Herbert Spencer, and that he cannot lay claim to complete originality in this respect. Conceding this, however, it will be allowed that Lewes made an independent use of the principle, and was

building with it a philosophical tradition different from that of the synthetic philosophy. Herbert Spencer sets us the example here by disclaiming connection with Positivism, and the fundamental difference in the tradition of the two schools is beyond question. English Positivism arose, as we have seen, out of the union of Comte and Hume, while the foundation of the synthetic philosophy was achieved in a union of Hume with Kantism as it had filtered down through the medium of the school of Hamilton.

When Lewes incorporated the concepts of evolution with the synthetic tradition of Comte and Hume the basis of that form of the new empiricism which we call Positivism was virtually completed. We may characterize the theory as Neo-Positivism, and we will find that the historical elements which entered into it will enable us to understand its most characteristic features. It is, in fact, a synthesis of objective phenomenism with psychological sensationalism which is the principle of subjective phenomenism. Its internal structural principle is that of a developing experience conceived under the rubrics of evolution, race-experience and heredity, and its phenomenism embodies itself epistemologically in the dicta of Lewes that only the phenomenal is empirical, and, therefore, knowable, while the noumenon or transcendent term of Kantism is met-empirical, and therefore beyond the reach of thought or affirmation. Neo-Positivism, as it came from the hands of Lewes, is therefore a system of empiricism from which the extra-phenomenal is rigorously excluded, and in which the phenomenon becomes an absolute term.

We have seen that Neo-Positivism represents the second great step in the constructive movement of English thought during this period. The third, and doubtless the most important single step is that embodied in the synthetic philosophy of Herbert Spencer and his school. There was evidently a period in Spencer's thinking when he was in reaction against the old empiricism, which could maintain its position against transcendentalism only by putting an

unbearable strain on its individualistic principle, and we may suppose that it was the dawn of insight into the capabilities of evolution when conceived as an inner principle of experience, that first reconciled him to empiricism, and led to the project of a synthetic philosophy. Aside from this hypothetical conjecture, it is certain that the groundwork of the system was achieved when it occurred to the mind of Spencer to substitute the categories of race-experience and heredity for the individualistic principle of the old philosophy. This was the first great step, and perhaps as momentous a single step as has ever been taken by the human mind. For it not only reinstated the experience-philosophy on a foundation that appeared to be infinitely stronger and more comprehensive than the one it had displaced, but it brought psychology, and through it philosophy and epistemology, into line with the new developments in the organic and biological sciences. We are here most vitally interested in the epistemological bearings of the synthetic philosophy, and from the point of view of the new principle it would seem possible to heal the breach between rationalists and empiricists on the question of the original and acquired possessions of the human mind, an issue which the old philosophy was unable to close, by conceding the claim of the rationalists that the most important contents of the individual consciousness are original capital which he brings with him into the world, but claiming in connection with this that those original possessions are the inherited results of the past experience of the race. On this basis Spencer claims that the conflicting schools can be reconciled, and the new empiricism be proved competent to meet all legitimate requirements.

Up to this point, however, there is no essential difference between the programme of Positivism and that of the Synthetic Philosophy. If another factor had not entered into Mr. Spencer's thinking the Synthetic Philosophy might have assumed an attitude toward the noumenal or transcendent

that would have brought it into substantial harmony with Positivism. But we have seen that Spencer borrows a motive from Kant, and the incorporation of this constitutes the second and final step in the completion of the synthetic system. It is not material here to know how Spencer first became acquainted with the writings of the Hamiltonian school, for it is evident that his knowledge of Kant was not, in the first instance, first-hand, but was obtained through the medium of the English Kantians. The important point is the fact that Spencer accepts the negative metaphysic of that school, the doctrine that the absolute or unconditioned, while a necessary presupposition of the relative and phenomenal, is yet completely transcendent of all the conditions of knowledge, and, therefore, unthinkable. This doctrine Spencer adopts, and incorporates with the groundwork of his system in the first part of his *First Principles of Philosophy*. In appropriating it, however, he modifies it somewhat by putting more emphasis on its positive aspect than the Hamiltonians had deemed advisable. In his hands the doctrine is embodied in a proposition that involves both an affirmation and a denial. The necessary existence of a transcendent absolute as the ground of the relative, and as supplying the ground-principle of science, is affirmed and supported by both direct and indirect evidence, while in connection with this it is maintained that the nature of this transcendent object is absolutely unthinkable and must remain for ever shrouded in impenetrable mystery. It is this second step in which an element of Kantism is thus incorporated into its constitution, that differentiates the Synthetic Philosophy from Neo-Positivism, and justifies Spencer in his indignant repudiation of the classification that would confound him with the Positivists. By virtue of this step the Synthetic Philosophy reaches an empirical concept in which the sphere of experience, which is that of possible knowledge, becomes articulated with, and in an important sense grounded in, an absolute, that is represented as welling up and manifesting itself in the forms of

relative existence, but which in its own real nature holds itself aloof and unapproachable.

We have, then, in the two forms of empiricism, which have embodied themselves in Neo-Positivism and the Synthetic Philosophy, the two constructive movements in the empirical thought of the middle section of the nineteenth century. Before going on, however, to a third constructive movement of a different type it will be important to dwell briefly on some of the characteristic defects of the new empiricism as embodied in the forms sketched above. We have seen how Hegelism puts the supreme emphasis on reason, the transcendent noumenon of Kantism, and subordinates experience to it as a contained moment. The project of pure empiricism involves an exact reversal of this order, the putting of the supreme and, in fact, exclusive emphasis on experience, while reason has no independent status, and only obtains recognition in so far as it can justify itself from experience data. The procedure of Hume is typical here, and substantially fixes that of all his successors. Now, Neo-Positivism is a system of pure empiricism, and may be judged strictly on that basis. What, then, is the characteristic defect of pure empiricism? In answering this question we shall appeal simply to the judgment of history upon systems of thought in general, and from this point of view it will become evident that what we are seeking to determine is the characteristic respect in which Neo-Positivism has failed to deal adequately with the problems for the solution of which a philosophy may reasonably be held responsible. It will not be difficult, I think, to point out this characteristic defect. It has its root in the restriction of the notion of experience to the phenomenal and the rigid exclusion of the ultra-phenomenal, as also ultra-experiential, and therefore, to all intents and purposes, unreal. This is what the term metempirical means—the denial of the transphenomenal as unreal. But there is that in man's nature which renders it impossible for him to restrict his thoughts and his interests to the empirical sphere as thus defined.

His consciousness becomes, in spite of his will, the bearer of questions which lead into the metempirical, and it happens that these are the most vital and persistent of all the problems he has to face. Neo-Positivism has no answer to any of these questions but the denial that any answer is possible. The human spirit will inevitably grow weary in the end of this intellectual snubbing, and will demand a philosophy that can give it more positive assurance.

The Synthetic Philosophy, on first blush, seems to present a more hopeful situation. Not only does it contain a repudiation of pure phenomenism, but its entire structure rests on the positive assertion of a transcendent reality, and this reality is clothed with a quasi-religious significance. Spencer grows fervent in his exposition of the shortcomings of pure Positivism. But the appearance here is largely delusive. Historically the Synthetic Philosophy has proved itself weak at two fundamental points. In the first place, its attempt to ground philosophy in a principle that affirms the necessary existence of the unthinkable, seems to involve a subtle self-contradiction, since it is surely incumbent that a thing should be in some sense intelligible before its necessity can be made out. It seems impossible to separate the questions of existence and nature so completely that what bears on one will not also shed light on the other. Again, the bald negative which the Synthetic Philosophy opposes to the most pressingly interesting and vital problems of the human spirit puts it in this respect on the same plane with Positivism. It seems to be a matter of little moment that we can assert a transcendent reality if we are cut off from any intelligible apprehension of its nature or what it may be doing or purposing in the universe. True, by a sort of poetic license we may define a kind of shadowy $\Theta\acute{e}os$ on the background of Spencer's unknowable, but the stern logic of the situation will be incessantly reducing our creations to nought and our religious feeling, if we have any, must find its satisfaction in an absolute mystery. Of the two species of Agnosticism with which the thinking of the time is

affected, the denial of everything that transcends the phenomenal, and the denial of the possibility of knowing a transcendent whose existence must nevertheless be affirmed, each in turn fails to meet demands of vital importance, and both alike present an attitude of bald and helpless negation to the most pressing issues of the human mind.

It was no doubt a sense of the helplessness of empiricism, even in its latest forms, to meet the higher spiritual issues, that led to a third attempt at construction, which we may characterize as Neo-Rationalism. The movement finds its chief inspiration in Hegel, and originated about a generation ago, when Hutchinson Sterling brought out his two-volume work entitled *The Secret of Hegel*.¹ In spite of the fact that Sterling's effort was received with some merriment and no little incredulity at the time, an irreverent wag describing it as a work in which the Secret of Hegel had been carefully concealed in two volumes, it supplied an important clue to the interpretation of Hegel by connecting his thought directly with the categories of Kant, and what for our purpose is more important still, it proved to be the first step in a Hegelian revival which has assumed large proportions and promises valuable results. Through the interpretation of Sterling the pulsating heart of the Hegelian dialectic was projected into the field of English thinking, and a movement originated of which the late Thomas Hill Green may be taken as the next and individually the most important representative. We are not concerned here with the ethical views of Green, but rather with the central category of his thinking, which was the norm of the Hegelian rationalism. The *point d'appui* of Green is to be found in the current sensationalism of the time, which Lewes had happily expressed in the dictum; given sensibility and its laws, and everything else may be deduced from them. Green charged sensationalism with blindness in overlooking or denying the internal relational character of the data on which it proceeded, and his aim was to demonstrate the existence of an

¹ *The Secret of Hegel*, in two volumes, London, 1865.

immanent rational element in all sensation. This insight is central in his monumental *Introduction to the Philosophy of Hume*, a work in which English philosophical criticism strikes a new and profounder note, and in which it also becomes evident that a new claimant for philosophical honours is on the field. Green's critical work gave the foretaste of a constructive movement in which his lamented death prevented him from participating, but the work was taken up and ably pushed by others, until now we have the school covering in its activity every important field of philosophical effort, and including among its adherents the most vigorous thinkers of the time. The school has had an important development in America as well as in Great Britain. Dr. Wm. T. Harris may be regarded as its pioneer and chief representative on the American side of the water.

Historically, as we have seen, this Neo-rationalistic movement may be regarded as having its origin in a reaction from empiricism, and in particular from its agnostic attitude toward the transcendent. The speculative insight of philosophy threatened to go out in darkness, and the pioneers of the new movement, in seeking for a means of reviving it, found it in the central category of Hegelism, the pulsating dialectic of immanent rationality which to Hegel expressed the whole inner truth of reality. We may call it the concept of rationality as distinguished from that of experience on which empiricism had proceeded, and the aim of the school is to show that the pulse of rationality is central, and constitutive in experience itself. The principle of the school was first employed as an organ of destructive criticism to expose the fundamental weakness of the current empirical theory, its attempt to construct knowledge out of abstract sensational data from which all inner rationality had been excluded.

This is the whole burden of Green's insistence on relations in his criticism of Locke and Hume, and it is the main charge which he has to bring against the later representatives of the empirical school. Later on it be-

came the motive of a constructive effort, the watchword of which has been that experience must be through and through rational, and that the notion of reason must in the last analysis be one under which the real may be conceived as a unitary whole. The norm of reason the school finds in the dialectical notion of Hegel, of which it makes first a critical, then a constructive application.

In the foregoing survey we have not attempted to be exhaustive of the important movements of recent thought,¹ but have simply aimed to trace those which seem most characteristic of the time, and in which the leading motives of the following discussions are to be found. Going back now to the main point of departure in the historical survey, the dialectic heart of Kantism in which the two moments of experience and rationality were involved, we have seen how the old issues have been re-opened by the alternate emphasizing of the notions of experience and reason, and how out of the divorce thus effected the schools of Neo-empiricism and Neo-rationalism have sprung into existence and developed. In the remainder of this introduction we wish to indicate what to us seem the fundamental defects of the new movements, in view of which a fresh effort toward reconstruction seems necessary. The empirical movements proceed as we have seen, on the notion of experience and their aim simply expressed is to develop a theory of knowledge from data supplied by experience. If the question be asked whether this programme as thus stated is open to legitimate criticism, I think the answer will have to be in the negative. The strong point of empiricism, that which has rendered it well nigh impregnable, like Antaeus upon his native earth, is its dogged persistence in keeping its stand upon and within experience. To us it is clear that experience must supply to philosophy its point of departure and that the concept of experience must be its supreme category.

¹ It is only necessary in this connection to note that we have said little of Schopenhauer and Lotze, not to speak of the important developments of the Scottish School in English thought.

If we are to find fault with empiricism at all, it must not be for making experience its starting point, but rather for its defective conception of the nature of experience. The fundamental weakness of both Positivism and the Synthetic Philosophy was found to arise out of the relation of these systems to the ultra-phenomenal and transcendent, the one meeting the whole issue with a bold and sweeping denial, the other, while postulating an ultra-phenomenal reality, yet boldly denying that it is in any sense knowable. Now the structural defect out of which this denial arises is to be found in the notion of experience with which those schools set out. To neither is experience a term that is all-inclusive but it is inclusive only of the phenomenal and relative. Whether, now, we assume that there is no reality beyond the phenomenal or not, we are at least unable to dismiss the notions of the ultra-phenomenal and absolute from consciousness, or to break their connection with the concepts of the relative. To a notion of experience that is inclusive of the phenomenal only, they constitute therefore an outlying and disturbing factor. We cannot dismiss or suppress the ultra-phenomenal and it cannot be included in our notion of experience. Human thought is thus put into a dilemma the painfulness of which is only intensified by the further conclusion we are driven to, that inasmuch as all the categories of knowledge are intra-experiential, therefore, the spectre of the ultra-phenomenal can never be laid, but must go on haunting us and troubling us with bad dreams for ever. The difficulty here is to be escaped, I think, only by reforming the notion of experience so as to make it all-comprehensive. When this has been done the distinction that before was ultra-experiential becomes internal, and the ultra-phenomenal also becomes a term within experience. It will be clear I think, that this solution not only relieves the great strain of the situation, but it also sheds a hopeful light on the problem of knowledge. In view of the altered condition, and the fact that the distinction between the phenomenal and the ultra-phenomenal, is internal to experi-

ence, no *a priori* reason is left for denying the possibility of conceiving the whole content of experience, inclusive of the ultra-phenomenon, under categories of knowledge. The ground is thus taken away from the dogma of the unknowability of the absolute, and the knowing activity is left free to go its own way and discover its own limits, in the course of the effort to know. If empiricism will admit this fundamental reconstruction of data, then we are ready to espouse its cause and fight out the issues of philosophy on its platform.

The characteristic defect of the Neo-rationalistic School is to be sought for at the opposite point of the compass. It is a strong point of this school that it substantially accepts the notion of experience as fundamental, and conceives the pulse of rationality to constitute its internal movement. In this we recognize a profound insight, and to the proposition that rationality is the inner heart of experience no legitimate objection can be offered. The point of legitimate criticism may be stated, I think, as follows. If the notion of experience is to be taken as fundamental, then we ought to find our point of departure and the categories of our procedure in experience. It will be consistent with this position to start with the hypothetical presumption that experience must be rational, inasmuch as the concept of an irrational experience is in the last analysis absurd; but *it is not consistent with the position to approach experience with a principle of rationality that is, in effect, ready-made; for in that case we cannot be sure that our principle will be in conformity with the inner nature of experience, and that our application of it will not take the form of forcing experience into conformity with our own presupposition.* To be more specific, the central moment of Hegelism is a pulse of unmodified absoluteness, and to this is due the characteristic defects of the system—its failure to realize a true point of distinction between absolute and relative, and its failure to ground mechanism as anything but unreal show or appearance. Now, the fact that the initial impulse of the new

school was not to first-hand investigation of experience, but rather to the application to it of the central category of a pre-existing system of thought, would lead us to expect that in the systematic working out of its programme not only would a certain degree of artificiality and maladaptation arise in the application, but that the category itself, if it had any characteristic defects, would tend to generate in the new field of its activity the same species of difficulties which had arisen in the old. If now we approach the work of Green in criticism or that of Caird in the Theory of Religion, we find the presumption everywhere to be that a moment of rationality must be one of absoluteness, and the result is that neither Green nor Caird is able to find any qualitative difference between the thought-activity in its finite or relative and its absolute forms. The ingrained tendency in old Hegelism to conceive reality under the notion of unmodified absoluteness, and to reduce the finite and relative to mere *Schein*, thus perpetuates itself in the new rationalism and forms its most characteristic defect.

The above criticism is not meant to apply to all the thinkers who may be loosely classed as Neo-rationalists of the Hegelian type, for many of these may not be vulnerable to its point, and I could name some who by virtue of the infusion of new blood have largely outgrown the limits of the old categories, but the stricture is directed rather to the tendencies of the school as a whole. To press the point of the same criticism from a somewhat different angle, let us suppose that we have taken the notion of experience as the fundamental category of our procedure, and that we are convinced, whether from the study of Hegel or from some other source, that experience must be through and through rational. In this conviction we have simply become conscious of the presupposition of all science and philosophy, but we have not thereby determined, *a priori*, what the form of rationality shall be in experience. The determination of that question involves the entire endeavour of science and philosophy combined.

The thinker of the Hegelian type is liable, however, to forget the distinction, and to approach the investigation of experience not only with a postulate of rationality, which is indispensable, but with a pre-determined notion of the form which the rationality of experience must necessarily take. His principle is thus liable to become a procrustean bed upon which experience is to be tortured into the prescribed shape. On the contrary, we claim that experience has the prior right, and that the investigation must in a large sense develop the form of rationality out of the process of investigation. And one great advantage that we are prepared to claim for this way, over all others, is the fact that it leaves us open-minded to accept whatever we may find to be demonstrable either on the basis of intuition or rational necessity. Whatever elements of Hegelism may survive in a theory of the world that is developed on such a method will be found to be congruous with a rational scheme of experience.

To the objection that in order to conceive the absolute the organ of thought must be in the last analysis absolute, the answer is that it is not necessary for consciousness to achieve unmodified absoluteness in order to be able to think the absolute. The moment of passivity and consequent relativity is ever present as a modifying term in consciousness, and we can never reach a point where we realize our own agency as absolute. But the moment of absoluteness is internal to our consciousness in the pulse of self-activity, which is never able fully to realize itself. We think the absolute when we think away the passive limit from this moment of self-activity, and we think the necessity of the absolute when we reach a point where it becomes clear to us that the rationality of the finite and relative have their last grounds in an experience that is absolute. The statement that the thought of the absolute is achieved by thinking away the modifications of the finite and relative, and the statement that in conceiving the absolute, consciousness must become absolute, so that its activity will be that of the

absolute thinker itself, are two materially different propositions which are not reducible to a common basis. The first statement involves the principle of the following discussions, a principle the elaboration of which will, as I think, render it intelligible how a finite consciousness may relate itself to the absolute without breaking the molds of its finitude. In order to intelligibly conceive the absolute, and, therefore, to come into spiritual relations with it, we need only employ the resources which are involved in our experience as finite agents, while in order to become identical with the absolute, or to achieve unmodified absoluteness, it would be necessary for us to realize the stand-point of an absolute whole of experience, which is impossible.

In the first paragraph of this introduction the relation of the doctrine of evolution to the problem of knowledge was referred to, and further on we saw how the categories of evolution, race experience, and heredity had rendered an enlarged and more effective development of empiricism possible. At this point, the question we have to ask is whether, after all, the notion of evolution renders necessary any serious modification of our conceptions of the fundamental relations of knowledge. It is true, of course, that the psychologist has his whole problem profoundly modified by the notion of evolution and this mainly because to the psychologist the history of the content which he finds in consciousness is vital, and evolution profoundly modifies the categories of history. We may also admit that through its bearing on psychology, evolution has an important indirect bearing on epistemology inasmuch as the epistemological material is for the most part psychological, but in spite of this when the question is put with respect to the fundamental conditions and relations of knowledge, I think the answer will have to be in the negative. In the first place, while the theory of mental development enables us to reach a more adequate doctrine of self it does not affect the fundamental relation that exists between the knowing subject and its objective content. Again, although the theory

of development enables us to trace the genesis of such categories as space, time, and cause in the growing consciousness, it does not affect the final form of these categories or the relation they bear to the cognitive process. In short, there is no fundamental condition or relation of knowledge that is materially affected by the notion of evolution, but these conditions and relations remain relatively stable through the flux of change in which development works out its results. From a deeper metaphysical point of view it is the concept of evolution itself that must submit to the determinations of knowledge, for it will be found that in so far as it becomes epistemologically necessary to ground relative processes in an absolute experience just so far will it become necessary also to connect the evolutionary aspect of the world itself with a ground reality that is stable and involves the flux of change only as transcending and including it.

Great, therefore, as has been the role which evolution has played in moulding the scientific conceptions of the time it cannot be said with truth that it has seriously affected the fundamental problems of knowledge. The conditions of knowledge and its relation to experience remain substantially as they have been since the time of the Greeks, and as they always will be till some radical change is effected in the knowing activities themselves. This is not likely to happen, least of all through any possible extension of the concept of evolution. The conditions of the epistemological enterprise are more stable, then, than are those of psychology or any directly historical science. The most pressing demand for epistemological reconstruction does not spring from the modifying influence of the theory of evolution or from any other extraneous source but primarily and fundamentally from the inadequacy of the basal concepts of epistemology itself. A theory of knowledge must be solidly experiential, while at the same time it avoids the pitfalls of traditional empiricism. It must also make its final appeal to the principle of rationality while avoiding the mistakes

of traditional rationalism and its one-sided emphasis of the relations of pure thinking. The student of knowledge needs in this respect to learn the lesson of Schopenhauer that there is a moment of will in all knowledge, and he cannot afford to scorn the mystics who will teach him that feeling also enters into the heart of rationality. And he will have learned his whole lesson if he realizes the fact that the highest principle of the real in experience is that of the ultimate unity of the true and good.

PART I.

GROUND CONCEPTS OF KNOWLEDGE.

CHAPTER I.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE.

ONE of the most unsatisfactory features of modern Philosophy has been its tendency to oscillate between two very different modes of conceiving experience ; the one relatively profound and satisfactory, the other to a great degree superficial and inadequate. In the profounder conception, experience represents that kind or activity of consciousness in which the real is supposed to be most immediately and surely apprehended ; while according to the more superficial but widely current view, it stands for a species of custom or sense of uniformity bred of the constantly recurring factors of our conscious life. Now, it has been the misfortune of our modern thinking that the question of the relation of Philosophy to experience has been treated almost invariably on the avowed or tacit assumption of the truth of the superficial view of the nature of experience. To such an extent has this assumption been carried, that, with the majority, the possibility of any other conception has almost ceased to be believed in, and the thinker who is constrained to espouse the profounder view is apt to imagine, like Elijah the Tishbite, that the company he is in is very small and select. Nevertheless, I am disposed to think that appearances here are largely deceptive, and that throughout the history of thought there has been present a, for the most part, unacknowledged allegiance to a deeper and truer

idea of experience. The fact that it has been unacknowledged, and to a great degree unrecognized by thinkers themselves, has been a fruitful source of confusion, and is largely responsible for the fact that so many of the leaders of thought have been so chary about admitting the vital relation of knowledge to experience. This has worked harm to Philosophy in various ways; first in giving to sensationalism an apparent monopoly of experience and the prestige which this carries with the public; and what is even worse, breeding in the minds of many profound thinkers the suspicion that experience is too shallow and misleading to have anything of value to say to Philosophy. All this is, of course, deplorable, and is partly responsible for the disrepute into which Philosophy has fallen, not alone with the learned, but also with the intelligent public. For outside of the circles of specialists, and in the common beliefs of men, there is a very close connection between experience and reality, and experience is commonly accepted as a final court of appeal, before which that which asks our belief or allegiance is to have its claims finally adjudicated. Here is an instance, I take it, where the old scripture has been fulfilled, and the truth, hidden from the wise and prudent, has been revealed to babes and sucklings, or at least to those who are comparatively innocent of logical and metaphysical reflection. Philosophy, however, has its remedy at hand, and that is simply an explicit recognition of the deeper conviction on which it has proceeded from the beginning. It has only to free itself from the unconscious dialectic between inconsistent conceptions of experience, of which it has been the victim, and to recognize and proclaim its dependence on experience truly and profoundly conceived, in order to make itself four-square with the intelligent public who are interested in its problems, as well as bring itself into the best attitude for the discovery of truth. If we recognize the fact that in the profounder usage of Philosophy experience stands for the mode or organ through which the truth is most directly and surely apprehended,

a historical inquiry into the place of experience in Philosophy becomes a search for the most vital principles of the various systems. From this point of view it at once becomes obvious that the conceptions of the nature of experience have been as varied as the systems in which they have arisen, and that they supply data for a really profound classification of the results of thinking. In the first place, to confine our view to modern thought, systems have divided on the question as to what elements in consciousness are the sources of a real experience of truth. To be more explicit, they have split on the question whether sensible representation or rational conception is to be taken as the organ of truth and reality. The dogma of sensationalism is that sensation and experience are identical, and that sensible representation constitutes the only realizing activity of consciousness. Thinking has no initiative therefore in knowledge, and its function is purely abstractive and elaborative. However much sensationalism may vary in the hands of different members of the school, it is self-consistent throughout in its adherence to its central dogma—its insistence on the sensory character of all real experience.

Historically, the theory opposed to sensationalism has been known as Rationalism, on the ground that it has sought the principle of true experience, and the realizing activity of consciousness, therefore, in the rational function of thinking or conceiving. The real is that which is concerned in the activity of thought, the truth is not given in sensory processes, but is the object that is envisaged in clear thought. Rationalism does not deny all value to sensation but it declines to allow that it is a real mode of experience. Thinking alone gives truth, and sensation has value only as a confused kind of thinking. We have only to study the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz in order to verify the truth of these representations, and to see, moreover, that rationalism, in all its changes of form, remains true to its central dogma. Thought is the only organ of

reality, while to the sensory processes are ascribed only subordinate and derivative value.

Now while it is true that as respects method the term empirical has been appropriated by sensationalism, and the rationalists have been charged, with how much justice I do not pretend to say here, with ignoring experience, yet we must not allow this to blind us to the more important and significant fact that from the profounder point of view, which we are advocating here, rationalism as truly as sensationalism is a theory of the true nature of experience. A rationalist does not admit that real experience can be given in sensation. True experience, he claims, as well as knowledge, is in the last analysis the prerogative of thought. The fault of rationalism is not its neglect of experience in the large sense, but its neglect of the senses. In the life-history of developing creatures like ourselves, it is obvious that sense bears an initial part in the experience processes. Its neglect will surely, therefore, smite the system guilty of it with leanness and emptiness. This has been the fate of rationalism in the past. But it must not be forgotten that sensationalism has also been called on to suffer for its sins. For its denial of thinking, its reduction of it to a merely abstractive and elaborative function, it has been smitten with blindness in the region of higher truth, the logical result of which is scepticism. The judgment of history is that neither sensationalism nor rationalism, in their traditional forms at least, are able to satisfy the true demands of Philosophy.

But the distinction between sensationalism and rationalism is not exhaustive of the tendency to vary in modern doctrines of experience. There is another and wholly different line of cleavage which coincides with the distinction between immediate and mediate processes in consciousness. This gives rise to the two opposing conceptions of experience as being identical with mediacy or immediacy in consciousness. (1) Theories of Immediacy rest on the assumption that in the immediate activities of conscious-

ness, inasmuch as they do not, it is supposed, involve the distinction of subject and object, there is a real identity of knower and known, or of thought and its object. Experience is identified with this function of immediacy, in which the object is one with the activity in which it is apprehended and is thus the reality itself. It is the characteristic tendency of these theories to deny the reality of the mediate activities, or at least to assign them a very subordinate part in the apprehension of truth. All true experience and knowledge arise, they urge, in an activity in which the distinction of subject and object are merged in identity.

There are two species of this immediacy—that of feeling and that of intellect. The former is the principle of mysticism which in all its forms—and they are legion—maintains as its central dogma that truth is not apprehensible by processes of intellection, but must be attained, if at all, through the immediate touch or reaction of feeling. Truth is therefore to be grasped primarily, not in intelligible forms, but rather in an act of appreciation, whose content can only be vaguely symbolized. The primal voice of experience is : I have felt : whereas the intellectual categories by means of which this content of feeling is reduced to intelligibility are secondary and unessential. One has only to read the characteristic products of mysticism from Dionysius to Récégac in order to be convinced that the organ of mystic knowledge is the immediacy of the feeling consciousness. On the other hand, if the immediacy of intellect be taken instead of feeling as the real organ of truth, we are in presence of the Platonic form of idealism and of certain types of modern intuitionism. To the Platonist, feeling is present as a motive and an atmosphere, so that the idea is not far from the mystical intuition, but the organ that apprehends is not feeling but reason, in an act of immediate contemplation. The idea which is truth in its essence reveals itself to, and in this activity of reason. It is characteristic of Platonism at the same time to assert that rational intuition is the organ of truth, and to assign to the

discursive activity of thought a function that is not only subordinate, but also preliminary to the real act of knowledge. To neither feeling nor discursive reason does truth reveal herself. She sanctifies herself as a vestal virgin for the supreme moment when reason shall discover her with immediate vision. The most dominant school of modern intuitionism, the so-called Scottish, asserts this intellectual immediacy in a form materially different from that of Platonism. Here immediate vision is not affirmed, but rather the immediate authority of certain principles or deliverances of reason. Scottish intuitionism represents, therefore, an immediate faith of reason, its confidence that those convictions which are fundamental to its life, those categories which are essential to the structure of its knowledge, are also true.¹ While, therefore, Platonism asserts the truth of the immediate insights of reason, Scottish intuitionism maintains the validity of its immediate faiths. In opposition to these theories of immediacy stand those systems in which the recognized organ of truth is some form of ratiocination. The advocates of mediacy, in the midst of almost infinite variations of opinion in other respects, are perfectly unanimous in their denial of the adequacy of immediacy whether of reason or feeling, and in their insistence on the dogma that truth and reality yield themselves only to processes which are logical and reflective. The adherents of this doctrine split into two distinct, and, for the most part, irreconcilable camps, according as the logical understanding or the higher speculative reason is regarded as the organ of truth. The first class, which we shall call the Dialecticians, occupy substantially the ground of the Rationalists of the eighteenth century and the Positivists of the present, maintaining with them that the categories of the logical understanding, as space, time, and cause in the ordinary sense, are the only modes we have

¹ The classic statement of this position will be found in the works of James M'Cosh: particularly in *The Intuitions of the Mind* and *First and Fundamental Truths*.

of discovering truth. They agree with Hume and the letter of Kant, in rejecting metaphysics as illusory, and with Comte in restricting our knowledge of nature to its aspects of phenomenon and change. They are, however, true rationalists in their repudiation of mysticism and intuitionism, as well as in their unfaltering belief that no truth is discoverable except through the activities of the human understanding.

Standing out in the strongest antagonism to the Dialecticians is a group of thinkers who may fitly be called Ontologists, inasmuch as they regard the higher or speculative reason as the organ, and, in fact, the sole organ, of absolute truth and reality. Of this group the most conspicuous, as well as typical, representative is Hegel. In Hegelism we find the exclusive validity of the higher ratiocination, as we may call it, asserted in connection with the repudiation of all forms of immediacy. Hegel's objection to Schelling's Absolute as being shot out of a pistol is characteristic of his whole mode of thinking. To Hegel and the typical Hegelian nothing is true or real until it has been deduced. In fact, this process of deduction or dialectic is itself the essence of reality. The immediacy of truth and reality is involved in the constitution of the notion which stands as the dialectic centre of all being. The real is never merely present *to* or *in* consciousness, but it must realize itself there by the threefold activity of the notion. This notion is the form of reflection. Truth and reality can be got at, therefore, only through mediate and reflective channels. The position is ontological in the sense that the notion does not simply reveal the real to consciousness, but that in its threefold activity it becomes the real and the only real itself. In this cardinal sense, Hegelism asserts the identity of thought and being.

If we remember the distinction with which this discussion set out, between the profounder and the more superficial conceptions of experience, it will be clear, I think, that the systems of thought we have been following,

in their efforts to determine the principle of truth and reality, have also been formulating, though not always, perhaps, with conscious purpose, what they conceive to be the organ of real experience in consciousness. Confining our attention to this profounder sense of the term, it will hardly be disputed that Philosophy must be, if not empirical, which may be a very different matter, at least experiential in the sense that its great business is to apprehend and make intelligible the content of experience. For the guidance of Philosophy it becomes, then, a very vital matter to determine with some definiteness what is involved in the notion of experience, and in what way it stands related to the content and methods of Philosophy. The need, in other words, of a critique of the notion of experience is a pressing one, not only in view of the vital relation it bears to the pursuit of truth and reality in general, but also in view of the unfortunate ambiguity in the use or misuse of the term which our historical sketch has revealed. In all the interminable controversies between empiricists and their opponents it has very seldom occurred to anyone that the notion of experience itself is in sore need of critical determination. Even Kant, the author of the critical method, accepted uncritically the notion of experience that had prevailed in the school of Locke and Hume. That this was deplorable will be apparent to anyone who attempts to read Kantism in the light of any large and profound conception of experience, we may well ask what Kantism would have become had Kant prefaced his critical activity with a real critique of experience.

A more recent instance of the need I speak of is to be found in one of the most notable contributions to contemporary metaphysics, F. H. Bradley's treatise on *Appearance and Reality*. In this work the importance of experience is duly appreciated, and it is evident that the author has no superficial conception of its nature in his mind. But we do not find in his discussion any more than we find in Kant's, a serious effort to reach a critical definition

of experience. True, Bradley in one place identifies experience and reality. But, again, he reduces reality to sensation. He also identifies the real with the absolute, and conceives that in the absolute all finite relations and distinctions disappear. If, then, the real is at the same time experience, sensation and the absolute in which all finite distinction lapses, do we not, in effect, reduce experience, in the last analysis, to the immediacy, not of reason, in which, as Hegel teaches us, distinctions are conserved, but of feeling, in which with the lapse of distinction all intelligibility is lost? That Bradley means to reach a final term in his philosophy in which intelligibility will be conserved, is evident from the fact that he uses his best endeavour to rescue his absolute from the pit of the unintelligible. But he has no resource here but a dint of assertion that becomes almost tiresome. Bradley is not a mystic, but he is virtually preaching a mysticism which the majority of mystics would repudiate, when he identifies experience, which he regards as reality itself, with an absolute in which it is completely lost to intelligibility. Would Mr. Bradley, after denying all intelligible modes of conceiving the absolute, still be willing to admit that the absolute may be brought into appreciable relations by means of symbols? If so, we may hand him over without compunction to the tender mercies of the mystic.

What is needed obviously is such an analysis of experience as will reduce it, in a measure, to a definite conception, in view of which its relation to knowledge and reality may be determined. To make a preliminary step in this direction, and in the light of the conception reached, to essay the treatment of some of the vexed questions in epistemology and metaphysics is the sole motive of the present somewhat long-winded discussion.

One of the things so obvious as to be universally overlooked in the discussions of Philosophy, is the distinction that is to be made between what is presupposed only, and what is actually apprehended in consciousness. Distinctions

may and no doubt do lapse from apprehension, which still survive as conditions of conscious activity. And we do not make a materially different assertion when we say that consciousness may involve presuppositions which it has never taken up in an act of apprehension. In short, in order to perform its functions it is not necessary that consciousness should clearly conceive, or have at any time conceived, all the distinctions that are implied in its activity. In fact it seems to be universally true, that no consciousness is able to criticise its own activity from the level of that activity itself. The function of criticism which involves an awareness of latent distinctions, is only possible from a higher level of consciousness. Professor James has warned us against the psychologist's fallacy which is committed by reading a high-level consciousness into a consciousness of a lower level that is being investigated, and the warning is worth heeding. But there is a sense in which the distinction involved in the psychologist's fallacy becomes the metaphysician's guide. When the problem is not the genetic one as to what the low-level consciousness is aware of, but rather what distinctions must be presupposed as latent in the low-level consciousness before it can be conceived as performing its functions, then the business is a critical one, and can be transacted only by the high-level consciousness from its own point of view. To be explicit, the metaphysical question is rendered answerable only as the high-level consciousness translates some of its own consciously apprehended distinctions into terms of latency in the low-level consciousness. Now, I am unable to conceive how any consciousness at all would be possible in a medium where all distinctions have lapsed. To be more explicit, it seems to me that where the distinction between the conscious activity and that of which it is aware, however dimly, is supposed not to exist either in some apprehended form or at least latently, so that it will be effective, though itself in the sub-conscious region; there consciousness itself must be supposed to have lapsed. In short, for the very

existence of consciousness some duality must be presupposed corresponding in some vague and rudimentary way at least, to the distinction between self and its object in the high-level consciousness of the adult. In dealing with this issue, it is important, it seems to me, that two questions which are often confused should be distinguished: (1) Is it necessary to suppose at the basis of consciousness as such, some distinction analogous to that which differentiates the self from its object? (2) What is the minimum of distinction that must be presupposed? The reason for an affirmative answer to the first question has already been given in substance. Without the presupposition of some kind of duality, the very notion of consciousness loses its intelligibility. For consciousness is awareness of somewhat, whether that somewhat be defined as object or not. If we are not prepared to admit an ultimate duality of the real, and that is a different question, we must admit, I think, that consciousness involves duality whether this be conceived as internal or external to it. The subject knower will have its other which may be its own content, and this may be ever so obscurely apprehended, but by virtue of there being a consciousness there will be another, and this other will effect somewhat, either as explicit object or as latent condition of conscious activity. But the admission of this does not commit us to the doctrine of a full-fledged subject and object in consciousness, as a necessary condition of its activity, or in fact to any subject and object in the strict sense of these terms. We commit the psychologist's fallacy in a flagrant form when we suppose that consciousness must be fully aware of its own duality in order to get on. All that the most pronounced metaphysics of consciousness needs to insist on at this point, is that in its most rudimentary states some duality is involved out of which the full-fledged distinction of subject and object gradually emerges. The stages of a developing consciousness, presupposing this duality of constitution, might be represented as follows:

First and simplest, the so-called immediacy of sensation. If consciousness at this stage could be reduced to the form of an abstract and isolated pleasure-pain feeling, devoid of latent elements of representation or relation, there would be some plausibility in the supposition that here we have a form of consciousness in which no duality is implied. But it will be admitted, I think, that the existence of such a form of consciousness is purely hypothetical. It has never been hit upon in any experience or observation, and it has against it the fact that as Professor Dewey phrases it, "the simplest possible consciousness always shows itself to reflection to possess the threefold phases," that is, to be discriminative and purposive as well as pleasant-painful. The hypothesis that the primitive consciousness is pure pleasure-pain seems to carry with it the conclusion that consciousness is in the beginning abstract rather than concrete. But it is not possible to conceive consciousness as arising anywhere otherwise than in connection with the reactions of some organism upon the stimulations of its environment, and it is inconceivable that these reactions should be absolutely pleasant or painful without any other characteristics. As plausible would it be to suppose that representation could exist absolutely devoid of feeling, a hypothesis which no one has the hardihood to maintain. Conceding, however, for the sake of the argument that such a form of consciousness could exist, it is still open to doubt whether even a pure pleasure-pain experience would as a matter of fact be wholly free from dual implications. The low-level consciousness, by hypothesis, is simply a feeling or plurality of feelings, of pleasure and pain. This would not, however, entitle the high-level consciousness to say that there is nothing implicit in that pleasure-pain experience that does not appear on the surface. If we connect the psychological with its biological conditions and assume that every psychosis is, biologically speaking, an organic function, then just as in the biological sphere all activities are to be construed, not as blind and aimless reactions, but as acts of

organic conservation, so in the psychological field every psychosis or conscious act, even the simplest, must be regarded as not blind and aimless but as related to the life of a psychic organism. In other words, the simplest activity of consciousness will not be mere pleasure-pain feeling without any other character, but it will also be related to the life of the organism. Now a conscious act of self-conservation cannot be wholly devoid of internal character. The character and aim of a pure biosis, if the term may be allowed, may be external to it, but in the nature of the case this cannot be true of a conscious function. It is of the nature of an act of consciousness that it cannot be conceived apart from some degree of self-awareness. And if every psychosis, even the simplest, is a self-conserving act, this character cannot be purely external to it, but if it has any sense of itself at all, it must sense itself as self-conserving. This will be its internal character.

It is not so clear that every psychosis has wrapped up in its internal character the germ of an objective or other-reference. But recourse to biological analogies will help us again at this point. The self-conservation of the organism is secured through adaptation or accommodation to some environment. Accommodation is a means to a more ultimate act, that of assimilation. Through accommodation to its environment the organism grows by the assimilation of nutritive elements. Here, again, it will be obvious, I think, that while to the biosis the motive and end of this adaptive process may be wholly external, yet this cannot be true of a psychosis even in its lowest form. Take, for instance, the maternal instinct of birds. It would, of course, be folly to ascribe to the mother-bird, in building her nest at a certain season, in laying her eggs and sitting on them till they are hatched, any of the remote considerations that influence human parents in like circumstances. We may, in fact, suppose that the whole sphere of ultimate aims and motives is hidden from the mother-bird and with it the rationality of her own conduct. But this does not by any means

reduce her conduct as she is able to compass it, to the categories of blindness and aimlessness. In the very nature of the case our reasoning here must be largely hypothetical, but I think most people who know something about birds, will agree with me in thinking that a sufficiently exhaustive analysis of the mother-bird's experience would bring out the fact that her conduct is not blind or aimless but that in every detail of it it is informed and motived by conscious reaction upon definite stimuli. By this I mean that within the comparatively narrow limits of the bird's conscious life the same kind of conditions exist and the same kind of relations prevail as are found in the larger horizon of the human consciousness. The difference will be found to consist in the indefinitely greater scope and complexity of human conduct while the essential relations are the same in both cases. Doubtless the mother-bird is untroubled by remote considerations, but within her narrower horizon her conduct has its motive in the satisfaction of some conscious need and her reactions upon her surroundings are informed through and through with selective intelligence and purpose. The bird knows very well what she is doing even though she might fail to pass a satisfactory examination on the ultimate rationality of her conduct. To go straight to the logical conclusion then, it seems that from the nature of consciousness we have a right to conclude that its simplest acts are not without internal character and that this internal character includes some germ of self-reference as well as some rudimentary form of reference to an object.

This conclusion may lay us open to the suspicion of anthropomorphism, and we may even be charged with the psychologist's fallacy. Our answer will be partly one of confession and avoidance. The low-level consciousness must be judged, if at all, from the stand-point of the high-level consciousness, and it is possible to be so sedulous in avoiding anthropomorphism as to lose all insight into the workings of minds lower than our own. Besides the determination of the internal character of any psychosis is

not a purely psychological enterprise; on the contrary it is largely metaphysical. Moreover, the metaphysician must not stand in too much awe of the psychologist at this point, for while the legitimate psychological inquiry here is genetic and is concerned with the history of the psychosis, the question under investigation is metaphysical and concerns the internal character of the psychosis. When the question is what internal structure is indispensable to any psychosis, the high-level consciousness supplies the true stand-point of debate, and the metaphysician has the right of way. But further than this, if we distinguish between absolute and relative simplicity, it will be found that the ascription of absolute homogeneity of internal character to the simplest possible psychosis is unwarranted. To genetic Psychology it may have some value as a hypothetical starting point, provided it be regarded like the corresponding conception of absolute homogeneity in general evolution, as a pure fiction. But just as it is possible to prove the absurdity of postulating absolute homogeneity of any state of matter that can be conceived as actual, so the supposition of an absolutely homogeneous consciousness, if we attempt to conceive it as real in any given case, will prove to be self-contradictory. The most that can be affirmed of any conceivable psychosis is relative simplicity of internal character which does not involve the denial of internal distinctions but rather their reduction to the lowest terms consistent with the survival of consciousness.

The simplicity of the lowest consciousness cannot be taken, therefore, as absolute, but only as relative. Consciousness in all its forms must be conceived in terms such as will be consistent with the presence of those internal distinctions necessary to its existence and development. The basal distinction, of this character, is no doubt that which inevitably arises, between the feeling of self-conservation and that of selective adaptation to some rudimentary other—and which as we have contended, is internal to every form of psychosis. This distinction may be regarded then as a ground-category

of consciousness without which, in some rudimentary form, no single psychosis could exist.

To return then to the point with which this discussion set out, the immediacy of the sensory stage of consciousness is to be construed in relative rather than in absolute terms. It is to be so conceived as to be consistent with that structural duality which in the high-level consciousness becomes the developed distinction between self and not-self. At the same time it is not to be overlooked that in putting this construction on the primitive consciousness, the distinction must be thought of as at its lowest terms. To recall at this point the important distinction made by James and Bradley between knowing things and knowing about them, it would be absurd, no doubt, to suppose that the primitive consciousness knows anything about the duality of its constitution, yet that it knows it in some sense appears in the activity of the young partridge when it pursues and captures its food on the instant of emerging from its shell. Such intellection is possible to a very low-level consciousness, and may exist in a very rudimentary form.

The simplest stage of consciousness may then be characterized as one of relative immediacy, a stage in which conscious activity is unhampered by complexity and unmediated by reflection or the desire to know *about* itself, a stage in which stimulations call forth immediate responses, and in which volitions, so far as they exist, are without deliberation. That consciousness in this stage is dominantly subjective, as many suppose, is, I think, open to serious dispute. A consciousness in this stage would be primarily aware, it seems to me, of stimulations, while its own reactions would arouse a secondary feeling of self. The foreground would thus be occupied by what we may call the object-consciousness, and the first experience would be of an objective character. What, in the first instance, would chiefly engross it would be stimulations, and not subjective satisfactions. These latter, while they would without doubt, constitute factors in the play of conscious-

ness as a whole, would not exercise the function of initiative but would find themselves assigned to a secondary rôle. It is only a question here to which factor in consciousness shall be assigned the major part, the consciousness of the stimulations themselves or the feelings which prompt the search for more stimulations. When the question is so stated the primacy of the objective consciousness, in this stage, becomes clear since it is obvious that the attention of an unreflecting consciousness following the order of arousal, will become primarily absorbed in the stimulations and only secondarily in their subjective reactions.

The second well-marked stage of consciousness is that in which the simplicity of action is mediated by complexity of structure, and, as a partial result of this, by reflection. That thought does not accompany the simple structures is well known. The mechanism for the transmission of stimulation and response must become so complicated and the paths of association so intricate as to require the office of a mediator in order to relieve the stress and interference which inevitably arise. Only then will the conditions of reflection and thought be present. It is a law of mental growth that the higher forms of consciousness do not come into active play until they are needed as agents in the economy of adaptation. For this reason reflection must be regarded as absent from the lowest level of consciousness, and its appearance must be taken to mark a distinctive step in mental evolution. The duality of consciousness in this stage is not, of course, open to dispute, for it is that of the ordinary human consciousness, in which many things implicit in the lower consciousness have become explicit. Not only do distinctions of self and not self, subject and object, rise into explicitness, but reflection begins to play upon them, and knowledge of them is supplemented by knowledge about them. Consciousness in this stage makes an object of these distinctions, and conceives reflectively the relation between itself and the things it apprehends.

The highest conceivable stage of consciousness is that of the

so-called higher immediacy, in which, as the adherents of the Hegelian school generally assert, the dualism of self and other is transcended in the identity of consciousness with its object. Now, if we characterize the lower immediacy as the stage of dominantly objective consciousness, and the middle stage of ordinary human adult consciousness as that of the co-ordination of subject and object, it might seem to follow logically that in the higher immediacy we reach a stage in which this dualism lapses in the conscious identity of the two terms. But just as we have seen that the simplicity of the lowest stage cannot be taken as absolute, but as merely relative, so in the highest stage we will find, I think, that the same qualification will be needed. To conceive the higher immediacy as involving the lapse of all internal relation will be found tantamount to reducing the highest consciousness to pure unintelligibility. It is possible to say something in favour of a doctrine of ultimate reality in which by transcending internal relations and distinctions it leaves consciousness behind. The unthinkable of such a real involves no necessary contradiction. But to identify the highest reality with consciousness, and to conceive it at the same time as transcending distinction and relation is to involve oneself in a subtle contradiction of the first water. This will become apparent if we try to think conscious activity that is wholly devoid of internal structure. If this avoidance be conceived as absolute we have on our hands a consciousness that presents a dead-level identity like the substance of Spinoza. Such a consciousness would find its symbol in death rather than life. The way to the highest consciousness involves the expulsion of this lifeless monstrosity, and the substitution of a concept of the highest activity. How shall this be achieved? We have seen that in the lower immediacy the object is dominant and the subject is relatively passive, while in the intermediate stage there is a duality in which subject and object are in a sense co-ordinate. Following the line here suggested, we would be led to expect that in the stage of the higher immediacy

the subject would dominate while the object would be relatively passive. This is what we in fact find to be the case, and we may follow the thought of Aristotle and represent the subject in this stage as self-active. A self-active consciousness is one in which the moment of passivity has become latent, and which is, therefore, self-moving and self-determining. In relation to the lower levels of consciousness, the highest will be one of freedom and self-activity.

Does this higher form of immediacy which we call self-activity involve the lapse of the distinction between subject and object, or self and not-self? This much must be conceded without further parley, namely, that the relation of these terms can no longer be that of co-ordination. In the absolute consciousness the object or not-self must take a place of subordination. But this does not carry with it the conclusion that the distinction has lapsed or has been transcended. The object may still survive, but now as something that has been penetrated and realized. We mean as much as this when we say—God knows us through and through. The question here is—can being be completely penetrated and realized and yet remain an object, a not-self? If not, then the distinction lapses, and the higher immediacy becomes wholly unintelligible. Our world is in the last analysis opaque. But this means that consciousness itself lapses in the absolute. The higher immediacy is not consciousness at all, then, and it has no significance for experience, and the whole question as to the lapse of such distinctions as those of subject and object, self and not-self, in this absolute becomes puerile. The real question that confronts us then is whether this higher immediacy shall be regarded as conscious or as something that transcends consciousness, and our answer to this question will depend largely on our conclusion as to the issue stated above, namely, whether completely penetrated and realized being can remain an object or not-self. Now the only solution of such a question

that is possible will be by way of approximation. Let us take as our examples the intellectual and emotional relations of man and man. Young Plato becomes a pupil of the philosopher Socrates. Daily intercourse with the youth brings him more and more within the intellectual purview of his master. Socrates comes to know him through and through, so that he can predict his actions and his thoughts on any theme. This growing intimacy of knowledge is accompanied with an approximatingly close relationship between the two men. Does this growing mental penetration and realization of the nature of Plato render him any the less an object or a not-self to Socrates? On the contrary, there is not the slightest tendency towards the emergence of personal distinctions, but there is every reason to think that these, instead of tending to lapse, become clearer and better defined. Let us suppose that an emotional relation also springs up between them and that master and pupil become lovers. Now we know that love is a great unifier, and that there is a sense in which lovers become one. But what we have to consider here is whether this unity of love involves in any sense the lapse of the distinction between self and not-self. On the contrary, the very notion of love involves the distinction between the lover and the object loved. Even in the case of self-love, the self must be thrown out and conceived objectively before the emotion is possible, whereas in the case of the love of a not-self, no one can say that there is the slightest tendency on the part of the lover to confound the loved with his own personality. The truth seems to be in the opposite direction and in the clearer definition and distinction of the beloved.

If this be true of love it is none the less so of hate. There may be, of course, ignorant and unreasoning hate, just as there may be love of that species. But in so far as hate is intelligent, the more completely the hater penetrates and realizes his object the more intense will be his hate. The question here is different in some respects from that of

love. Hate in its very nature is separative, and it may be questioned whether the complete penetration and realization of an object is compatible with the hatred of it. But, we may ask, why not? If our hate is reasonable then it will follow that the more completely we know our object the more reasonable our hate becomes, and if we conceive our knowledge as raised to the infinite, our hate will then have become supremely rational.

The above illustrations are all approximations, since in the nature of the case no direct demonstration is possible. But if we apply the principle of approximation as the mathematician does, we may argue that if within finite and determinable limits the clearness and adequacy of the distinction between subject and object or self and not-self are, other things being equal, functions of the completeness with which the knower or lover penetrates and realizes his object, it follows that if the degree of this realization were raised to infinity the recognition of these distinctions would, at that point, reach their maximum of possible adequacy and clearness. It at least follows, to extract the minimum of inference from our premises, that there is no ground for the supposition that the higher immediacy of consciousness involves the lapse of those distinctions which are essential to it in its lower forms, but that the force of the reasoning bears strongly in favour of the conclusion that in the highest stage of consciousness such distinctions as that between self and not-self, instead of lapsing, reach their ripest and maturest form.

The bearing of this result on the question whether consciousness may be ascribed to the self-active and absolute, is obvious. We attempt no demonstration here that the absolute is conscious, but that no contradiction is involved in the ascription of consciousness to it, is now clear enough. For if the self-active is consistent with the distinction of self and not-self, it is also consistent with consciousness, and its activity may be conscious. And this is all that need be asserted at this point, since the main purpose in this stage

of our discussion has been attained when we have shown that the highest conceivable type of consciousness is not one in which the distinction of self and not-self lapses, but on the contrary, the type in which this distinction matures and reaches its highest efficiency.

Shall we then identify experience with consciousness? It might seem obvious that experience and consciousness have a common content, yet identification on this ground alone would imply a lack of discrimination. If we observe the logical distinction between intensive and comprehensive relations it will become apparent that from the point of view of intension experience is the deeper term, and that there may be phases of consciousness that fall short of experience. In short, experience is a term of realization, and what we experience must, in a sense, be so penetrated as to be both in and for consciousness. There may, however, be content in consciousness which has not, as yet, become fully realized, and which, from the standpoint of a finite experience, perhaps never will be realized. From the point of view of intension, then, consciousness is the broader term, and the identity is not complete. If the question be argued from the point of view of comprehension, which is the ordinary one, the conclusion will be different. All the activities of an ideally developed consciousness are included in the notion of experience. At any lower stage of consciousness, then, than that of ideal perfection, experience will be found to include not only the conscious but the sub-conscious, and a hypothetical state of latency called the unconscious. Here also the identity is not complete. But it can be said from both points of view that the identity is proximate, and tends to reach completeness in an ideally developed consciousness and an ideally complete experience.

Again, distinguishing between content and process or form, we may further define experience, in view of its process or form, as a mode of realizing conscious content. Shall this mode be conceived then as unitary, or are there several modes of experience? This question, as we saw in

our historical review, is one on which philosophy has split into factions. Rationalism affirms as its central dogma that there is only one form of realization, which is thinking. The real is in the last analysis, thought and all other forms of apparent realization are phenomenal and lapse as we approach the absolute, while only thought survives. This the Volitionists dispute, and they are as strenuous as the Rationalists in maintaining their dogma of the primacy of some form of effort-consciousness, either blind impulse with Schopenhauer or impulse and idea in synthesis with Lotze and Wundt. Opposed to both Rationalist and Volitionist stand the Mystics and a wing of the modern psychologists, who find in feeling, especially in its form of pleasure-pain, the only primary and real conscious function, both volition and thought being in some sense derivative from feeling. The organism begins with being pained, say these psychologists, and then reacts upon the painful consciousness. Volition is born out of this secondary reaction, and as to thought, it is a late comer, and even less original than volition. So that only feeling is primary, while thought and will are derivative functions. The question at issue is not simple, but involves several distinct considerations. In the first place, a distinction is necessary between logical priority and priority in time. The prior in time will be relatively low in the scale of organization, while the logically prior will be relatively high. Now, it may well be, for example, that the first consciousness in the order of time will be one that is explicitly pure feeling, or, if you like it, pure pain. We have already given our reasons for thinking, however, that an absolutely pure feeling-consciousness could not exist, and that it must in its lowest and simplest forms involve the rudiments of representation which may be to a great degree latent, but none the less present and real. The bearing of the argument against absolute simplicity is also against the exclusive pretensions of feeling. For if we admit internal structure and germs of representation into

our psychosis, we have denied the claim of feeling to be considered the only primary element, although we admit that the psychosis is largely one of feeling. The question of logical priority is to be regarded as altogether distinct from that of genesis. The logical prior is the relatively high in the scale of organization, and may, therefore, be the relatively late in time. In fact the absolute *prius* from the logical point of view will be the very last presupposition of being, and will represent the point of absoluteness in our world. And it is to this point of absoluteness that the rival schools of Rationalists and Volitionists must push their claims. From the psychological stand-point such an issue could not arise, inasmuch as psychology deals with the genetic rather than the logical order. But here, where the issues debated involve the logical and metaphysical, the question is germane. Metaphysically, whether we be Rationalists or Volitionists, we are obliged to push our claim to the court of last appeal, and if we put a rationalistic interpretation on the world, then we have to settle issues with the Volitionists by showing that the absolute *prius* of the world is a pure thought-activity. Now, the position may be maintained, I think, that in the very last resort the point of absoluteness must be found in a thinking activity. If our world is not to be at its heart meaningless, an outcome of blindness or accident, we must believe that the thought or it existed somewhere as the *prius* of its realization. We cannot regard our world as a world of meaning, and at the same time ascribe it to blind feeling or will. This is the point where Rationalism is impregnable. But it is weak when it becomes one-sided, and applies the principle of exclusion. Royce has urged this in his very subtle discussion of the principle of individuation. Though largely in sympathy with the Rationalist's point of view, he sees clearly that pure thought supplies no principle of complete realization. A world simply thought is not a world completely real. In order that the world may become real it must not be left to the indifference of thought-alternatives,

but it must be specifically intended. In order to be intended the world must be object of selective will as well as thought. But selective will is motived by love and its opposite, hate. So that the real world is the object of absolute love. What is this but a very powerful and convincing arraignment of the principle of pure rationalism? Thought, apart from feeling and will, is as powerless to ground and explain our world as is feeling apart from thought and will.

The pure Volitionists deserve no better fate. For the will of Schopenhauer is not full-fledged will, but mere *Trieb* or impulsion from which every thought element has been abstracted, and which is, therefore, blind. But that *Trieb* also includes feeling, as motivation, is obvious. Schopenhauer's world is one of feeling-will *versus* reason or thinking, and the question is whether such a world is possible. There are two alternatives here: either feeling-will is to be conceived as an absolute world-principle, or it is to be taken as that of a genetic process. The first alternative brings up the old issue as to the logical *prius*, and here we are confronted with the alternatives, either a world that is in the last analysis irrational and meaningless, or a world in which thought is absolute. We cannot deny intelligence and yet retain a significant world. Let us take the second alternative and regard feeling-will as the ground-principle of a genetic process. Here it is evident that we are dealing not with a logical term, but with a *prius* in time; and it is here the Volitionist will be at his best. For, if we conceive our world as a process in time, and nothing more, it would be absurd to place any developed forms among its first elements. It must be in the beginning a world of rudiments, and can only reach maturity through growth. In such a world it is obvious that the rudimentary forms of consciousness will have the priority, and these may well be regarded as impulsive, and, for the most part, blind. But there are two objections to this as a final view. In the first place, it is impossible to regard our world as a

genetic process pure and simple. There must be some point of rest in it which transcends the process, or the process itself falls into a chaos of mere unmediated change. It is impossible to conceive genesis as a last term of reality. If we let this pass, however, we meet the second difficulty. Let the first psychosis be some form of *Trieb* or feeling-will; this cannot be regarded as absolutely simple. But if we admit internal structure we must, as we have shown above, admit internal distinction and germs of representation. This means that the rudiment of thought is already in our first psychosis. It would seem, then, that the Volitionist's principle is in the last analysis even less satisfactory than that of the Rationalist.

We are not concerned here chiefly with the nature of the absolute, but with a doctrine of experience. It follows, from the above discussion, that the activity of experience is not simple but complex. It is an activity that involves not simply thought, but also feeling and will. If we designate this activity as activity of realization, and if we conceive it possible that any given psychosis may be explicitly either a thought, a feeling, or a volition, there will then be three specific forms in which the activity may express itself—the form of thinking, of feeling, or of willing. And each of these will represent a mode of reaction upon the content of consciousness, and a means of penetrating and realizing it. What term shall we adopt, then, as applicable to an activity that is complex in its constitution, as we have seen, but explicitly or overtly, either an act of feeling, thinking, or willing? I think we may apply to it the term *personal*. The very notion of personality involves that of expression. Some nature utters or manifests itself and thus becomes personal. Now we cannot characterize every distinct psychosis as a distinct personality. The distinctions of personality must rest on fundamental grounds, and a form or mode of personality must represent a fundamental distinction in consciousness. We have seen that consciousness is internally complex, embracing the rudiments, at least, of

feeling, thinking, and willing, and that explicitly some one of these elements will dominate every psychosis, determining the form of its expression. This may be regarded as the first and most fundamental law of conscious expression, and if we name it the law of personality we have the doctrine of personality not only psychologically, but also metaphysically grounded. For, as we have endeavoured to show above, consciousness in all its forms is internally dual, involving at least a rudimentary self distinguishing itself from a rudimentary object or other, and it is manifest that the self term in this relation is the distinctive bearer of conscious activity, while the not-self stands as content. Personality would then attach to the self-term in the relation, and would represent a primary mode in which the conscious self realizes the not-self or world of content. A person is to be conceived as a self in manifestation, a self reacting upon and realizing its world as content, in a form which may be explicitly either a mode of thinking, or feeling, or willing.

Now, it is quite possible that the objection will be made here that this way of conceiving personality is inconsistent with the current doctrines on that subject. But I would like to know what current doctrines of personality there are extant. I am unable to remember anything pregnant that philosophy has said on the subject since the time of the early Christian thinkers. Even Kant, with his fine sense of the dignity of the person, has nothing very illuminating to say about it except that it is the bearer of free agency and the imperative of duty. This is true and valuable. But what is it to be a person, psychologically and metaphysically? No answer is vouchsafed, and since Kant it has been the fashion in philosophy to class personality with foreordination and freewill and leave its discussion to the angels. The view developed here is no doubt only the rudiment of a complete doctrine, and it is also no doubt very defective, but it is at least an attempt to deal with a neglected subject with a measure, however small, of insight.

At this point we are in a position where the main results of the discussion, so far as it has progressed, may be summed up in a provisional definition of experience. We have tried to show that experience in its profounder sense represents in the systems of modern thought the central activity through which truth and reality are supposed to be realized. Our criticism of these systems has shown, we think, that on this cardinal issue they have, as a rule, become partizan rather than catholic, and have given their allegiance to some abstraction. The result has been that while we have had Rationalists, Volitionists, and Mystics in plenty, there have been few to seek a really catholic and comprehensive principle. Our analysis has brought to light that no psychosis is without internal structure, but is an incipient self reacting upon a not-self; and we have shown that every psychosis is internally complex, involving elements of rudimentary thought, feeling, and volition. The very constitution of consciousness is inimical, therefore, to the partizanship of the schools, and points the way to a concreter and more catholic doctrine. We have also seen how these conclusions with regard to consciousness lead to the grounding of a doctrine of personality on a fundamental law of conscious expression. And with reference to experience we have found reason for identifying it with the fundamental forms of conscious activity, with those modes, in short, which lead consciousness to a more or less complete realization of its object. Summing up these results, we may define experience as *the sum of these personal activities by means of which a conscious self reacts upon its object or not-self, and translates it into realized content, these activities being inclusive of thought, feeling, and will; or, objectively—the system in which these activities are included.* Whatever fault may be found with this definition, it is not open, I think, to the charge of partizanship, inasmuch as Rationalists, Volitionists, and Mystics may find shelter in its ample folds. It also emphasizes the dynamic character of experience, and enables us to identify it with the whole realizing activity of con-

sciousness. And it will be seen, later on, how the definition we have developed here makes it possible to assert the most vital relation between the concepts of experience and reality.

CHAPTER II.

EXPERIENCE AND REALITY.

F. H. BRADLEY, in his ingenious and suggestive work,¹ draws a distinction between the world of relation and distinction on the one hand, and that of the Absolute on the other, designating the first *Appearance*, the second *Reality*. He also identifies experience with reality. This brings up the whole question as to the nature of reality, and its relation to conscious experience. No term in philosophy, not even experience itself, has been employed more vaguely than that of reality. Everyone except a few sceptics knows that there is reality, but to tell what it is, that is a question of another order, and involves the whole problem of philosophy.

Now, there are certain propositions about reality, a criticism of which may perhaps pave the way to an intelligent consideration of the main question as to its nature. In the first place, we may say with the pure phenomenist that the real is what exists; that reality and existence are identical. It would follow, then, that everything that is real also exists. But the existent is the actual, and the actual excludes the merely possible, the hypothetical, or the necessary. Modern logic, however, has demonstrated that the majority of our general propositions fall into the latter categories. It follows logically, then, that the majority of propositions which we regard as true, are unreal, and that

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd Ed., London and New York, 1897.

only historical statements and statements about matter of fact can be regarded as real. And outside of logic the case is even worse. If the real is strictly identical with the existent, then we must exclude the possible, and say that strength that is not in exercise is unreal, and that we do not really know the multiplication table except when we are repeating it. The past is also unreal except when it is restored in memory, and the future save when we are anticipating it. Moreover, from such a conception of reality the ideal in all its forms must be excluded. It is clear that the relation between reality and existence is not one of complete identity. We may not agree with those metaphysicians who class the existent with the unreal, but on the other hand we cannot affirm, without absurdity, that existence is absolutely indispensable to reality. That what exists is real is a proposition which, with proper qualification, may be accepted, since it only implies that existence is an aspect of reality.

But that implication would meet the denial of one who opposes appearance and reality as two mutually exclusive and contradictory terms. For the apparent will include the whole sphere of distinction and relation; that is, the whole sphere of the actual. What would be asserted then is a relation of exclusion between the real and the actual or phenomenal, and since the existent is actual the existent is unreal. Furthermore the actual, which is the finite world of plurality and change, is self-contradictory, and therefore unreal. The only real is the absolute, which maintains internal harmony with itself only by negativating relations and distinctions, and thus attaining the nirvana of complete internal simplicity of nature. The vital question here is, of course, whether the notions of distinction and relation exclude that of reality. It is the old issue in a new form, whether the absolute is to be regarded as transcending all internal complexity in the distinctionless identity of a simple nature, or whether it is to be conceived as constitutionally complex, and therefore as involving the principle of distinction and relation. Bradley's

whole enterprise rests on the assumption that a relation is a separative term, and therefore inimical to the internal unity of being. He contends that relations break being up into fragments. But what if this, which must of course be acknowledged to be part of the business of relations, were not their whole function? What if a relation, looked at from the outside, were pluralistic and separative, but, looked at from the inside, structural and organizing? Outwardly a relation may be a thing of unmitigated plurality and change. But the outward view is by itself an abstraction, and abstractions, as such, are of course unreal. Looked at from within; that is, from the stand-point of some comprehending consciousness, a relation is also and primarily, unitary. There can be no starting-point for any kind of thinking without unity. But thinking cannot make a single step out from its starting-point without differentiation and distinction. How are the two conditions realized? Through relation. Relation binds; thought is possible: relation separates and divides; thought gets on. Bradley has seen very clearly one side of the truth, but, ignoring the other, the half truth generates a whole contradiction. A necessary presupposition of thinking is unity. If this be true we see how an inexorable logic drives a separative thinker like Bradley to his conclusion.

On the one hand we have the first presumption of thinking, which is unity; on the other, the absolute and unmitigated breaking up of things into fragments. This world of relation and distinction is not real, then, but a mere by-play of illusion. The real world is a world of unity and simple identity.

Proceeding along this line is absolutely hopeless, for the same logic that forces us to the rejection of the actual world as illusion will also drive us to the conclusion that the real world is unintelligible. For if distinction and relation be given up as illusion, there is no hope for us; our real is reduced to absolute internal simplicity, and becomes a dead identity without difference. With an un-

intelligible absolute on the one hand, and a nugatory relative on the other, our universe becomes hopelessly irrational and absurd. I do not say that this is the kind of a universe that Bradley or any other thinker of the Eleatic type believes in. All through his book the light of a different sort of intuition is struggling to pierce the darkness. But it is useless. Nothing can be got from thrashing over that straw, except dust and blinded eyes. The Eleatic dilemma arose in the first place out of the apparent contradiction between permanence and change. Being is one, it is therefore unmoved, and motion and change are false appearances. Bradley generalizes the old situation so as to include all the modern categories of relativity. Distinction, relation, qualification, is each *per se* separative and pluralistic; it breaks up being which is one and internally simple. Hence it is the opposite of being and reality. The knot of this trouble is to seek, I am sure, in a false or inadequate conception of distinction and relation. If, when we distinguish or relate, we simply separate or exclude, then nothing further is to be said. But is it so? Let us take the relation of identity. No one is more strenuous than Bradley, the logician, in opposing the notion of distinctionless identity, which prevailed in the old logics.¹ Identity, in order to be real, must comprehend difference, and this is necessary if reasoning would not be mere tautology. But Bradley the metaphysician seems to forget, and difference abstracted from identity is straightway found to be its contradictory.² Of course it is contradictory if it be set over against identity. But difference can contradict only that which implies its own denial. Does identity involve the denial of difference? We have Bradley's

¹ See *Principles of Logic*, pp. 131, 132, 263, 266, 425, and 431.

² Mr. Andrew Seth claims to find two mutually inconsistent views in Bradley's work, and there is some plausibility at least in his contention. That the construction of the book on which these criticisms proceed is consistent with its main trend is borne out, I think, not only by the general treatment of relations and distinctions, but also by its manifest failure to reach an intelligible conception of the absolute.

authority for thinking that true identity implies and comprehends difference. Why then should difference exclude identity if it is included in identity? Surely if there were no differences there could be no identities. Identity is a relation, and relation implies terms that are different. Identity arises in a world of differents. But it says, these are not simply different, for in order to be different there must be in their nature a ground of relation, and in this they will be the same. Difference has a presupposition, then, which is sameness. Pure difference is a mere abstraction. It is only real when it falls within some nature that is unitary. The last presupposition of being is, of course, identity. But the whole argument here turns on the question whether either identity or difference are to be construed abstractly, and in a sense that renders them mutually exclusive, and the doctrine here advocated is that neither can be conceived apart from the other. They are thinkable only when they are together; a world of differences must be a world of sameness, and a world of sameness must be one of difference. This would be metaphysically necessary even in a world of monotony and boredom. The whole point of the contention here is that identity in the concrete is a unification of differents, while difference in the concrete is distinction in a nature that is one; that contradiction arises only when we disturb this union and set difference and identity cheek by jowl as abstract opposites.

The same reasoning applies to any other pair of relations. If we take the categories of change and permanence we may array them in hard and fast opposition, for it is clear that in the precise respect in which things change they cannot be permanent, and the converse also is true. If, then, we conceive permanence and change as abstract opposites, it is inevitable that they should fall into contradiction. But let us abolish this isolation and the dilemma vanishes, for the two conceptions belong together, and it is impossible to think permanence without change, or change without permanence. Abstract permanence or abstract change is only

a half thought, and is as futile as one blade of a pair of scissors. Again, as to substance and attribute. Here the question is, not how a substance can manifest an attribute, but rather the Herbartian problem as to how *one* substance can have *many* attributes. In other words, it is a specialized form of the problem of the one and the many. But the problem of the one and the many is only a form of the general problem of identity and difference. The Herbartian dilemma is self-made, for it proceeds on the assumption of the absolute internal simplicity of being. It vanishes, however, if we reject that assumption as false and admit that being in all its forms must be conceived as involving internal complexity and distinction. If a nature is not absolutely simple, it already contains in it the germ at least of distinction and relation, and what shall we say further? The principle of qualification is contained in distinction and relation. If we reject the conception of being as absolutely simple, and adopt that of internal complexity which we have seen to be necessary, we have then travelled all the road from the notion of a substance that has no possible mode of expression and can be related to quality and change in a purely external and mechanical way only, to that of a real which by virtue of its internal character inevitably manifests or expresses itself in quality and change. What is contended for here is nothing less than a revolution in the concept of being. The old Eleatic doctrine of the absolute internal simplicity of being has proved itself able to bear but one species of metaphysical fruit. It has been worked to its logical conclusion, time and again, in the history of philosophy, and has invariably reached the same goal. The fundamental difficulty with it is that it is an utterly powerless and fruitless conception. It leads to no rational doctrine of the world, and it inevitably lands the human mind in a chaos of abstract and unreal contradictions. Let us once for all exorcise the absolutely simple from philosophy, and admit that being is internally complex, that it has within it

the germs of distinction and relation. We will then have achieved a fruitful conception, for we will have found in the very heart of the real the principle of its self-expression in a world of plurality and change.

In saying this I do not mean that Bradley openly espouses the doctrine of the internal simplicity of being. On the contrary, there is a sense in which his absolute comprehends everything, even error and illusion. Every qualification of the relative is somehow comprehended in the absolute. The trouble with Bradley's absolute, however, is that it is a sort of universal maw in which everything is swallowed up and loses its identity. Internally it may be unmitigated chaos or supreme order. We cannot tell; for there is no principle of intelligibility that admits of valid application to its nature. For this reason, if there is internal complexity or distinction, it is not available. Again, the logic of the principle that reduces all relative distinctions and relations to self-contradiction and illusion leads back to the absolute simplicity of being in its internal nature. The Eleatics drew the right conclusion from their premises. Bradley's logic of relativity is that of the Eleatics, and the result of it is a barren conception of the absolute, tantamount to a dead identity which excludes every living process.

There is one point of view from which Bradley's discussion of Appearance is without doubt perfectly conclusive. It is a crushing refutation of metaphysical phenomenism. If we are going to stop in our view of the world with the merely phenomenal, and yet regard it as a complete world, we must be prepared to find it honeycombed with contradictions. Bradley has the unerring instinct of a sleuth in tracing these contradictions to their coverts. It is not for this that we feel dissatisfied with him, but rather that having so clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of phenomenism, he himself should fall into the pit along with the phenomenists by virtually divorcing the phenomenal from its ground. If the phenomenon is separable from its ground, or; to be more specific, if difference may be

separated from identity, then the phenomenist may be right in attempting to treat it as a separate entity. And it is mainly because this is impossible that Bradley is able to show the absurdity of phenomenism. In doing so, however, he is refuting his own assumptions in the critique of relations, since the whole cogency of his demonstration has its source in the inseparable union of the terms which he, nevertheless, treats as though they were distinct. If it were only meant that the phenomenal world, when taken as the complete reality, is self-contradictory and void, we could not but agree. But the simple logic of this would be that the phenomenal world is not a separate and complete reality, but only becomes real when viewed as an aspect of a larger and profounder world, its connection with which frees it from contradiction and secures its reality. But Bradley's logic leads in an opposite direction. Since the phenomenal world, when taken as a separate and distinct entity, is a contradictory world, it must not be admitted to the kingdom of reality at all, but must dwell forever outside in the limbo of the unreal. The real must be something entirely different from this and exclusive of it. On this assumption we have the conception of the absolute worked out. The real or absolute is that which transcends all distinction and relation ; in which there is a complete lapse of the principle of phenomenality. It, therefore, gives the phenomenal the cut direct, and leaves it out in the cold. The phenomenal world is thus hopelessly relegated to the sphere of non-being or worse, while the concept of reality which remains, proves to be no real concept at all, but rather a spell to conjure with. For what boots it to assert that such an absolute is ineffably rich in content or even to fall down before it in mute worship, if it is impossible for us to conceive any principle by means of which it could have any intelligible content, or be in any way distinguished from a Chinese idol ? The absolute that will ground and reify the phenomenal is neither an absolutely simple entity in which all distinctions and relations must be conceived as

having lapsed, nor a monster that devours its own children, but rather a being internally complex, and having within it the principle of distinction and relation.

I am convinced that the attempt to develop a contradiction between the notions of reality and the phenomenal world rests on a false diagnosis of the nature of the real. Thinkers of the Eleatic type proceed on the assumption that being must assert itself as one in such an absolute sense as to exclude the phenomenal, which involves plurality and change, as unreal and illusory. This judgment could not be reached, however, from anything that is found in the nature of the phenomenon. That the world breaks up into plurality and that it is in a state of change has no significance in itself until we put the metaphysical question, whether plurality and change represent the whole nature of reality. This question leads to a reflection in which we pass either to a nature in which the phenomenon is rooted and grounded, and of which it is, therefore, a real expression, or to one from which it is excluded, and by which it is contradicted. Now, the thinkers in question take the latter course and reach a concept of being that is unitary and self-identical in such a sense as to exclude and deny plurality and change as falsehood and illusion. But the root-principle of this thinking is not to be found in the denial to being of any particular phenomenal expression, but rather in the denial of any possible expression. And such a denial can be logically maintained only on the supposition that being is internally simple in a way that excludes all complexity of nature; but being, conceived as absolutely simple and uncomplex, must, as we have seen, be dead and motionless, and the Eleatic achieves his permanence in a region of eternal death.

There is no escape from a dead universe if we cling to the superstition of the relationless simplicity of being, for in that case the principle of manifestation can have no root, and the real can give itself no expression that is not illusion. The opposite of being is, according to this mode

of thinking, the phenomenon, and what being denies and excludes is the possibility of any truthful outward manifestation. In opposition to this it is maintained here, that being involves internal distinctions and that it contains in its nature the principle of normal and even necessary phenomenal expression. The manifestation springs out of the heart of the real, and pulsates with reality. In order to see how the principle of self-manifestation is grounded, we have only to recall the analysis of the preceding chapter, in which the internal nature of being was found to be dual, taking the form of a subject—actively realizing its world as objective content. That being shall realize itself in some mode of expression seems to be involved in the very notion of an internally complex nature and will not be denied, I think, except when the internal complexity itself is denied. This being the case it logically follows that the phenomenal world which is the manifestation of the nature of being, will be presumably true rather than false, and that the unreal will arise only when the conditions of normal manifestation have been in some way belied. In short, it is not the phenomenal that the real denies and excludes, but rather that which stands in the way of and thwarts its true manifestation.

The foregoing paragraphs were written before I had the opportunity to read the appendix to the second edition of *Appearance and Reality*. In view of what is said there, the intention of the author to ascribe a degree of relative reality to the phenomenal world will be no longer in doubt, and the question that remains open is whether his treatment of the phenomenal is, after all, consistent with that purpose. We think that it is not. The crucial test arises, I think, in connection with the notion of relation. Bradley persists in his denial of the reality of relation and professes his inability to understand how relation can be internal. This seems to me to involve the whole point at issue. A relation is a two-sided thing, as we have seen. On one side it is distinction, and this is the aspect of it which

must in Bradley's view, be purely external. The denial of the possibility of internal relation carries with it the denial of the possibility of internal distinction. But if internal distinction lapses we are back again in the pit of internal simplicity or dead-level identity. What boots it then to say that the absolute is a kind of experience, when once we have denied everything that makes the notion of experience conceivable? The real will in spite of us transcend all our categories and will admit of only negative definition. We can escape only by recognizing the internal complexity of being. And, if internal complexity, then distinction and internal relation. In order that the phenomenal world may be in any sense real it must have its root in the internal complexity of the real which it manifests. On the contrary, the source of unreality will be pure externality. A distinction or relation that is purely external, that has not its root in the internal nature of some being, will have no significance for the meaning of the real. It will profess to manifest, but will belie its pretensions.

Have we not here come upon the true nature of mere appearance in the phenomenal world? In the current conceptions of men appearance stands opposed to solid fact and reality. An appearance is a lie; it professes to be that which it is not. How then can anything profess to be that which it is not? Only by professing to be the expression or manifestation of a nature that is not the actual inner of the manifestation. Thus the appearance is that of my friend, but on investigation I find it to be an illusion, and that my friend is not there. This could take place only in a world of plurality, where by some juncture of conditions the outer garb of a nature that is not actually present is created. This of course suggests its own problem, which we do not stop to consider. It is sufficient for our purpose here to mark the distinction between what may be called mere appearance and the real manifestation of a nature.

We have now reached a point where the results so far

attained of our inquiry into the nature of reality may be summed up. In the first place, it is clear that the notion of the absolute simplicity of being, in its last analysis, must be given up. The notion of simplicity is wholly powerless and inane. The absolutely simple neither is anything that can possibly be conceived or rendered intelligible, nor can it possibly do anything. The real must be conceived as being internally complex, as having an internal nature which involves distinction and relation. From this conclusion there is no escape. But if being is internally complex, then there is no escape from the admission that it has in it the principle of expression or manifestation; that is, the principle of a phenomenal world, and the denial of the reality of the phenomenal becomes impossible. The possibility of the phenomenal as a manifestation of real inner nature is thus secured. In the second place, as to the phenomenal world itself we have found reasons for distinguishing between the real manifestation and the illusory or unreal. In the absolute sphere the principle of unreality is the denial of the phenomenal as such, and this is involved in the doctrine of the absolute simplicity of being. But in the sphere of the phenomenal the unreal is identical with false expression or manifestation, with that which, for any reason, belies or contradicts the inner nature of being. There is, then, a well-grounded distinction possible between reality and illusion in the phenomenal world itself. Now the phenomenal world, by which we mean the sphere of manifested distinction and relation, is not only rendered possible but is also vindicated as real; that is, as a true expression of being, when it is connected not simply with internal distinction and relation, but with the inner nature of being as we have found it necessary to represent it. On this point we expect to be more elaborate at a later stage of this discussion. Here the vital position which will at present have to be to some extent assumed, is that in determining the essential inner nature of experience we have

also to that extent been determining the inner nature of being. The doctrine that being is not simple but complex carries with it this logical necessity, namely, that the internal structure of absolute nature shall be regarded as ideally complete or perfect. Connecting this with the practical identification of being with experience which at this stage is laid down as a postulate,¹ it is clear that the determinations of experience may be taken as determinations of the inner nature of being. Admitting this, it becomes not only possible but also logically necessary, to connect the phenomenal world with the inner nature of reality in such a way as will be borne out by the nature of experience. If in experience we have a revelation of the inner nature of being, then the analogy of experience will be valid in the interpretation of being. But we have seen that experience is complex and that it realizes its content; that is, its phenomenal world, through the activities of thought, feeling, and volition; that it relates itself to its world not only in the conceiving thought, but also in the selective intention in which individual and specialized forms of content are realized. Applying this insight to being, the inner nature of which we have taken experience to represent, it is evident that we find here a principle which enables us to ground the phenomenal world in an intelligible relation to the inner nature of the real. For if being expresses itself in a phenomenal world at all, this world and the objects in it, must have their idea in the thought of being, and the principle of their realization in the selective activity of being. In order to become, then, the phenomenal world must have been conceived and realized in the thought and selective purpose of being. It will then express the meaning of being, and will be real rather than illusory.

The *notion of reality includes, then, a synthesis of being and manifestation.* The real is not simply being conceived as possessing an internally complex nature. This

¹ This postulate is taken up and investigated in Part III., in the chapter on "The Transcendent as Experience."

is only one term in reality, and taken apart is an abstraction. Nor is it the phenomenal world which, taken apart, is also an abstraction. The notion of reality is that of an essential inner nature that gives itself a real expression in a sphere of manifested plurality and relation. The real is a synthesis of the two terms in such a way that the internal nature expresses its meaning and intention in the phenomenal world. Such a notion of reality, it is clear, will strike in two directions. On one side as we have seen it is wholly inconsistent with that theory which conceives the unity of the real to be inconsistent with distinction and relation, and which on that ground denies the reality of the phenomenal world. On the other side, it is equally inimical to phenomenism, the theory which denies the unity of being in the interests of plurality and change. The real is, from one point of view, the unity of plurality and change; from another, the plurality and change of that which maintains its oneness.

What shall we say in conclusion as to the relation between reality and experience. They may possibly seem to be identical, since practically all the predicates of the one have been found to apply also to the other. But we cannot assert their identity without ignoring an important distinction. In our analysis of experience we found it necessary to distinguish between the process by which content is realized, and the content itself; and the definition of experience with which the discussion closed was a definition of process rather than one of content although the content was included. If we distinguish between experience-process and experience-content, reality may be taken as the equivalent of the latter. Experience and reality will then become correlative terms, implying one another. It must be observed, however, in order to avoid misconception at this point that this correlation of terms can be taken as complete only from the stand-point of an experience that is absolute. The terms may not be, and in fact will not be, commensurate in the case of any finite and relative experience.

The real must always greatly transcend any finite experience and there will be outlying regions of reality which it has not compassed, and doubtless never will. But the relation here will still be approximately true. The correlation will express the ideal law of the relation and it will always remain true of every finite being that it can only realize its world through experience. There is no short cut to reality.

CHAPTER III.

KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE, AND REALITY.

THE current notions of the relation of knowledge to experience are, as a rule, vague to the last degree. We sometimes identify the two and again we set them in hard and sharp opposition. The relation is no doubt very close but it does not lie on the surface, and may not yield its secret even to the most penetrating analysis. Knowledge is, of course, a conscious function. Taking it objectively it is a product of what we call the cognitive consciousness. What then is this cognitive consciousness, and how is it related to consciousness in general? The primary function of a cognitive consciousness is representation. Now the conclusion was reached in the first chapter that all consciousness, and, therefore, consciousness as such, is representative. But consciousness from another point of view is feeling, and expresses itself as pleasure-pain. These two aspects are inseparable. Here we consider the question why they are inseparable. The primary consciousness, as we do not need to prove here, is conscious activity. But this cannot be characterized as either representation or feeling for it is in its concreteness both of these. But this concreteness does not shut out the possibility that one of these aspects may be absolutely first and the other in a sense secondary. And this is the very point of vital interest here. All consciousness arises, in the first stages,

as response to stimulation. Now I think it is evident that the initial step in response must be representation, in its mere rudiments of course, rather than feeling. I do not see how this could be determined by experiment since the elements are so inseparable. But in the indivisible act, which is a recoil from some stimulation, the presentation constitutes the object-reaction while the pleasure-pain is the subject-reaction, and the question is, which form of recoil is presupposed in the other. This cannot be settled except from the point of view of ordinary stimulations. Of course some stimulations may be so violent, as in the case of wounds and bruises, that the presentative element is completely drowned in the rush of feeling. But the ordinary stimulation will be one in which the pleasure-pain element is almost inappreciable. In fact the first stimulation will not, as a rule, be either pleasant or painful, but will rather be the vague sense of some presence, perhaps the shadow of a larger animal, which inspires a feeling of terror; that is, of anticipated pain, and leads to some defensive action. It is evident here that the initial response of consciousness is presentative and that the pleasure-pain feeling arises as a secondary recoil from the stimulation. If, however, we attempt to separate feeling and presentation and conceive either as existing abstractly we involve ourselves in illusion. Presentation itself is a kind of feeling, and it is called presentation because in its fore-front it is a kind of awareness. Pleasure-pain is also a kind of awareness; but it is called feeling because in its fore-front it is painful or pleasant rather than presentative. If we call the moment of presentation the cognitive or object-consciousness, and the moment of feeling or pleasure-pain the subject- or self-consciousness, it will be found that the two are absolutely inseparable: they are aspects of one activity which inevitably gives itself both an object and subject expression. That they are inseparable will be apparent if we suppose, for example, that feeling could exist without presentation or idea. In such a case the feeling will be robbed of all

value for action. Let us suppose that the organism has received a stimulation from the environment which arouses a pleasurable feeling. Now, the current doctrine is that this pleasurable experience will lead the organism to seek a repetition of the stimulation which produced it. This is perfectly true, but how is the repetition to be effected? Current opinions seem to alternate for the most part between the hypothesis of blind and tentative search on the one hand and that of a species of happy accident on the other. Neither hypothesis conceives consciousness to be supplied with any organ of direction. On the contrary, I think it can be maintained with a reasonable degree of confidence that in the very constitution of the reactive consciousness there is contained not simply a provision for effecting repetitions but also for the direction of the efforts to repeat. If, in connection with the pleasure-feeling, there is an ever so momentary survival of a memory-image of the stimulation, this will serve to intelligently guide the efforts to repeat. The young chick that finds a certain insect unpalatable as food is not condemned to the uncertainties of either happy accident or blind effort to avoid,¹ but its reactive consciousness contains in conjunction with the repugnant taste an element of cognitive discrimination which enables it to intelligently avoid a repetition of the distasteful experience. This element of discrimination must be some kind and degree of awareness of the object which has become fixed as an antecedent term in consciousness, and which on the reappearance of the obnoxious object revives in memory and brings up its associate, the memory of the repugnant taste that motivates the avoidance of the object. The whole process would be unaccountable did we not suppose that the normal relation of presentation to other forms of consciousness is that of precedence. It follows, then, that the cognitive or object-consciousness takes precedence of the subject- or feeling-consciousness in the first conscious acts.

¹See Loyd Morgan's *Habit and Instinct* for the original of this illustration.

This must be recognized, while at the same time it must also be remembered that no abstract separation is possible between the two aspects of consciousness. Every act of consciousness involves the germs of both subjectivity and objectivity.

We have seen that the reactive consciousness takes on its subject and object forms in feeling and presentation. But it is clear, in the last analysis, that reaction is not a primary form of activity. There must be action before there can be reaction. And the question here is where this initial activity shall be located. It is, of course, possible to conceive the environment as initiating the activity, and consciousness as simply responsive. This, however, would involve the necessity of conceiving a purely passive and inert state of consciousness as the antecedent of its activity. But such a state is unthinkable. To conceive consciousness in a purely passive state is to conceive it as completely annihilated. We cannot then adopt the convenient device of supposing a passive consciousness aroused into responsive activity by the initial action of the environment. If consciousness is to be presupposed at all, it must be conceived as active before it becomes reactive, and there will be a primary pulse of consciousness that will precede both feeling and cognition. Is there any way in which the nature of this primary pulse can be determined? We think not beyond the general presumption that every being must have in it the initial impulse to self-expression. We cannot conceive it as internally simple, but as bearing a germinal impulse to self-manifestation. This must be true of consciousness if we consider it a form of being. But that this impulse should be further determinable is in the nature of the case impossible. We must, I think, avoid the identification of this primary pulse of consciousness with any definite form of conscious activity. We cannot say with Schopenhauer that it is will, for it is also the *prius* of feeling and presentation. It is rather to be conceived as the inner nature of consciousness uttering itself in a pulse of activity which has in it

the germs of thought, feeling, and volition. The question whether such a pulse be blind or seeing is only determinable in view of our doctrine of the inner nature of being, and in the light of the phenomenal mode in which it expresses itself.

Having reached the conclusion, then, that the initial active consciousness cannot be identified with any of the modes of conscious activity which are reactive, but that it must be taken as the primary pulse which contains the germs of all these, we are in a position to make further progress in determining the relation of cognition to other forms of mental activity. In a former chapter we have seen that consciousness is complex, including three distinguishable forms of activity, which we call feeling, thinking, and willing. We have sought in the above paragraphs to determine the relation of feeling and presentation or thinking. It remains, then, to consider the place of willing in the mental economy. Now if we decline to identify will with the primary pulse of consciousness, it is clear that we will have to seek for it among the manifestations of the reactive consciousness. We have seen that feeling arises as the subject-side or aspect of mental reaction, the object-side of which is some form of presentation. This subject reaction will take the form of pleasantness or painfulness which will motive a subjectively initiated recoil upon the environment for the purpose of repeating or avoiding the stimulation that has given the pleasant or painful experience. The case of the young chick quoted above will be in place here. The chick having obtained its first experience of unpleasantness from the disagreeable taste of a certain species of worm, on the recurrence of that form of stimulation, experiences, as we have shown above, a recurrence of memory-images not only of the object but also of its associate the disagreeable taste. These terms mediate a further reaction, the memory-image of the object leading to its identification with the present object, the worm crawling about on the ground, and the associated memory of the disagreeable taste leading to the

reaction of avoidance and rejection. If the original experience be pleasant the reaction will be one of appreciation, and the agreeable morsel will be swallowed. It is to this form of reaction which is motived and directed by the memory-images of representation and feeling, that the term volition is to be applied. Of course there is included in this act, as there is included in all acts of consciousness, the primal pulse of initial activity (since reaction is not conceivable apart from action), but in this instance the reaction seems to be more completely identified with the initial impulse. And this is reasonable, inasmuch as volition is more explicitly an act of self-conservation than is either feeling or presentation. It is, in fact, the activity in which self-conservation completes and realizes itself.

It will not be difficult now to determine the relation between cognition and volition. Volition, we have seen, is not a simple but rather a complex function, involving both presentation and feeling. But it is not resolvable into these. It is the distinctive form which the self-conserving impulse of conscious beings assumes, and in this character both presentation and feeling are its servants. Dependent as it is for motive and guidance upon feeling and presentation; in its own proper character, and in view of its essential function, they are only parts of the mechanism necessary to its effective action. In the first stages of conscious activity it will then be natural to expect that such a function as cognition will be completely subordinate to volition. The intellect will be in this stage the bond-servant of will, and will have no independent status of its own. Only when intelligence has been considerably developed, and the responses necessary to the well-being of the organism have been relatively well organized, will it become possible for the presentative faculty to secure for itself a sphere of relatively free activity which may be devoted to the independent search for truth. The tendency of mental growth is, however, in this direction, and while we find at the beginning of the process, cognition serving as

the willing slave of feeling and volition; at the end of it knowledge has become master and tends to subordinate everything to itself.

The point where this transition from servant to master takes place marks an epoch in the history of consciousness. This point is reached at the moment when any consciousness becomes able to arrest the stream of its own representations or ideas, and to make them even for an instant, objects of contemplation. This point of transition to the higher forms of intellection, while it has been recognized, has been conceived, as I think, by epistemologists, in too abstract a manner. The tendency is to regard the transition as a purely intellectual transaction. Consciousness, it is said, reaches a point when it begins to objectify its own content, and hold it up for contemplation, and this is conceived as arising out of the exigencies of the cognitive consciousness alone. But I am convinced that it cannot be accounted for without connecting it with other forms of consciousness. In order that the stream of ideas may suffer this arrest it must be connected in some way with the movements of the subject-consciousness. There must be pleasantness or painfulness attached to it in some way through which it acquires a degree of interest that will arrest the feeling side of consciousness. This arrest will be followed by attention, which is a volitional function, while interest is emotional. Attention once arrested and fixed, the conditions of the free play of the cognitive faculty upon its content are present, and in this play we have the spring of conception and generalization. It is true, of course, that conception and generalization, the conditions of their existence being once secured, have motives of their own; but the point of interest here lies in the fact that there is no reason to suppose that the intellect alone, and without the mediation of feeling and volition, would ever make the transition from simple presentation to conception and generalization. The whole resources of consciousness are mustered in order to effect this great step in mental history.

When the ideal stream has once been arrested and objectified, what we call reflection becomes possible, and reflection is simply the play of consciousness upon its presentational elements. It is, therefore, distinctively cognitive and intellectual, but is motived by interest and attention, which, as we have seen, are forms of volition and feeling. In this stage of the intellectual life the order is reversed, and the presentational element, which we will call here the idea, and which in the primary stage was a simple agent of feeling and will, now takes precedence, and becomes the end of the emotional and volitional activity. Reflection, which in its initial stage takes the form of conception, is simply the interested play of attention upon the elements in the ideal stream. It is not, however, an aimless play, and the question here is what sort of interest it is that motivates the reflective activity at this stage? We can answer this only by going back and relating the process to prior stages of experience. We have seen that the pleasure-pain reaction originates a tendency to repeat certain experiences and to avoid others. For this reason an interest attaches to every memory-image of a past experience, which gives rise to an impulse to appropriation or rejection. This impulse will doubtless survive the birth of reflection, and will supply to it its primary motive, for just as the pleasure-pain feeling associated with certain memory-images motivates the impulse to repetition, so when these mental terms have become objects of reflection, the primary interest associated with them survives and generates an impulse to seek other presentations of the same kind. Thus the search for the same arises in the sphere of ideas, and this will be accompanied, of course, with the corresponding impulse to reject and cast out those elements to which a painful interest attaches. The first movements of reflection will thus be pretty completely under the guidance of motives that are not distinctively intellectual. When the child first starts out on the trail of identities and differentials in its experience, it is not moved to any appreciable extent by purely intellectual motives, but its interests are practical,

and its conceiving activity follows purely practical lines. Gradually, however, through the operation of what James calls the law of dissociation,¹ the pleasure-pain interest falls into the background, and the dominating interest becomes intellectual; that is, attaches to the identities and differentia of the ideal stream itself, and the stage of intellection proper has been entered upon. There is then a relative indifference of feeling with respect to the pleasure-pain associates of ideas, and the interest attaches itself more undividedly to the search for samenesses and differences in the ideal terms themselves. The first form which this search takes, if we presuppose the interested attention in which it originates, is *comparison*, which is simply the conscious seizure of points of sameness on account of their sameness, and of points of difference on account of their difference. Comparison thus involves both identification and differentiation in their simplest forms at least, and is thus a two-sided activity. Comparison results in *abstraction*; that is, the selection of points of sameness in the terms compared, and the exclusion of points of difference. Abstraction represents, therefore, the first step of organization in the conceptual world. In it the negative, which is, of course, implicit in comparison, becomes explicit, and we have the fact exemplified that consciousness cannot take a single step forward without denying as well as affirming. Abstraction is a selective function, which cannot be indifferent to points of difference, but must meet them with the attitude of exclusion. It is from the beginning a dual activity of integration and differentiation, and its product is the notion or *concept* which mediates the higher intellectual life of consciousness.

The new term which we call *concept* may be considered either from its subject side as an activity, or from its object side as content. On the subject side it is simply a point of view developed by the activity of abstraction, by virtue of which consciousness comes to apprehend the uniformities; that is, the identities and differences, of its experience. In

¹ See James' *Psychology*, vol. i., pp. 486-87.

other words, the concept is a formula which sums up for us the results of our experience, so that when we have developed a true concept we have achieved a thought which is true generally of a whole field of experience and will also enable us to anticipate more experience. On the object side of content the concept is realized through *generalization*; that is, through the detailed application of the thought to all the particulars in experience of which it is true. The generality of our ideas consists in the scope of their application. Generalization traces the rays from their focal point out to the multiple objects on which they terminate. It is through generalization that our thought becomes rich in content and maintains its concreteness.

The concept so originated is called a *universal*, which is simply a thought that comprehends all the particulars of one kind under a common point of view. The true universal is thus a synthesis of particularity and generality. It does more than merely aggregate the particulars of experience; it organizes this plurality under a unitary point of view. Through the concept the many in experience becomes truly one inasmuch as its particulars are no longer isolated but take their places as parts of an organic whole. The process of universalizing which is involved in the concept also includes the extension of the conceptual activity to its mediate forms which are called *inference* or reasoning. For it is obvious on the analysis of the inferential process that it is not generally different from conception. If conception is a name for the process by means of which the thought of our experience is universalized, then inference is nothing else than an indirect way of furthering that end, and concept and inference may without further ceremony, be classed together as names for the same intellectual process.

But the concept is not the last, nor the highest step in the cognitive process. We learn this very clearly from Kant's analysis as well as from the analysis of our own conscious processes. The category in Kant represents the concept: at least the concept in its most fundamental form.

But the concept itself ends in a plurality. There are several fundamental conceptual unities in experience, therefore, and the concept does not unify consciousness as a whole, but leaves it split up into fragments. Kant finds the unifying principle in self-consciousness, but is not very successful in exhibiting the method of its application. Perhaps a fresh analysis at this point may lead to some important results. It seems to me that we have here reached one of those points which form epochs in mental history. Every one will recall John Paul Richter's account of the point in his experience, when, as by a sudden flash of light, he came to the knowledge of himself, and his world stood before him suddenly transformed. We have here concentrated into a single intense moment an experience that is ordinarily achieved by a relatively long and gradual process. The form of mental activity in which it embodies itself is that of *judgment*. For what is judgment essentially? It is the self-appropriation or self-rejection of that which is conceptually present to consciousness. This will be evident from analysis. The primary pulse in judgment is that of affirmation or denial, and affirmation is self-commitment of consciousness as a whole to some conceptual content, while denial is the self-reaction of consciousness as a whole from some conceptual content. It is possible for two contrary conceptual contents to stand side by side in consciousness. This is the principle of alternative which is necessary in order to make judgment a living process. We have seen that the conceptual activity leaves consciousness split up into parts. The situation is even worse than this; it leaves consciousness divided among alternatives and opposed to itself. There is involved in the very nature of the concept, therefore, an appeal to something higher. The concept does not profess to say the last word in cognition. It supplies the materials and creates the situation for the living exercise of the activity of judgment in which consciousness, as a whole, interposes and heals the breach by committing itself to one alternate and sweeping away the others by denial.

Judgment is the act therefore in which knowledge terminates: it takes the form of a personal endorsement of conceptual content as real, and it results in the unification of the sphere of content; that is, the objective world, by relating it to the unitary self-activity of consciousness and thus binding in inseparable and living synthesis the subject and object sides of our mental experience.

If the above account of judgment be correct, it becomes clear that knowledge culminates in an act which is essentially a pulse of self-consciousness. No single act of real cognition is at all complete until it has ended in this pulse of self-endorsement or denial. Without it, the concept is only the rudiment of knowledge. We can know only in one way; that is, in the self-endorsement or self-rejection by consciousness as a whole, of some content presented to it. It is clear, then, that in the function of judgment the pulse of self-consciousness incorporates itself in the very constitution of knowledge. No act of knowing can be purely objective. In order that it may complete itself the subject must come forward and put upon it the stamp of its approval, and it is only this final stamp that gives it the right to pass as current coin throughout the realm of consciousness.

We are now in a position where a provisional definition of knowledge may be attempted. In view of the foregoing analysis we may I think, define knowledge, *first*, on the side of process, as *that activity of consciousness which begins with presentation and culminates in the self-endorsement or rejection by consciousness as a whole, and in an act of judgment, of some presented conceptual content*; or, *secondly*, on the side of content: *knowledge is that conceptual content of consciousness which has been endorsed as real*. Taking this definition as our guide it will not be difficult, I think, to reach some intelligent conclusions as to the relation of knowledge to experience and reality. We have defined experience as the sum of those personal activities by which the self in consciousness reacts upon its world and reduces it to realized

content, and it is clear at this point that the activity of knowledge is included in the activities of experience. For, that the knowing activity is personal is proved by the act of judgment in which it reaches completion. Knowing is one of the modes by which the self in consciousness realizes its object. We are precluded then from representing knowledge and experience as in any sense mutually exclusive terms. Knowledge is included in experience as one of its forms, or as one of the processes by which it realizes itself. Broadly and fundamentally, this is true and it makes it forever impossible to effect any sort of a divorce between knowledge and experience. If however, this fundamental relation be recognized it will be possible to effect a relative but important distinction between knowledge and experience. Experience includes the emotional and volitional forms of activity as well as that of knowing, and is the more adequate term, therefore, for expressing the whole activity of consciousness. From this point of view it is obviously true that knowledge is to be distinguished from experience, as one of the included processes, from the whole. But, however important this distinction may be, negatively, in saving us from certain kinds of errors, it will not have much positive value until its relation to the experience-processes as a whole has been further determined. What part does the knowing activity perform, we must go on to ask, in the process of experience as a whole? How is it tributary to experience, and how does it depend on experience? In order to answer these questions it will be necessary at this point to recall some distinctions made in the first and second chapters. We there saw that while it is necessary to reject the notion that any psychosis can be absolutely simple in its internal nature, yet in consciousness as a whole, or in experience as a whole; genetically conceived, there are stages of relative simplicity and complexity. We saw also that experience presents stages of relative immediacy in its lowest and highest stages and it is this distinction especially that we will find of importance at this point.

Let us start out with the threefold division of consciousness into the stage of the lower immediacy, the stage of mediacy and that of the higher immediacy. The truth we wish to bring out by means of these distinctions is that of the vital but varying relation of the knowing activity to the process of experience throughout all of its stages. If we take the stage of the lower immediacy in which simple sensation dominates, we will find that here the important factors are feeling or pleasure-pain, and volition. The tendency is for the feeling-motive to lead immediately to action. It is only by analysis that we discover a place in this activity for the knowledge-term. But that it is present is beyond dispute. In a former investigation we have found that the knowledge-term, the presentation, is the very first on the field and that it is necessary not only as a condition of the arousal of the feeling-term, but also for the guidance of the volitional response. The fundamental importance of the presentation cannot then be denied. But in this stage, as we have seen, presentation is only a means to volition, and as the activity here is non-reflective the tendency is for the feeling-motive to pass immediately into volition. The whole foreground of consciousness is filled, therefore, with the sensation and the action while the knowledge-term, though important and indispensable, is crowded out of sight in the background and finds it hard to get recognition. It is only when that first great epoch in the intellectual life occurs, out of which conception is born, that the knowing activity begins to receive some sort of independent recognition, and this point marks also the second great stage of experience, that of mediacy. By the stage of mediacy we mean that point in experience where feeling and action are in a sense forced asunder and a mediating term, reflection or deliberation, makes its appearance. It is characteristic of this period that the whole activity of consciousness changes its form. Its spontaneity is broken up or tends to be so and it begins to approach its ends in a tentative manner. Even feeling changes its form from the immediacy

of pleasure-pain which seems to ride over the representation to its end, to emotion in which feeling waits humbly upon representation. The stage of mediacy is characterized by the more or less complete dominance of the intellectual activity over other forms. This we can exhibit in detail. In the first place, let us consider the form of the intellectual activity itself in this period. It is no longer naïve unreflective presentation, but its characteristic mode is conception in which the content of experience is thought under general points of view. Now each of these points of view is an idea which once achieved is at the absolute disposal of consciousness. And in view of its origin which we have traced above, each idea will have an interest attached to it and, consequently, at least an implicit intention or energy of realization. The idea is not then a dead and powerless term but we may with Foulleé designate it an idea-force.¹ The intellectual terms, in short, are not abstract but concrete activities of consciousness, bearing the germs of feeling and volition with them. We are not to suppose then, that the feeling and volitional activities of consciousness are at this stage in any sense distinct from or apart from the intellectual. They are implicit in the intellectual. They do not, in the first instance, rouse the intellect but the intellect excites them, and we may consider how this comes to pass. Let us suppose that the idea of some object, say a desirable position rises in consciousness, the interest which attaches to it will cause its arrest in accordance with well-known psychological laws and it will become fixed as the object of contemplation. The play of consciousness upon it will tend to develop the germ of feeling which it involves, and through this change to transform it into an emotion to which the idea is no longer external but internal. This leads to a second transformation in which the emotion motivates a volitional action or impulse to the appropriation of the desirable object. This moment of the experience is distinguished by the fact that now the activity has become

¹ See Foulleé, *La Psychologie des Idees-Forces*, Paris, 1893.

explicitly one of will while the feeling-idea has become implicit as motive.

The relation of the intellectual term to the concrete activity of consciousness at this period is clear enough. Consciousness is dominated by the idea in the sense that it asserts the right of initiative. The active consciousness first shapes itself explicitly in the form of idea. This idea is the eye of consciousness which presents some interesting content to it. And this interesting content stirs the implicit feeling, and the experience becomes an emotion with the idea functioning at its heart to keep it in touch with the arousing content. Were the idea to lapse at any point in the experience the emotion would immediately dissipate. The idea is, therefore, the one condition of the persistence of the emotion. Furthermore, when the experience has become volitional by the arousal of the impulse of appropriation, and the feeling has become implicit as motive, the idea remains the eye of the soul, and the spring of the whole activity. Let us suppose that at this point of the history the idea should lapse out of consciousness, what would be the result? Clearly the motive feeling would dry up, and the volitional impulse would cease to exist. The primacy of the idea cannot then be disputed, and the stage of mediacy is represented by that period in mental history in which the idea functions explicitly as the protagonist of the conscious life. This primacy is only rendered the more obvious by the tentative form which conscious activity in this stage tends constantly to assume. An act of deliberation, whether intellectual or practical in its dominating motive, is a transaction which involves a plurality of ideas. We have seen that ideas are not emotionally indifferent, and that they are in reality proposals for volition. When a plurality of these present their interesting content simultaneously, or in close succession, to consciousness, a situation is created which calls for debate and decision. If the dominating interest chances to be intellectual, and the transformation into feeling does

not take place, the transaction will be one of ideas pure and simple, and that alternative will be chosen which is most congruous with that complex of ideas and interests which constitutes the present make-up of consciousness as a whole. If, however, the emotional transformation should take place and lead on to the volitional, only the form of the transaction would be changed, for the dominating considerations would be practical rather than ideal, and the alternative chosen would be the one that proved itself to be most congruous to the complex-emotional states and practical aims which constitute the present make-up of consciousness. In both forms of the deliberative process, however, it is clear that the idea holds the key to the situation, and mediates the whole experience. We conclude, then, that the mediate stage of conscious experience becomes so by virtue of the primacy of the intellect. The characteristic product of experience at this point in its history is the idea, and the idea mediates and determines the activities of feeling and will. But in the exercise of this primacy there is no abstract separation of the intellectual from the emotional and volitional activities; but consciousness remains substantially concrete, its ideal terms holding in them the germs of feeling and volition.

For the third stage of experience, that of the higher immediacy, we have to seek our analogies for the most part, not in the mediate, but in the primary consciousness. While the primary consciousness is dominantly sensational, the higher consciousness is to be regarded as dominantly emotional. By this I mean to say that the higher form of experience is reached when the interest of the idea has led to an emotional transformation which tends to be permanent. But why should any emotional transformation tend to be permanent? We can find an answer to this only by recalling some things which we have already determined. In the first place, we reached the notion of experience as the personal activity of a self by means of which it penetrates and realizes its world. The realized world takes its place

in consciousness as content of experience, and is that to which we apply the term reality. Again, we have seen that consciousness is constituted by a complex of elements intellectual, emotional, and volitional, which combine in various forms of synthesis in the several stages of the experience process. In the first stage, while feeling seems to dominate, yet, owing to the practical exigencies of life at this point in its history, it is strictly subordinate to practical ends, and is in fact the bond-servant of will. In the mediate stage the intellect dominates and feeling is its servant, and at best a connecting link between intellect and will. There is, however, something about feeling, at least in its higher emotional form, which would naturally lead one to regard it as a final term, a point of rest in experience. Feeling is a subject term; it is the taste which the subject itself gets of its own experience, and, in short, the subject's appropriation of its own experience. We have seen in our analysis of the intellectual function that the activity ends in judgment, which is the self-appropriation or rejection of the presented content of some conception. Judgment is, therefore, in its essence a pulse of self-feeling, and it is a germinal form of self-consciousness whose business it is to integrate the presented content with consciousness as a whole. Now, if we conceive this judgment-function which is explicitly a self-relating activity, and in that form essentially emotional, as becoming implicit as the unifying core of an emotional state, we will begin to have an idea of that form of experience which we are trying to realize. The judgment of self-consciousness relates the self to the world of its experience as a whole. This world, as a whole, becomes its realized content. But we have seen that the elements of this world, the ideas which constitute our apprehension of it, are interesting, and tend to become transformed into emotional experiences. The world as a whole will, therefore, be interesting, and its apprehension will tend to become transformed into an emotional experience. We mean that in the last analysis the knowing activity cannot be taken as

final. It not only leads on to the emotional, but its end is transformation into emotional experience.

If the question be asked here why volitional experience is not to be regarded as the final term, we can only point to the fact that volitional activity can be regarded only as a mode of realization, a way in which some condition of consciousness is brought about which is itself not volitional. But an ultra-volitional state of consciousness must be either intellectual or emotional, and this brings us round to the point where we have recognized the finality of emotion. The last and highest stage of experience must be regarded, then, as one in which the self realizes its world in an emotional experience. To this form of experience we may apply the term *appreciation*.¹ The world of appreciation is a world in which the self realizes its content immediately in an emotional experience. The stage of the higher immediacy is then one of appreciation. Knowledge in its ordinary mediating forms has been transcended, but it is pertinent to ask whether knowledge itself has been transcended. In the lower stages of experience we have seen that the idea is the eye of the soul, without which it is blind. Has the soul any other eye in this higher stage of its experience? We think not. The ideal term is no longer explicit, and the experience is emotional in its form. But the idea is implicit, internal in the emotion. Let us eliminate all ideal elements from this higher experience; what remains? Only blind feeling: all insight is gone. The truth is, it is only when the thinking, ideating activity has thus become internal to feeling, and expresses itself in emotional forms, that it becomes what we call the higher reason. The form of feeling is that of immediacy. Thinking is the seeing activity, the principle of insight, and when thinking acts under forms of feeling it becomes intuition; the contents of its thoughts are immediately rather than mediately obtained. Shall we say then with the mystics

¹ See Royce, *Spirit Modern Phil.* "Physical Law and Freedom," pp. 387, 410. Royce seems to apply the term to the whole sphere of freedom.

that the intuitions thus obtained are ultra-rational, and that they cannot be correlated with truths apprehended by the ordinary processes of reason? This also we deny. We are told that the mystic intuition can be achieved only by an act of "self-alienation,"¹ that is, by the complete transcendence of experience and by self-identification with the absolute. But in the very nature of the case the transcendence of experience is impossible. No being can realize anything, except as a form of its own experience, and experience that is not self-related is impossible and contradictory. The mystic intuition, if it is not to be rejected as illusion, must take its place within experience as one of its functions. The mystic intuition is also said to be lacking in the quality of universality; it is in fact a revelation which, however valuable to the individual consciousness in which it appears, cannot be affirmed as having truth for any other consciousness. It is thus a strictly private affair, and cannot possibly be given a place in a system of truths that possess general validity. But here again I think there is a serious misapprehension. It is true, without doubt, that the higher reason does not achieve generalized universals like those in the conceptual sphere, but that it does not achieve universals cannot be maintained. For what is the higher reason according to our analysis? It is the idea become internal or immanent in emotional experience, so that this experience becomes an organ of immediate vision. This vision, when connected with that heightened pulse of self-consciousness which tends to integrate the higher consciousness into a complete unity, and renders all its acts immediate deliverances of consciousness as a whole, is what we call rational intuition. It is not a purely intellectual affair; it is rather emotion pervaded and penetrated with intellectual vision.

To assert that this organ cannot yield a result that is universal, but that it must be, on the contrary, purely idio-

¹ See Recegac, *Bases of Mystic Knowledge*. Eng. trans. No. 7, Scribner's, 1899.

syncratic, is, I think, a mistake. The truth seems to be that along with much that is idiosyncratic it also yields a peculiar kind of universal. The ordinary universal of science is one that rests on mediate evidence and whose tests are all mediate. Thus, when we say that man is mortal we assert a proposition the reasons for which are to be found by a detailed analysis of the contents of our knowledge. But the universal of the higher reason is one that participates in the immediacy of the higher stage of experience. Truth is reducible in the last analysis to an ideal form, and we must bear in mind that the function of the higher reason represents the last analysis, or rather the last synthesis of experience. The higher reason is the organ whose special office it is to conceive truth in its ideal form. We are prepared then to expect that here we will get glimpses of the ideal which will reveal to us lineaments, however fragmentary, of absolute truth, glimpses which in the form of intuition, that is, of immediate apprehension, will bear as their content those fundamental ideas which constitute the ground principles of the mediate forms of knowledge, and at the same time contain the guarantee of their own truth within themselves. Let us take any of those basal ideas such as truth, right, duty, good, law, and we will find that each in turn is a presupposition of the lower forms of experience, that it is related to the mediate activities as an integrating, organizing principle, and that when it has been tracked to its last hiding place, it is found to be a principle of immediate validity, shining in the immediacy of its own nature, and lending its authority to the lower forms of experience.

Now, the doctrine professed here will be misapprehended, unless two important distinctions are recognized. In the first place, these truths of the higher reason are not to be confounded with the ordinary axioms of science which represent simply the first and simplest relations of knowledge. They are, on the contrary, final rather than first concepts, and they are in the highest degree complex rather than simple, including potentially at least the whole rich

content of an ideal experience. In the second place, they are to be distinguished from rational content that is purely idiosyncratic. The rational activity being the activity of the whole consciousness in its highest state, will naturally and inevitably yield two kinds of content, the idiosyncratic as well as the truly universal, and these the revealing reason may not be able properly to discriminate. We are not seeking here to withdraw any species of rational content from criticism, but are contending for a thorough and adequate criticism that will lead to a distinction between two kinds of rational content. Failing of this criticism, the mystic leaps to the conclusion that the entire yield of the higher reason is idiosyncratic, and therefore valueless for science and aloof from the ordinary activities of experience. We admit that the higher reason does yield this unique content, and that it may be of extreme value to the individual consciousness; for every experience may, and, I think, will, contain very rich elements of content that are peculiar to itself and incommunicable. But this idiosyncratic element is to be critically distinguished from the universal elements, those basal insights which take their place as organizing principles of all experience and as ideals of a perfected experience.

The doctrine stated above has the merit, I think, of recognizing the distinctively emotional character of the higher experience and its capacity to yield unique elements of content, while at the same time correlating it with the lower activities of consciousness as the organ of certain truths which are necessary to the organization and completion of the whole field of knowledge. This brings us to a point where it will be possible to reach a relatively adequate conception of the relation of knowledge to experience. The knowing activity though not the whole of experience is yet present either implicit or explicit in the whole of experience. It is inseparable from other forms of experience-activity. Starting out as a mere agent of volition it is able to assert for itself a relatively commanding position in the

mediate stage of experience, and feeling and will become in an important sense its servants, at least very dependent upon it, while in the highest stage of experience the knowing activity again becomes internal and consciousness becomes outwardly emotional. The function of knowledge here is vision, and its products are these organizing and unifying conceptions that are necessary to experience as a whole. In every stage of experience the knowing activity is the eye of the soul while at no stage can it be asserted absolutely that knowledge is an end in itself. The final state of consciousness, as we have seen, is emotional. What consciousness seeks in its world as its very last end is a state of feeling, a satisfaction in which it can rest. The very last word of experience is not knowledge but edification. If we say then that in the largest and most final sense the business of the whole of experience is edification or satisfaction it will be clear in this connection that in every stage of that business knowledge is the eye of the soul by whose agency the end is intelligently pursued, and that the highest stage is characterized by the immediacy of the relation between the vision and the satisfaction.

The relation of knowledge to reality is a topic which cannot be elaborately treated at this stage of our discussion. The dictum of M'Cosh that knowledge must begin with reality if it would end with it is no doubt the truth of the matter in a nutshell. Knowledge is a process within experience and starts with experience-data. Now, we have seen in the first chapters that while experience and reality cannot be completely identified, yet the real must be conceived as content of experience. Knowledge, then, must start with the real. But in order that our discussion may not come to a stop here an important distinction must be recognized. If the real is to be completely identified with experience-content it must be with the content of a possible rather than an actual experience. At this stage at least where we are not considering the metaphysical question whether it be necessary to postulate an infinite experience

as real, the distinction between actual and possible experience is vitally important, for if we identify reality with the content of actual experience we are manifestly guilty of absurdity unless we bring in the metaphysical postulate. Whereas if, leaving the metaphysical question open, we identify the real with possible experience-content we have achieved a position from which the relation of knowledge to reality may be determined. It becomes obvious that knowledge must begin and end with reality if it would be knowledge at all and not illusion. The whole business of knowledge is to extend actual experience by an effort to determine the content of a possible experience. As fast as it is determined it, of course, becomes actual. But the very effort of knowing involves a transcendence of the limit of actual experience. The relation of knowledge to reality involves also that of reality to consciousness. We have seen that a distinction must be recognized between experience-content and conscious-content. There may be that present *in* or *to* consciousness that has not been penetrated and realized by consciousness. We have identified reality with realized content. It can only be conceived as real if it is completely realized in some consciousness. But this can be maintained, it is clear, only in view of a distinction similar to the above. If the real is to be considered realized content of consciousness we must distinguish between actual and possible content of consciousness, and the real can only be identified with possible content of consciousness. Of course we have to make the same reservation here regarding the metaphysical postulate of a consciousness in which the possible is to be conceived as real, as was found necessary above. The real, then, is possible content of consciousness and will be found to be a transcendent term in relation to an actual consciousness. It will include the realized content of the actual consciousness; also that which is simply present *in* or *to* consciousness, together with an extra-conscious sphere which exists as yet only as implicate or postulate. The recognition of these distinctions enables us

to avoid absurdity and to take a rational position with reference to the relation of knowledge to reality. If we fail to distinguish between actual and possible experience then it is impossible to see how knowledge can get beyond actual experience, or, in fact, how experience can extend its own limits. If we fail to distinguish between actual and possible content of consciousness, it is impossible to see how anything can be regarded as real that is not actual content of consciousness, and the reality of the whole sphere of possibility is straightway denied. We must make room in our world of reality, it is clear, not only for the actual content of consciousness, including that which is merely present and not realized, but also for the sphere of possibility, the world of postulate and implication.

When we say, then, that reality is the content of knowledge we speak in terms of achievement. From any attained, or perhaps attainable, standpoint the real must be largely outside of knowledge. To get to know the real as it is, must be the ideal of all our efforts, but that we shall ever know the real as it is—that is a different question. If it be said that the real as it is, is in its nature unknowable, that is to deny that the real is possible content of consciousness or experience, and we are back in absolute darkness and chaos. If our world is to be made in any sense intelligible, we must cling to intelligible conceptions. We must affirm that the only real thinkable to us and, therefore, the only real worth affirming, is a real which is the content of a possible experience. We are willing that any other real should become the prey of the sceptic and the agnostic.

To sum up in a concluding paragraph the leading results of this part of our discussion, the aim has been, in short, to reach better definitions, than are current of some of those leading conceptions which are fundamental to a satisfactory doctrine of knowledge. The result of confusion in this space is that a great deal of our modern energy has been wasted or misdirected. Now it seems to me that a prime condition of

a rational treatment of the problems of knowledge is the attainment of more adequate conceptions of the significance of such terms as knowledge, experience, reality, and of their relations to one another. In this trinity of conceptions, as we have seen, experience is the all-comprehending term. Knowledge is the product of one of the included modes of experience, while the real is to be regarded as the realized content of experience. If, however, experience is to be regarded as the all-comprehending term, it is only in the ideal sense or in terms of perfection that this can be taken as absolutely true. So far as actual experience is concerned, its content as we have contended will stand for a fragment of reality only. It is the aim of experience to encompass all reality, and reality can be conceived only as content of a possible experience in which it is realized. Likewise, in respect to knowledge it is only the possible ideal experience in which it is completely contained. When we say that knowledge cannot transcend experience, we mean the limits of a possible experience. The actual experience is transcended by every act of knowledge, and knowledge may know things by postulate and implication, which only the possible experience can compass. The same relation of transcendence exists between actual knowledge and reality. When we characterize the real as the content of knowledge, it is possible knowledge we have in view. The real is, of course, more than possible knowledge; it is possible experience. But its relation to knowledge is that of possible content. So far as actual achievement is concerned, it will always be largely transcended. Our world, in the larger part of its extent will be for us a region lying outside the limits of achieved knowledge. If we do not admit that it is unknowable we must concede that it is for the most part unknown.

CHAPTER IV.

THE IDEA OF METHOD IN KNOWLEDGE.

KNOWLEDGE is related to experience, as we have seen, not only as a mode by which experience passes from a stage of lower to one of higher immediacy in which reason is immanent in feeling, but in its fundamental relation it is included in experience as one of its activities. Experience includes the activities of choice and feeling, as well as that of representation, and knowledge may in general be conceived as that activity in which conscious experience reduces its content to intelligibility. Now the activity of knowing may be considered from two different points of view, the first, epistemological, in which the subject of investigation is the concrete functions of knowing, and the objective categories under which they define their content; the second, logical, which is more abstract, and seeks to develop an organon of method. Logic may be designated broadly as a doctrine of the method of knowing as distinguished from its content and its objective categories, and is, therefore, more abstract and formal than general epistemology. In this chapter we aim simply to develop the notion of logical method so far only as it enters essentially into the epistemological processes. Just as epistemology itself deals with one aspect of experience, so logic deals with only one phase of epistemology, the formal aspect that is characterized as method. The discipline called formal logic originated and

grew up in an effort to abstract the conceptual process, by means of which experience passes from the lower to the higher stage of immediacy. It is, therefore, a doctrine of the mediate operations of the mind, and has its beginning at that point in the experience process considered as a whole, where the *naïvete* of sensation passes into that reflective activity which conditions all the higher forms of experience. The notion of formal logic is, in short, the notion of reflection abstracted and organized into a method.

It occurred to thinkers before Aristotle to seize upon fragments of the reflective process, and develop them into canons of reasoning, but the mind of Aristotle was the first that conceived an adequate notion of logic as the scientific formulation of the whole process of reflection, and the famous peripatetic is, therefore, very justly called the father of logic. Now, assuming that logic involves the abstraction of the reflective process from its concrete context in experience, there are in the last resort but two fundamental points of view from which an organon of logic may be developed. If we take our stand upon the first pulsive movement of thinking, we will find that it is simply a moment of self-assertion, and supplies no principle of distinction or inclusion, but in the second moment of the process the pulsive activity will have come upon some objective content, and this forces discrimination in the form of disjunction or alternation. The activity is confronted with an opposition, content standing over against content, and is forced to become selective. To state the same fact in somewhat different phrase, if we start out on any process of thinking we will find that the first step is a straightforward act in which something is conceived ; that is, we apprehend some content. If we continue the process, however, beyond the first act, we will find that this content relates itself by opposition to something that it opposes and excludes. If we think round, we oppose and exclude square, and in doing so our thought has become selective ; it has chosen round and rejected square. It is possible for us now to seize on

this moment of selection as the true and characteristic movement of reflection, and to develop an organon from it, and this is precisely what the Aristotelian logic has done. This will become obvious if we consider that the principle of identity or contradiction, for the situation is two-sided, is, in fact, a principle of selection. The moment of identity is that of the affirmation or choice of the included content, round, while that of contradiction is the opposite moment of negative choice, the exclusion of the opposing content, square, as inconsistent. The formulation of this dual activity into the principle of identity-contradiction supplies the basis of the whole Aristotelian logic.

The value of this concept of logic consists in the fact that it does embody fairly well the ordinary movement of scientific thinking, which is for the most part an activity of selective discrimination, resulting in the organization of content into a system of concepts concatenated on the basis of their relations of mutual inclusion and exclusion of common or opposed content. The Aristotelian logic proves itself inadequate to the whole process of thinking, however, in the fact that it ends with the moment of contradiction. Its concept of system is in the last analysis, one in which identical elements are rounded up, so to speak, and defined by the negative activity of exclusion. But it will be clear, I think, that the reflective process itself cannot stop with the moment of contradiction if it would be in any sense complete. The truth of this will be clear if we observe that in a world of contradiction there is always a content outside of that which is included. The act of contradiction marks division and exclusion. But what are we going to do with the outside, the excluded and unorganized world? There is the same motive for organizing it as there was for thinking in the first place, but we will find that if we attempt to organize our whole world of content by means of the principle of contradiction we are condemned to an infinite series of steps involving an endless process of exclusion. Our world as a whole eludes all our efforts, and is

for ever transcending and defying our categories. A logic that will be adequate to the whole demand of reflection must go beyond contradiction, and supply a principle for the comprehension of the whole.

This leads to the second possible standpoint for a logic of reflection. If we follow the process of reflection from this moment of contradiction we will find that it does not exhaust itself in the double act of inclusion and exclusion of content, but that there is a reflex or return movement, and a relating of the whole to the point where the process originated, a point which we may now call that of individual comprehension, inasmuch as the activity is one that includes and makes internal both moments of identity and contradiction, and subordinates them to the pulse of unity or comprehension. It is impossible for reflection to complete itself otherwise than in this activity of individual comprehension, which reduces identity and contradiction to moments of an included world.

The standpoint we have achieved here is that of dialectic, or the logic of Hegel. The dissatisfaction of Hegel with the Aristotelian concept of logic arose fundamentally out of the conviction that, ending as it does with the moment of contradiction, it lacks any principle for the comprehension of reality as a whole, and, therefore, fails to embody the whole process of reflection. The Hegelian concept of logic will be achieved if we conceive the dual moment of identity-contradiction as the middle term in a threefold activity, which begins with the straightforward pulsive act of self-assertion, which the Aristotelians also recognize, moves forward to the second or selective stage, where it becomes dual, and ends in contradiction; and lastly, completes itself in a third stage of individual comprehension, in which the opposition of the second stage is transcended, and the whole world-content is unified. The Hegelian notion involves this threefold internal activity, and the dialectic is simply this inner activity of the notion conceived as completing itself, and then finding in the last act of comprehension the

motive for the repetition of the process on a higher plane. We thus arrive at the notion of reflection as an incessant and self-completing process of differentiation and higher unification. The Hegelian logic originated like the Aristotelian in the attempt to abstract the inner dialectic of reflection and reduce it to a system of formal categories.

That there is no other standpoint outside of these two, from which a logic of reflection could be developed, will be obvious without further consideration. It is possible, however, to make the attempt to mediate between these two concepts of logic, and to develop a quasi-genetic history of the process of reflection. This is what Lotze does in his very subtle treatise on logic,¹ and whether he succeeds or not in defining any tenable middle ground for logic, which is doubtful, his patient analysis of the windings of thought, is instructive. The chief value of Lotze's discussion arises, we think, from its exhibition of the inability of reflection to complete itself short of an all-comprehending notion of reality. Starting with the activity in which the concept is formed, he shows that the conceptual content cannot maintain its unity, but immediately falls apart and supplies the problem for judgment, which in its effort to deal with the duality reaches as its last step the principle of disjunction in which the effort to conceive our world-content takes the form of an incessant inclusion and exclusion, so that there is always some content left outside of our widest category. The final distinction of content in the logical judgments leads in the various species of inference to attempts to overcome the difficulty. These take the forms, successively, of subsumption, quantitative and qualitative substitution, and comprehension under the notion of classification. The aim of Lotze is to show how each mode of inference supplies the motive for its successor, until, in the attempt to reach a point where the dialectic may rest, we are led to what Lotze calls the form of speculative thought,

¹ *Logic* (English Trans.), Oxford, 1888, vol. I., part i.

in which the whole content of reality is conceived under some principle of organic unity.

It is not our purpose here to follow the history of logical doctrine out into any of its details. It is sufficient that we have achieved the two points of view from which it is possible to formulate principles of reflection. The thought of Lotze develops no new standpoint or principle, but simply exhibits the process more or less successfully by which reflection at various stages of its progress takes on relative formulations which, in so far as they embody pure reflection, are easily reducible to the basis of either the logic of contradiction or the logic of unity. The principal motive of the above discussion has been to prepare the way for an objection to the ordinary way in which logic is applied to the problems of epistemology. The tendency is to abstract the form of reflection, and, having developed it into a logical organon, to regard it as an instrument that may be applied externally to the knowing activity, and to which the moments of this activity as a process in experience must conform. This is the presumption that underlies Lotze's procedure, who, having abstracted the process of reflection from its place in the concrete, is at a loss to see the connection between the formal and the real relations of things. If we abstract the form of the relation-process, and then attempt to apply it to the content of reality in an external and arbitrary fashion we will be certain to meet obstacles that cannot be overcome. Form cannot be imposed on content externally without becoming a procrustean bed. If we name this tendency to superimpose form on content the logician's fallacy then we may say that Kant was a principal offender, for his practice throughout was to conceive form as prior and external to content, and, therefore, to vest it with a legislative prerogative. Hegel was too deep-sighted to miss the true relation of form to content, but it cannot be maintained that he has not sinned in his practice, and as for the Hegelian school, its temptation is to break through all limits, and force the whole rich

content of reality into conformity with a few cast-iron moulds.

We do not wish to be understood here as depreciating the value of logic, the study of which is an indispensable condition of clear and methodical thinking, but what it seems to me to be a matter of the highest importance to maintain here, is that the epistemologist simply commits a monumental blunder when he mistakes his office for that of the formal logician, and attempts an external application of his organon to the concrete material of experience. The difficulty that confronted Lotze in his epistemological industry, and which rendered his efforts in some measure abortive, the impossibility of discovering any real point of identity between formal and real relations, was largely self-made, and arose out of his effort to conceive some external union between elements that are never separate in reality. How then, we may ask, are we to conceive the relation of logic to epistemology or rather the relation of the forms of logic to the activity of knowledge? The answer to this will not be far to seek. The knowledge-process is internal to the larger process of experience, and in it the form is immanent and not separable from the material content of thinking. We do well to unfold our formal logical schemes, and there is an important sense in which our logical concepts will have a guiding influence on all our thinking. But the function of these must be regulative rather than constitutive; that is, we must think in conformity with logical forms rather than actually think the logical forms into the material of thought. But the constitutive thinking in the evolution of a theory of knowledge that would have reality for its content, must be immanent thinking. We must conceive the logical form as in vital union with real content, and must look into the heart of the real for the actual pulsations of constitutive thinking.

The doctrine contended for here is one of much more than technical importance. The notion of experience which we have reached is sufficient to show that all reality must

be conceived as intra-experiential, and that it is impossible to conceive of a logic that would in any sense transcend experience. We have seen, moreover, that the knowing activity is included in the broader activity of experience. Now, logic is a discipline founded on the formal aspect of knowledge. Is there any sense, then, in which logic can take a prescriptive attitude toward knowledge? None except in the subordinate rôle of a regulative organ of subjective thinking. Our logic may embody our ideal of correct thinking. But we have no prescriptive right to impose this ideal on the concrete processes of experience. We must penetrate these processes and from the internal point of view, follow them whithersoever they go. The windings of reality may not conform at all points to the turns of our logical ideal, and even when we have conceived our category truly we only know its real function when we find it actually at work. It is possible for a thinker to have the highest respect for the categories of the Hegelian logic; in fact to accept them as the truest formal statement of the reality of the world, and yet at the same time to refuse to accept them as infallible *a priori* guides. The form, however adequately conceived, will not enable us to infallibly anticipate the actual trail of reality, for content has a reactive influence on form that is not *a priori* calculable. Hence it is that in order to preserve the real trail of knowledge we must keep close to the heart of experience and be ever prepared to find that in their application our formal ideals may require modification.

The first requirement, then, in order to reach a true conception of epistemological method is that the notion of epistemology be distinguished from that of logic. The notion of logic is that of an organon of the formal aspect of reflection. But epistemology has no exclusive concern with the forms of reflection, but is equally concerned with its content. We have seen that if we abstract the form of thinking from its content and develop it into an organon, its relation to the actual thinking process involved in knowing

can be regulative only and not constitutive. Epistemology, however, has no direct concern with regulative processes. The processes in which it is interested are real activities in experience, and, therefore, in so far as it realizes its aim, the organon it constructs will be constitutive; that is, an anticipation of the actual process of knowing. How then shall this constitutive relation be achieved? It would, no doubt, be impossible to give a completely satisfactory answer to this question. But epistemology will approximate to its aim, if in the *first* place it correctly apprehends the essential situation out of which knowledge develops and the stand-point from which the activity of knowing becomes possible, and *secondly* if it correctly seizes upon the form-activities in which it directly lays hold of and defines its content. The answer to the first requirement has been largely anticipated in the preceding chapters. It is impossible to define a true stand-point for epistemology apart from an adequate notion of experience and of the relation of knowledge to experience. We have seen that the very notion of experience involves the internal complexity of the nature of which it is a function, and that the fundamental complexity is the tendency of the nature to distinguish itself as subject in relation to objective content. This distinction we have seen to be essential to knowledge which is a form of experience. Again, the distinctive characteristic of knowing, as a form of experience consists in the mode by which it realizes content, which is that of presentative and aconceptual representation, or, in general, the definition of the content of reality in terms of an objective idea. The true stand-point of epistemology is, therefore, that of a conscious subject activity related to content and defining it in terms of some objective idea.

The second requirement is that we correctly seize upon the form-activities in which the content of the real is defined. These form-activities will be, of course, those of objective apprehension, and these will lay hold of and define the content of knowledge. It is impossible, however, to

conceive a subject-activity as immediately apprehending content as objective. There must be some middle terms, and these will be both mediating and defining. It is clear that these middle terms will be elements of form which arise out of the reaction of the subject-activity upon objective stimulations, and that they will appear as functions of an objective consciousness and as defining forms of objective content. This much it is necessary to say here in anticipation of the fuller discussion of the first chapter in Part II. That there is in cognition and the knowing activities in general what Professor Ladd has aptly styled a "trans-subjective reference"¹ will be admitted by every one except the crassest kind of a subjective idealist. But how to exhibit the process in experience by which the trans-subjective is realized in objective form, is a question the terms of which are rarely understood, and the attempted answers to which have been few and, as a rule, insufficient. It is too much the custom of the contemporary student of knowledge to scorn the Kantian notion of categories, and to either imagine that in giving a psychological analysis of conscious activities he has also solved the epistemological problem, or else to content himself with an *ad nauseam* iteration of the fact that cognition is objective without making any effort to show how this is possible. Kant both saw the problem and set a high example of the way to go about its solution. That cognition does not terminate in a subjective consciousness, but that it is truly objective is a fact the recognition of which is an indispensable qualification for dealing with the problems of knowledge at all. This insight leads naturally to the question of method. If cognition is a subject function, and yet realizes forms of objective reality, how is this possible, and by what means is it effected? The answer to this supplies an essential element of epistemological method and will be given in detail in the doctrine of the categories. All that we need say here in addition to what has been

¹ *The Philosophy of Knowledge*, New York, 1897.

advanced already is that the middle term in knowledge, the term in and through which the subject-activity is enabled to realize all objective content, is part of the essential structure of the knowing act, and in fact the part that is most characteristic.

We have employed the Kantian distinction between constitutive and regulative thinking as a means of distinguishing the internal process of knowledge from the external and regulative ideal that is ordinarily embodied in formal logic, and at this point we may identify that middle term of knowledge in which the transition to true objectivity is effected, with the constitutive principle of the internal method. A true answer to the question, how the trans-subjective reference is possible, and how it is effected, will also be a true answer to the question of method, how are we to proceed internally and constitutively rather than externally and regulatively? It is only by discovering the mediating terms in cognition, and by observing that they are also forms of an objective consciousness that we will obtain the clue to the internal method. We are proceeding according to that method when we distinguish the processes by which we think about our world from those more direct processes in which we think our world, and endeavour to follow the trail of the latter. That such an enterprise can be realized only by laying hold of and thinking in terms of those mediating categories which render objective knowledge possible, will become obvious to anyone who has patience to make the effort.

That the distinction of subject and object consciousness is fundamental to the stand-point and method of epistemology has perhaps already been made clear. But we will venture to add a few observations here in order to make "assurance doubly sure." Opposition to the notion of this distinction as being fundamental, comes as a rule from a certain class of psychologists, and yet some of the best psychologizing of the day is showing us that the idea of self is of cardinal importance, and that a rational science of psychological

doctrine is rendered possible only by connecting all the activities of consciousness with the central self as their subject. Now the epistemologist simply claims the right to take this self which the psychologists are defining and vindicating as central in experience, as the subject and bearer of the knowing activity, and inasmuch as to know is to define in terms of objectivity, the epistemologist finds it necessary to develop from the psychologist's self an immediate implication which the psychologist himself may permit to remain latent; namely, that there can be no self without its objective other. The self without its other would be an unreal abstraction and in order to achieve a situation that is concrete and real the self must be conceived as in constitutional and fundamental relations with some term that calls forth its effort to objectively define and realize. In view of the fact that the central function with which epistemology deals is that of cognition in which the object term is incorporated, and which is overtly an objective transaction, it becomes obvious that in order to achieve the ground of its own possibility it must develop the latent implication of psychology and regard the object term in consciousness as co-ordinate with that of the subject self. The distinction of subject and object, and of subject and object consciousness is thus seen to be fundamental to epistemology.

The internal method will start, therefore, with the activity of a subject-consciousness in which is involved a distinction of self from the objective, however latent and rudimentary this distinction may be conceived to be, and the possibility of its procedure will depend, as we have seen, on the function of certain mediating terms, in and through which objective content will be laid hold on and defined. In determining the steps of this process, the epistemologist has to thank the psychologist again for important aid. The genetic study of the self, has led to the discovery that the whole process of self realization is indirect and mediated by an objective activity. The child plays upon and enters into

its object through processes that are mainly imitative, and by a kind of reflex return of consciousness brings the spoils of its excursus back to the home treasury in the form of an increment of self realization. The law of self development seems to be the realization of self through the appropriation and assimilation of its other and this law includes the biological as well as the psychological in its scope. The student of knowledge needs only to take this law as his guide, and recognizing the fact that the cognitive activity is a function within experience, to look in the objective activities of consciousness, those acts in which some element of objective content is achieved, for the first results of the knowing process. Or, to state the same thing in different phrase, the direct business of knowledge is the determination of objective content. We begin our struggle to penetrate and realize our world and in the course of this effort we come to realize ourselves. This is an all important fact for the doctrine of method. That the knowing activity is a subject function but that its first overt explicit moment is objective, and that the momentary self-consciousness remains latent until the return wave arouses it into activity, the recognition of this is fundamental since upon it hangs the whole law and the prophets of a true epistemological procedure.

Starting with this concept of the situation the internal method rests for its middle point as we have seen, on those mediating terms which are necessary, in order to render the process of objective realization possible. If the objective could never be brought within the embrace of intelligible form it would be impossible for these imitative processes by which the object is penetrated, to operate. That there may be imitation, there must be something intelligible to imitate. The child must seize upon some element of form before it can have a *pon sto* for the function we call imitative. The first stage of knowing is thus presupposed in the moment of imitation which originates as a species of reaction upon the objective, and of which a first taste has been obtained in a

more primary activity. Now it is this more primary moment that is contemplated in the method we are advocating here. Just as the genetic psychologist endeavours to seize the actual constitutive principle by which the child enters into and realizes its object, so the epistemologist, if he would follow a method of equal efficiency, must endeavour to lay hold of the principle by which the knowing activity formally appropriates and defines the objective as intelligible content. And in order to successfully achieve this he must not only truly apprehend what these principles or middle terms are but he must also make them the principles of his own thinking. By that I mean that he must make the effort to think his world through, under and by means of the principles he has apprehended.

From this point of view the internal method will become a species of epistemological dialectic between subjective and objective terms in consciousness. The activity we call knowing will not involve simply a movement of action and reaction between an objective and subjective consciousness, but by virtue of the place which the mediating terms or principles hold in it, becomes dialectical in a higher sense. The mediating terms of objectivity are, in general, points of coalescence for the subject and object consciousness, and they thus become principles for the presentative and conceptual apprehension of a world of content. Were there but one mediating principle, or were there no way of passing from principle to principle, our world might become a procrustean bed on which we would find ourselves helplessly bound. We do not find this to be the case, however, for we are led to the discovery that as the process of inner reflection preceeds each principle of form, while it proves itself without limit on its own plane, or in its own kind, yet inevitably leads to a point where its transcendence becomes necessary. If, for example, we start with some principle of quantitative determination which involves the notion of dimension, we will not find that the possibility of dimensional determination comes to an end somewhere, but what

we actually strike will be a qualitative limit. If we apply the principle of dimension to the determination of reality, we will reach a point where another aspect of the real will begin to assert itself, an aspect that does not involve the denial of dimension, but rather transcends and includes it. The significance of such a fact as this is that one principle of objective definition leads on to another as its necessary implication, and that this implied principle proves itself to be not only qualitatively different from the other, but one whose function in relation to the lower principle is one of transcendence and comprehension. The internal method will not lead us to set aside the mechanical in order that we may assert the teleological or spiritual, but rather in the evolution of the mechanical, and the endeavour to think the world under mechanical categories a point will be reached where it will become necessary to conceive the real as qualitatively transcending the rubrics of mechanism, and at this point we will come upon the initiative of a higher and comprehending principle, in the light of which we will be able to achieve a further construct of reality.

We are in a position now to correlate our doctrine of method with the concepts of experience and reality which have been developed in former chapters. The notion of experience we have seen to be all-comprehensive and inclusive of the whole process by which the world is realized and rendered intelligible. It is inclusive of both theoretic and practical activities, and contemplates the realization of the world for feeling and will as well as for thought. The whole activity of knowledge is to be conceived as internal to experience, and consists in the realization of the world for and in the thinking activities. The real is to be conceived as the whole content of experience, and as therefore internal. If there is anything transcendent it will still be included in actual or possible experience. The content of knowledge is the content of experience intelligibly apprehended and defined under presentative and conceptual forms. The content of knowledge is also content of experi-

ence, and is therefore real. Now *the method of knowledge, as we have conceived it, is an embodiment of the inner dialectical process by which the content of experience is reduced to content of knowledge.* And inasmuch as knowledge itself is included in experience, and therefore experiential, the method of knowledge is experiential in this broad sense. It is not only internal to experience and limited by experience, but its function in the large sense is the explanation of the content of experience. We may expect, then, that in following the gradual development of the knowing processes we will be at the same time achieving a more adequate view of experience.

PART II.

EVOLUTION OF THE CATEGORIES OF KNOWLEDGE.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF THE CATEGORIES.

DAVID HUME, viewing consciousness exclusively from the side of content, and finding it outwardly composed of a plurality of sensuous feelings, concluded that the mind is primarily only a mass of unrelated sense-elements, and sought in the aggregations of these elements for the genesis of the principles of knowledge. Given the sense-elements and a disposition to cohere when in some way unaccountable they are brought together, and the whole structure of experience could, he thought, be explained. But Hume had not reckoned with the possibility that in the data of knowledge may be included elements of different species. Nor did he sufficiently realize the obstacles that beset the epistemological problem when it is approached from the point of view of a mere observer of phenomena. The mere observer sees only the outward mechanical aspects of consciousness and needs to inner himself to the point of view of the experiencer of phenomena before he can be in a position to understand the complexity of his problem. Kant's insight was deeper than that of Hume, and his conception of the conditions of the problem of knowledge was more adequate in at least two respects—(1) in the distinction which he recognized between the ordinary sense-elements in consciousness and certain structural terms which he called categories; (2) in his recognition of the dual

aspects of consciousness, subjective and objective, and his attempt to relate its mechanical plurality to the unity of self-consciousness. Whatever we may think of the value of Kant's work, and on that point opinions will vary, I do not think that the necessity of some such diagnosis as that of Kant can be successfully denied. To confine our observations to the second point, it will be clear on reflection, I think, that such a business as that of knowing cannot be fully understood from the mere observer's point of view. It is open to the psychologist, in some parts of his field at least, to perform the office of a mere generalizer of observed facts; but the epistemologist, if he attempts this purely external office, soon loses the thread of his discourse and begins to utter nonsense. Consciousness is so manifestly internal in its structure, and knowledge is so clearly a function of this internal structure, that the hopelessness of the task of attempting to construct a natural history of knowledge from the standpoint of external observation ought by this time to be generally conceded. The only road open to the epistemologist, as distinguished from the psychologist, is that of the experiencer or knower himself. In other words, he must start as knower rather than as the outward observer of knowing, his method must be internal rather than external, and his materials will be found to be dual and complex rather than simple. For the process he is endeavouring to trace will be found, from the beginning to the end of it, to consist in the effort of a subject consciousness to overcome its object, the world of not-self, and to reduce it to the form of realized content. Obvious without much reflection it ought to be, that the point of view of the subject consciousness is the only tenable one for the student of knowledge.

In treating epistemology from this internal stand-point the problem of the categories of knowledge becomes central. It is not hard to understand why the very notion of the categories should be foreign to such a method as that of Hume. If consciousness be taken as inwardly simple, and

outwardly a mere plurality of sensations whose business is aggregation, no problem of a subject-consciousness relating itself to the content of an object-consciousness, which it seeks to penetrate and realize, is even conceivable, much less real. This being the case, the rise of mediating conceptions like the categories will not be anticipated, nor will they be understood if they do appear. What, then, are we to understand by categories and their part in the activity of knowledge? To answer this question we must seek to know how the category first made its appearance as an element in epistemological theory. This leads us back to Kant, who was the first to attempt a thorough analysis of the knowledge-psychosis, and who made the discovery that every act of cognition is, on its subject side, a judgment; but that this judgment when submitted to sufficient pressure is forced to disgorge a concept or form of synthesis through which the judging consciousness is enabled, on its part, to appropriate a plurality of sensations or feelings as realized content. To this concept Kant applies the name category, and the term is used in his philosophy for certain organizing conceptions which stand between the unitary activity of the judgment and the unmitigated plurality of the sensations, and whose business is to reduce these to forms in which they can be appropriated by the judgment. Kant does not apply the name category to all mediating conceptions, but distinguishes those concepts, which have obviously been generalized from particular experiences, from others which resist this mode of analysis, and seem to be necessary conditions rather than products of the experience-process, and confines the name to the latter species. *In Kant, then, the term category is used to designate original and constitutional modes of synthesis in consciousness which arise between the judgment activity and the plurality of the sensory consciousness, and whose function is to mediate the process by which the former appropriates the latter and reduces it to the form of realized content.*

We are not directly concerned here with the somewhat mechanical character of the above representation, or with the question whether Kant's doctrine of categories is tenable. The point we are interested in is the fact that, in Kant's doctrine of the categories, modern thought has brought safely to birth something of permanent value, and we proceed to the investigation of the categories with the conviction that they will be found to contain a large part of the secret of knowledge. This will appear if we endeavour to realize what essentially the problem of knowledge is. Reverting to the previous discussions, we are able to say that the activity of knowing owes its form to the internal structure of consciousness. This internal structure involves a distinction of a self or subject-consciousness from an object-consciousness, and its content of not-self. The whole activity of experience expresses itself in the effort of the subject-consciousness to penetrate and realize the world of the not-self; and the activity called knowing is this effort of the subject-consciousness in so far as it expresses itself in presentation and idea. Our knowledge of the world is our idea of the world, and our idea of the world is the not-self penetrated and realized by the subject-consciousness and reduced to the form of ideal content. We do not, of course, mean to say that this ideal is realized in any actual subject-consciousness, for here it is necessary to again distinguish between the actual and the possible. The ideal of knowledge is that of possible content of the subject-consciousness. The not-self will, and perhaps must, always transcend the limits of actual knowledge. What we actually know may forever remain a small fragment of what we conceive to be reality. To know then, when translated into terms of activity, is the effort which the subject-consciousness makes to translate the not-self from the state of possible into that of actual content by means of presentation and idea.

We thus obtain a workable conception of the meaning of the knowledge act. It is essentially the subject-consciousness' translation of its object, the unrealized world of the

not-self, into realized content, and we may be said to know our world completely when we have reduced it to this form. The world known must be the world as envisaged in our idea. How, then, shall this translation of the unrealized world into the realized world of idea be effected? The answer involves the office of the categories. We do not mean at this point to defend any metaphysical doctrine of the categories; our aim is substantially the same as that of Kant in the first two parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; that is, to determine the nature of the categories and to exhibit their function in experience. Now, in view of the concept of the knowing act which we have reached, it is clear that the formal office of the category will be to mediate the act by which the subject-consciousness appropriates its world, and reduces it to the form of idea-content. This, however, does not determine for us what the categories are, and how they perform their office. Only the first of these questions is germane in this chapter, while the remaining chapters of this section will be a detailed answer to the second. If we take our stand within experience, and seek to realize the process by which it gradually achieves and appropriates its world, we will find it possible to arrange the stages, in a quasi-genetic scale, somewhat as follows: (1) The world of immediacy or presentation; (2) the world of mediacy or of concept relations; (3) the world of the higher immediacy or of the self-unifying reason. And following the vision from its beginning through its successive stages, the following categories will inevitably reveal themselves. Our world-vision in the lower presentational stage will be a world of space and time, and by that we mean a world in which the structural organizing relations are spatial and temporal. In the mediate sphere the structural concept will be dynamic and actively synthetic in their character, and our world will be one of cause, substance, and interaction. Finally, the world of higher immediacy will be a sphere of unification in which the lower stages, or perhaps the better word here would be forms, of world-manifestation are brought into the final

unity of the idea by relation to some ground principle. Here the categories are manifestly the self-relating ideas of ground and unification.

Here, then, we come upon, as I think, the fundamental categories of the process by and in which the knowing activity realizes its world. In its first and simplest stages the world presents and organizes itself in the forms and relations of space and time. Our reactions, so far forth as they possess objective form, are reactions in space and time. The process has its subject side, of course, which is presupposed in all acts of knowledge. But the fact signalized here is that whatever the complexity of motives and conditions may be, the form of the world-vision that emerges is that of space and time. A point is reached, however, in the epistemological history when the presentational aspect of the world no longer proves satisfactory. The knowing subject begins to have an awning that some parts of its vision are not final, that they are there because of something else that is not now present, and the everlasting what and why are born. It is clear that these questions initiate us into the sphere of dynamic relations of things which do things, and have aims in doing them. From this epoch in our mental history our world becomes an occult region of hidden relations, and its presentative aspects lose in great measure their finality as things in themselves, and tend to lapse into mere symbols of a world of deeper meanings. This profounder and now more interesting world is one of cause primarily, and then of substance and interaction. The question has been put to the world, which will only find its answer in the everlasting unrest of consciousness and the ceaseless activity of science. Nor in these even will it attain its final answer. For the persistent what and why shape themselves at last in a question as to the final meaning and purpose of this whole sphere of reality. What is reality in its last analysis, and what is the self-explaining principle of its existence? It is clear that in these questions we encounter the demand for a completely realized

world, for a reduction of our world to ideal content of the knowing consciousness. We have seen that the knowing activity in its very constitution involves the reduction of the world from the form of possible to that of actual and realized content of knowledge, and it is here that we come upon the point of the consummation of that process. The last act of knowledge is that in which our world reaches final unity as the content of an idea, in the light of which it is self-grounded and self-explained. The categories here are manifestly those of ground and unification.

Let us say that the whole aim of knowledge is the reduction of the world, or the not-self, to ideal content of consciousness. We will then be able to see that the categories are the constitutional forms of this content. The world, in so far as it is realized and realizable, presents itself in certain forms which are essential to its manifestation. By that we mean that otherwise it could not become ideal content of consciousness. The categories are never to be confounded with subject-activities. They presuppose these of course, and arise, as we have seen, out of the reactions of the subject-activities, but in their own proper character they belong to the world of content as the forms of its actual and possible realization. They are the ways in which the world must express itself to and in consciousness in order to get recognition, as well as the perceptual and conceptual modes which the subject-consciousness must adopt in order that it may be able to penetrate and realize its object. The categories are not then merely subjective nor merely objective. They are not exclusive features of the self, nor yet of the not-self, but are true mediators like the soul in Platonism, participating in both subject and object nature, and thus rendering the act of knowing possible. *A category may then be defined: subjectively, as the constitutional mode through and in which the subject-consciousness penetrates its world, and reduces it to ideal content, and objectively, as the form which the world or not-self is obliged to assume in order to present itself to and in consciousness and become content of its world-idea.*

CHAPTER II.

SPACE AND TIME—PRESENTATIVE.

THE central problem in knowledge is that of the categories and their function in experience. But the whole problem involves three terms: the subject-consciousness or self, the not-self or unrealized world of objectivity, and the categories. The principal interest here attaches to the categories, but the treatment of these involves at least a provisional conception of the other terms. In dealing with knowledge, genetically, as we propose here, it is not necessary that we should have at the outset a developed doctrine either of the self or the not-self. For the development of the self we cheerfully accept all the results of genetic psychology, but at this point and for the purposes of our inquiry the question of interest is not how does the self grow, but rather what conception of the nature of self is necessary in order that the activity of knowing may be intelligible? This question has been virtually answered in previous discussions, and will require here only a brief and explicit statement. We cannot assume, as a condition of the knowing activity, any developed form of self-consciousness: this, as we shall see, is one of the last products of experience. What we must assume, rather, is a consciousness in which a subject-activity is seeking to penetrate and realize an, as yet undefined and unrealized, object. This must be assumed in order that the spectator may have an adequate view of the situation. But if the

observer asks himself what consciousness of the situation on the part of the knowing subject itself must be presupposed, the answer is not so clear. But this much must, I think, be conceded; namely, that to a distinctionless consciousness an act of knowledge would be impossible. The very act of knowing carries in it a distinction however rudimental, between the knowing activity itself and its content, or that on which the activity terminates. This much must be conceded. But if we presuppose the first act of presentation, the knowing activity can continue only as a search for and recognition of the same among different. Let us conceive this activity of identifying and differentiating, of appropriating and rejecting in its lowest possible terms; it is evident, I think, that we cannot cancel it altogether out of consciousness without destroying the possibility of the knowing act. For when we consider the matter, we realize that to know involves more than self-distinction from a not-self. If this were all, the not-self would be, for aught we know, as impenetrable as is a stone wall for ordinary vision. The possibility of the knowing act involves, in short, the possession of a rudimentary instrument of knowing, and when we ask what the nature of this instrument must be we are close to the answer that it must be what Plato thought it to be, a rudimentary power of distinguishing the same from the different. If then we suppose consciousness to involve as part of its internal nature rudimentary distinctions between the knowing activity itself and its object, and between the same and different in the sphere of the object, we have conceived a situation in which an act of knowing becomes possible. And I think it will become evident on consideration that less than this cannot be assumed. Again, if we ask the question what view of the object is involved in the very possibility of the knowing act, it will be conceded that there must at least be a rudimentary distinction between the knowing activity and its object, and to that extent a determination of it as a not-self. But when this concession is made it will become still

further evident that something more is necessary. If the not-self is ever to become realized content, it must not simply be differentiated from the self. It must be penetrated and appropriated. An act of knowledge must involve a rudiment of realization, and this is only conceivable on the supposition that distinctions are *possible* in the object. In other words, the object must be a sphere of possible *sames* and *differents*. The not-self cannot, therefore, be represented as absolutely opaque and distinctionless, for that would be tantamount to representing it as absolutely impenetrable and unknowable. We must take a further step, then, and in order to achieve these objective conditions that are necessary to make a knowing act possible, must conceive the not-self as involving that which may be distinguished as the same and the different. The internal nature of the not-self cannot then be represented as absolutely simple, for this, as we see, would render the act of knowledge impossible. In order that the knowing act may be possible, the nature of the object of knowledge must be conceived as internally complex, that is, as involving possible distinction; for it is now evident that it is only through this internal complexity of the object that the knowing activity can penetrate it and make it its own.

Assuming this rudimentary structure, we shall now proceed to the main business, that of tracing the evolution in experience of the categories of knowledge. Taking the scheme of categories and stages as outlined above, we find that the very first form of the cognitive consciousness that begins to define itself is that of space. Bearing in mind that the world of objectivity is as yet an indifferentiated sphere, although involving possible differences, and taking our stand with the subject-consciousness, which may be conceived as on the point of rousing into action, we will find that the initial procedure may be represented somewhat as follows. Consciousness may be supposed to be in a state of diffusion, nothing having happened as yet to induce it to pull itself together in an act of attention. But let some-

thing obtrude itself into the field of consciousness of a sufficiently interesting character to attract attention; the indifference of the subject-consciousness is instantly broken, and from a state of diffusion it passes into one of concentration, and focuses itself upon the point of disturbance. Up to this point the psychologist and the epistemologist see the same thing. But here the epistemologist begins to have a special problem. He is specially interested not in the natural history of consciousness as a whole, but rather in the rise and function of the formal categories of knowledge. Fixing our attention, then, on this focussing activity, and bearing in mind the fact that the subject-consciousness is implicitly a differencing, integrating activity, we may ask what aspect of this activity will first become explicit in the focussing process with which we are now dealing. Clearly, it will be the differentiating aspect. This will be quickened into life, and attention will be first of all a faculty of distinction. Now, if we connect this with the fact known to psychologists, that attention is intermittent, and proceeds by alternating pulsations of flow and ebb, that there is a succession of concentrations and diffusions in the central activity of consciousness, we will be ready, I think, to admit the following representation. The focussing consciousness will not hit upon any points of objective fixity which resist its energy point blank, for in that case no progress could be made, but rather, every point at which it concentrates will be like a vent out of which issues an explosive energy that hurls consciousness back upon itself in a more or less diffused state. The whole phenomenon presented here is that of alternating and opposed energies, the one outgoing and concentrative, the other inflowing and diffusive; the one marking the flow, the other the ebb of attention. To the inflowing energy the psychologists apply the name stimulation, and the movement of consciousness is called a response to stimulation. This representation will be useful here in enabling us to connect our analysis with that of psychology, for the stimulation is the term which the activity of

consciousness is going on to define, and the process is at this stage explicitly objective. The question here is, then, what element of objective form will first arise out of this ebb and flow of consciousness which the psychologist represents as response to stimulation? Translating the terms of psychology into more appropriate epistemological phrase, we may designate stimulation and response as objective and subjective consciousness, and bearing in mind the fact already stated that the process at this point is explicitly objective, we will be prepared to find the first element of form showing itself in the objective consciousness. Returning now to the point, where in response to motives already indicated, consciousness focuses itself in the act of attention, we have, as it were, a collision of the subjective and objective consciousness, followed by the rebound of the subjective consciousness. Now, it is at this point evidently that presentation has its origin. If the rebounding consciousness did not bring back with it a rudiment of presentation, the origin of presentation would be inexplicable. It is evident, too, that this rudiment of presentation will be a determination of the objective consciousness, and that out of the successive rebounds will arise our first definition of the object-world.

From the very nature of the situation it will also be evident that we are dealing with a process, and that it will have to be represented in terms of activity. Considered objectively, what then, essentially, is this process? Well, the first activity that is quickened into life is that of difference. We saw that above. But this difference must be of some specific kind, and, I think, we will not mistake if we call it the difference of outness or externality. The objective consciousness begins to stand out as something confronting and alien. For this is what outness or externality means in the last analysis, something's assertion of itself as a not-self. My not-self is that which is outside of me and external to me. Manifestly this is the way in which I must begin to define my world if I am to begin at all. But the

definition takes a specific form. The pulsating activity of consciousness possesses the characteristic, as we saw above, that it is never able to find a point of rest, but that the expulsive energy of the objective consciousness perpetually drives it back upon itself, only to be followed by reconcentration of attention on the object. If we conceive this activity, then, as an alternating and incessant process of point-intuiting and point-outering or externalizing, we will have seen how consciousness takes the first step in the perception of space. No doubt, in perception colour is inseparable from space, and that the first overt element of space will present itself only as a patch of colour. But colour presupposes surface, and it is the activity out of which surface arises as an objective form that we are considering here. Let us suppose, then, that the mode of determining space-points in experience has been truly represented. We have only to suppose the continuation of this activity in order to see how the perception of space is developed from these elements. As a matter of fact the points involved are not mathematical, but the smallest units of perceived space. This was pointed out by Hume, and is a commonplace in psychology. The mode in which these space-points come together into an extended superficies is the same substantially as that in which different space-aggregates fall into one space. We have only to suppose on the side of content, the operation of that tendency which James has pointed out, of the homogeneous in experience to become one; and on the side of the subject-consciousness, an integrating activity, in order to be able to realize how the presentation of surface arises. The point of vital interest in this analysis is not so much the natural history of the space consciousness as the kind of activity out of which space-presentation arises, and the fact that space is a first determination of the objective consciousness. Attention, out of its first repulse by the objective, extracts the germ of a presentation of the object, and this is a rudiment of space. The whole of the activity of space-determination is, therefore,

a development of a presentation-form of the objective consciousness.

Space, then, is a first determination of the form of an objective world, and the point reached in the doctrine of space may be stated as follows. We have been determining the space of simple perception, the space which the young animal and the child apprehend in common with the adult. The first perception of space-form involves no reflection, and, therefore, no explicit activity of judgment. By this we do not mean to deny the presence of anything analogous to judgment in the simplest acts of consciousness. The reverse seems to be the truth. That dual activity of concentration and rebound, out of which the first elements of space-perception arise, has something akin to judgment in it. It is, in fact, an activity that develops later on into an explicit judgment-function. Now it is of this simple space of perception that Hume seeks to trace the genesis. But Hume's account starts too far down the stream, and after some important things have happened. Space, he thinks, comes in with the impression as an arrangement of coloured points. There, no doubt, occurs somewhere an arrangement of points, but it seems evident that the first step in space-perception is the getting of the points, and no account of the rise of space-perception will be adequate that does not attempt an analysis of the activity of consciousness out of which the elements of space arise. Having overlooked this first stage in space-perception, Hume was led to regard as original what is really derivative. This error misled him in various ways; among other effects blinding him as to the true objective character of the space-form in perception. Kant represents the space-form in perception as a pure intuition, and in this would seem to deny that it has any development. He also characterizes it as *apriori*, and by implication denies that it has its origin in an experience-process. These positions of Kant were taken in order to vindicate the originality and truly objective character of space from the criticism of Hume. But it seems to me

that these ends can be secured without proceeding to such extremes. No one will claim at this stage in psychological analysis that space-perception is not amenable to the law of development. We have seen how it starts with a mere rudiment of space. It is equally clear that it has its origin in experience; that it is, in short, the product of a certain form of conscious activity. Do these facts go to prove that space is derivative, or that it is not truly objective? Such an assumption has surely run its course in the history of philosophy, and may now be honourably retired. We believe that everything arises in experience, the original and the derived, the subjective and the objective, and that it is the business of the explorer of experience to distinguish one set of elements from another. Kant could have established the essentials of his doctrine of space without claiming that it is in any sense *apriori* or aloof from the process of experience.

We have said that by implication the above denials are contained in Kant's doctrine. Strictly speaking, Kant rarely, if ever, takes psychological ground. His real contention is that space, being a logical *prius* of perception, cannot be regarded as content which is given, but must be referred to the subject-consciousness as an element of form which it supplies out of its own constitution. Now, the premise of this reasoning is indisputable, but the conclusion is open to denial. If we distinguish between the subjective and objective aspects of consciousness, we will not need to suppose that space is one of the original possessions of the subject-consciousness. Rather it will become clear that space is to be regarded as an affair of the objective consciousness, and that it arises as an element of objective form. It is objective from the outset, and its real *prius* is the collision which takes place as we have seen, between the subject- and object-consciousness in the alternating pulsations of attention.

From the point of view held here, a critique is also possible of what for convenience we may call the Berkeley-

Lotzean doctrine of space. It is not maintained that the views of Berkeley and Lotze are the same in all respects, but that these thinkers agree on the one point of the subjective derivation of space. Berkeley, who was the first modern thinker to treat space-perception analytically, finding the development of our perception of the dimensions in space to be accompanied by certain subjective feelings arising as secondary reactions from the adaptive movements of the sense organs, drew the conclusion that these subjective feelings are constitutive of space-perception, and that space is, therefore, a purely subjective phenomenon. Little reflection is needed to show that a distinction must be made between the subjective conditions of space-perception and the perception itself. When once we have attained to the space-percept, it may well be that its development depends on certain feelings of muscular tension, but Berkeley overlooks the whole question of the origin of our perception of space. Had he begun at the beginning of his problem he would probably have discovered that however space-perception may develop, in its origin and first rise it is objective. In like manner the Lotzean theory of local signs may be accepted as a substantially correct account of the subjective aspect of the development of space-perception. Nor is Lotze's doctrine, that space arises as a unique reaction of consciousness upon stimulation, here called in question. The one point in debate is Lotze's subjectivity, which is a matter of the interpretation of data. And the criticism to which we think he is open is the following. After having correctly represented the rise of space-perception out of a unique reaction of consciousness upon stimulation, Lotze misinterprets the nature of this experience. So far as we can see, the stimulation in Lotze's account does not get any determination in the process, but remains mere abstract stimulation at the end as in the beginning. It is the subject-consciousness that receives a modification, as yet non-spatial, which by certain processes it works up into an element of space. On the contrary,

we think the stimulation comes out of the process with a modification. We have represented the stimulation as an objective consciousness, and it is in the sphere of this objective consciousness that the first element of space-form appears. It appears as an objective determination. Our world is now no longer a formless and unintelligible chaos, but it takes on in space its first element of intelligible form. The doctrine maintained here against both Berkeley and Lotze is the original objectivity of space. This is its primal character which it maintains to the end, no matter how much subjective machinery may be involved in its development. The subject-process is not contested at all. But the point insisted on is that the experience cannot be purely an affair of subjectivity. The space element must be there as a datum of the process.

We have attempted above a mere sketch of a doctrine of presentative space. Its essential features may be very briefly stated. The assumption on which the whole analysis proceeds is that space, like every other feature of our world, will have its rise and development in experience. For us there is no space in itself apart from experience. In order that any experience may be possible, a distinction between a subject-consciousness which shapes itself in the act of attention, and an object-consciousness that presents itself in the form of stimulation, must be recognized. The first activity of consciousness will take the form of a concentration of the subject-consciousness on the point of stimulation and the accompanying rebound. Thus the pulsating movement of consciousness arises. Now, space-form has its origin, so far as we can determine at this point, in this experience. It arises as the first element of determination in the sphere of the objective consciousness, not as a contribution of the subject-consciousness to the object, but as a real determination of the object, so that now the world of the not-self is not wholly opaque and undefined, but in space takes on its first form of intelligibility.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the rise of

time from that of space. We may distinguish, as Kant does, between the inner and outer senses, and may represent time as the form of the inner sense. No doubt time is the form of the inner sense, but we get no light here on the question of its origin. How does time arise as the form of the inner sense? If we abstract the pulsations of attention from the objective consciousness and regard them as purely subjective phenomena, they present themselves as a series of *changes*, and it would seem that all we have to do is to consider this series as such and we will have the idea of time. But the case is not so simple. What should direct the attention to this subject-series? There is no reason to suppose that self-attention is a primary act. There is every reason for assuming that primary attention is objective and that self-attention would, therefore, arise in the form of reaction from the objective. Can the form of reaction, out of which time-perception arises, be determined? We will perhaps be on the right track if we assume that space-perception is somehow involved in the origin of the perception of time. It is the peculiarity of time that it must originate as a series, if at all. We cannot conceive a change absolutely, but in order to be perceived it must not be alone. If now, the perception of a subjective series is not primary, but arises in a reactive consciousness, and if this reactive consciousness is somehow related to space, we may ask how space comes to be mixed up in the transaction. The answer will be suggested, I think, if we suppose that some advance has been made in space-perception, and that the contents of the objective world began to have rudiments of definite and distinguishable form. These will present themselves to the attentive consciousness in a *succession*, and the first perception of a series will be derived from the one-after-another order of these objective events. But just as the subject-consciousness reacts from one term of the series, so it will react from the series itself, and the result will be the first apprehension of *inner* change. For accompanying these outer events there are inner events or changes in the subject

consciousness and what is maintained here is that the inner changes are not apprehended *as changes* directly, but by way of reaction upon the apprehension of the change-series in its outer form. In order to understand the situation we must distinguish between the existence of an inner state of consciousness and the apprehension of this state as a change. It is out of change that time arises, but change already involves time, for it *is* time when abstracted from the content that changes. The perception of time clearly involves then the fixation of a certain degree of attention on the inner processes of consciousness, and time-form arises as a result just as space-form arises in the objective consciousness, but the perception of time is more erudite than that of space. It presupposes space as the condition of the objective series in reaction upon which, the first sense of the subjective series arises. The truth is, we are unable to see how the sense of the subjective series can arise at all until after the consciousness in which it appears has had considerable objective experience. Let us suppose then that the point has been reached where the first element of time-form begins to arise. How is this origin to be conceived? The concrete fact in consciousness is that of a plurality of conscious states or acts. When viewed as a whole these become a series of changes. But no state of consciousness taken by itself is a change. The presupposition of a change is a series and this series is time. It would seem then that when consciousness becomes able to perceive its states as changes, the whole business is complete and time is already here. The secret of time-perception must be sought, I think, in that moment when consciousness lays its hands upon several of its states *in one act* and senses them in their relation. Then, in its relation to the group thus brought under our view, each state becomes a change inasmuch as consciousness must make a movement in order to get into that state. It is only then, as a member of a series, that a state of consciousness can be a change, while, on the other hand, the series cannot be apprehended apart from the

changing states of consciousness. This account is sufficient at least to disprove the theory that the perception of time arises as a kind of result of the perception of change. In order to account for time we must find some psychosis that will yield time and change in one act. No such psychosis is conceivable as a simple state. It must arise as a reaction of attention upon the inner life, in an act which comprehends a considerable portion of that inner life, enough at least to include the passage of consciousness from one state to another. Out of this complex sense of passage from one state to another will emerge the rudiments of both time and change, time from the experience as a whole and change from the sense of transition.

Presupposing, then, the ability of consciousness to realize some intuition of the objective space-world, from which, by way of reaction, consciousness is able in an act such as we have indicated, to achieve the first rudiment of time, there are still two questions which press for answer. We wish, in the first place, to know something further of that objective intuition which leads to such important results, and, secondly, we are interested in the development of time-perception. It would simplify matters greatly if we could say that time and change are first apprehended in an objective form, and that the subjective apprehension is simply a reflex of the objective. The difficulty here is, that it is impossible to conceive a purely objective intuition of either time or change, for then time and change would arise primarily as forms of the objective world. But it seems clear, in the case of time at least, that this is impossible. We seem to be in a dilemma, and the case would, perhaps, be hopeless did we not remember that our outer experience embodies itself in a very concrete form which we call *movement*. It is customary to define motion as change of position in space. But this is a definition in terms of what motion presupposes. Without space there could be no motion, and without the perception of space there could be no perception of motion. This is obvious. It may be that motion is an extra-conscious condi-

tion of space-perception, but in order to be itself perceived there must first be some determination of space-form. This is to say, that something must appear in order that it may appear moving. Let us then assume the perception of space, what more than this, we may ask, is involved in the perception of motion? Simply change, which is the shifting of attention, and is objectified solely through its connection with space. We find then that space mediates our first perception of change and makes it seem objective. But change is the shifting of attention, and attention is a form of subjective consciousness. The sense of change is, therefore, in its roots subjective, and the rebound of consciousness from the object is only necessary to make this apparent. When, therefore, consciousness reacts from the phenomenon of change the sense of time is born. For change is essentially time, and the reacting consciousness takes the form of a sense or presentation of itself in state of change. Subjective motion, or rather the subjective equivalent of motion, is the changing consciousness. But motion is only the objective image of this mediated by the perception of space, and the experience, when it comes to its own, finds itself to be subjective. Thus time is born as the sense of a changing consciousness.

Having determined the origin of time-form in experience, it is scarcely necessary to maintain that the intuition is unique, and that time is an original form of experience. The close relation of time in its objective form to space might seem to justify the supposition that time-perception is in some way derived from space experience. But we have seen that time originates as the form of a changing consciousness, while outer change, that is motion, presupposes space as its condition. But, that space is not constitutive of motion, becomes evident from the fact that space is not motion, nor does it move. Space does not change, but when that which is already spatial changes we call the phenomenon motion. Space is then a *prius* and not a constituent of motion, and the perception of change is an unique intuition,

irreducible to anything simpler than itself. The perception of time being this perception of change rendered inner, the impossibility of deriving it from space-perception becomes apparent. Nor do we need to dwell at length here on the development of time-perception. This is mainly a psychological affair and is not difficult to trace, once the origin of time-perception has been determined. The one fact which we would emphasize here is the persistent subjectivity of time. Space is relatively remote, and the spontaneous tendency of consciousness is to represent the space-world as a sphere of independent existence. But time is so closely associated with the pulsations of consciousness that it is impossible for us in the same way to segregate the time world. We cannot conceive a time world apart from the activity of a pulsating consciousness.

While space and time are inseparable in experience, they are in fact self-distinguishing and self-differentiating forms which tend from the outset to distribute the contents of consciousness into two distinct, though closely related, worlds. If we revert to the primary distinction, which, as we have seen, underlies the whole experience-process, the distinction of a subject-consciousness from an object-consciousness, it will appear that in the intuitions of time and space we have the first determination in experience of the forms of these two worlds. While there is a sense in which time is objective, yet it is essentially subjective, and the rise of the time-intuition is the first formal definition of self in experience, while the rise of the space-intuition is a corresponding first definition of the world of the not-self. This fact led Kant to distinguish time and space as the forms, respectively, of the inner and outer sense. The conclusion we have reached is in substantial agreement with that of Kant, only we have avoided Kant's presuppositions and have presented the origin of the space and time intuitions in the terms of a developing experience. We assume that it is the business of experience in its cognitive activity to gradually develop for us our whole intuition of the world. The first form

which this intuition takes is that of the time and space worlds. There is involved in the original structure of experience a complexity that expresses itself in a duality of consciousness, subjective and objective, and out of this arises the two worlds of the self and the not-self. The first formal determination of this distinction is effected in the time and space intuitions. The time-world is, therefore, the first explicit form which the self-term takes in experience. The young quail and the child have some form of self-consciousness. But the self-awareness which all consciousness must be conceived as possessing in rudiment, will be largely implicit and latent in the quail and the young child. The first overt step in the development of self-consciousness, and consequently the first explicit form of the conscious life, will be that of time. The young dog in his waking moments as well as in his dreams, will know himself at least as a flowing stream, albeit as one in which the *I* is as yet submerged. But that, explicitly, he will have any richer self-intuition there is no reason to assume. The subject-world will be a flowing stream with implicit elements that await further experience for their development. In like manner the not-self will be a world whose first formal determination will arise in the space-intuition. In Kantian phrase, space is the form of the outer sense, and expressing this in terms of experience, things get themselves outered ; that is, explicitly segregated from us and set over against us as external to us in the space-world. The young chick has its outer external world, but so far as that world has defined itself in an intuition, it is that grub which it seeks as food and the things which it is to pursue and shun. The development of its world is motived by a whole complex of interests and feelings, but the cognition-form is simple. That the first cognitive consciousness penetrates into the underlying sphere of causes, or that the outer world is explicitly determined other than spatially, there is no reason to suppose. The other elements of the experience are either subjective or they lie in a region

that has not as yet been penetrated by the cognitive intelligence.

Space and time take their place then as the first categories of a developing experience. They arise as the first presentation-forms, through the mediation of which consciousness begins to realize its world as content. Space stands as the simplest presentation-form of the world of objectivity, the world of not-self. In space the world presents itself as a sphere of outer, external existence. Time is the form in which the subject-consciousness first realizes its own inner content. In time it envisages itself as a flowing stream whose sense of unity and self-hood is as yet implicit.

CHAPTER III.

SPACE AND TIME—CONCEPTUAL.

KANT failed to distinguish with sufficient clearness between space and time, as forms of presentation and the same categories as forms of reflection, and this failure led him to ascribe necessity and universality as well as *apriority* to presentative space and time. We have seen in the preceding chapter that they cannot be regarded as *a priori* in any sense that would tend to make them prior to experience. Logically they mediate the cognition of the world as the first forms of its apprehension. It is almost needless to argue that space and time do not present themselves in this stage under any appearance of universality or necessity. In ascribing these qualities to them, Kant is regarding them exclusively from the reflective standpoint. As presentations space and time are simply there, and no question of necessity or universality can arise. But when that epoch in the mental life occurs in which the cognitive consciousness passes out of the stage of simple presentation into that of mediate and conceptual experience there results a transformation not only of the content but of the space and time forms of our world. Other categories, it is true, have their rise at this period, of which account will have to be taken later on, but the point of special interest here is the transformation that reflection effects in the categories of space and time. We may say, in brief, that here a passage is made

from the space and time of ordinary experience to the space and time of mathematical intuition. The position may be revolutionary, but it seems obvious, that the space and time which the mathematician has in view is different from the space and time from which Hume and the empiricists have attempted to derive the concepts of mathematics. In dealing with presentative space and time we find ourselves in agreement with Hume when he takes the ground that neither are infinitely divisible, but that the element of each is some *minimum visible* or appreciable. In short, the element of presentative space or time is an empirical term not further resolvable, and cannot, therefore, be either infinitely great or small. Nor can any apodictic certainty attach to any processes in which simply these concrete terms are involved. If mathematics founds directly on these empirical data it is folly to claim any certitude beyond ordinary experience for its concepts and results, and empiricism seems to have won its case so far as mathematics is concerned.

But I feel sure that something important has been overlooked here, and that the Humian doctrine of mathematics is largely an illusion. What then is the trouble? It is that the important epoch which is marked in experience by the rise of reflection has been completely overlooked. Conceding that mathematics is founded on space and time intuition, we may here ask two questions: (1) What transformation is made on space and time by the reflective consciousness, and (2) is mathematics immediately connected with the space and time of presentation or with that of reflection? The nature of the transformation effected may be expressed in the statement that the space and time of reflection are not the products of perception but of conception. Now the peculiarity of conception is that its first step is one of abstraction, and that abstraction works by objectifying the aspect of experience involved and by putting it into a position where it can be contemplated and critically examined by itself. It is to the reflective con-

sciousness therefore that space and time become abstract objects of contemplation. And it is when space and time are thus conceived that they become really one to us and are seen to be universal and necessary forms of realization even for the first stages of experience. We see, in other words, that if any world is to begin to appear at all it must present itself in the forms of space and time. These are necessary conditions of a certain determination of our world. Such judgments are reached, however, not by any simple extension of the perception-process, or by any operation in which perceptive data are directly involved. But in conception the whole point of view has been transformed, for now space and time are considered as pure forms of content, as forms of a world that is represented as purely objective. These forms have been abstracted as objects of contemplation, and the question of reflection is not how they arise in experience, but rather what is the inner nature of space and time as formal determinations of objective reality?

Now, when reflection brings its activity to bear on space and time it does not rest satisfied with external appearance, but seeks to penetrate to the inner nature of these objects. When space is the object of contemplation it is found to involve two opposite characteristics. From one point of view it is altogether discrete, no assignable point of fixity being found in it. The fluency of space under analysis is only arrested when a position is postulated as an absolute starting-point for this process of unbridled flux. This postulated point cannot be identified in any way with the units of presentative space, for here we come in view of the other and opposite characteristic of conceived space, namely, extension. We mean by extension the opposite of discreteness; that is, continuity. Space is not only the principle of unlimited fluency, but also that of unlimited consistency. And just as there must be a beginning of fluency in some fixed point, so there must be a beginning of extension in some point that is not extended. To state the matter shortly, while it is true that presentative experience

has its starting-points, which are relative and fluent, this is not true of reflection. The reflective consciousness demands something more stable, and it finds it in the point which is dimensionless and yet the spring of all dimension. That the mathematical point is not a term of ordinary space, only the crassest materialism would dispute, and that it is the indispensable starting-point of mathematics no one would have the hardihood to deny. What then are we to make of the fact that the mathematical point is not itself spatial? There is, I think, only one conclusion to be drawn: the mathematical point is a transcendent term so far as the space and time of presentative experience is concerned. It is the reassertion in reflection of the point of view from which the whole world-vision begins. We have seen how that vision starts in the reaction of a subject-consciousness upon something objective, and how out of this arises a spatial determination of the objective. The whole experience arises as that of a subject-consciousness striving to penetrate and realize its world. The vision of the world presupposes, therefore, a subject point of view which transcends it.

To carry this a step further, the world of reflection presupposes as its condition a point of view which transcends that of ordinary preception, and this point of view will be found in the explicit subject-activity, of which reflection is a function. In order to reflect the subject-consciousness must assert itself as a subject; that is, as an *I*. It is in the effort of reflection that the subject rises out of and above the stream of time, and the moment of its appearance changes everything. It becomes henceforth the centre of all experience. The space and time worlds stand before it as objects of contemplation, and the transformations that it makes have already been indicated in the account of the rise of conception. But in relation to space the advent of the *I* is all-important. We have seen that the mathematical point is transcendent of the whole world of presentation. The truth here becomes apparent that the mathematical point represents the new standpoint of reflection from which

the naive world of perception is to be transformed. The self-realizing subject in the reflective act is virtually summoning the space-world before a higher tribunal to be judged. And its verdict is that the naive space-world of presentation is self-contradictory when considered abstractly, and that in order to be accepted as real it must submit to transformation from a higher point of view. That point of view is a *posit*, so to speak, of the reflective consciousness. Let us here take a step backward, and note the conceptual activity as it first operates on space. In general, we have seen that conception arises as a search for the same in the midst of different. But in the case of space, when the power of abstraction has objectified it, there are no different. All spaces are perfectly homogeneous, and fall together in a perfectly seamless identity. For this reason Kant calls space a pure intuition. We have, then, in the one space a concept which shows no traces of the piecemeal process by which it has been achieved. The seamlessness of the intuition is due to the absolutely homogeneous nature of the content. There may be a thousand spaces of a thousand different worlds, including the worlds of madness and dreams ; but to conception all these spaces are homogeneous and melt into one.

It is this one space of conception that supplies the basis of the reflective processes involved in mathematics. In a seamless space the units of perception have disappeared. There is absolutely no trace left of the coloured point which constituted the unit of the presentation. Let us now connect this with the reflective *I* which was the outcome of the above analysis. We have said that the mathematical point is a posit of the reflective consciousness. We are able here to realize in a measure how this comes to pass. The stand-point of reflection is that of free activity. The *I* has risen out of the space- and time-stream which becomes an object of its contemplation, and the whole mathematical intuition is the function of this free contemplation. Let us suppose the reflective consciousness to concentrate itself in an act of

attention upon this objective representation, if we may be allowed to apply this term to the content of conception; it is clear that the aim of the activity will be to fix in the first instance a point of departure from which the whole space may be conceived. But it finds the object absolutely fluent with no stable points in it, and reflection, in order to achieve a point of rest which shall serve also as a point of departure, posits the mathematical point, which is simply a hypothetical *pou sto* which consciousness finds necessary in its efforts to realize a space conception. The mathematical point has none of the properties of presentative space, it is not extended, and occupies no room, simply because it is a hypothetical but necessary view-point of the reflective consciousness in its effort to achieve a conception of space. Having achieved this *pou sto*, the mathematical dimensions are readily determined. The moving of the point out of itself generates the line which has one dimension, length, but no breadth; that is, except in the one aspect it maintains its transcendent ideality. The moving of the line out of itself generates the surface, which is still ideal in respect of depth, having no thickness. Finally, the moving of the surface out of itself generates the solid, and with it three-dimensional space, the space of ordinary experience, is realized.

The mathematical elements, points, lines, superficies and solids, are thus achieved. Hume in his empirical derivation of the terms of mathematics ridicules the notions of points without dimension, lines without breadth and surfaces without depth. Everything in his view is built up from the concrete units of perception. I think we are able to see that Hume's doctrine rests on a complete misapprehension. It supposes mathematics to arise as a kind of manipulation of the terms of perception, but in so doing skips the whole process of conception, and the important transformation which it effects. The truth is, in reflection a new point of view is achieved from which the space-world is transformed. The mathematical point has nothing in common with the

unit of presentation, nor have the lines and surfaces of mathematics anything in common with the presentative lines and surfaces except what they acquire through motion. It is through motion that the mathematical intuition gradually achieves an empirical result. Thus the moving point realizes the line which as to its length may be empirically determined; the moving line gives the surface which as superficies may be empirically determined. The moving surface yields the solid which as such is amenable to empirical treatment. It is not claimed here that the mathematical and the empirical worlds are two different and mutually exclusive spheres. On the contrary the mathematical world arises as a reconstruction and reinterpretation of the world of ordinary perception from a higher point of view. The *pou sto* of the mathematical activity, the point, is purely ideal and transcendent, but the intuition achieves itself through motion, in the process of generating lines, surfaces and solids. This movement which mediates the result also squares it with experience, for it is found that the space yielded by mathematical conception is a space capable of empirical determination. The mathematical therefore contains or involves the empirical. Its results are open to empirical processes. The important distinction to be observed, however, and that on which the conception of pure mathematics depends is this, that *the mathematical process is not a simple extension of the empirical*. To pure mathematics the points, lines, surfaces, and solids are ideal and the internal determinations of these are ideal. The conception of space when once realized supplies an adequate basis for the processes of pure mathematics.

Mathematics ceases to be pure when an element of empirical determination enters into its data. Thus if the orbit of a comet is to be calculated its actual course must be ascertained by observations, or in at least a part of its extent. Taking the result of these observations, the mathematician asks what is the ideal law of these data? and he answers his own question by conceiving with the aid of calculation,

an ideal line or curve, which is not at all identical with the path actually travelled, but which represents the path to which the body approximates and which it would realize, were all empirical variations eliminated. The difference between pure and applied mathematics is, therefore, largely one of relation to ordinary experience. The one starting with the ideal and approximating to the empirical sphere; the other starting from ordinary experience and approximating the ideal.

Similar results will follow from a consideration of the transformation which reflection brings about in the apprehension of time. We have seen that time is primarily the form of a flowing consciousness; it presents itself, therefore, as an onward movement. Time has only one dimension which might be represented in the line described by a mathematical point in passing from one position to another.¹ Time presents three aspects, which we call past, present, and future; or memory-time; that "saddleback of time," which is grasped in a present experience; and anticipation-time. These are empirical distinctions in the time of presentation. Reflection, however, involves, as we have seen, the achievement of a new stand-point from which presentation time is transformed. When the *I* rises out of the stream of time-presentation its self consciousness has defined itself against the stream which now becomes object and is played upon by the activity of conception. The result is the concept of time as pure change, as the incessant flow of discrete pulses, an endless sequence of discreteness. Now, the reflecting consciousness here as in the case of space, seeks some point of rest as the *pou sto* of its determination of time, but it finds everywhere the instability of incessant flux. Where then shall the stand-point of the concept of time be found? We have seen how the mathematical point arises as an ideal posit of the *I*. A corresponding point in time is required

¹ Strictly speaking time is not dimensional at all, but rather the form of pure discreteness. It only becomes quasi-dimensional when it is spaced in the act of generating the line.

which shall mark the distinction between lapsing and on-coming time; this point can only be the present. But here again the old difficulty is encountered. Any empirical moment contains both lapse and onflow. A moment of pure presence can be achieved then only by transcending empirical time altogether and taking the stand-point of the reflective intelligence. In short the ideal-present is the *posit* of the *I*, and like the corresponding term in space is a hypothetical but necessary point of departure for the realization of a reflective intuition of time. When time becomes an object of contemplation to the self which has risen out of its stream, the starting point of the conception is found in a timeless moment, a point of stability occupied by reflection and in relation to which time becomes an objective flow of discrete moments.

The notion of time is that of unlimited discreteness. The flow of time is only the procession of incessant difference and change. Time is a purely separative, divisive, individuating conception. Nothing has any continuity in the same time as it may have continuity in the same space. The present is, therefore, a moment of stable identity in a stream of endless differences. It is this property of time which mathematical reflection seizes upon when it extracts from the notion of time the principle of discrete magnitude. The simplest operation of arithmetic is counting. But there is an experience antecedent to this which leads to practical results that are similar. A cat with three kittens finds on returning to them that one of the group has strayed away, and goes off in quest of it. "See the intelligence of the cat. She is able to count," exclaim the unreflecting. But the experience does not necessarily involve anything like actual counting. We have only to suppose the powers of memory and association in the cat's mind in order to see how on her return to her kittens a memory-image of the absent one arises and sends the mother off in quest of its original. There is, in short, a representation in the cat's mind of an object that is ordinarily present, but which is

now absent. In order to reinstate the experience of presence the search is instituted. Counting is, however, a more complicated process. It involves in its very simplest form a power on the part of consciousness to segregate the content of any distinct pulse of experience from that of other pulses, and to regard it apart from these. This is involved in its ability to say, or at least to conceive, *one*, or the unit. The unit is the content of a present experience conceived apart from other contents, and as indivisible, though the indivisibility may be a sort of uncritical assumption. This content of a present experience will usually be some object of sight, say, a marble, but that is unessential. When consciousness has objectified the content of any moment of present consciousness as one, it has thereby achieved the *pou sto* of the counting process. To count is to pass our world before us in its discreteness ; to note as discrete and by itself, the content of each moment or pulse of consciousness as it passes. Thus, the boy having achieved the *one* stand-point of number, is able to segregate this marble world which has been to him up to this point a mere undefined aggregate, into the discrete series one, two, three, four, and so on indefinitely. To count, says H. B. Fine, in his profound little book on number, "is to note the one to one correspondence of things." To this I agree, and it is his process that I am here seeking to ground in the reflective consciousness.¹ One to one correspondence implies the possession of the consciousness of the *one*. This achievement I have tried to exhibit above as the initial step in the development of the number-consciousness. The first counting is relatively concrete, the distinguishing of several successive contents of successive moments of consciousness, and naturally breaks down before it has proceeded

¹ Fine also connects counting with space rather than time. The justification of this is to be found in the fact that in the objective act of counting things, time has already coalesced with space and the situation is already complex. It will be found by analysis, I think, that the notion of discreteness involved in the ability to count is a pure product of time.

far. But gradually a *number-form* or concept is abstracted from this experience, this number-form being simply the ability of consciousness to hold before it the representation of a succession of empty moments, which take gradually the form of the number series, one, two, three, four, say, up to nine. The boy in making this achievement is gradually developing that term in his own consciousness, the concept of the number series, which is necessary to render free counting possible, and his counting from this point will take the form of noting a one to one correspondence of things, one term of this correspondence being the number-series which he now carries in his own mind.

The notion of number, when once achieved, becomes the principle of discrete magnitude, while that of space when achieved becomes the principle of continuous magnitude. Mathematics thus attains the ground-principles that are necessary to its operations, and from which may be developed the mathematical view of the world. There is, however, a distinction upon which we are tempted to dwell here, although at the risk of digressing from the main line of our discussion. I mean the distinction that is ordinarily made between the two kinds of magnitude, discrete and continuous. We are in a position here to see, as I think, how this distinction arises out of a difference in the nature of space and time. Space is continuous, and its generation shuts out discreteness, and naturally reflection finds in space-dimension, or rather in the generation of space-dimension, its notion of continuous magnitude. Time supplies, as we have seen, the principle of unlimited discreteness, and thus leads naturally to the number-principle and the notion of discrete magnitude. Now magnitude is a general name, of which quantity is a specification; the former being a concept of indefinite extension or indefinite plurality; the latter involving the notion of some limit-determination. The *quantus* or how-muchness of magnitude involves more than the simple noting of the one to one correspondence of things; it involves the further notion of a limit of plurality or extension at least

in a germinal form. When we come to the notion of *measure* we strike a further determination. The concept of measure is that of a definite limit of magnitude. It involves not only the *quantus*, how much, but it is already in possession of the answer, *so much*. The notion of quantity has thus been seized upon by consciousness, and defined as a standard of objective measurement; the yard, or foot, or hour. This being true, I think it will be evident that the first processes of counting are much simpler than the simplest processes of measurement.

It is clear at this point, I think, that the space and time of reflection, while rising upon that of presentation, is not a simple continuation of it, but rather a transformation. It is upon the transformed space and time of reflection that mathematics and the mathematical intuition of the world are founded. We have seen above how the concepts of space and time arise, and how the principles of continuous and discrete magnitude are grounded in these concepts. In all this we have simply been observing one aspect of the process in which experience, through the mediating activity of reflection, takes a new step in the conquest of its world. The further significance of this will be the theme of another chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF QUANTITY AND QUALITY.

EXPERIENCE passes definitely into the quantitative stage when it begins to shape the question, How much? The child that says, "Me wants much berries, or two, or a lot of berries," has doubtless as yet made no formidable inroads into the territory of abstract ideas, but he has put the interrogation to his world that will in the end revolutionize and transform it. The child's question is a demand on reality which arises under the pressure of immediate want, and this is doubtless the way in which all our problems originate. Eventually it frees itself from the slavery of particular desires, and then the question becomes the pioneer in a quest for the meaning of the world. We are not concerned here with the general form of that question, but rather with that special form which we call quantitative. The question, how much, is one that involves a definite category of content, either space or time; it is a question that involves either discrete or continuous magnitude. We have seen in the last chapter that the notion of quantity involves that of limit; not of fixed limit, but of one, rather, that is to be determined. The question of quantity is simply the form which curiosity about our world takes when we are conceiving it under the categories of space and time. Now, there are two modes in which this curiosity may express itself. It may take the form of an effort

either to develop the internal properties of space and time conceptions, or to determine the character of space and time as forms of the world of experience in general. The former effort leads to the development of mathematics in its pure form, and as an organ for the determination of the ideal laws of the concrete phenomena of space and time. Mathematical intuition, as we have seen, beginning with the analysis of conceptual space and time into dimensional terms, develops from these the principles of continuous and discrete magnitude, space yielding the former and time the latter in the notion of number or counting. That we have here the starting-point of the whole mathematical determination of the world is obvious.

The second form of the quantitative notion is that which leads to the effort to determine the character of space and time as forms of the world of experience in general. It is important to bear in mind here that the standpoint we have now achieved is not that of ordinary perception, but that of reflection. The space and time we are considering are the transformed space and time of conception. It is this space and time to which the predicates, universal and necessary, may be ascribed. There is no point of view from which presentative space and time assert themselves as either universal or necessary. Presentative space and time are simply present as elements of an immediate experience. The question of the necessity of the present does not arise, and that of universality in relation to a present experience has no meaning. No marvel, then, that Hume was unable to find either in space and time forms of a present experience. Kant was true to experience when he denied Hume's denial and reasserted universality and necessity; only he regarded experience as purely presentative, and was, therefore, led to assert for these, priority to all experience. We are able to see at this point that there is no priority of universality and necessity to presentative experience, and that when considered in relation to conceptual space and time, priority is simply another name for the mediacy of

experience. A few steps of analysis will make this clear. We have found it necessary to distinguish conceptual space and time from the space and time of presentation, and it has appeared, also, that conceptual space and time involve a fresh starting-point from which a unique intuition is achieved. All this goes to show that conceptual space and time are not forms of any world that is immediately realized in perception, that is, of any actually experienced world. How, then, are they related to the world? Philosophy is tempted to say here that conceptual space and time are pure subjective abstractions having no objective validity or relation to a real world. But if this temptation be withstood, I think we can find a better way. We have only to remember a vital distinction which we have already found it necessary to recognize, namely, that between the *actual* and the *possible*, in order to see a way out of the difficulty. It has been found that conception generally is a mediatory term, and that what it mediates is the possibility of experience. The whole of experience must be regarded as an effort to translate the possible into the actual. The concept mediates this effect by supplying the form of a possible experience, and conceptual space and time are to be regarded, therefore, not as forms of an actual, but rather as the forms of a possible experience. If experience is to go on, there must be the possibility of further advance, and the mode of this advance must be conceived. The starting-point is, of course, the presentative space and time of perceptual experience. Space and time are here forms of present and immediate realization. Experience is a process, however, and in order to get on there must be the possible, and the possible is that which is conceived as experience-content, but has not as yet become actual. It is to this sphere of possibility that universality and necessity belong. Let us seek the notion of this universality and determine, if we can, what it involves. In the first place, it is clear that universality of no specific character is not one that anybody can have any interest in affirming. The universal that has

significance must be specific in its character. Universality does not absolutely exclude the notion of limit. The idea of space may find a real limit in the idea of duty. If the question be, Can we conceive other possible forms of experience that are not spatial or temporal ? Plainly, Yes. If the question be, Can we conceive a limit to any given actual experience ? Again, plainly, Yes. But if the question be, Can we conceive a limit to possible experience ? the answer is just as plainly in the negative. If the possibility of experience is to be limited, the limit must be fixed outside the conceivable. The possibility of conceivable experience cannot be limited. Now we have seen that space and time are forms of conceivable experience. They are the forms, and the only forms, which enable us to conceive the extension of quantitative experience, and without them the conceivability, and, hence, the possibility, of quantitative experience would lapse. A universal may be defined, therefore, as the mediating form of a possible experience. Space and time are in this sense universals because they alone make a quantitative experience possible. Necessity is simply the obverse side of universality. If space and time mediate the possibility of quantitative experience, the question of necessity is one as to the quantitative experience itself. Is it conceivable that a limit should be fixed to the possibility of quantitative experience ? If we answer in the negative, as clearly we must, then space and time take their places as necessary in a world where the possibility of quantitative experience cannot be limited.

It appears then that the quantitative aspect of the experience-world is not capable of internal limitation. By that we mean that no quantitative limit to quantity is conceivable. We cannot conceive space as stopping anywhere, or time as reaching the end of its string. The world of quantity must be conceived as unlimited, therefore, in its own kind. We mean by this (1) that no limit can be assigned to the possibility of quantitative experience, and

consequently to space and time as forms of a possible world; (2) that the notion here involved is a purely quantitative conception. It means the negation or cancellation of quantitative limit. The reasoning here seems to be tautological, but the conclusion which it aims to express is that no assignable limit of kind can be imposed on to either space or time. Hume refutes the doctrine of the infinite¹ divisibility of space and time by showing its inconsistency with his own doctrine of empirical units of space and time. We do not need to point out here that this refutation rests on a misunderstanding which vitiates Hume's whole doctrine of mathematics. The space and time here involved are the conceptual forms of possible experience. The hypothetical starting-points in both conceptual space and time are without dimension, and nothing but an endless process can achieve the passage from the dimensionless to that which has dimension or the reverse. The endless divisibility of space and time is, therefore, necessary. That the unlimited extensibility of space and time is equally necessary a little analysis will suffice to show. Can we conceive a limit to the possibility of quantitative experience? No. Then it is impossible to assign any limit to space and time. The Kantian conclusion developed out of the mathematical antinomies, that the only space-and time-world that is knowable is one that is indefinitely extensible in experience, strikes in the neighbourhood of the truth then, and it is only necessary to substitute the term endlessly, as explained above, for indefinitely in Kant's phrase, in order to reach the essentials of our own doctrine. We have only to lay the spectre of a space and time in themselves and identify the unlimited space and time with the universal and necessary forms of the possible world of quantitative experience.

The consciousness of quality is different in kind from that of quantity, and yet closely incorporated with it. It

¹ The term infinite as used by Hume is the equivalent of endless or unlimited.

would be misleading here to attempt to deal with this consciousness from the point of view of objective qualities. These are in a sense its products, and what we are concerned about here is the genesis of the notion of quality and its essential nature. Here we may, I think, learn something from Kant. On its objective side quality is substantially reducible to existence, while on its subject side it is, as Kant truly apprehended it, the alternating pulse of assertion and denial. The truth in a nutshell is that the space- and time-world is not simply conceived in an ideal representation, but that it is posited in existential judgments. The problem to be solved is that of the origin of these existential judgments as elements of experience. The business here is in the first instance one of analysis. The existential judgment is resolvable into its judgmental and its existential elements, and the existential element is resolvable into the notion of existence as such, and that of the quantitative form or aspect of the conception. Now judgment, as we saw in the first section of this book, is an unique activity differing in species from conception and reasoning. It is in substance the characteristic act of the subject-consciousness in which it appropriates or rejects proffered content of experience. To judge is, therefore, to self-appropriate or to self-exclude, and an act of judgment may be characterized as an act of self-appropriation or self-exclusion. Judgment presupposes a presented content either of simple apprehension or of conception. In order that judgment may act, there must be present the vision of either an actual or a possible world, and the judgment will embody the attitude which the subject-consciousness takes toward the objective material presented to it. In the judgment we have an experience which arises as a reaction upon the content of the objective consciousness, primarily given in presentative and conceptual forms. The whole activity of knowledge cannot be packed into the judgment-form, for when we analyze out of the concrete judgment, the elements which the activity presupposes we find re-

maining as the essence of judgment a subject act, a species of consciousness in which the self relates itself definitely to some hypothetical content of experience.

The judgment is so closely bound up with existence, however, that all judgments would seem in their very nature to affirm existence, and there is a sense in which this is true. But the *differentia* of existence is not to be sought in judgment, and this is the vital point. Existence is primarily a matter of presentation or conception, not at all, in the first instance, a matter of judgment. To exist is to be present or presentable to consciousness. Existence may be defined as presentableness to consciousness. Kant involves himself in a knot of difficulty in his discussion of existence simply because he imagines it to be altogether an affair of judgment. The difference between the hundred dollars imagined and the hundred dollars in my pocket is, he thinks, the difference between non-existence and existence. The imagined hundred dollars do not exist, while the hundred dollars in my pocket do exist. But Kant is wholly unable to say what the notion of existence adds to the hundred dollars in my pocket. It adds nothing if we presuppose the dollars as already there, for in that case we must either identify existence with the content, and then in the judgment of existence we have the affirmation of content twice over; or, with some of the processes of consciousness by which the content is realized, and in that case the process is already there. We do not need to tangle ourselves in this net if we hold to the point that existence is not primarily an affair of judgment but of presentation and conception. Existence is presentableness to consciousness, and things may exist either actually or possibly. That exists actually which is content of a presentation or is reducible to such by the ordinary processes of experience, while that exists possibly which is content of a conception. We have seen that a concept is a mode of representing the content of experience as a whole. This content can never be reduced to actual presentation, but

must remain in the category of the possible. The object of conception, so far forth as it is conceived content, exists therefore only as a possibility, not as an actuality. Let us return with this insight to the problem of the hundred dollars. We say that existence is a property of the representation of the dollars, and is in this case present in the conception as truly as it is in the judgment.¹ Only the content of the conception is that which exists as a bare possibility, while the content of the judgment is that which exists actually; that is, either as actual content of presentation, or as that which may be reduced to this form by the ordinary processes of experience.

In the above representations there are, it is true, certain qualifications necessary in order that the position may be able to bear criticism. We have used the terms actuality and possibility in a way that requires some further definition. The actual has been defined as content of a presentative experience, and by this is meant not only what may be there at the present moment, but what may be there as a result of the ordinary processes by which experience is reduced to the form of presentation. Thus I believe that the Soudan exists actually, not merely as a possibility, because I am convinced that if I comply with certain conditions of cognition the Soudan will become actual content of presentative experience. The term actual includes, then, presented content, and that which may be reduced to this form by compliance with the ordinary conditions of cognition. The term possibility is also in need of further definition. We do not deal with the term abstractly here, but simply in its relation to existence. What do we mean by existing possibly? This question brings out a double meaning that is often concealed in the phrase. By existing possibly may be meant that which is conceived as content of a possible experience; that is, of an

¹ To put the matter in somewhat different form, we conceive the dollars as existing content just as truly as we judge them to be existing content. Conception does not, however, go beyond possible existence.

experience which may become real, but perhaps not reducible to the presentative form; as for example the satisfaction felt in the attainment of some good or the ideal content obtained through some process of learning. In the broad sense we say that such things exist, as content of a possible experience. But this meaning is not to be confused with another that is perhaps more germane at this point. Existing possibly may be simply the presence of the conditions of a disjunctive judgment. Let us consider how this may be. We have seen already that judgment is not the first activity, but has a presupposition. There must be presented or conceived content before judgment is possible. But the situation is not always simple. In fact the ordinary situation is that of rival alternatives contending for endorsement. To recur to the illustration of the hundred dollars, let us suppose that the alternatives are my pocket with the hundred dollars, and my pocket without this content. So far as the alternatives themselves are concerned, we have two contrary representations, either of which may be reduced to actuality by complying with the ordinary conditions of cognition. The situation represents the suspension of the judging function, and during this rest of judgment we can see clearly enough that the alternatives bear precisely the same relation to existence. They are both contents which may be reduced to actuality by complying with the ordinary conditions of cognition; which one of them is so reducible, is a question of fact, and does not affect their essential existential character.

The above result, if true, simplifies our problem somewhat, for our two alternatives, in the case of a suspension of judgment, bear the same relation to existence and exist actually, according to the above definition of actuality. Considered in their relations to experience and the ordinary conditions of cognition, they are both reducible to the content of presentative experience. For the term existing possibly there is left then only the one meaning, that of an experience-content which may be realized, but not perhaps

in the presentative form; while to all content which belongs definitely to the sphere of presentation, the term existing actually is applicable whether this content has been reduced to a present experience or not. Now, the situation as it presented itself to Kant was radically different from the one we have supposed. In Kant's case there was no suspension of judgment, but the pocket was first supposed to contain a hundred dollars, and then it was supposed to be empty. We have here a pair of judgments to start with. Then the case was debated on the supposition that the existential judgment applied to the full pocket, while the idea or representation of the hundred dollars applied to the pocket when it was empty. Thus we have placed over against each other, a judgment in accordance with fact, and a supposition contrary to fact, a situation out of which it is impossible to obtain any instructive result. In order to get on we must abolish all this complexity, and suppose that the fulness or emptiness of the pocket is the very point in question, and that with reference to this, judgment is at a point of rest. These are then the presented alternatives both existing actually, in relation to which the question of fact can be settled only by complying with the ordinary conditions of cognition. And it is only after the question of fact has been answered, and the pocket found to be full, let us say, that the alternative of the empty pocket is seen to be contrary to fact, and, therefore, to represent non-existence. The non-existent is, therefore, that alternative content that is cancelled by an experience which realizes some definite content opposed to it.¹ Thus experience in

¹ Some confusion as to existence might be avoided by distinguishing its notion from that of reality with which it is ordinarily identified. The existent is that which is present to consciousness, and this may be either actual, possible, or necessary: or it may be real or unreal. To become real consciousness must take some definite attitude toward it, either of appropriation or rejection. It is this act of self-appropriation or rejection, which embodies itself in our theoretic and practical judgment, that translates the presented into the real world. Apart from this there may be existence in plenty but no reality.

affirming the content of the full pocket, throws out as non-existent the alternative content of the empty pocket.

The doctrine we are defending here is not that existence and non-existence have no relation to judgment, but rather that they are in the first instance qualifications of content and not of the judgment-form. Things are not non-existent because they are judged to be so, but they are judged to be non-existent only after they have been rendered so by actual content of experience. It is impossible to see how a judgment of existence could rest on any other ground. We have seen, moreover, that the essence of judgment is self-appropriation or rejection of proffered content. But there is none of this activity in existential experience. The so-called existential judgments represent the activity of judgment at its vanishing point. It is in a strict sense only an act of re-cognition; we find that primarily our judgments have little to do with the existence of things, except to admit what has already been determined before some other court. In the light of this fact the question becomes pertinent as to what precisely the relation of existence to judgment may be. Is a simple assertion of existence a real judgment? We think not. When we say God is, have we affirmed anything that we did not already possess? It is impossible to say that this judgment adds any new content to experience or knowledge. This will be clearer if we recall the fact that judgment is not a primary activity, but that it presupposes presentation and conception. Content *presents* itself in these forms, and its existence, actual or possible, has already been determined. The judgment of existence in reference to such content is exactly like the judgment we pronounce when we recognize the presence of some content in the familiar phrase: "Well, here you are." The judgment adds nothing that was not already in the presentation.

On the contrary, a real judgment effects some modification of content. It either adds content to content, as, "God is love," or it adds some definite form to content already

there, as, "the field is triangular." Of course there is a sense in which the qualification affirmed in these judgments must be already in presentation or conception. We are not asserting that judgment is independent of other processes, but simply that in a real judgment some qualification of content is involved. And we have seen that this qualification may be brought about in two ways, either by adding content to content or by a formal determination of content. When either of these things is done a real judgment has been pronounced. What then is the relation of such existence to judgment? Simply that existence is the *presumptive point* of all judgment. The judgment, God is love, means that the presented content of the idea of God is such that love becomes part of its qualifying content. The field is triangular, means that the presentation of the field is such that triangularity becomes a formal qualification of its content. Unless this material or formal modification is effected no real judgment has been pronounced, and the judging activity has been simply playing around its presumptive point. Existence is this presumptive point, and we may say, therefore, that all judgments involve existence, in so far as they presume the presence of some content about which they are affirmed.

Returning then to the main line of the discussion, we may say that judgment is a function which presupposes existential content, and the judging activity is, objectively considered, the qualification of this content. What then, we may ask, is it *subjectively* or in its significance for consciousness? Clearly judgment is the activity in which the subject achieves its own self-consciousness. The judging activity is an ego-function. In it the self asserts itself in an act which objectively may be described as an operation on reality, but subjectively it is an act in which the subject rises to the consciousness of itself as possessing or excluding certain qualified real content as its own. Judgment always represents the subject-moment of experience. The elimination of judgment from consciousness would mean the lapse

of self-consciousness. If it were possible, which it probably is not, consciousness would become purely objective, a thing of content, but with no sense of its subject-relations. The judgment-consciousness on its subjective side is what Kant had in view in his category of quality. The designation is in view of its objective aspect as a qualifier of content, but the moments are subjective. Affirmation and negation are acts of a pulsating consciousness, and limitation, for which we might substitute qualification is simply a designation of this consciousness in view of the function it performs on content. Every judgment, whether it be affirmative or negative, is, so far forth, a definition of the real. Its function is definition, qualification, limitation of some existential content.

Now, if we conceive this qualifying activity as mediated in its relation to the objective, by space and time, we will be able to see how a synthesis of the qualitative with the quantitative is effected in judgment. The judgment is subjectively an activity in which the self becomes related to its content. Objectively it is a qualification of reality. But this qualification cannot be effected by judgment alone. Without the mediation of some percept or concept, judgment would simply play around its presumptive point. Here the mediating terms are space and time, or, to be more accurate, the principles of the quantitative use of the understanding derived from them, those of continuous and discrete magnitude. The qualitative consciousness has not at this stage in its evolution achieved a point of view from which pure qualitative self-determination is possible. The self-consciousness, while it does shape itself into the I, is always an I that is absorbed in some objective operation. It is a stage, therefore, in which there are *ego*-functions, which operate under objective categories, but no *ego*-function which relates itself consciously to its activities as a whole. The subjective unity of experience as a whole is as yet a latent term in consciousness, and only to be awakened when consciousness begins to conceive its own activities under more subjective categories than those of space and time.

The aim of this chapter has been to show how consciousness of quality becomes incorporated with that of quantity, so that our judgments in this sphere become quantitative and mathematical. We have seen that this incorporation is effected through the mediating concepts of space and time, which are the categories of the world of quantitative determination. From the concepts of space and time, as we have seen, the principles of discrete and continuous operations in quantity have been deduced. The mathematical consciousness is thus equipped for its work. Not only so, but the apodictic character of the mathematical data stands vindicated from the destructive criticism of Hume. On the one hand we have achieved the stand-point in reflection from which mathematical science may be developed in its pure and applied branches, while on the other we have seen how space and time serve as mediating categories of a certain phase of experience. To exhibit this has been our main purpose. In the synthesis of the qualitative and quantitative under the concepts of space and time we not only achieve an instrument of mathematical reflection, but also an important stage in the experience of reality. By means of this synthesis the objective world takes on its first formal aspects, and the subject world utters itself in these *ego*-judgments which stand as first forms of definite self-realization.

CHAPTER V.

THE VOLITIONAL CATEGORIES. CAUSE.

WE do not come upon the various aspects of reality by a species of accident, but they arise inevitably in the course of a normal experience. Space and time constitute for us the representation-forms of the world of quantity. But that they are not exhaustive is proved by the fact that other ways of representing reality may and do arise. It is not by accident either that we have designated the group of categories under this section, volitional. The common characteristic of the group is that they are dynamic, and constitute the forms of a world of energies. We saw in an earlier chapter how closely the whole cognitive activity of consciousness is connected with underlying volitional functions, so that our first intellec[t]tions are dominated by purely practical motives. In space and time cognition achieves categories which enable it to assert relative independence of volition, and to develop an instrument for the intellectual determination of the content of reality. But underlying this whole sphere of space and time determination is that of volitional activity and effort, and it is inevitable that this activity should itself at some point in experience become an object of cognitive interest, and that through this interest certain categories of a volitional type should arise, in the light of which a further objective determination of the world becomes possible.

Where, then, shall we look for that fontal experience out of which these dynamic categories are to emerge? If we bear in mind that the order of experience is first the objective, then the subjective, we will be prepared to look for our starting-point somewhere in the region of the objective consciousness. We saw also, in seeking the origin of space-form in experience, how the content of the objective consciousness gradually becomes defined as an object, so that the world of stimulation is now no longer wholly undetermined. Let us now see whether this supplies the datum needed for the emergence of a dynamic category. The fact we are made conscious of when our volitional energy falls upon an object that has been somewhat defined is that of *resistance*. Psychology has magnified this experience as the spring of some of the most important elements of the mental life. The point of importance here is that the experience of resistance when interpreted objectively, which it always is in the first instance, presents itself to us as a qualification of the object. We do not experience resistance, but resisting objects. In short, we find ourselves environed by things which seem to take delight in thwarting and nullifying our own energies. These recalcitrant objects may be the bodies of our own companions, which we conceive as being moved by will-energies like our own. In fact, it is very probable that our world will at first be filled up largely with living beings with which we are associated. But this is a matter of comparative indifference, for whether our objects be animate or inanimate, their resisting quality will be equally conspicuous. The objective world from this point of view will obtrude itself upon us as a system of resisting things which obstruct our movements and stubbornly persist in making us get out of their way.

Out of this experience of resistance several categories will gradually emerge, the first, and in many respects the most important, being that of *cause*. Let us then proceed to the analysis of cause in order to determine how it comes to be a dynamic category of the objective world. There are

no doubt three stages that are distinguishable in the genesis of our experience of cause, the first of which is involved in our experience of the effect which resisting objects produce upon us. Not every effect will serve, but the object must set itself in resistance to our will, we must feel ourselves put out of the way by the object and must suffer something from its resistance, say a stumped toe or a bruised finger. The second stage will no doubt be that of our reactions upon resisting things in which we will have the experience of mastering the things and putting them out of our way. The first stage gives us the passive aspect of cause, ourselves mastered and put out of the way by things. The second stage supplies the active side, our wills mastering things and putting them out of our way. This is the sense of agency. Now there is a third stage in which we learn to translate the impacts and collisions of things among themselves into terms of our own experience with things. Out of our own causal experience arises the power of seeing things, not ourselves resisting one another, and putting one another out of the way. If the subject of this experience be a boy or a savage, he endows things with wills, and translates their experience into an exact counterpart of his own. This shows the volitional root of the category. As the boy grows older or the savage more intelligent, he becomes less anthropomorphic in his conceptions of things. He no longer endows the inanimate with conscious will. In short he subtracts his notion of consciousness from his conception of agency and the causality of things upon things becomes to him a species of non-conscious energizing. But the volitional character of the relation survives in an important sense. The notion of agency, of things mastering things and producing changes in them, persists as the essential feature of the notion of cause. From the genetic point of view Locke was right, then, when he identified the notion of cause with that of agency and conceived power to be its essential characteristic. Naive and uncritical as Locke's account is, it seems to me to strike much closer to the genetic root of the

notion of cause than does the more laboured and critical representation of Hume. The truth is, Hume's account of the origin of the notion of cause is largely mythological. He excludes all dynamic quality from it at the outset and attempts to reduce it to an idea of invariable time-sequence which has been generated by experience of the uniform sequences of certain elements in consciousness. We might admit the mode of genesis without thereby conceding Hume's conception of the nature of the notion. But it is safe to say that Hume has missed the true genetic account. It may be that the boy's notion of cause is crude, and that reflection will lead him to modify it, but that a cause is to him an agent that does something to something, is sufficient proof that the origin of the notion is volitional, and not as Hume conceived it to be.

In his genetic account Hume is in reality exploiting a result of reflection. This will be clear if we remember that it is the notion of cause as universal and necessary, that he is seeking to explain. It has already appeared in the doctrine of space and time, that the criteria of universality and necessity are absent from the space and time of presentation, and belong only to that of conception. The same distinction will need to be observed in the treatment of cause. There is a spontaneous experience of cause which precedes its reflective apprehension. When the boy observing some behaviour of an object asks what makes it do that, he is expressing the spontaneous notion of cause. The cause of the behaviour is the something that makes it do it. There is, of course, a latent assumption here of the necessity of some cause, but such reflection has never risen into the boy's consciousness. The cause of the spontaneous consciousness is an efficient agent that is factual rather than necessary. When, however, we begin to reflectively apprehend cause the graver issues begin to arise. The principal of these are the questions concerning the nature of the idea of cause, and of cause as universal and necessary. What is cause and how is it related to the

objective world? It is here that we meet directly the issue raised by Hume. Is cause a category of energy or is it merely a relation of time-sequence? It is evident to reflection that cause bears some temporal relation to its effect, and Hume may be right in seizing on this temporal relation as the most available datum in experience for determining the special causal connections of its contents. The question is different, however, when we ask for the nature of the connection between a and b when it is said to be causal. We are then interested to know not how a and b came together but the nature of their connection. Do we mean to say that there is nothing in the connection that cannot be explained by the supposed method of their coming together? This question was never fairly faced by Hume. It was left to J. S. Mill to meet it squarely, and it soon became apparent to him that the definition of cause as invariable time-sequence would have to be given up. The uniqueness of the causal relation impressed him, and in order to escape the implications of the volitional theory, which he denied, he conceived a cause to be an unconditional time-antecedent of a change or event. The cause of b is that time antecedent a , the absence of which would inevitably entail the absence of b . Here we have plainly a relation of necessity, and the question is whether this necessity is mathematical or of some other species. Now, Kant has shown that the necessity of cause is not mathematical, since, as he contends, there is nothing in the notion of an event or change from which an antecedent could be infallibly deduced. This is true of both terms of the causal relation. If the unconditionality of cause is not deducible from time it must represent something unique and irreducible in the notion. Locke thought the essence of cause to be power, and this points, I think, in the right direction. We have seen that genetically, cause is a form of volitional agency, and when the notion of volition is eliminated that of agency still survives. But agency is activity and the cause is, therefore, a form of activity. In

the two terms, activity and time, we may possibly find data that will lead to important conclusions.

There are only two species of activity conceivable, that which contains the principle of its own initiative, and that which finds its initiative in another. The first we call self-activity, the second stimulated or conditioned activity. Now, that whose activity is conditioned or stimulated has as its presupposition an antecedent stimulation; and extending this supposition we reach the conception of a *series* or system of activities in which each depends on an antecedent activity for its initiative, and each in turn becomes the antecedent source of initiative for another. We thus arrive at the notion of a system of conditioning activities which we call causes, and of conditioned activities which we call effects. But inasmuch as such a system contains no point of *first* initiative, no absolute term, each of its parts is at the same time cause and effect. From one point of view it is the stimulation needed to initiate another activity, and from another it owes its own activity to the stimulation of another. The notion of causality is thus one of conditioned agency, and this is the element of uniqueness in it. It involves time in a very essential way. For conditioned agency—that is, agency which depends for its own initiative on another—is not possible out of time. Time in its order of sequence supplies the form of such agency. The dependence of activity on other could express itself in no other form than that of time. Hence, if we distinguish the form of cause from its content, its inner pulsation, we will find that formally it is invariable antecedence and consequence in time, while in its inner nature it is a species of activity. A good definition of cause would be, *conditioned activity in time*.

We have seen that cause on its inner subjective side is agency, and it is on this side that we are able to trace the development of the subject-consciousness in the experience of causation. The spring of it all is the volitional activity of consciousness, which takes the form of a subject-

consciousness reacting upon stimulations in the way of appropriating or rejecting their content. In short, volitional experience is an activity which brings the subject-consciousness into relation with something on which it depends as the stimulating source of its own adaptive activities. Now, while it is true that the first outcome of this situation for knowledge, will be some determination of the object, yet the development of the subject-consciousness is inseparable from that of the objective. The very form of volitional experience, as we have seen, involves a collision between the subject-consciousness, and something objective, and the cognitive gain of this experience for the subject comes in the development of the subject's awareness of itself as standing over against an object or not-self. It is in volitional experience that the distinction between self and not-self is developed and the self defines itself as opposed to and distinct from the not-self. Clearly it is in volition that the duality of experience is effected and clearly defined. Will is a principle of self-determination in the sense that it must have as a background at least, another or not-self in view of which the self is defined. In volitional activity we have, then, the spring out of which the first sense of conditioned self-agency arises.

The most concrete notion of cause we have found to be that of volitional agency. The will-element is, however, soon abstracted from, while the notion of agency persists. We learn to detach agency from our own consciousness and from that of others, and to conceive that unconscious things, sticks and stones, are also agents which may do something to us and to one another. This is the first stage in the definition of the notion of cause. There is first the volitional activity itself, which is by degrees extended to things as well as persons. But an abstraction has now been made, and the boy, say, is able to represent things without wills as agents that receive changes from other things and are capable of producing changes in others. The world of things is represented as a system of give and

take. Now, the essential core of this representation is the notion of agency, and, to define more strictly, conditioned agency. The boy has not conceived the notion of conditioned agency in a very abstract form, but he has the substance of it in his notion of things without wills engaging in this give- and take-activity. The truth is, we may suppose the boy to have reached this stage of causal experience without ever having conceived the notion of cause abstractly. The causal experience, like that of space and time, has its stage of relative immediacy. Cause, if not a presentation like space and time, has at least a spontaneous stage in connection with presentative space and time. If we suppose that the perception of space has developed sufficiently for the perception of things, then by an unreflecting, if not unconscious, process, activity which as first apprehended is volitional, is gradually transferred to things which are no longer represented as having wills. The notion of cause thus achieved is a product of the spontaneous activity of consciousness, and there is no reason for believing that the situation has been in any proper sense of the term, conceived. The concept of cause arises at a later stage when consciousness has become reflective. This conditioned agency is mediated by time. We have seen that time is the form of a change-series. In the stage we are now dealing with time has not been abstracted from change, but is apprehended in the concrete; and it would be perhaps more strictly accurate to speak of the time-sense, and to ask how the time sense mediates the experience of cause. Put in this way the answer is clear. The time sense is in its first overt form, as we saw, the sense or perception of objective change. It is through the time-sense that the world presents itself as a series. But the serial form is indispensable to the notion of cause. A world of causation is a world of serial conditions. Kant saw the fundamental connection of time with cause, although, as it seems to me, he missed this connection in his famous section on the category of cause. For, if the time-sense supplies the

form of the causal series, it follows that no series in which the primal overt relation of the parts is not that of time-sequence can be considered causal. We may contemplate in succession, backward and forward, upward, and downward, the parts of a building, but we are all the time presupposing as the basis of our experience a certain fixed order of parts in space. The time-sequences do not in any sense affect this order, and hence the relation of its parts cannot be regarded as causal. The boat moving down the stream supplies a different situation in which time enters as a constituent factor in determining the form of the events. The series is, therefore, causal. Time mediates cause by supplying its indispensable *event-form*, and thus determining the world of cause as a world of sequence. The causal experience then becomes possible. The most concrete presentation of the causal world, that is, of things suffering and inflicting changes or modifications, has as its form the time-series, inasmuch as the changes themselves are terms of a time-series, and could not be otherwise conceived.

But the causal experience is not completely exhausted in the time-series. It is vitally important that we should note this. The time-sense is not identical with the experience of cause, any more than time is identical with change. Time is the form of change, but change itself in its inner nature is activity. Change might be defined as activity in time, and as we have already defined cause as activity in time, the two might seem to be identical. To conclude so would be a hasty inference. Let us ask ourselves whether the experience of change is the same as that of cause. What is the experience of change? It is clearly the sense we have of passing from one condition to another following it, and objectively, our perception of the passage of things from one state to another. The change is this activity of transition. Now, what is the experience of cause? It is our sense that some change we observe in ourselves or others, say the change in an animal from life to death, is

due to some activity which is not identical with this passage, but is presupposed by it. Thus, poison may have been administered, and the change-series, from a state of health to one of death, follows. Now this whole change-series may be observed by us without our having any experience of cause. The first experience of cause, as we have seen, is that of ourselves doing something to something else, or suffering something from something else. Later it becomes more detached from ourselves, and we observe things acting and reacting as agents in the game of give and take. But through all this refining process the notion of agency survives. This being the case, our experience of the passage of the animal from a state of health to one of death becomes causal when we connect it with some agent which is supposed to have initiated the changes we have observed. Our experience becomes causal by virtue of that connection. This is what the boy is in quest of evidently when he asks, What killed the bird? or What makes the engine behave so? The change-series has been observed, and the question of cause is one of initiative. The time-world is one in which things have a beginning, and the question of cause is one concerning the conditions of this beginning.

The notion of causality must be distinguished, therefore, from that of change. The notion of change is rather to be identified with effect than cause, for it is that of the series, the beginning or initiation of which is to be accounted for. Effects are changes or series of changes that are connected in experience, either directly or indirectly, with some initiating agent, and it is in their relation to this agent alone that they are considered effects. Apart from this relation, changes are simply events in time, and do not point beyond themselves. We see the sparrow flying about alive, and a moment later we see it drop to the earth dead. These are simply happenings; facts in a time-world which only call for explanation when we seek to make the experience causal, and ask for the initiating agent of the change. And we may refine the concepts of cause and effect as much as we

like, the notion of initiating agency will still survive. A cause will never be reducible to a change-series, but will always remain the concept of that which it is necessary to presuppose in order that the changes may be initiated. And it will be found that this presupposition will take the form of connecting activities observed, with other activities antecedent in time which are supposed to be necessary, in order that the activities observed may have a beginning.

In order intelligently to understand causal experience, it is important that we should distinguish at least two of its principal stages. These we call the stage of spontaneity and the stage of reflection. There is, of course, a sense in which a certain degree of reflection is involved in the simplest causal experience. That anything has a cause is, of course, not a perception but a kind of reflection. Up to a certain point, however, this reflection is not self-conscious, and it is immediately acting. In this stage the experience involves little or no abstraction. The agents are concretely conceived, and their activities are not considered apart from themselves. It is either one or other; living beings doing or suffering things, or else sticks and stones, which we have learned to regard apart from conscious will, doing and suffering things. The notion of agency is central in the whole experience, and the distinction between the agent that does or suffers and the other that suffers or makes to suffer, is never slurred. The situation is in the nature of the case one in which the self defines itself more and more clearly in relation to its objects. It is only in the reflective stage, however, that any definite conceptions of cause arise. The point in our experience when the notion of cause becomes an object of arrested attention, and we begin to be curious as to what the term means, marks a new epoch in our mental history. At that point we begin to develop a concept of cause and to subsume our world under it, and thus make a start in a process which it requires the whole of science and philosophy to complete. The reflective notion of cause from the outset is that of the

conditional beginning of things. The world of happenings is one that is not self-explanatory, but the very fact that change is its most obtrusive aspect leads us to conceive agents to whose activity the initiation of these changes may be ascribed. To the first reflection these agents themselves may not be further determined ; the question as to whether or not a cause is to be taken as an absolute beginning may and doubtless will be as yet in abeyance. No doubt the first step of reflection will be one of extension, and will involve the scope of causation. We have seen how the distinction between the possible and the actual arises in experience, and how in reflection we conceive a possible world in relation to which the categories of space and time take on the aspects of universality and necessity. The same process leads to precisely similar results in the case of causality. Spontaneously we seek a cause for every change or change-series. Reflectively we conceive that a cause is a universal and necessary term in a world of changes. We first conceive our world of change in terms of a world of possible experience. The conception may not be in any sense complete ; in fact, it is likely to be a mere sketch, few of the details of which have been filled in. It is sufficient at least for the present exigencies of reflection that we have been stirred to think on the change-aspect of things. From this starting-point the concept of a world of change soon evolves, and not far from this is the reflection that any change has a cause. This reflection contains the germ of the more advanced thought that a cause is a universal and necessary antecedent in a world of change.

The notion of cause as a universal and necessary category in a world of change thus develops. But the question still presses, What is a cause ? and reflection must go on. We have seen how the notion of agency persists in that of cause. At this point we have a further illustration of the same fact. The point which reflection attacks here is not so much that of agency as it is that of the kind of agency involved in causal initiative. The question, in short, whether

a cause is to be conceived as an absolute beginning, or only in a relative conditional sense, arises here, and we very soon begin to distinguish the notion of a causal beginning in a series of change from that of an absolute beginning. The two concepts are, as we shall see later, inseparably connected, and the notion of cause has, as Dr. Wm. T. Harris has well said, the notion of self-activity coiled up in it. But that consideration belongs to another chapter. The point of interest here is that reflection very soon reduces the notion of cause to that of a term in the change-series itself. A cause does not transcend our world of change; it is an element *in* that world, and is itself, in one aspect at least, a change. The temptation of reflection at this point is to become sceptical and to deny the difference between cause and change. A cause is simply a change among changes and has nothing characteristic. This was Hume's thought. Anything, he says, may be the cause of anything. From this it is a short and logical step to the identification of cause with mere time-sequence. A cause is only that change that happens to invariably precede another in time. But reflection must go back and resist the temptation. A cause may be an element in a change-series and still remain an agent. For when we ask for the cause of a change or series of changes, we are not looking for terms of that particular series, but for terms of another series that is conceived to be more fundamental. A teacher in a preparatory school finds that the majority of his pupils in a certain year have failed to pass the entrance examinations to college. This is a fact to be explained. No satisfaction will be gotten, however, out of the relation of this phenomenon with changes of its own series; that is, with results of former years. The only service of such comparison will be the clearer definition of the phenomenon to be accounted for. The first step in the right direction will be a search for a more fundamental phenomenon or series of phenomena, the operation of which will supply the initiative of the series to be explained. This explanatory series will be

found, let us say, in the indolence of the pupils or in bad methods of instruction, or in both. The discovery of these phenomena and their definite relation to the phenomenon to be explained supplies what we call its cause. This cause is in one aspect of it only a change or a series of changes, but in the aspect of it which entitles it to be called a cause, it is an agent which initiates another change or series of changes. The change we call cause belongs to a series that is conceived to be more fundamental than the series we call effect, and in relation to it, is the term that we must presuppose in order that the origin of the effect-series may be conceivable. The notion of agency is, therefore, a persistent element of that of cause. Assuming this, we are in a position to deal with the relative character of the notion of cause. The notion of cause is that of agency. But all the discoverable causes in this world of temporal phenomena are themselves phenomena and subject to the law of succession. Not only so, but they are subject to the law of agency itself. While we find them necessary in order to conceive the beginning of some other elements in our world, we find it impossible to conceive their own beginning without relating them to prior agency. If we seek in cause for a point of rest in our world we find that every cause is a vanishing point. There is no absolute cure for mutation in the notion of cause. Through the notion of cause we are able to relate changes to other changes deeper down in our world. But however deeply we may penetrate, we do not get below the foundation of sand. We are in the world of Heraclitus, where the flux is eternal and remediless, and were our reflection to stop here and attempt to take the notion of cause as final, despair would be our inevitable doom. There is a sense in which this despair has already seized upon the modern spirit, and we may admit with Hume that long-continued reflection on the world of change and the incessant flux which it presents, if not accompanied with something more profound, will inevitably plunge the mind into sceptical despair. That this despair is not in-

evitable, and that reflection may lead to better and more positive results will not be denied if we consider for a moment that conditional agency is not an ultimate conception. That which owes its initiative to another has its presupposition in that which contains its initiative in itself. The *prius* of conditional existence is self-existence. This is an insight as old as Aristotle, and as necessary to experience as the notion of cause itself.

CHAPTER VI.

SUBSTANCE.

CAUSE has been treated as the first of the volitional categories, and in the genetic order of experience it is no doubt the first of this group that rises into clear apprehension. The child is a seeker after causes long before he becomes curious about substances. Yet in the spontaneous experience there is an early appearance of the notion of substance. The unreflective consciousness first hits upon the notion of substance in the form of particularity. The child does not in its first experiences have the concept of gold, or wood, or stone, but its first experiences are of this piece of gold, this stick, that stone. Any one may remind us, of course, that the notion of gold is involved in the recognition of this piece of gold, and that it is somehow involved in the most particular experience. No doubt, but it is true, nevertheless, that notions make their first appearance well swaddled in the garments of a particular experience. Though important they seem to cut little ice at first, and take a very humble place in the experience as a whole. This is all we claim. The first substances with the boy are the pennies which he spends for sweetmeats or ammunition, the sticks or stones with which he persecutes the dogs and cats of his acquaintance. He has not consciously conceived stones and pennies as abstract entities, nor has he at this stage of his experience made any definite distinction between the notion of a thing

and that of its qualities. To conceive a thing as a mere bundle of qualities, or, on the other hand, as something apart from its qualities, belongs to a much later stage of reflection. The qualities get their recognition, and the boy says this lemon is sour or this stone is rough and hard. Along with this there is, however, a spontaneous recognition of substance. It is *this* stone that is hard and rough, and *this* lemon that is sour. In the very form of the experience a conscious distinction is betrayed, not between a thing and its qualities, but rather between something and its ways of showing or behaving itself, and in the recognition of a something that does show itself, or behave in certain ways, we have the germ of the notion of substance.

The central experience out of which the notion of cause arises is, as we have shown, that of resistance to our efforts to master things and put them out of our way. Now in this experience of resistance a peculiar feature begins to show itself. The resisting thing, however much we may master it and put it out of our way, will not vanish from our path. It manifests a kind of resistance which we learn to call solidity, and however much we may push it about in space there will be some place that it will monopolize and from which it will exclude and defy us. In other words, we experience the *persistence* of things as a special feature of their resistance. And inasmuch as our objective world is a space-world in which things define themselves and their qualities, our first experience of substance will take on the forms of the space-world. The forms in which persistence will first manifest itself in our experience will be spatial and may be expressed in the term solidity. The very first notion of substance which the boy gets is no doubt that of things as solid. If they simply resisted his energies they might escape substantial determination. But in the same activity in which they resist they also define themselves in space. The stone persists by virtue of its solidity, that is its holding out in a certain part of space against all the boy's efforts to expel or suppress it. If he were asked to

formulate his experience, and was able to give it expression, he would say that a thing is substantial to him only as it shows itself able to hold its own against his efforts to suppress or squash it. In a world where everything could be squashed, it is not at all likely that the notion of substance would ever arise. The notion of substance is clearly volitional in its origin. It arises, as we have seen, as an aspect of the experience of resistance which is at first very concretely interpreted by the child. The resistances it meets are the transactions of things with wills and are resented as such. No doubt the persistences of things are conceived in the same way. The refusal of things to be squashed will not at first be abstracted from volitional transactions, but will arouse the same kind of resentment as is provoked by resistance. The first notion of substance will involve then the notion of agency, and we might be tempted to conclude that agency is its essential feature. But this would be hasty. The fact of importance here is that substance and agency are inseparable, inasmuch as a substance that does nothing is inconceivable. A substance is not a substance however by virtue of what it does but by virtue of the fact that it *persists* in doing. Substantiality and persistibility seem to be interchangeable terms. The distinction here noted will be found to square with representations already made. The substantial is in the first instance the solid, and the solid is that which refuses to be squashed. The stone may scratch the boy's hand; it may fall on his foot and crush it even. This is not the experience out of which the notion of substance is born. The boy must bite upon the stone and find that it will not be crushed; he must stamp his toe against it; it must resist his effort to squeeze it with his hand. These are the experiences that give birth to the notion of substance. If, now, we differentiate the experience of persistence from that of simple resistance, we will also be able to differentiate the notion of substance from that of change. The notion of change expresses itself in that of a series of vanishing points. There is no point of rest in change.

The truth is the very notion of change involves the negation of rest. A change supplies no ground on which anything could support or assert itself. The world of change abstractly conceived is the incessant flux of Heracleitus. But the notion of substance supplies the point of rest in a world of change. The notion of substance as opposed to that of change is that of the stable, the persisting, the resting. Things not only resist, but they persist, and just as resistance is the spring of causal experience, so persistence is the spring of the experience of substance. Find me a point of stability and rest in experience, and to that point I will apply the name substance.

The experience of substance, like that of cause, is mediated by time, but in a peculiar way. Time mediates cause, as we saw, in its flow; that is, in the aspect of it which is the form of change. We saw, however, in our analysis, that the starting-point of time is a timeless moment, a posit of consciousness to which the flow in every part of it stands related. The present, in other words, is a starting-point for the whole of time. Now, the notion of substance is mediated by time in this point of present departure for all its moments. It is only in the light of this point of departure that time can be said to persist or continue. The time series does not persist, but vanishes. That time persists and that time shall not end, these are true to the point of departure, for to that point there shall always be time; the world shall always flow on. And this is true, because in the present we achieve a point of rest which transcends the flow, and from the point of view of which alone the flow of time becomes a fact of experience. It is in its timeless point, then, that time mediates the notion of substance. The notion of substance, as determined by time, is that of something which in its participation in the time-series, its flow through the succession of changes, has in it a point of present departure from which the whole series may be conceived and constructed. This is, in truth, involved in the simplest experiences. When

the boy selects out the ball with which he has been in the habit of playing from the other balls, he in fact takes that and that alone which unifies a whole series of experiences by supplying them a point of present departure. The other balls are not substances to him in the same real sense. In truth they are only substances in the sense that through their similarity to his own ball they supply to him starting-points for possible experience-series like his own. He does not think of this, of course, but the translation of what he does think and feel into these terms is a short and easy process.

Let us take this notion of substance then, and follow it through the spontaneous and reflective stages of experience. Originating, in the first instance, as a notion of solidity, as something that succeeds in keeping us out of its place, it takes on an additional qualification when we come to regard it as a point of present departure for the unification of a series of experiences in time. The boy's ball is more to him than a persistent solid; it is an object which supplies to him a point of present departure for the unification of a whole series of experiences. The notion of substance here indicated is a virtual achievement, as we have seen, of the spontaneous and relatively unreflecting consciousness. When real reflection originates, and the notion of substance itself has been arrested in an act of attention and is made the object of reflective activity, the implications of the spontaneous experience begin to unfold, and a critical determination of the notion becomes possible. Now, one of the first efforts of reflection is to distinguish the notion of substance from that of quality. The merit belongs to Locke of having embodied this infancy of reflection in his treatment of the subject. Starting with a distinction of things into substance and qualities, he precedes his doctrine of substance with an analysis of quality. Without entangling ourselves in his theory of perception, we may start with his distinction between primary and secondary qualities of things. The primary quality is the respect in

which the thing resembles our perception of it. Thus, its solidity or figure is a primary quality. A secondary quality, on the other hand, is an effect in consciousness due to some unknown property of the thing. The plexus of primary and secondary attributes constitute the qualitative aspect of the thing. Locke found that when he had summed up the solidity, figure, colour, sonance, etc., of things, he had exhausted the resources of perception, and he had to face the doubt whether after all a thing is anything but the sum of its qualities. Locke was guided by a correct instinct when he refused to allow this and protested that a thing is a substance. But what is the substance of things apart from their qualities? Here was the sticking point with Locke. His conception of qualities was such as to leave no place for substance except as an outside support for qualities. The substance of a thing was, in Locke's view of it, some residuum, after its qualities have been exhausted, and which by rights ought to make itself known. Its failure to do so threw Locke into the most painful perplexity. Now we may well agree with Locke's critics, that the substance he was seeking is a Will o' the Wisp. We will never find substance apart from its qualities, or as a mere external support of these, but whether this failure justifies us in denying the reality of substance is another question.

The next step in modern reflection was in this negative, sceptical direction. Finding no other ground in experience for the affirmation of substance, Locke contents himself with protesting that it is necessary. Berkeley agrees with Locke that substance has no empirical ground to rest on, and then by calling in question the Lockian theory of perception, seeks to show that the plea of necessity is groundless. Berkeley's scepticism is confined to the notion of material substance, but that of Hume is more sweeping. It is in Hume that modern reflection first gets down to real fundamental criticism. Taking as settled all that Berkeley had accomplished, Hume attacks that which we have seen to be central in the notion of substance, namely, the

persistence of things. He has no difficulty in showing that our perceptions of things do not persist. In order that the thing may persist through a series of perceptions it must maintain itself apart from our perceptions, and be the same to-day, for example, that it was yesterday. The notion of substance involves, then, the ability of so-called things to maintain their self-identity apart from our perceptions. Hume's criticism may be summed up in two propositions. (1) There are no things apart from our perceptions; things and our perceptions of them are one and the same; there is no persistence in our perceptions, but what seems to be continuity is only rapid succession of resembling parts. Now, if we would avoid the pit into which Kant fell in supposing an abstract world of isolated things in themselves, there is a sense in which we will admit that the first proposition states an important truth. There are no things apart from our perceptions, if by our perceptions we mean experience. If we say that there are no things apart from experience, and remember that experience has two categories, the actual and the possible, we are taking a defensible position. We do not know that Hume meant this. In fact, it is certain that his concept of experience was defective. Be this as it may, the doctrine that there are no things apart from experience does not carry with it the conclusion that things are identical with our perceptions. A perception may be a very simple affair and yet lead to a very complex construction. Our experience of a thing will no doubt begin with some perception, but the thing will be the outcome of a more or less complex process of reinstatement. It is not always recognized that the experience of a thing is largely a process of reinstatement, and that the perception must furnish a starting-point for this reinstatement or the apprehension of the thing will not follow. The experience of things arises at such points and nowhere else. We do not mean that such reinstatements may not take place without the rise of the apprehension of a thing, for we remember that percep-

tion is also an indispensable condition of the apprehension of things. The experience of a thing is inseparable from a present perception. The point we are arguing is that it is not completely identical with this perception. It involves also a point of departure for the reinstatement of a series of actual or possible experiences. In other words, it involves a point with reference to which the flowing stream of perceptions will be one.

If this be admitted, it will be easy to concede the second of Hume's propositions, namely, that the law of our perceptions is not persistence, but rapid succession. The apparent unbrokenness of perceptual experience is that of a flowing stream, which may be broken up into moments. The continuity of things is what the perceptions testify to, rather than the substance of the perceptions themselves. When a present perception reveals the boy's ball to him, the perception is not the thing, but the witness of the thing. It reveals to him one of these points of departure from which a reinstatement of experiences becomes, in this instance, actual. The perception is a passing moment, but the thing is persistent and recurrent. Now, we have seen that the notion of substance is precisely that of such a point of reinstatement. The first experience of substance is that of persistence in the form of solidity. But this experience soon coalesces with that of time at its point of present departure. The notion of substance thus becomes that of a persistent point of present departure for the actual or possible reinstatement of experiences. But this we have seen is also an essential element in the notion of a thing. The bearing of it all is obvious. The notion of a thing necessarily involves that of substance, and Locke is right in protesting that substance is necessary. The critics were right, however, in refusing to accept Locke's notion of substance. But they were wrong in thinking that things could be adequately conceived as mere plexuses or bundles of qualities. The bundle cannot be conceived as a thing in itself, but there must be some persistent point in experience

for the reinstatement of the bundle as a whole. The bundle must be made up every time it is experienced, and we call the bundle a thing when the initiative of this making-up process is found in a present perception.

Hume was virtually blind to that whole aspect of things which is involved in the notion of substance. Things are simply bundles of qualities, and he thinks the bundle somehow makes itself up. When, on maturer reflection, this seems impossible, he becomes sceptical, and is disposed to regard things as illusions. It was at this point that Kant's criticism began. Kant was keen-sighted just where the vision of his predecessor failed. There is a sense in which it is true that Kant was the first modern mind to have a fresh intuition of substance. Up to his time the notion of substance had been treated as that of an ontological condition of experience and not as one of its elements. Kant repudiated this method, and the fundamental aim of his whole discussion was to develop such a concept of substance as would bring it into vital relations with experience as one of its constitutive elements. We do not mean, at this point, to enter into the details of Kant's doctrine of substance. What we propose is simply to point out the fact that Kant laid the foundations of an epistemological concept of substance, and, in doing so, made an epoch in modern thinking. We are not concerned here with his apriorism, which has been more often criticized than understood, but simply with the fact that the vitals of Kant's doctrine are to be found at the point of Hume's greatest blindness. Kant saw that the whole business of the concept of substance is to relate the fluent elements of experience to stable points of departure, from which their unification or reinstatement as a whole becomes possible. Without these stable points of departure it is impossible to conceive a flowing experience as realizing any centres of self-relation, and, therefore, as being rational. Kant's whole contention is that these stable points of self-relation are absolutely necessary. For otherwise the whole world of

experience would lapse into the Heracleitean flux, and there would be no point of reference from which anything could be either true or false; either substance then or the total and irrevocable lapse of the possibility of any knowledge.

Now, it is not necessary to be an unqualified believer in Kant's doctrine in order to see that the importance of his work consists quite as much in what is gradually defining itself in his representations as in anything that he actually says. He is too much given to stickling over the formal aspects of his doctrines, and his notion of architectonic is that of a pedant. But what Kant was really defining to our later vision was the close analogy of the notion of substance with that of self. Kant did not see this, at least with any clearness, but in his hands substance begins to assume the lineaments of a subject-activity. This will appear not only from his conception of substance as a necessary point of permanence and self-reference in experience, but from his whole doctrine of the categories and their relation to the judgment-functions in which they are affirmed. The categories are modes of conceiving experience-content, and we have seen how the judgmental function connects each with the *I*-consciousness. But the *I*-consciousness is itself a point of departure for the conscious unification of experience. Is it not significant, then, that the category of substance should be conceived as such a point objectified? Are we not at liberty to conclude that in the notion of substance the *I*-function objectifies itself, and thus originates in experience, objectively conceived, those stable points of self-reference which have been found to be so essential? It is in the thought of Kant that the notion of substance is revolutionized and quickened, ceasing to be that of a mere dead substrate and becoming the analogue of a living subject.

It would be interesting at this point to follow the post-Kantian development of the notion of substance through the reflection of his successors. We would then see how in the thought of the idealists the notion of substance became

gradually ontologized without losing its vitality until, in the system of Hegel, it becomes identical with that three-jointed activity of thinking which constitutes the inner core of all reality, while in that of the realists the self-assertiveness of substance is emphasized, and its notion becomes that of self-maintaining units of individual being. But to enter into any detail into this chapter of the history would lead us afield from our epistemological inquiry. Kant has brought us to see how the notion of substance supplies a vital element in our experience, and in so doing provides a true basis for epistemological doctrine. Reverting then to the main line of the discussion, we have seen how the reflection on substance developed in our modern thinking from Locke to Kant. And it is no doubt true that the principal stages in this development have their analogues in individual reflection. The business of reflection in general is to develop an adequate concept or thought of that which hitherto has been only implicitly or crudely apprehended. We have seen how the boy implicitly treats his ball as a persistent point of departure for the reinstatement of experiences as a whole. The same boy, if he goes on to reflect on the things of his experience, will find himself gradually distinguishing things from his perceptions of them. His first philosophy will be that of crude realism, and he will conceive things as having a life wholly apart from his perceptions. A second stage will be entered upon when it is discovered that this aloofness must be given up, inasmuch as things must adapt themselves to the mode of perception as a condition of being apprehended at all. This reflection is likely to lead the mind from crude realism to the opposite extreme of subjective idealism. For what is more natural, when the dependence of things on our modes of perception has once been discovered, than to jump to the conclusion that things are pure subjective constructions, and that being and perception are one and the same thing. And when this stage has been reached and things have become the creatures of our own imagination, so to speak, the plunge

into scepticism as to the reality of our world will be almost inevitable. The subjective world will almost inevitably seem to be an illusion, and our scepticism can be cured only by achieving some point of view which shall be revolutionary. The stage here indicated represents a point of departure for opposite conclusions. The reflecting consciousness will either succeed or fail to achieve the revolutionary conception. Failure will mean the death of philosophy, or at least sceptical despair. But let us suppose that success follows the effort. We may then ask what is the nature of the new point of view which is to work such momentous consequences? Kant compared the revolution effected to that which Copernicus brought about in astronomy. He claimed that just as Copernicus had shown that instead of the earth being central in the solar system the sun itself is central, so he was seeking to bring about the corresponding change in the intellectual world by showing that things must give up their absolute pretensions and become satellites of the intelligence in which they are apprehended.

Now, as a matter of fact, Kant only half effected the revolution he intended, when in truth it ought to have been altogether successful. The change he contemplated involved as its necessary outcome the substitution of the notion of an experience in and through which the world of things is to be realized for that of a world of things to which experience and its activities are simply related. But clearly, if such a revolution is to be successfully carried out, experience itself must be endowed with a realizing function. We cannot blow hot and cold with the same breath, and after taking away the independence of things, leave them a ghostly existence in a sphere that is inaccessible to experience. The notion of the dependence of things must be carried out to its logical conclusion in the doctrine that experience is a realizing activity, and that things can have no other reality than as content of actual or possible experience. Kant's lack of success was due to the fact that

he was still in bondage to the conception he was seeking to destroy, and was thus restrained from clothing experience with true realizing activities. That these are not two mutually exclusive spheres, a world of things standing in its own right and an experience trying to gain entrance into this world, Kant could never clearly make up his mind. But, thanks largely to his failure, we are beginning to learn the lesson that complete and unconditional surrender to experience is the first condition of the maintenance of the true objectivity of things. It is surely by this time becoming obvious that Kant's doctrine of the categories is central to his whole point of view, and that the categories are the only modes by which experience-content can be realized. If this be true, is it not clear that to persist in distinguishing between the content of experience and a supposed real, outside of it, is to infallibly reduce experience-content to pure subjectivity and illusion? We will then have on our hands an experience-world of pure illusion, over against which stands a world of inaccessible realities, and our last state will be worse than our first.

The revolution will be made effective if we clothe experience with a realizing prerogative and are willing to concede that the content that is achieved through the normal activities of experience is content of reality; that the world we are gradually realizing in the experience-process as a whole, is the real world. Now, it is this reflection, that the world which is defining itself to us in our experience-processes is the only real world, and that we have only to complete our notion of experience by connecting the actual with the possible, in order to see how the world of reality may be included in its content; it is this reflection, I say, that cures our scepticism and brings us back again to the status of reality. In its light all the categories commend themselves to us as functions under which the real becomes conceivable and takes its place as part of an actual or possible world.

The bearing of this reflection on the development of the

notion of substance will now become clear. The passage from perception to conception is in a sense a passage from objectivity to subjectivity. The concept is relatively more an affair of the subject-consciousness than is the percept. That being the case, the process of reflection would naturally be conceived as one that is abstracting and leading us away from reality were we not convinced that experience is itself a realizing activity. Let us once obtain a firm grasp of the doctrine that experience is a realizing activity, and it will follow that those concepts which arise as normally out of reflection as percepts arise out of the spontaneous activity, are also modes in which the real is defining itself. The conviction will grow upon us that the concepts of reflection are necessary in order to mediate the extension of our experience of the real world. Assuming, then, that the sceptical transition has been made and that we are prepared, from a new point of view, to regard things as solid realities, the question that remains will be how these solid realities are to be conceived. We are absolutely cut off from regarding them as independent of experience. They must be brought inside and treated as determinations of experience-content, and the only question here is what sort of a determination is involved in the notion of substance? In seeking an answer we will avoid thrashing over old straw by assuming at the outset that the notion of substance has been so far determined that we may take it as the analogue of a subject-activity. A substance will at least be a persistent point of departure for the integration of actual or possible experiences. In the further determination of this conception we will be helped, I think, by the reflection of the post-Kantian realists. The tendency of the realists was, as we have seen, in the direction of emphasizing the self-asserting individuality of substance. The points of departure in our world which we call substances, persist by virtue of their self-assertiveness. The only notion of persistence that is possible in the last analysis, is that of self-assertiveness. The persistent only persists by asserting itself. Every substance, then, must be

conceived as a point of self-assertiveness. Now, it is easy to see that in this conception, while conscious will has been abstracted from, the essentials of volitional agency yet survive. It is of the essence of will to be self-assertive and to be dualistically self-assertive; to assert itself against, or at least in reaction upon, a not-self. And it is only necessary to carry this reflection out logically in order to see how a pluralistic and individualistic notion of substance will emerge. The Cartesian conception of substance, which is also that of Spinoza, is dominated and determined by the idea of space. Substance is therefore a continuous and relatively lifeless monster not capable of division into real parts. But the Leibnitzian conception, which is also that of post-Kantian realism, is that of self-assertiveness incorporated with points of departure in time. Naturally and necessarily then the notion of substance which thus arises is thoroughly individualistic. It takes the form of a point of activity asserting itself against a not-self, and when we remember that our world is a world of experience, and that the notion of substance is that of a determination of the content of the experience-world, it will be clear how the whole sphere of experience-content will resolve itself into a plurality of these self-asserting individuals.

The doctrine of substance as developed by the post-Kantian realists is unquestionably defective in some important respects. It leads, in one aspect of it, to an extreme form of metaphysical individualism. But there is a sound reflection at the heart of it which renders possible an important advance in the notion of substance. We have seen how the concept of substance was transformed in the thought of Kant into that of an objective analogue of subject-activity. In the thought of the realists this notion is further determined in an individualistic direction. The notion of substance becomes that of monads which represent points of individual self-assertion in the world of experience-content. The notion of the content of experience as resolvable into a plurality of points of self-asserting

individuality is, I think, an essentially valid one, and we have only to abstract from the definite notion of self-assertion, as we have already abstracted from that of will-determination, in order to reach the concept of substance which is fundamental to modern physics, the notion of it as in the last analysis reducible to points of persistent energizing. Modern physical reflection has found the atom conceived merely as a unit of solidity to be untenable because it involves the notion of dimension as an ultimate quality of substance. But we have seen that the concepts of both space and time are dimensionless in their points of departure. In the last analysis the same is true of substance. The vital core of the notion of substance is that of a persistent point of departure for the individualistic determination of content of experience. This point of departure, as we saw in the instances of both space and time, is transcendent of dimension, and represents, implicitly at least, the *I*-point in present experience. The point of departure for substance is similar to those of space and time. Only the departure here is distinctively one of persistence or self-assertiveness, and is, therefore, volitional in its type. The real unit of substance is the self-assertion of the *I*-point in experience, and objectively, as a determination of content, it is a dimensionless point or centre of persistent energizing.

In conclusion, the connection between the categories of cause and substance may be very briefly indicated. We have seen that a cause is a conditioned beginning of a series of changes. It is that term in experience the superposition of which makes the beginning of any given series of changes conceivable. A cause is, therefore, a principle of change or modification. We find clear water changing its colour and becoming black, and this change becomes conceivable when we are told that ink has been dropped into it. But the notion of cause, although it has that of self-activity coiled up in it as a presupposition, is that of conditioned agency. It is itself a change among changes, and in itself supplies no point of rest in the shifting scene. It is at this

point that the notion of cause finds support in that of substance. It would be impossible to conceive an experience made up merely of changes. There must be at least one persistent point of departure; the point where the experience of the *I* asserts itself. But the category of substance arises, as we have seen, as a determination of experience-content. In short, an indispensable condition of the rise of a world of content in experience is that this content should be related to a plurality of persistent points of self-assertion analogous to the *I*-point in experience. Why should it be necessary for experience to conceive its content under the qualification of substance as well as cause? The answer is not far to seek. The world of changes demands cause as the principle of the beginning of its series of events in time. But cause itself is simply a more fundamental phenomenon, and is itself subject to the law of change. But we have seen that experience of mere changes is inconceivable. Changes as a whole demand persistence. There must be an aspect of the world which itself transcends change. The world-content must, therefore, be related to a plurality of persistent points of departure for change series, and these persistent points, which are to serve as the unifying principles of change-series, are supplied in the concept of substance.

The category of substance supplies to experience those points of rest which are needed in order to make its processes conceivable. Or, to state the matter in different phrase, the category of substance represents the mode by which experience realizes those points of rest or permanence in its world which are necessary in order to render the series of changes possible. Without cause no beginning of change would be conceivable, but without substance the very notion of change would be absurd. Cause is the principle in accordance with which changes are organized into a mutually dependent system: substance is the principle which supplies in its notion of permanence the condition which our world demands in order that the system of changes may be possible. Neither the notion of substance nor that of cause

as we have developed them, supplies experience with an absolute principle. The notion of cause is that of conditional agency, and has its presupposition of agency that is self-acting, while the notion of substance as we have developed it here, is that of persistent points of departure in the sphere of experience-content, which, however, have a common relation to the central *I*-function of experience as a whole. The points of rest are relative, therefore, and have their common presupposition in the central activity of self-consciousness.

CHAPTER VII.

COMMUNITY OR INTERACTION.

WHILE the notion of community has always found a place in the common consciousness, it failed of distinctive philosophical recognition till Kant gave it a position in his list of dynamic categories. Long before this date, however, physics had recognized the principle of community in its notion of action and reaction, which it had reduced to definite quantitative statement. After its recognition by Kant the notion of community or reciprocity was taken up by the Herbartians and made central in their individualistic metaphysics. This was inevitable, since, in a world of co-existing individuals, the transactions among its units become of prime importance. It was not an accident then the emphasis which the realists put upon the reciprocal activities of things, but the result of insight, the metaphysical outcome of which is seen in the Lotzean doctrine of interaction. At this point, however, we are not so much concerned with the metaphysical interpretation of community as with the genetic question of its rise in consciousness. There can be little doubt that in its first rise community is a category of the social consciousness. The notion, even in its crudest form, will, no doubt, be absent from the first experiences of the child, which will, so far as consciously realized at all, be either objective or reflexively subjective. The early experiences will take the forms of either suffering or doing

something, and while, of course, to our reflection, there is community of action yet in the consciousness of the child one of the terms will be mostly in the background. Only when it reaches a point where it is able to hold the terms of a relation in consciousness will the sense of community or reciprocity have its origin.

The experience out of which this sense will emerge, will not, we think, be any form of simple reaction such as would be possible to an isolated individual. For anything that we can see to the contrary, the germs at least of the experience of cause and substance could arise in a consciousness that was simply related to things. The community of personal wills does not seem to be essential to either of these notions. But the notion of community has its rise in a social situation. There must be at least two wills seeking to appropriate the same thing before the sense of community will be possible. Hence the importance of the quarrels of childhood in the development of the social sense.¹ Let us suppose then that *a* and *b* find themselves striving to appropriate the same toy, say a rubber ball. Their efforts bring them together in a collision of will—efforts which gives each the sense of other agencies competing with and modifying his own. The experience is not that of simple resistance, but a peculiar type of resistance, that which arises out of the efforts of a plurality of agents to secure the same thing.

This is the complex situation out of which the sense of community will first arise. Now it is not in the line of the main purpose here to follow up this experience on its social side, or to attempt to show how, out of the collision of agencies, social co-operation gradually emerges. What we are seeking is the origin of a category with whose general epistemological significance we are chiefly concerned. And

¹ Those who wish to follow out the genetic process in detail will find it ably developed in Professor Baldwin's two volumes, entitled *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, to which I am greatly indebted in this representation.

the points of vital interest here are—(1) that the experience out of which the sense of community arises is distinctively volitional in its character; (2) that the peculiar feature of this experience is the presentation of the simplest form of social situation, the sense of colliding agencies in the quest of volitional satisfaction.

The germinal notion or sense of community thus arises out of a social situation, and from one point of view continues central in the development of the social consciousness. But from another point of view; the broad epistemological in which our interest centres here, the notion of community becomes abstracted from the concrete social situation and takes on a more general character. We have seen how the notions of cause and substance are gradually distinguished from that of will-activity while preserving the quality of agency, and here a corresponding differentiation takes place. Abstracted from the notion of colliding wills, the concept of community still perseveres as that of activities colliding at some point of common tendency. The mere fact of collision of forces is not adequate to the notion of community. That notion could only originate out of a social situation in which the collision is the resultant of a common will-aim, if we may be allowed the term, and the abstraction from will leaves the oneness of aim intact, and is of the essence of the notion. The social philosophers suppose that they have found the principle of this commonality of aim which conditions the social situation, in the sense or consciousness of kind,¹ and whether their principle be adequate or not, it is at least a recognition of the fact that community does involve, in its simplest form, some point of common tendency or reference. In a universe of completely isolated parts, where there are no common objective aims or tendencies, collision would be impossible, or, if it did arise, would be pure accident and without significance.

Let us consider, then, what additional features the notion

¹ See Professor Giddings' work, *The Principles of Sociology*, No. 1, 1896.

of community introduces into our world of cause and substance. The world of cause is a system in which all changes must be referred to terms that will render their beginning conceivable. It is a world of conditioned beginnings. The world of substance is, as we have seen, a system in which persistent points of departure are necessary in order that the series or succession of changes may be conceivable. The notion of abstract change is absurd, and a world of abstract change is intrinsically impossible. The very existence of a change series is conditioned by its reference to a persistent point of departure which we call substance. We have seen also that the world of cause and substance is a world of plurality, whose unifying principle or point of common reference is to be sought in the central activity of experience. Now, we have only to identify the conditioned starting-points of our world of cause with the persistent points of departure of our world of substance, in order to reach the conception of a world of co-existing parts or units whose causal activity will take the form of an inter-activity of these parts, out of which will arise the series of modifications or changes which we call phenomena or effects. The notion of causal agency in such a world is thus modified into that of inter-activity, and the notion of substance becomes that of the persistent points of agency between or among which this inter-activity subsists. In short, when we conceive the world under the notion of community, its causal and substantial aspects resolve themselves into a quasi-social situation broadly conceived, in which the great fact becomes the action and reaction of the parts of which the situation is constituted.

Now, it seems to me that reflection renders the passage to this category, in our experience of the world, necessary. It is conceivable that a world of bare causality would not involve the notion of co-existence, although it is open to doubt the possibility of such a world. But when our world has been qualified by the notion of substance as well as by that of cause, then the relation of co-existence becomes necessary.

A world that contains a plurality of substances must be conceived as a world of co-existing parts. This will be its fundamental aspect, while that of succession will become secondary. In short, the series of modifications or changes, which we call effects, will take their places as phenomena of the inter-activity of a plurality of co-existing agents. We are thus driven to the notion of community, or interaction as Lotze calls it, as a necessary step in the evolution of our experience of the world. And this transition, as we have seen, carries with it a very profound modification of our whole conception of the world. Whereas up to this point co-existence has played a minor part in our world-drama, it now becomes the protagonist, and sequence assumes a subordinate rôle. The flow of changes or events from being the principal feature of our world is forced to take its place as a phenomenal aspect of a profounder world of co-existent and interacting parts.

The notion of community or interaction as a world-category involves, therefore, a transformation in our mode of conceiving the world. It is now no longer its historical aspect of succession in time that is uppermost, but rather its static aspect of co-existence in the light of which it presents itself as a community of permanent and mutually influencing individualities. The notion of community; or interaction, as we shall now call it, is not simple, however, but very complex, and thus far we have treated only its most obvious features. The subtlest discussion of interaction to be found is, of course, that of Lotze, and to him our indebtedness will be obvious. The notion of interaction involves not simply the idea of bare collision and rebound, but something much more profound, namely, the internal modifiability of the colliding agents. Take for example the simplest possible case, that of one billiard ball striking against another. We say that the impact of one ball against the other communicates motion, so that the stricken ball passes from a state of rest to one of motion, while the striking ball has experienced a change of an opposite character. But nothing is explained

by this account, for if nothing happens but the communicating of motion, why does it not pass through the stricken ball and leave its state unchanged? The phenomenon cannot be of this simple character, but there must be a point somewhere at which the recipient of the impulse gathers itself up, so to speak, into a knot and becomes the subject of the impulse which is thus translated into movement. We have thus movement, impact, impulse, which is translated again into activity, and outwardly the billiard ball changing from a state of rest to one of motion; or in the case of the impelling ball, from a state of motion to one of rest. Now the case of the billiard balls is one of the simplest examples of interaction. We have seen that the problem it supplies is not simple but very complex. The situation is not thinkable at all if we do not suppose the internal modifiability of the agents, and this means that these agents are able somehow to receive internally and to re-act upon, impulses which are communicated externally in the form of motion or activity. The simplest form of interaction involves the supposition, therefore, of internal subject-points or their analogues from which impulsions are received and responded to.

In all this field we have to acknowledge Lotze as our master. It was his reflection that brought out clearly the impossibility of conceiving interaction as an external activity among elements which remain internally indifferent. If a and b interact it is impossible to conceive a and b as not being internally moved. The possibility of any communal relations is conditioned then on the internal modifiability of the elements involved. This is Lotze's way of saying that being cannot be conceived as internally simple. Everything is internally complex and behaves itself as though it had in it a point of subjective reference. Otherwise no behaviour at all could be ascribed to it. Lotze helped us to see that the principle of change is, in the last analysis, internal to being rather than external. For after all, the notion of interaction resolves itself into that of substance. The

actual collisions, in so far as they are not accidental, are to be regarded as phenomena of internal character. Let us suppose that *a* and *b* come into relations with each other and that certain changes or modifications ensue. The phenomenon and its results can be understood only in the light of the nature of *a* and *b*. The whole transaction must be read, in the last analysis, in terms of internal character. This reflection led Lotze to a concept of substance analogous to that of Leibnitz, whose monads are internally determined substances, only Lotze proceeds more empirically than Leibnitz. The earlier thinker reaches his concept of substance deductively, and employs it to determine the notion of relation. But Lotze finds relation in experience and follows it inductively back to substance. The notion of substance is not predetermined then, in Lotze's reflection, but post-determined, and in the light of its manifestations. There is behaviour, and there is behaviour of a certain kind. What must the subjects of this behaviour be in order that they may behave at all, and what must they be in order that they may behave as they do? We have seen that any behaviour at all involves internal character of which it is the expression, and so the further question comes up as to the implications that may be involved in the way that things actually behave.

It was by reflection on the actual behaviour of things that Lotze reached the conviction that substance must be regarded not as internally simple, and, therefore, unmodifiable, but on the contrary, as internally complex and subject to internal modification. And this reflection led to the further conclusion that in view of the actual behaviour of things they are only unreal abstractions, if we do not go the length of conceiving them to be internally the analogues of our own selves: Lotze uses the term "soul-like beings," by which he evidently means beings of the self-type which have a point of internal activity analogous to the I-function of experience. Now, a conception analogous to this has already been developed in our doctrine of substance, which

we found it necessary to represent as a persistent point of departure for the unification or reinstatement of experiences, and as a point of rest in relation to change-series. The very notion of substance is one that clothes it with subject functions. The substantial points in our world are points of departure for a possible experience, and a substance cannot be thought in any other way than as bearing to the series of changes or modifications which it grounds a relation in all essential respects the same as that borne by a subject to the content of its experience. In view of this it is doubtful whether Lotze succeeds in exhausting the meaning, for substance, of the category of community or interaction. We have seen that the situation presented by interaction is essentially social. The *a*'s and the *b*'s mutually affect each other through their internal characters, and not in a purely external way. And it is inevitable that the self-analogy should be employed in conceiving their nature. But the question that will not down at this point is this; Are we not obliged to go one step further and ascribe to our *a*'s and *b*'s something analogous to sociality? If things are capable of transactions that are essentially social can we avoid ascribing to their internal character something that is analogous to the social? The whole of Lotze's very subtle discussion of what he calls *transeant* activity bears on this problem, and tends to demonstrate the unthinkable of purely external agency. The purport of Lotze's reasoning stated in a nutshell is that inasmuch as *a* and *b* cannot be conceived as affecting each other externally, they must be conceived as affecting each other internally. The notion of the passage of influence from *a* to *b* is absurd, for how can it be conceived as crossing the gulf that separates *a* and *b*?

Lotze goes so far in this reflection as to conceive all agency as, in the last analysis, internal; but he still, in a sense, leaves the *a*'s and the *b*'s external to one another. It is evident, however, that our position will only be a half-way house, unless we in some way achieve the conception of the *a*'s and the *b*'s as internal to one another. And it is in this con-

nection that the doctrine of the self that is being developed by the social psychologists comes to the aid of our efforts to present the inter-relations of things. The demonstration is gradually forthcoming that the self is not an isolated unit of conscious activity, but is essentially social. The conscious self grasps its fellow along with itself, so that the relation between it and its other is internal rather than external. The consciousness of *a* includes *b* as an internal term in relation to which the behaviour of *a* is to be determined. The social self is the *a*, into which the *b*'s have entered as modifying factors, and all changes, social adjustments, etc., are internally effected. The behaviour of the social self is that of a subject whose activity is a function of polar opposites, the self and the other. From this point of view it becomes clear that the social organism is an expression of the internal nature of the units of which it is composed. In the reflection of social psychology we have the self transformed into a social unit by making it inclusive of its fellow with which it interacts, and this leads to the conception of the social aspect of the world as a manifestation of internal nature. In view of this, what we contend for here is the completion of the Lotzean doctrine of things in the light of this social intuition. When we have conceded that the agency of *a* and *b* in their inter-relations, must in the last analysis be internally rather than externally conceived we have taken a step that in order to be valid logically involves another. The mutual agency cannot be mutual unless the agents are conceived as internal; that is, the *b*'s, in order to affect the *a*'s, must become internal to them, so that *a* somehow includes *b*, and by a reversal of relation is included in *b*. In short, the situation must be socially apprehended, and the *a*'s and the *b*'s must be conceived as social units in mutual intercourse.

But this process must be accompanied by the necessary abstraction in order that we may avoid illusion. In order that things may be social units in the full sense of the term, they must of course be conscious, but the notion of conscious-

ness has been abstracted from that of things. A thing is a substance manifesting qualities, and we saw that when we attempt to think a thing we are forced to conceive it after the analogies of self. And we have further seen that the effort to think the inter-relations of things leads to the conception of them as analogous to social selves. These conclusions stand on their own ground, and are independent of the difficulty involved in the attempt to realize how such agency would be possible without consciousness. The points of vital interest are (1) that the notion of things has been reached by the abstraction of conscious agents and agencies from the consciousness in which they become known, and by their objective employment as determinations of the content of experience; (2) that the notions of things and their relations preserve the essential characteristics of the selves and their relations that are known in consciousness. There is no other mode conceivable by which definition and determination could be introduced into the world of content. The whole defining and determining process is a normal and necessary activity of experience, and the world that arises is both a necessary world and the only world conceivable. The system of things, as they are determined in this experience-process, is necessary, therefore, and as we have seen, part of that necessary outcome is the construction of the world of things under the social category. Full as the conception may be of difficulties, and I am convinced that it involves fewer intrinsic difficulties than any other, it supplies a notion which renders the behaviour of things possible, and is itself a strictly necessary outcome of the experience-process.

The difficulty of conceiving things as non-conscious social units arises mainly from the attempt to stop with the notion of a thing as that of a final term in reality. But such an attempt is purely arbitrary. The very nature of the experience-process, out of which the definition of things arises, is sufficient to show the impossibility of regarding things as absolute terms in reality. That process, as we

have seen, involved from the outset a subject-activity which gradually defines itself as an *I* or self-function, and in relation to which the world of content arises. The process of experience, objectively and cognatively conceived, is one in which this content is defined under successive categories until it reaches the dignity of a system of inter-related things. But we have seen that the thing is, in the last analysis, a persistent point of departure for the reinstatement, or more primarily, the integration of a changing content, and it is obvious that a thing has a presupposition in the central self which conditions the possibility of the whole experience in which alone it is real. A thing arises as the defined content of experience, and it is the resultant of a point of defining activity which is conceived in the consciousness that is central to the experience. In the last analysis then a thing is resolvable into a *posit* of some consciousness. The central or *I*-consciousness defines its world of content by positing in it points of departure for possible experiences like its own. Around these are constituted the things of experience which are individually conceived to be agents analogous to our own wills, while, as members of aggregates and in their inter-relations, they are conceived after the analogy of social units in a world-community. From this point of view the difficulties which seem to beset the notion of things as being essential analogous of the selves of the social organism, change their aspect and take the form of problems as to the final relation of things to the experience in which they arise. For the present these problems must give place to an attempt to conceive the world of the categories as a whole.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DYNAMIC CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE group of categories reviewed in the preceding chapters may be called dynamic, in the first place, because, as we have seen, they are rooted in volitional experience, and secondly, because they are forms of the activity of things. Even the notion of substance, which involves the point of rest, is essentially dynamic in its character. For this reason the consciousness, in which these categories arise may be called the dynamic consciousness and the world which they define may be called the dynamic world. Now, it is true of the categories that while they represent modes of defining and realizing the objective world of content, they are also modes of consciousness. Every category, when it has become reflective, is a mode of conceiving, and expresses a characteristic way in which consciousness thinks its world. The group of dynamic categories will then, taken as a whole, embody the modes by which consciousness realizes its world as a sphere of activity. The world of activity is, however, the world also of space and time. The two worlds become incorporated in one experience, and are in fact inseparable. It is only after things have defined themselves in space and time that they are qualified for the world of the dynamic categories. The order of experience is: first, space and time, and then upon these, or rather from a deeper spring, arises the world of cause, substance, and interaction. But all

these categories are to be conceived as defining principles of the one world. It is only in a relative, subordinate sense that a variety of worlds can be apprehended. Everything, in the last analysis, gets itself related to the central activity of experience and takes its place in the one world of content.

Like space and time, the dynamic categories are conceived as actual in the sphere of actual experience. I mean by this that the spontaneous experience of cause, substance, and interaction does not take on the forms of universality. Our first judgments of cause or substance are not judgments of necessity, but judgments of actuality, and the boy is not concerned with the question whether any change series can originate without a cause, but rather with the actual cause of the change-series which is troubling him at the present moment. The category is an actual term in the sphere of actuality, and this determines the form of our judgment regarding it. Only when reflection enables us to break the bondage of present experiences, and we begin to conceive the outlines of a possible experience, do these categories assert themselves as universal and necessary. The universality and necessity of cause comes to birth in the reflective act by which we seek to complete the world of experience. The question, Can any event or change originate without a cause? is an interrogation of the possible, not of the actual. We assume that events do not originate without causes, but the question of possibility implies that we are endeavouring to conceive some world, in which events could arise independently of causal antecedents, and the negative answer to such a question is our recognition of the impossibility of the conception. We do not conceive a causeless situation and then judge it to be impossible, but we find the conception impossible and our judgment is our acceptance of the impossibility of the situation. A causeless world is an inconceivable world, and this being the case, cause becomes an indispensable feature of any world that is conceivable and, therefore, universal and necessary. Obviously the same

conclusions follow with respect to the whole group of dynamic categories.

There is, however, an important qualification that must be admitted here in order that the above conclusions may be completely valid. In saying that space and time are universal and necessary forms of a possible experience, we mean a presentative experience. In order that a world may present itself it must take on the garments of space and time. No vision of a world of continuous magnitude is possible under any other forms than that of space, and no experience can present a change series in any other form than that of time. We do not mean that experience may not have aspects that are not spatial or temporal. In like manner the universality and necessity of cause are limited to the change-aspects of the world. A cause, according to our definition, is a conditioned agent, and itself a term in a change-series. That which is permanent demands no cause. We say, then, that so far as experience presents a world of change, cause is a universal and necessary feature of it, and the conception of a causeless world is impossible. The same is true in a somewhat different sense of the category of substance. We have seen that a substance is at least a point of relative stability which serves as a nucleus for the consolidation of experience-content into things. The question whether any world that presented the aspect of change would be possible without these points of relative stability, is soon answered in the negative, for change is an abstraction unless there be that with reference to which it changes, and an experience-content that is all drift and no persistence cannot be conceived. A world of possible change must also have its points of relative stability. But just as in the case of causality, so here, the universality and necessity of substance does not mean that experience may not have other aspects besides substance or that substance itself is not a relative conception, which has as its presupposition a transcendent aspect of reality. Every category is universal and necessary on its own plane of

being, but there its prerogative ends. It is not open to space to say that there shall be no room for causality, or for cause to set itself up in opposition to substance.

The conception of the dynamic categories as universal and necessary aspects of a world of possible experience supplies a point of view from which the problem which agitated the mind of Kant may be treated. The final aim of Kant in his deduction of the categories as necessary forms of experience was to find in them those basal concepts which rest at the foundation of the procedure of science. Kant's endeavour here is related to the scepticism of Hume, which practically swept away the foundations of science and left the world of experience adrift without any points of stability, in a sea of change. Kant finds in the categories the organizing principles of a coherent world, and his aim is to show how in these principles the possibility of science is grounded. Having in the categories of quantity and quality already grounded the scientific procedure of the mathematical sciences by showing how the fundamental conceptions of discrete and continuous magnitude have their roots in time and space, he is now concerned with the corresponding roots of the physical sciences. Now, it is not my purpose here to attempt a reproduction of Kant's doctrine, but rather with his investigation in mind to seek to show how physical science does find its ground in the concepts of the dynamic consciousness. Science starts with the world of phenomenon or change, and, therefore, with the world of time. This world presents to us the aspect of mutation and instability. When we begin to reflect, the world seems to vanish before a universal dissolvent and we seem to be in a scene of shifting sands which nowhere supplies any points of rest or stability. From another point of view our world seems to be a plurality of isolated events or happenings, no one of which is self-explanatory or able to give any account of itself. This aspect of unmitigated change and plurality will present study at first in a purely objective manner and the first motive of reflection will be

cosmological or physical, although at some stage man himself will come into competition with nature as an object of reflection. The first question that will arise in the reflection of the race, as well as in that of the child, will be one of causation. And the first qualification of the unmitigated change and plurality of the world will arise in the notion that changes are not without anchorage, but that somewhere in our world there is something that will shed light on their origin, and thus clothe them with a degree of rationality.

Now, this naive impulse, as it may be called, in the consciousness of the undeveloped man or boy, becomes in the reflection of the awakened adult a concept of the dependence of phenomena generally on conditioning antecedents the supposition of which will be adequate to account for their origin. The boy's question, Who broke my bat? or Why did the bubble burst? implies a search for conditioning terms in a world of experience which, when found, will enable him to understand the rise of events which as yet stand unexplained. In the reflection of the awakened adult this impulse becomes generalized in the notion of cause as a necessary and universal feature of a world in which changes have a place, and we are interested specially at this point in the form which this notion takes in the adult's scientific construction or reconstruction of his world. Evidently it takes the form of a universal and necessary connection of all the terms in a series of changes with antecedents which are conceived to be the conditioned agents of their origin. And by conditioned agents we mean terms in the world of change that are needed to mediate any given change or series of changes that may be conceived. We have found it necessary to distinguish between the notion of cause, which is that of conditional agency, and that of absolute or unconditional agency, which the notion of cause presupposes. The notion of cause then introduces into a sphere of unmitigated change and plurality, the principle of dependence, and this principle, in its universal form, grounds the con-

ception of the change-world as a system in which every term has a conditioned antecedent in some other term or series of terms by connecting it with which, we are able to answer our questions, how or why. The whole of science originates in the questions we put to our world, and the first question is that of the connection of things. Not satisfied to leave the phenomena of our world in the state of unmitigated instability and plurality in which they seem to arise, the first question we ask is for some relation that will connect one term with another in the order of dependence. The development of the notion which this question implies leads to the conception of the world as a flowing stream of phenomena that are related, not simply in the succession of time itself, for the time-succession only supplies the form of the problem here, but in an order of conditional dependence. The primal instinct of science is to seek in some antecedent phenomenon the term that will supply an answer to the question, how or why, raised in connection with any section of the phenomenal stream. Now, we have seen in our discussion of cause that the antecedent is never a phenomenon on the same plane with the term or series which is to be explained. It belongs to a relatively deeper series, so that the question of cause is that of relative grounding. The trend in causal explanation is to refer phenomena not simply to antecedents, but rather to deeper antecedents, so that in the development of causal explanation we are not only realizing a system of dependence among phenomena, but we are also developing a profounder conception of our world. We are gradually reaching a concept in which the explanatory terms are becoming more and more profound; in which not any antecedent, but only the first antecedent, will supply an adequate answer to our question. The first principle of scientific explanation will be one, therefore, which formulates the requirement that *phenomena shall be explained by connecting them as consequents with other phenomena which shall not simply be antecedents in time, but which shall be conceived to belong to a*

deeper conditioning series. In the light of this formula it becomes evident that causal explanation leads to no view of the world that can be called final, even from the standpoint of physical science. There is no transcendence of the phenomenal sphere, but simply a grounding of change-series in deeper change-series. There is no grounding of change as such in any permanent principle, but the mere search for causes represents a form of that restlessness of spirit which ever seeks a stable ground of repose in its world, but never finds it.

It is clear that the scientific demand cannot rest in causality, but must go on to the more stable concept of substance. Now there is a sense in which the very suggestion of substance is enough to disturb the equanimity of science. The term has come down from the middle ages with connotations which not infrequently lead to its unceremonious ejection from good society. But the notion of substance with which the present discussion is concerned is the one that we have taken pains to unfold in a preceding chapter. There is a sense in which science finds the concept of substance to be necessary in its efforts to explain its world. Science, as we have seen, resolves itself into questions which the reflecting adult puts to his world. The instability and plurality of this world is somewhat mitigated by the causal answer which leads to a gradual innering of the phenomenal series. But no explanation is satisfactory that merely connects one unstable condition with another. The bond of causality is, after all, a rope of sand that gives no security, and we are forced to seek a more satisfying principle. This we find in the notion of substance. We have seen that the concept of substance is that of a persistent point of departure for the organization of a plurality of experiences into one, and the identity of substance with the inner principle of things has also been pointed out. The demand of science for a more stable grounding of its world finds its apparent answer in the notion of substance, and though the keen scientific intellect cannot rest satisfied with the unanalyzed things of ordinary experi-

ence, yet its analytic leads not to the suppression but rather to the transformation of the ordinary notion of substance. We have seen how the concept of substance is resolvable in the last analysis into that of a persistent point of organizing activity for the content of experience. Science reaches a result that is analogous in its resolution of things into the elements of which they are constituted, and the conception of these elements as points of departure for the genesis of material phenomena. These points may be taken with a qualification of dimension, as in the atoms of the chemist, or they may be stripped of this qualification and become the dimensionless force centres of the physicist. Whatever form they may be reduced to, they will preserve their essential character as points of permanence which are conceived to be the necessary grounds of the world of change. The whole system of things, qualities and relations, will be conceived as rising out of these permanent elements which will be represented as persisting through all the changes of things. It has become apparent, of course, that this assumption of permanence cannot be absolute, and that the postulated atom has its presupposition in some central positing activity, and it is also true that the inner simplicity of the atoms which science apparently assumes cannot be maintained. But this does not affect the fact that science seeks and finds in the notion of substance those points of relative unphenomenal stability which it conceives to be necessary to a more complete grounding of its world than is possible under the category of cause. The principle which the concept of substance supplies to science may be stated as follows: *All changes must be conceived in connection with persistent points of activity, of which they are the phenomena, and in connection with which they become parts of a stable system.* That the principle of substance is profounder than that of cause is evident. It grounds a much more adequate conception of the world and leads in the end, as we shall see, to a transformation of the notion of cause itself.

That the categories of substance and cause fail to ground an adequate conception of the world will become clear if we recall the apparent assumption that is involved in the notion of substance; that is, the internal simplicity of the stable points of being. This assumption is not, it is true, in reality essential to the notion of substance, and a true doctrine of substance will survive its dismissal. But it is true, nevertheless, that science needs at this point some category other than that of substance in order to attain a concept of the inner nature and relation of things that shall be adequate. This category is found in the notion of community on interaction. This notion involves, as we have seen, the internal modifiability of the permanent elements of being, the *a*'s and *b*'s which we conceived as persisting in a changing experience. The internal modifiability of the elements involves, as already pointed out, a modification of the ordinary conception of the relation of changes to the permanent elements. The changes become phenomena of the internal character of these elements, and thus are more profoundly and more rationally grounded. The notion of interaction implies then a doctrine of the internal character of things, as well as a modification of the causal conception of their relations. Assuming the principles already deduced from the notions of cause and substance, we have reached a conception of the world in which the fundamental agencies which underlie its changes and give rise to its phenomena are a plurality of persistent points of causal energy. But as yet these agencies have been conceived as related to one another only in the sequence of time, while it is evident that the notion of permanence makes necessary also the relation of co-existence. And when we apply the notion of co-existence to that of a plurality of persistent causal energies, it is clear that the causal activity must be conceived as a reciprocal interchange. The relations between the *a*'s and the *b*'s can no longer be represented as protensive causation, but rather as reciprocal influence. There is

a real transaction between and among the elements of an aggregate, the result of which is that all parties have both given and suffered some modification. Now, the problem at this point is that of the grounding of a principle that shall express the nature of our world from this new point of view. In order to reach a solution we must bear in mind that in the principle of substance we have that of the self-assertion or self-maintenance of the elements of being. There could be no world of content if things did not maintain themselves against all attempts to suppress them. Assuming this and applying it to a reciprocal aggregate of elements, we reach inevitably the conception of a system of interacting and mutually modifiable parts in which each element must be conceived as giving as much as it receives. This equality of action and suffering is involved in the very notion of self-maintenance in such a system. Any other supposition would make it necessary to conceive the possible suppression or cessation of elements of being, than which the notion of the collapse of the whole universe would not be more absurd or irrational. The principle we are seeking will be one, therefore, of reciprocal and equal agency, and may be stated as follows: *All changes must, in the last analysis, be regarded as phenomena of the activity of co-existent and interacting elements whose influence upon one another is to be conceived as reciprocal and equal.*

The three dynamic categories thus lead to the enunciation of three principles which are manifestly fundamental to a scientific conception of the world. They also represent in their order a gradual deepening of the scientific consciousness. The first efforts of science are to a great degree naïve and superficial. The whole of science will be conceived as a search for causes, and the most obvious dependencies will be accepted as adequate explanations. But a point will be reached some time in scientific reflection when it will be felt necessary to penetrate beneath the change-aspect of the world and lay hold of permanent elements as supplying the only adequate grounds of explanation. The result will be a

profound dip of reflection into the depths and the formulation of a doctrine of atoms or elemental forces. The passage from this conception to that of some kind of community will not be a long one, since the simple fact of the co-existence of a plurality of active elements involves a species of reciprocity. But it required the profound reflection of Lotze to penetrate the situation and show that community is only possible on the supposition of the internal modifiability of the elements, and that it is the recognition of this internal modifiability of the elements of being that renders possible an important advance in the scientific conception of the world. For, in the light of it, the phenomenal aspect of the world becomes internally rooted and acquires a new significance in its relation to the nature of things.

We have achieved in this category of interaction or community a point of view from which it will be possible, I think, to define what is called the mechanical conception of the world in the essentials of its nature and limits. We do not have in mind here the popular conception which contrasts mechanism with design, for this distinction arises at a considerable distance down the stream, but rather one that when achieved will enable us to realize the principle which determines a concept as mechanical. Now, I think, we will achieve this principle if we abstract the notion of community or interaction from that of the internal modifiability of the elements, and conceive the law of interaction as an expression of the mutual activity of elements which are assumed to remain internally unchanged. Mechanism, as I understand it, rests on the assumption of unalterable elements. Assuming a co-existent aggregate of these impenetrable parts in reciprocal action and reaction upon one another, the mechanical conception will be adequately grounded. Mechanism, in other words, is the notion of a system in which all changes are determined by the external agency of impenetrable and, therefore, internally unmodified parts. The notion of mechanism is not then opposed, in the first instance, to that of design or purpose, but rather as

external agency to that of internal agency. The starting-point of a mechanical conception is made when we abstract from the notion of internal agency and the internal modifiability of the elements of being, on which it is founded, and regard agency as the external activity of impenetrable elements. Such being the case, the questions (1) of the legitimacy and (2) of the limit of the mechanical conception arise. The first question in reality involves the consideration whether there is an aspect of the world that truly falls under the category of mechanism, and the correct answer will be found, I think, if we correlate our results here with conclusions reached in the discussions of space and time. We have seen how these categories ground the mathematical sciences in the principles of discrete and continuous magnitude. Now, whether we conceive our terms under the principles of discreteness or continuity, we conceive them externally and under the form of plurality. It is obvious also that mathematics rests on the assumption of the internal unmodifiability of the elements with which it deals. Its operations would be thrown into chaos, if its points, lines, and angles were conceived to be liable to internal change.

All phenomena fall under the mathematical categories as truly as they fall under the dynamic, and our concrete mode of conceiving them will therefore be mathematico-dynamic. The abstraction involved in the mechanical view has its roots in the mathematical categories. The world is first apprehended in space and time, and the first reflective principles for its scientific reconstruction are the mathematical, founded on space and time. The mathematical principles are forms of external reflection under which the elements of the world are conceived in mutually external or externalizing relations. This mode of conception involves, moreover, the employment of terms which shall be fixed in their definition, and therefore internally unmodifiable. Let us suppose, then, that the principles of mathematical reflection are applied to the sphere of the dynamic relations, the effect will be that all its terms will be represented in

accordance with the exigencies of mathematical conceptions. The sphere of causation will be represented as one of external conditioning agencies and that of substance as a plurality of persistent points of being external to one another and fixed in their internal nature, while the world of interaction will be conceived as a plurality of co-existent elements fixed in their internal character and giving rise to the phenomena of change by means of their external actions and reactions. When we ask whether the mechanical method of treating the world is legitimate, and, if so, how far it may be carried, we are simply seeking to know whether we can abstract from the internal complexity of the elements of the world and still develop a representation that shall be true and how far this mode of procedure may be carried without involving a departure from the truth. Now, it seems evident that we may abstract from the internal complexity of our elements and assume that they are internally simple so long as our aim is not to ground the phenomena of the world in some nature, but simply to develop formulae for the statement of their relations. If our question is how do things act and what is the law of their action, not how are the actions and things grounded, or how is their possibility to be conceived, we may work out our answer under mechanical categories. Mechanical science is, therefore, description reduced to the exactness of mathematical formulation. It is explanation only so far forth as its development of the formula that determines its place in the phenomenal system may be called such. But that it *is* explanation in this sense cannot be gainsaid, and that such explanation is of immense value for practical purposes is as little open to denial. The mechanical method of conceiving and explaining the world may then be regarded as legitimate, and in fact the only legitimate method, in all that sphere where abstraction may be made from the connection of phenomena with the internal nature of things.

There is a point, however, where the mechanical method of conceiving the world ceases to be adequate; a point to

which reflection is gradually led under the guidance of the dynamic categories. We have seen how the dynamic categories arise in obedience to a demand for the grounding of the changes in the world of experience and how successively the notions of cause, substance, and interaction are developed in the effort to satisfy this demand. There is a sense in which the dynamic consciousness begins at the very outset to satisfy this demand. There is a sense in which the dynamic consciousness begins at the very outset to transcend mechanism. The demand for grounding with which it originates has in it the germ of this transcendence. But it becomes overt in the notion of community or interaction. We have seen how the very possibility of interaction implies the internal modifiability of the elements of being. In order that there may be any transactions at all among the elements these must be conceived as internally complex and modifiable. In the notion of interaction then we reach a point of view where the question changes its form and becomes one not of descriptive formulas, but essentially one of ground-principle. The notion of interaction is found to be impossible unless we conceive phenomena as arising out of the internal nature of things. We thus reach a point at the same time of the grounding and the transcendence, of mechanism. It becomes clear on the one hand that the situation which renders the mechanical explanation possible is conceivable only if we regard it as a phenomenon of the internal nature of things, and on the other hand it is equally evident that in recognizing the necessary connection of phenomena with the internal nature of things we are achieving an ultra-mechanical conception.

CHAPTER IX.

THE AESTHETIC CATEGORIES.

THE categories treated in the preceding chapters have been named volitional because it is in volitional experience that their origin has been found. We have seen how these categories are necessary in order to mediate a growing conception of the world, and also how they lead up to a point where the mechanical conception which they are necessary to complete is transcended, and the germ of an ultra-mechanical point of view achieved. Up to this point we have been dealing largely with volitional experience and its out-working in the sphere of cognition. Even the forms of space and time, though purely presentational, arise, as we saw, out of volitional soil, while the categories of cause, substance, and community spring directly out of volitional roots. If man were not a creature of will it is not conceivable that he should develop such notions as that of cause, substance, or interaction. There is, however, in our experience a very obtrusive element of which up to this moment very little notice has been taken. Man is not only a creature of will but he is also a creature of feeling. From the outset his experience not only meets his volitional exigencies but it has the quality of being pleasant or painful to him, and this quality, which at this point we may call pleasure-pain, is important from two points of view; (1) as supplying the primary motives of the will-activity, and (2) as an important

factor in the development of the cognitive consciousness. The second topic is the one of special interest to us, and we may ask what epistemological value does the feeling-element in experience possess, and to what categories, if any, does it lead? If we revert to the doctrine of consciousness developed in the first chapters of this section we will recall a distinction which was found necessary, between the subject and the object consciousness, or at least between these aspects of one consciousness. And in that connection the fact was brought out that the element of feeling in consciousness arises as a pleasure-pain quality of the original stimulations and gives rise to a form of secondary reaction or impulsion to obtain more of these stimulations that are pleasurable and to avoid those that are painful.

Before proceeding further, however, it will be necessary to make another distinction of importance. If we regard feeling as arising in the first instance as a reaction of consciousness upon some stimulation, it will be found that these reactions will fall into two different classes. They will either be pleasant or painful in their first effects, or the pleasure-pain quality will arise out of their connection with some want or desire which the stimulation tends to gratify or thwart. In the former case the pleasure-pain reaction will be immediate, and will take the form of a qualification of objective content. The pleasure-pain reactions that are mediated by some want or desire which they tend to gratify or thwart, enter directly into the motives of action and may be called volitional. Of these we shall have something to say in another connection. Confining our attention here to the other class, which we may call aesthetic, these arise, as we have seen, as immediate responses to the stimulations of the objective consciousness, and from the first take the form of qualifications of content. Locke recognized a difference between those qualifications, which he called secondary, and others which seemed to be more primary, and he finds the source of this difference in the alleged fact of their greater subjectivity.

The secondary qualities, he says, are effects in us of the unknown properties of things to which they bear no resemblance, whereas the primary resemble the properties which they represent. Now, without entangling ourselves in Locke's theory of perception, let us ask whether the distinction as he conceives it is valid. We have seen that the so-called primary qualities seem more fundamental to things for the reason ; namely, that as conceived, they involve the notion of substance. If we abstract from the notion of substance, then it would seem that the secondary qualities are as fundamental as the primary, to the qualitative aspect of things. Every quality has its subjective aspect, inasmuch as it arises as a function of the subject-consciousness. But it is also truly objective since it arises as a definition or qualification of objective content. The colour of the leaf is a definition of the leaf-content of consciousness and the taste and odour of the orange are definitions of the orange-content of consciousness. The distinction of the secondary quality consists, not in its being less objective than the primary—all qualities are equally objective—but rather in the fact that its subjective aspect is more dominant and obtrusive. And the ground of this is to be found mainly, not in the mode of its origin, but in the kind of consciousness from which it takes its rise. A so-called secondary quality is an element of definition which rises out of a feeling-reaction. It is characterized, as we saw, by its immediacy, and being a product of feeling, has a greater degree of warmth than the primary quality. The secondary qualities of things are in fact what constitutes them emotional objects.

Our chief concern in this chapter, however, is not with any special forms of representation which may rise out of feeling, but rather with the nature of what we may call the aesthetic consciousness considered as an organ through which experience defines its world, and with the special categories which arise in this field. The aesthetic consciousness embodies itself in a psychosis that is dominantly feeling.

We have found reason, however, for denying the possibility of any psychosis that is mere abstract feeling. No feeling is possible without an element of representation. This may, of course, be a mere germ. But that anything should be felt without being, in some sense, apprehended, is inconceivable. The psychosis that we call aesthetic will therefore involve a knowledge-element, but the form of this will be determined by the character of the psychosis of which it is a function. A consciousness that is dominantly feeling will not define its object in the same way precisely as one that is dominantly intellectual. The mode of determination will be a function of feeling and will be what is called aesthetic, rather than intellectual or logical. We may ask then what the distinctive characteristic of an aesthetic mode of representation is, and we will find our answer in the kind of consciousness of which it is the function. Now, what we call a mathematical mode of representation is one that is determined by the fundamental principles of mathematical conception. These principles are those of discrete and continuous magnitude. Mathematically considered then, any content must fall under the quantitative concepts of geometry or number, and whatever the actual content may be, these are the categories under which it will be defined. Again, what may be called a dynamic mode of determination as distinguished from the mathematical, will be one in which the content will be defined under the concepts of cause, substance, or community. In other words, we will be seeking the explanation of a phenomenal content by relating it to a more or less permanent ground. But in aesthetic determination the principle is not, in the first instance, one of quantitative determination or one of grounding. The characteristic of feeling is that it develops a form of presentation and conception that is congruous to its own nature. And this leads to a closer consideration of the inner nature of the psychosis that we call feeling. In a former chapter we have taken the position that no state of consciousness is

internally simple but involves, in germ at least, the distinction between a subject-consciousness and some form of content. The distinguishing characteristic of feeling, as such, is that the subject term in this duality is more emphasized than it is in any other form of consciousness. In the very form of feeling there is a subject-determination, and feeling has, from the outset, something of the centrality as well as the warmth of a self-experience. In view of this fact we will be led to expect that the mode of presentation and conception which feeling develops will be a kind of self-assertion upon the sphere of content. And the question as to the nature of this self-assertion will lead us back to the dominating characteristic of feeling as pleasure-pain, or in general the type of consciousness which expresses itself in the forms of satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

How then will this activity of self-satisfaction or dissatisfaction express itself in the form of objective representation? Manifestly in some mode of defining content that will render it congruous to subjective feeling. The feeling-self is so constituted that some forms of representation will pain it while others will give it satisfaction. This original germ of aesthetic nature we cannot avoid assuming. And this feeling-self shapes itself into a demand or requirement that the content of experience shall take a form congruous to its own nature; that is, a form upon which it will react with pleasure rather than with pain. As a matter of fact, however, the aesthetic consciousness finds the world of space and time, as well as that of cause and substance, already here. It has to face a world that is given and in relation to which it is liable therefore to be pained as well as pleased. There is no guarantee that the world of space and time and cause will embody itself invariably in forms that shall be aesthetically pleasing. Just as there are forces in the actual world that tend to thwart the will so there are forms in the mechanical that will be painful to feeling. The aesthetic demand can find complete satisfaction only as an *ideal*. The truth is, we enter the sphere of the ideal

whenever we touch that of aesthetic experience. In the very nature of the case whenever the self begins to distinguish itself from its object an ideal demand begins to shape itself. The self is no longer able to take its world as it finds it, but it helps us to erect a standard of a normative world. The world that shall be is one that shall respond ideally to aesthetic demands.

What, then, are the fundamental categories of the aesthetic consciousness? It is evident that if by category we mean relation between feeling and its content, the fundamental aesthetic category will be that of *congruity*. Any content will be pleasing or displeasing to feeling accordingly as it is congruous or incongruous to the nature of the self that shapes the aesthetic demand. This is an important psychological consideration. But the category we are seeking here, as elsewhere, is one that functions as a defining principle of content. The question we have to answer is not what relation shall the representation as a whole bear to the aesthetic consciousness, but rather what relation of parts shall prevail in the representation? On what principle shall it be constituted? The answer is that the relation of the parts must be one of harmony, and when we ask what constitutes harmony, we answer such a blending of parts or elements as will constitute a whole that is pleasing. To the question what, in the last analysis, is the pleasing element in a representation, we answer, its unity, the harmonious blending of its parts into one. To the question, however, why this unity pleases, no answer can be given except the fact itself. In the aesthetic sphere we seem to strike in the notion of *unity*, a category as irreducible as those of space and time. Of course we may say that unity is the congruous and may seem to have accomplished something, but the congruous is the pleasing, and we are back at our starting-point. Again, if we attempt to resolve unity into harmony we find that harmony has no significance apart from the notion of the blending of parts or elements, a notion which is manifestly a torso until the concept of

some whole is supplied. That the unity of the parts of the representation contains by implication, if not explicitly, the notion of some whole, seems to be the fundamental objective category of the aesthetic consciousness. Now, the application of this category may be traced through the presentative and conceptual stages. Thus, in the sphere of colours or sounds the principle of blending will be a kind of rhythm, and the same is true perhaps of tastes and smells. In music the notes must form a melody, and a plurality of melodies must form a rhythm in order that they be aesthetically pleasing. The lack of unity is called discord here, and everywhere it will be found that unity expresses the principle of the representation, a departure from which will cause pain to the aesthetic consciousness.

When the aesthetic consciousness becomes reflective its category of unity becomes explicit, and it finds it no longer possible to rest satisfied with any conception short of that of a self-centred system. This is no doubt due to the fact that the aesthetic consciousness is essentially a self-consciousness. The aesthetic demand is a species of self-assertion and it is very likely true that the category of unity which we have found it so impossible to explain or resolve into anything simpler than itself, is only the objective counterpart of a unity that is first arrived at in self-consciousness. This is a point of vital interest to the present discussion, the principle aim of which is not the development of a doctrine of aesthetics, but rather the discovery of the principles of world-construction which have their roots in the aesthetic consciousness. We found that in the last analysis the demand for unity in our world is the voice of the aesthetic consciousness, and that it finds its tap-root in the intuition of self-consciousness. Feeling, as we have seen, is from the outset a kind of self-consciousness, and this no doubt determines the nature of the aesthetic demand from the beginning to the end of chapter. The category of unity contains the demand that the world of content shall realize the unity of a whole, and the whole that consciousness

has in view is the whole of self. The aesthetic requirement is that the world shall not be conceived, in the last analysis, as a plurality of unrelated parts, or as a series of conditional antecedents and consequents merely, or in fact as a community of interrelated elements, but rather as a unitary system whose elements blend together into a self-centred and self-regulated whole. The principle of aesthetic unity as a category of world-explanation may be stated, therefore, as follows:—*Every part of the world must be conceived as belonging to a system that constitutes a self-centred and self-regulated whole.*

The aesthetic consciousness thus supplies a principle of world-unification which is rooted in the consciousness of self. This principle, while its roots are subjective, is, however, as completely objective as the categories of cause and substance. It arises as a mode of defining objective content and leads, in the first instance to the development of that aspect of things which embodies itself in their so-called secondary qualities, while in the last analysis it takes the form of a principle or category of world unification.

The analysis of the two aspects of consciousness, volitional and aesthetic, and the extraction from that of their cognitive elements bring us to a point where we will be able, I think, to discover the root or roots of that all-important principle of reflection called sufficient reason. Leibnitz caught the essential function of this principle when he conceived it to be the true motive of world-construction as distinguished from a principle of formal consistency, like contradiction. But Leibnitz has little light to throw on the question of its origin. The successors of Leibnitz practically allowed his intuition to lapse and it was only in Kant that the ground of the principle was reinstated in the doctrine of the categories. Kant, however, put a too narrow interpretation on the principle of rationality, as we may call it, limiting it too much on one side to mechanical conceptions, and on the other failing to connect it with the aesthetic springs in consciousness, and it was left for Kant's successors, notably

Schopenhauer, to attempt a larger and more adequate construction. Now, the intuition of Schopenhauer, profound and admirable, as far as it goes, is defective, I think, in putting a too mechanico-volitional construction on the principle of rationality, and in practically differentiating it from the aesthetic consciousness.¹ The effect of this differentiation has been the practical denial by post-Schenpenhaurian philosophy of the epistemological value of the aesthetic consciousness and the tendency, so strongly marked in Lotze to divorce judgments of worth or value from judgments of truth or rational certitude. The way to escape the necessity for this divorce and its unfortunate consequences in various fields of inquiry is, I think, to recognize the cognitive nature of the aesthetic consciousness, and to seek the incorporation of its intuition into the texture of our principle of world construction.

The point of this incorporation will be found, I think, in the nature of the aesthetic category as one of unification. Unity, when conceived, is an ideal, and, therefore, a pre-scrip-t for the completion of an ideal world. The notion of unity as arrived at in the aesthetic consciousness, is not in any sense a transcript from the world of actuality, but is rather a formula for the completion of any conceivable world. It is, therefore, not only a category of a possible world, but supplies to consciousness the ground-motive for the carrying out of its conceptions into the sphere of possibility. It is this category that answers our question why the actual is not sufficient, and why there should be this activity in consciousness forever delineating the features of a world of possible experience. We have seen that conception in its very inner nature is a delineation of the possible, and we find the inner motive of the possible, that impulse which comes in it the intuition of the possible generally and the need that we should enter into it, in this unitary

¹ For an admirable statement of Schopenhauer's doctrine, see *Princeton Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. i., No. 1, "The History of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," etc., by Professor Wilbur Urban, Ph.D., pp. 41-54.

category of the aesthetic consciousness. For the aesthetic principle is at the same time a demand and an intuition ; that is, it is not only an ideal requirement or prescript, but it is an intuition under which our world completes itself. It is, in fact, a demand accompanied with insight. This being the case it represents the point in our conceptions where the worth and truth motives, coalesce and become one. It is impossible to say that the unification of our world adds more to its worth than it does to its truth, or the converse. In order that there may be any science the world must be conceived as completing itself in an ideal unity, and this ideal completeness is also the spring of its worth or value. Let us then proceed to the task of exhibiting this fact in detail. We have seen that the mathematical categories of the quantitative consciousness arise directly out of the conceptions of space and time. But space and time as conceived are the universal and necessary lineaments of a possible world, and this possible world is possible only by virtue of its being conceived as ideally unified and complete. The lineament then owes its characters of universality and necessity to the fact that it is a feature of an ideal and possible world, and the mathematical concepts which arise out of the categories of such a world owe the peculiar quality of their certitude which we call apodictic, to the fact that they are concepts of the ideal and possible rather than mere transcripts of the actual. From this point of view the concepts of mathematics become a system of prescripts for the completion of a world of possible experience. If now we apply the term mechanical to the mathematical mode of representing the world in general, we may say in the light of the above considerations that the principle of the mathematical conception of the world is *Aestho-mechanical*, and may be stated as follows. *Mathematical reflection contemplates a world of possible experience, the parts or elements of which are organized and unified under the concepts of discrete and continuous quantity.*

The presence of the aesthetic motive in the dynamic categories might be anticipated from the close relation which

is known to subsist between feeling and that volitional experience in which these categories are rooted; volitional activity apart from feeling in some form being inconceivable. Now we have seen how the volitional or dynamic consciousness embodies itself in a group of epistemological categories which mediate an important stage in the apprehension of the world. And we have also found that feeling itself or the aesthetic consciousness is cognitive and supplies an important epistemological category. How then shall the relations of these epistemological elements be regarded? Are they to be conceived as remaining apart or as coalescing into one principle? The former supposition is the one that has had the widest vogue in our modern thinking, but the latter seems to me to strike nearer the truth. The aesthetic category is both a prescript and an intuition of unity. It involves the conception of a system in which all the parts or elements are related to a self-centre which reduces them to unity. This conception is that of a plurality of parts reduced to a unitary whole. Now there is a sense in which the dynamic categories are prescripts of unity. Cause requires the organization of phenomena into a system of conditional dependence; substance the organization of changes around persistent centres or points of departure; while community achieves the same result through the mutual relations of its parts. Not only are these categories prescripts of unity, but, as we have seen, they prescribe the principles of an ideal and possible, not an actual world. Furthermore, we have seen that all these categories have a presupposition in some central subject-activity of which they are conceived to be the posits. In short the categories of cause, substance, and interaction are principles of unification whose possibility rests on the presupposition of a larger unifying principle which is related to experience as a whole, and which enters into and constitutes the minor unities. That this major or conditioning unity is the function of that very aesthetic category whose fate we are here trying to determine, is obvious. The aesthetic category supplies then an

impulse and an intuition of unity which enter constitutively into the dynamic principles and impart to them a constitutional aesthetic quality. Abstracted from the aesthetic intuition would our world of dynamic relations be possible? Would the categories of cause, substance, and community express any truth? Are they not true to the same extent that they are of value, in so far as they serve as organizing principles of content in our world of experience? Abstractly conceived, the categories of cause, substance, and community may be regarded as principles for the organization of the parts or elements of the world under the relations of dependence and mutual influence. But, taken in connection with the central category of aesthetic intuition, they become modes of defining the connections among the parts of a system which is conceived to be one and self-centred. The principle thus becomes *Aestho-dynamic*, and may be defined as *the conception of a unitary and self-centred system in which the parts or elements are connected with one another in relations of dependence and mutual influence*.

Now the principle of sufficient reason, as we have here developed it, has been conceived in no abstract form, but concretely as a principle of world-construction. It is achieved simply by the incorporation of the aesthetic category of unification with the epistemological principles derived from the presentational and volitional elements in experience. There are three strata of conscious activity which we have been able to distinguish, the mathematical, the dynamic, and the aesthetic. Each of these in turn, as we have shown, is a source of epistemological categories and principles which mediate the evolution of our intuition of the world. The category of the aesthetic consciousness is that of unity which has its roots in self-consciousness, and the aim of the above discussion is to exhibit the fact that the principle of sufficient reason is the net product of the whole experience-activity, and that it arises out of the incorporation of the mathematical and dynamic categories with the aesthetic principle of unity. The principle of sufficient

reason simply embodies the form of a rational explanation or conception of the world that shall be considered adequate in any given sphere. It is, in short, the principle of rationality itself. Reason is not to be identified with volition or feeling. But it is the consummate flower of our whole nature, and incorporates in its constitution structural elements and motives from volitional as well as aesthetic experience. That sharp distinction which is often drawn between abstract intellect and feeling to the detriment of both, has no place here, for the highest rationality is the best and most complete, and is, therefore, the most worthy and the most true.

The aim of the above discussion has been concrete rather than abstract. The categories have been delineated as modes of a growing experience, and the principle of sufficient reason has been conceived in its actual function as an organizer of the world of experience under the highest category of unity. The relation of the logical form of the principle to what may be called its experience-form, is not difficult to apprehend. The problem of logic is not primarily the organization of the content of experience by means of defining categories and principles. But logic finds its problem by making abstraction of these concepts of experience, which are thus related to its content, and its procedure consists in developing the principles which will reduce these to internal unity and coherence. If then the abstraction has yielded adequate conceptions, it is possible for the logician to develop out of the internal relations of these concepts a general view that will correspond in its general outlines with the concrete order of experience, and a method of formal procedure that will agree in general with the concrete processes of science and philosophy. It is not, however, the primary aim of logic to correlate with any sphere of content, but rather, having abstracted from all content as such, to develop abstractly a general doctrine of rational principles and methods. In this view the principle of sufficient reason, as logic develops it, will simply be the

most adequate statement possible of the inter-dependence of the conceptional elements of an abstract world. Now, the interest of logic requires of course that the principle or law of sufficient reason shall be logically conceived, and it would only confuse logic to introduce into it categories which have their sole use as organizers of experience-content. For logic, then, the principle of sufficient reason must be abstractly conceived in its strictness as the law of ground in the interconnection of conceptions. But this is not inconsistent with the conception of sufficient reason as an extra-logical principle of experience. In fact the rationality of the world is not to be completely absorbed into logical categories, and there will always remain a sphere outside of logic, the concrete world of actual and possible experience, the rationality of which will have to be determined in view of categories and motives that are largely extra-logical. That is only to say, however, what is obvious, that reason itself cannot be confined strictly within the logical preserves but has other and more concrete forms of expression.

CHAPTER X.

THE SUBJECT-CONSCIOUSNESS.

UP to this point our attention has been almost exclusively absorbed in the development of a representation of the objective world. It cannot be imagined for an instant, however, that the representation of the object unfolds independently of the subject, or that the subject-world has not also been defining itself in the clear light of consciousness. We have seen that the subject-consciousness distinguishes itself, rudimentally at least, from the object in the most elementary psychoses, and although it is true, as we have maintained, that the apprehension of the object precedes that of the subject, it is yet inevitable that every step forward which consciousness takes in the definition of its world of objective content will be accompanied by a deepening of the subject's apprehension of itself. Now with regard to the development of the subject-consciousness, three principal topics arise for consideration, (1) the form of activity in which self-consciousness is specially involved; (2) the stages in the evolution of self-consciousness, and (3) the categories under which self-knowledge is realized.

The discussion of the first topic need not be long drawn out. In the first stages of our representation of the objective world we had occasion to take up and define the activity of judgment in its relation to conception and inference, and the conclusion which we reached there was

that in judgment we have a form of self-assertion in which the subject-consciousness either appropriates or rejects the presented content of perception or conception. The conclusion which we reached in that part of our discussion was that in judgment we have the special activity in which consciousness becomes self-realizing. In the chapter on the aesthetic categories, however, the special prerogative in the development of self-consciousness has, by implication at least, been assigned to feeling. Some reconciliation would seem to be necessary, and it will be found, I think, in the further development of a doctrine that has been asserted from the outset, namely, the essentially cognitive nature of feeling. We have maintained the inconceivability of feeling that is absolutely blind. The most rudimentary reaction of consciousness must involve some *Ahnung* at least, as the Germans would say, of the objective; some germ, however undeveloped, of presentation. Now when we have abstracted from this presentative element in feeling, there is left simply the consciousness of being pleased or pained, plus the *pulsion*, if we may be allowed the word, of appropriation or avoidance. Distinguishing these aspects of the feeling-psychosis we find in accordance with the doctrine developed in the first part of this volume, that its presentative and the pleasure-pain qualities are to be regarded as immediate responses to the original stimulations, while the pulsion, as we have called it, arises as a species of rebound or subject reaction upon these responses. The concrete feeling-psychosis is thus found to be complex in its elements, involving presentation, pleasure-pain, and a germ of volition, and in this it differs from other forms of psychosis only in the fact which determines its form; namely, that the quality of being pleasant or painful, or, to state this aspect of experience in its more developed form, the quality of satisfaction or dissatisfaction dominates and constitutes its overt, explicit character. It is this form of psychosis that is constitutive of the aesthetic consciousness and that is specially quickening to the realization of self. But if we were to seek in

this psychosis the core of activity in which the germ of self-realization is specially involved, we would unquestionably find it in that inner pulsion, the element which we have called volitional, and, hence, while it remains true that feeling supplies the greatest stimulus to self-consciousness, this is true only of the concrete psychosis we call feeling, while the specific root of the experience is to be found in its volitional term.

Now, there is absolutely no essential difference of form between the activity we call volition and the activity we call judgment. They are both self-pulsions, and they are both appropriative or rejective of presented content. In both the self identifies itself with its presented world, or else repudiates it and separates itself off from it. Where then does the difference between volition and judgment arise? Not in the form of the activities, but rather in their content, or, to use a phrase that is liable to misunderstanding, in their objective aim. To understand this we need to convince ourselves of one fact of the greatest importance; namely, that an absolute beginning of experience is unthinkable. Any conceivable achievement in consciousness has as its unavoidable presupposition some prior achievement or some prior content of consciousness. We need only attempt to follow our mental history in imagination back to its beginning in order to be fully convinced on this point. In attempting to determine the difference between volition and judgment proper we meet a form of this difficulty, for when we ask how judgment differs from volition, we have to look into the sphere of objective aims, and this involves the assumption that the consciousness in question is capable of aiming objectively at something. More than this, it involves the assumption that consciousness is capable of aiming at something in preference to something else; in short, that it is capable of taking a discriminative selective attitude toward preferred content. But we cannot suppose that an absolutely experienceless consciousness is capable of this selective function. There must be guidance either outside or

inside, and, therefore, every beginning has as its absolutely necessary presupposition, some content of experience somewhere. We are not, of course, interested here in the metaphysical implications of such a fact, but point it out in order to show the necessity, abstracting from the possible metaphysical implications, of postulating a result of prior experience which is conceived to exist in the form of present content or tendency, and which alone renders the selective activity of consciousness intelligible.

Assuming this content of prior experience, we may ask what light it is able to shed on the point in question. The truth is, it is an illuminating consideration. In its light we may draw an important distinction and say that while judgment in general has in view the relation of a presentation or concept to the body of presentative or conceptual elements already in consciousness, volition has more distinctively in view an interest which attaches itself to the practical categories of good and bad. In its lowest sense this interest may be represented as that of survival, while in its higher forms it would involve social, ethical, and religious considerations; in fact, all the elements that enter into the notion of complete good. It is not our purpose at this stage to develop this practical motive further than may be necessary in order to reveal the real line of cleavage between the activities of judgment and volition. They are both forms of self-assertion, and they both have as their necessary presupposition a content of prior experience, since without this a practical aim is no more conceivable than one that is purely cognitive. Judgment as well as volition must then be conceived as functions of a content of experience that has already been achieved, and the distinction will arise between them in view of their objective aims; that of volition being practical and operating under the categories of the good and bad while that of judgment will be more distinctively cognitive and will operate under the categories of the true and false. Without attending further to volition, we may now proceed from the point attained here to the

further determination of the nature of judgment. And the topic of special interest will be the nature of that relation between achieved and presented content which is involved in the activity of judgment. A judgment is a function in which an attitude of the self toward presented content is determined. The self either receives or rejects the proffered content. On what principle does this reception or rejection proceed? Manifestly on that of the agreement or disagreement of the proffered content, which may be a presentation or a conceived situation, with the whole content already in experience. The whole content at any time in experience will constitute the whole of our world, and the principle by which it is unified as one object of experience will be our criterion of rationality, the highest that is attainable, and it will be in view of this criterion that the fitness of the proffered content to be received or rejected will be determined. By the content of experience I mean, of course, that term in the broad sense developed in the earlier chapters of this volume, a content that includes not only presentative but also conceptual elements, and comprehends both the actual world and the world of possibility. I mean a content that includes the highest principles and aims which such an experience is capable of developing. And what I mean to assert in this connection is, that the judgment which determines presented-content as true or false is always and inevitably a function of experience-content when taken broadly, as we have indicated that it must be taken. That the function so conceived is not absolute is clearly apparent, and that it does not touch the last question regarding truth and falsehood is equally apparent. But if a content of experience is everywhere the *prius* of the judgment of the true and false, it follows that in order to reach a standard of truth and falsehood that shall not be relative but final, the presupposition of an absolute experience becomes necessary. This is true, and will be developed in its own place, but the point of vital import at this stage of our inquiry is that our judgments of

true and false, while they presuppose some absolute standard, are in fact, and in all cases, functions of a presupposed content of experience.

In view of this it will not be difficult to determine what the relation is that stands central in the judgments of true and false. It is a relation of harmony, consistency, congruity, agreement. In short, it is a relation of unity. If the presented elements will blend with and fit harmoniously into the world of the presupposed experience, then it will be accepted or endorsed as true; if not, it is rejected as false. Plainly then the constitutive relation in the judgment of the true and false is some form or aspect of that category of unity which we found to be the special principle of the aesthetic consciousness. In the last analysis, if a representation fits into the unity of our world, which, by hypothesis, is the highest conceivable to us in this stage of our experience, it is accepted as true, and becomes itself a part of our world-representation. If it refuses to adapt itself to this unity, it is rejected and cast into the limbo of bad and exploded worlds where, for aught we know to the contrary, there may be an eternal wailing and gnashing of teeth. Are we not logically drawn to the conclusion then that judgment is distinctively an aesthetic function? In view of this question, I wish to say that I think it vitally important that the aesthetic character of judgment should be recognized. We have reached a demonstration here that will doubtless commend itself to most minds as conclusive. The function of judgment is an affair of the aesthetic consciousness, inasmuch as the essence of the relation of true and false is constituted by the aesthetic category of unity. This should not be forgotten. But it is also important to be remembered that unity as above developed is epistemological and not distinctively a category of art. The position we have sought to demonstrate in this book is that every fundamental type of consciousness develops its appropriate and characteristic categories of knowledge, and that the epistemological contribution of the aesthetic consciousness is

the category of unity. In this chapter we have reached the additional conclusion that unity is the constitutive principle of the true and false in the activity of judgment. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this is not that all judgments must conform to the type of art judgments, but rather that in all judgments the principle of the true and false has its roots in the aesthetic consciousness.

The reason why all judgments are not judgments of art is doubtless to be sought, not in the principle of judgment itself but rather in the categories of objective representation. When the category of unity is applied directly, and in its unmodified form, to presented or conceived materials and the aim is to produce a representation that shall be immediately pleasing or the reverse, the judgment will be one of art, for its immediate aim is unity and its immediate test is feeling, and when the two immediacies blend together into one we call it beautiful. What art seeks is such constructions as by directly achieving unity of form will appeal directly to the feeling of satisfaction and thus give rise to the experience of the beautiful. A judgment of art in common with all judgments presupposes an experience-content of the species we call beautiful, and its acceptance or rejection of proffered content is simply its affirmation of the true or the false in relation to this beautiful content. In view of this the principle may be stated as of general application that the species of a judgment will be determined by the nature of the content it is dealing with, and the categories under which it is acting, and this principle will harmonize with conclusions already reached in the main body of our discussion. We have seen how the concept of unity applies to the categories in the various spheres of world-representation, and transforms them into principles of unification. Thus the world of space and time when brought under the category of unity becomes a complete and self-centred system in which the relations of the parts and elements are mathematically conceived. In like manner the application of the concept to the sphere of the dynamic

categories leads to the unification of the world under the rubrics of cause, substance, or interaction. The special consideration here is the fact that while in all cases the world is unified, yet the form of the unification will be mathematical, causal or artistic, according to the nature of the special categories under which the relations of the parts or elements of the world have been conceived. Now, it is only a recognition of this truth from a different point of view when we say that the species of judgment will be determined by the nature of the experience-content it is dealing with and the objective categories under which it is working. Let the categories be those of space and time or more specifically, the principles of continuous and discrete quantity, and the judgments of the true and false will take the mathematical form. But let the categories be dynamic or more specifically, the principles of causal dependence or community, and the judgments of the true and false will conform to the type of physical science. But let the category be that of unity itself in its immediacy, and the judgments of the true and false will take the artistic form.

The central principle of judgment is aesthetic, therefore, while its species, whether it is to be considered a judgment of art or a judgment of science, will be determined so far as the form of the judgment is concerned, by the special objective categories under which it is acting. This representation, I admit, involves a greater degree of community between the judgments of art and those of science than the average votary of either art or science would be willing to admit. For this I do not mean to apologize, as it is my conviction which I am seeking to make good here, that the categories of scientific and aesthetic truth have been allowed to part company too far in our modern thinking. I think it of the highest importance that the aesthetic texture of all our judgments and modes of conceiving should be recognized. And on the other hand, I think it no less important that the artistic thinker should recognize the epistemological character of his principles. In dealing with aesthetic

relations he is dealing with a kind of knowledge, and it is just as incumbent upon him as it is on the man of science that he have respect to the true and the false in his judgments. The representation of the world that he is developing must be a true representation and not simply one that may happen to produce an agreeable titillation in his own subjective fancy. The principal difference between him and the votary of science is not that one is bound to truth while the other may follow his own fancy, but rather that both being bound to the truth, what the artist is seeking is a representation that shall be true to the world-unity conceived under the category of beauty, while the votary of science is seeking a representation that shall be true to the same world-unity conceived under mathematical or dynamical categories.

The judgment function is, as we have seen, the activity in which the self realizes itself cognitively. We can scarcely conceive the awareness of self as reaching any degree of clearness or definiteness simply in the activities of presentation or conception. There must be some activity in which the self term in experience is specially involved, an activity in which the self takes an attitude toward the content of experience, and we have seen that judgment conforms to this requirement. In judging the essential act is one in which the self either appropriates or rejects proffered content of presentation or conception. This act has been called the "personal endorsement of reality," and has been identified with the act of belief.¹ Now, it would not be difficult to show, as we propose to do in a later chapter, that the self-core of belief and the knowledge-act are one and the same; an act of judgment. Belief and cognition differ, not in their essential nature, but rather in their relation to proffered content. They are both modes of appropriating or rejecting this content, and are therefore modes of judging. We do not dwell on this consideration

¹ See Baldwin's *Handbook of Psychology*, vol. ii., p. 158, where belief is defined as "the consciousness of the personal endorsement of reality."

here but go on to the main topic of this section, the evolution of the stages of self-consciousness in connection with the function of judgment. The point in the mental life where the subject-consciousness will begin to define itself cognitively, is that at which judgment proper begins to differentiate from volition. And this point which it would very likely be impossible to fix chronologically, will be reached when presentations begin to arrest attention as objects of interest and the appropriation and rejection of presented content begin to be determined in view of the true and false rather than the good and bad. This, I think, will be obvious whether we be able or not to identify the particular point in time where the history of the individual experience reaches this stage.

If we assume this as settled, then it will follow that inasmuch as judgment acts in view of, and upon presented or conceived content, the stages in the evolution of the cognitive self-consciousness will correspond in a general way at least, with the stages in the development of the categories of objective apprehension. We have only to retrace our steps then, and consider the form which the subject's self-apprehension assumes in connection with the different and successive types of objective knowledge. To this end we have already pointed out in connection with the categories of space and time how the self takes on a temporal form in which the *I* does not rise explicable above the stream. Of course it is to be admitted that in the experience of the adult-consciousness the *I* has risen out of the stream and asserts its transcendent relation to the whole content of its world, space and time included. But we are dealing with a genetic problem here, and have to suppose a consciousness, not of the adult whose history is behind him, but of the young child and the chick who have the greater part of the road to travel, and who, nevertheless, are capable of space and time experience. Let us eliminate the explicit activity of the dynamic and aesthetic categories from consciousness, and then ask what form of self-apprehension would still be

possible? This simplifies the problem, and the answer will be, I think, that the young child and the chick will have the self-intuition of a flowing stream of feeling. So far as it can be said to have any *Ahnung* of itself this will take the form of a more or less defined feeling of a flowing conscious life, the parts of which are continuous but not related in any explicit way to a conscious centre. When the reflective apprehension of space and time arises this lack of definite centrality is largely overcome, mainly, as we have seen, through the more or less implicit function of the category of unity, and this is especially the case in the development of mathematical reflection. We have to distinguish, however, between the mathematician's *I* which has a complex personal history behind it, and the *I*-concept which is necessary to the mathematical conception of the world. If we confine our attention to the latter it will be clear to reflection, I think, that the mathematical *I* would ever remain a somewhat pale and bloodless abstraction. The mathematical world is abstracted largely from volitional effort and feeling, and its intuition is achieved by conceiving the world of content under the principles of discrete and continuous magnitude. The many-ness and outerness of things conceived under some unitary point of view is practically exhaustive of its intuition. And with respect to this unity which asserts itself in the mathematical judgments, while it is true that implicitly the self affirms itself in these judgments, yet after all the unity that becomes overt as a necessary term in a mathematical world is largely an abstraction. Mathematical reflection in common with all reflection finds some centre for its world indispensable, but the degree to which this centre of objective conception is identified with the self-affirmation of the ego in consciousness, is inappreciable. It may be said then that in the judgment-activity that is involved in simple space and time intuition as well as in the mathematical unification of the world, we have a form of judgment which represents the *minimum* of self-cognition. However full-blooded the

mathematician's *I* may be, and we happen to know some very rich examples of this species, yet so far as the mathematical conception of the world is concerned the *I* need scarcely lift its head above the stream.

The very fact that the dynamic categories have their origin in volitional experience would lead us to expect that the *I*-consciousness would assert itself much more vigorously and concretely in the dynamic sphere than in that of the mathematical categories. This fact was recognized by Kant, and it is in connection with the dynamic categories mainly, that he develops his doctrine of self-consciousness. Now, we know that to Kant the *I*-consciousness, in so far as it assumed cognitive form, was reducible to the notion or concept of a transcendental unity of apperception, or, as we may say, reflection. This notion, as Kantians are all aware, was designated transcendental, to indicate that while it is to be regarded as a term that is transcendent to the matter which it unifies, yet it is not to be conceived as having any reality outside of this function. It is, in short, a notion of unity, and nothing else. We may, I think, admit the essential truth of Kant's representation here, and yet have adequate grounds for not accepting his doctrine in the form in which he states it. If we distinguish between the subjective side of the judging activity, the degree of self-awareness that it involves, and its objective function which it asserts in connection with the categories, we will be able to agree substantially with Kant as to the nature of the latter function. The business of the dynamic categories is the organization of the elements of the world-series under the relations of dependence, substantiality, and interaction, and to Kant we moderns are indebted, more than to any other thinker, for our ability to see that the judging function in its "personal endorsement" of content under these categories, supplies to them a unitary point of view from which the world of cause, substance, or interaction becomes one. And if we confine our attention to the objective function of the judgments, we must say with Kant that a real self is

not affirmed in this unification, but rather a category of unity, or, as Kant would prefer, a logical concept or notion of unity. We do not need to bind ourselves to Kant's special conception of the term logical, but may substitute for this the notion of a concept or mode of defining content which arises as part of an experience-process. This will enable us to see that in the transcendental notion of unity Kant has in fact stumbled upon our category of unity as developed in the aesthetic consciousness, and what Kant sees clearly enough is, that the unification and, therefore, the practical completion of the dynamic world is the function of this category. But Kant missed the real genesis of this category, and with it its real significance for the world he was trying to delineate. We have seen how this notion of unity arises as the objective category of the aesthetic consciousness, and that its function is, in connection with other defining categories, to produce a unitary representation of the world. But Kant having missed this derivation and finding the concept of unity among his objective possessions, naturally concluded that this "logical" notion represented all the self-cognition that could be affirmed in connection with the world. That he was right in thinking that this was all the self-cognition involved in the objective unification of the world under the categories is not here in dispute. We are as strenuous on that point as Kant, but what we wish to effect is a connection of Kant's doctrine with a true insight into the genesis of the category he is employing to unify the world. The notion of unity rises out of the aesthetic consciousness and serves as a principle for the organization of experience-content into the whole of a world-representation. But if we distinguish this objective activity from the consciousness in which it arises and fix our attention on the judgment-function itself, a different conception of the degree of self-cognition that is essential to the realization of this world begins to develop. The truth is Kant missed the whole subjective side of his problem, and finding that objec-

tively the category is the last term of unification, he drew the conclusion that it is also the first term in subjective experience, and that no self can be found in experience except a logical concept of unity acting at its centre. We are in a position to reach a more satisfactory result. The dissatisfaction that is felt with Kant's doctrine at this point was shared by Kant himself, and he sought to ground the concept of unity in experience, in a real ego which is outside of the circle of experience altogether, and therefore inaccessible, but at the same time necessary. This is but an adumbration of a true doctrine which connects the concept of unity with the judging activity in experience, and finds in this activity a form of experience in which the self peculiarly asserts itself. Here, if anywhere, we will discover the true root of self-cognition, and will be able to determine what degree of self-knowledge is necessary to our apprehension of the world. Fixing our attention on the judgment activity we are able to see that under the stimulus of the volitional categories the *I* is enabled to break through the temporal stream in which it has been merged in the earlier experiences, and to assert itself as a transcending term to which every part of the stream is related. No doubt the initial impulse to put the questions of cause and substance is a condition of this transcending event, but the *I* itself, as it realizes itself, will react in a more definite conception of these questions. The boy must in some sense begin to realize himself as apart from his world before he can intelligently question it, but it is true on the other hand that in this very impulse to question he is differentiating himself from his world. In the volitional exigencies of his life which underlie its cognitive activities, the common root-motive of all his questionings is doubtless to be sought. But that the self breaks through the stream in obedience to a dynamic impulse, and that this impulse leads to a bifurcation of two trunks, one of objective world-representation and the other of subject-realization, both of which are very closely inter-related at

every point as well as commonly rooted: this is the truth I wish to emphasize here, for on this foundation rests the whole "law and the prophets" of an adequate doctrine of self-knowledge in its relation to the knowledge of the objective world.

Now, the self-intuition that must be regarded as indispensable to the simple, spontaneous experiences of the dynamic consciousness, is not very rich in definite content. The self-consciousness of the boy who begins to ask what made the milk turn sour; or why God does not take away the thunder; or what makes the stone lie there to stump his toe; will have rolled itself up into a ball, and will have asserted itself in an *I*-function against its world of content. A great epoch will thus have been made in his experience, and he will have achieved the standpoint of a conceptual and reflective experience. But we must not suppose that he has travelled this road very far. The objective world is as yet largely a sealed book to him, and we do not need to suppose that he finds his subjective world in any different condition. The truth is, we must suppose it even more undeveloped, for as yet the impulse to put questions to self as the boy questions his objective world has not explicitly arisen. The fact of importance is that there is at this point a subject-world, and that it has asserted itself as an *I* that stands over against, and questions its world of content. The categories of the subject-world may all be as yet implicit, and the boy may not trouble himself about his personal identity or the meaning of anything that belongs distinctively to this subject-world. He may be a pagan instead of a Christian, in the sense that he takes no interest in the salvation of his soul. But in the judgment-acts in which he puts his questions, and more especially in the answers to these questions at which he arrives, a consciousness of his own reaction upon his world is achieved which represents the first, in any sense defined cognitive apprehension which he achieves of himself. The very nature of these questions will indicate the type of self-apprehension

which he is developing. They are all questions of agency and presuppose the development of the agency-consciousness in the mind that puts the question. Moreover, they are questions as to the agency of things, over against us and our agency. In short, they are questions as to the objective agency of things as they affect us and our agency. It is clear that the kind of self-apprehension that is unfolding here is that of self-agency as opposed to, at least distinct from, the agency of other things. There is unfolding at the same time and in the same experiences, the consciousness of the other as well as the consciousness of the self, and as in the order of development the objective takes precedence of the subjective, we have here the consciousness of self-agency unfolding in connection with the consciousness of the agency of the other or not-self. No doubt, as genetic psychology tells us, the first and most important factors in the development of this dual consciousness are the other living beings which surround us. But for our purposes here the kind of object that may call forth the experience is relatively unimportant as compared with the more general consideration as to the form which the dynamic experience of self takes in our apprehensions.

The spontaneous activity of the dynamic consciousness thus yields the intuition of a self-activity standing over against the activity of an objective not-self. The whole consciousness of self may be said thus to include the not-self in inseparable relations with the self which is ever distinguishing and opposing itself to the not-self. We do not need to suppose that the boy is in possession of all this philosophy of what he is doing, but we must credit him with the consciousness of what he is doing. The questions he puts to his world betray that consciousness, and we are unable to conceive how such questions could arise out of a consciousness that was not in this stage of self-apprehension. This result will be important, moreover, when we go on to consider the form of self-knowledge that develops in connection with the reflective activity of the dynamic

consciousness. We have seen that this consciousness develops certain objective conceptions of relation, under which the world-content which presents itself is defined and organized, and we have seen that judgment is a self-activity in which the presentations of these categories are endorsed as true or rejected as false. Now, in view of the above results, we are ready to go a step farther, and say that in this judgment-activity the categorized world is brought into the relation of another or not-self, to the self of the judgment-activity. In short, the judging activity in its relations with the categorized world develops a dual mould, a self and not-self mode of apprehending, and under it further categorizes its world. Only, in this instance, the dual mould is large enough to hold the wine of the subject-activity, as well as that of the objective representation. Returning, then, to the Kantian doctrine of self-consciousness as simply a logical conception of unity in experience related to a necessary presupposition, a transcendent subject outside of experience; we see where it is in need of amendment. The category of unity represents only the objective term in a true doctrine of self-consciousness. The subjective term is the self's apprehension of its own agency as connected with and distinguished from, the world of objective agency conceived under the categories. The true doctrine of self-consciousness, so far as it can be developed as a function of the dynamic consciousness, is one that includes in experience the self-agency which relates itself to the not-self; that is, to the sphere of objective agency that is realized under the dynamic categories. Kant's logical notion of unity is a torso, therefore, when conceived as standing alone in experience. It has a presupposition which is not a transcendent self outside of experience, but a real self-activity within experience.

We may assume, then, that the self that functions in experience is not a mere logical notion of unity, but rather a subject that gradually defines itself as it develops its definite apprehension of the objective world, and the re-

maining question of this section will be how far the subject's self-definition proceeds in connection with this objective representation? What we have to say here is an anticipation of the fuller treatment of the following chapter. But taking the objective categories as our guide, and bearing in mind that the dynamic consciousness develops certain principles of objective agency in connection with the notions of cause, substance, and interaction, we may say in general that in relation to this experience the growth of self-consciousness takes the form of the evolution, first of the feeling and then of the definite notion of self-agency as related and co-related with these objective agencies. In connection with its experience of cause it will become more and more clearly conscious of its own causal agency in both its active and passive aspects. The development of the objective category of substance will tend to bring into clear consciousness the fact of its own persistent agency and the unbroken identity of its life, while the unfolding of the objective experience of interaction will be accompanied with the fuller and clearer consciousness of its own relation to a community of interacting agencies like itself. The development of self-apprehension in this sphere takes, as we see, the form of a self-agent responding to the agencies of the not-self, and eventually defining itself in relation to and over against these objective agencies. The self-consciousness that develops out of dynamic experience is necessarily dualistic, therefore, and takes the form of a self-agency or activity defining itself in various ways in relation to the agencies of the objective world.

But this dualistic intuition while it is a vital moment is not the last moment in the development of the self-cognition. The truth is, we find the self in connection with the last of the dynamic categories, that of objective community or interaction, entering a stage of experience in which the duality while persisting is seen to be not ultimate but subordinate to some comprehending principle. The objective category of community was inconsistent, we saw, with the

notion of purely external action and reaction of parts, and involved the supposition of internal agency which is possible only when we suppose that each of the terms *a* and *b* somehow internally comprehends the agency of the other. We have only to apply this insight to the growing self-consciousness in order to see that a point is reached at which a communal intuition begins to develop. The self begins to apprehend itself in such a way as to include the agencies of the not-self as internal terms in its own experience, and to realize its self-agency as included in the broader experience of the community. I apprehend that the real sense of the social situation involves as the necessary condition of its realization this transcendence of the duality of self and not-self as mutually external agencies, and the inclusion of them as terms in a broader intuition. This fact of conscious interpenetration is recognized whenever we realize that the community in order to affect us vitally must enter as an internal factor into our lives, and that conversely if we would affect the community vitally our agency must enter as an internal factor into its life. It is clear, however, that this higher intuition is never achieved except in the light of some common objective aim, which brings the self and the community of not-selves into perhaps hostile collision. We have seen that collision always involves a community of aim either ultimate or proximate, and therefore the experience of collision may be an important factor in the development of the sense of community. At all events the communal consciousness will first give itself an objective representation, and this objective representation will take the form of a reduction of an objective plurality to unity. No doubt that we reach the notion of the unity of the social life of the community as a whole, and that, as a subjective reflex of this, we attain to the consciousness of our own inclusion in this unity. The point of vital importance to us, however, is the fact that this stage of conscious realization is mediated by the category of unity which we have found to be a distinctive product of the

aesthetic consciousness. The complete realization of the social consciousness in which the agencies of the self and not-self become mutually inclusive is a consummation in which the dynamic consciousness is transcended, and the principle of comprehension is reached in the intuition of the aesthetic consciousness. This accounts for the emotional quality of the concept of sociality, and the fact that in the notion of the social we are very close to the spring of beauty.

Under the concept of unity the self becomes cognizant of itself, therefore, as a social unit, as a conscious agency that is included in a community of agencies, and that includes this community in its own life. The effect of this is a further advance in the development of self-apprehension. This step which shall be final here is one in which the self which we have represented as internal to experience, becomes conscious of its relation to the world of experience as a whole. We have seen how the category of unity leads to the unification of the world, and we have also followed the applications of this category to the contents of the mathematical and dynamic consciousness. At the climax of this objective process we reach a point of immediate unification which gives rise to the notion of objective beauty. The subjective term of this experience we found in the immediate response of the aesthetic consciousness, in feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, to the objective representation. It is in this aesthetic experience that the subject's self-intuition completes itself. It is the final act of self-assertion embodying itself in the last judgment of self-consciousness, and it may be represented as an act in which the self integrates itself with the unity of its world. And it is important to ask here what form this integration takes, whether it results in the inclusion of the world in the self so that the whole world becomes the content of self; or, on the contrary, in the integration of the self and its content in the unity of a larger world of experience which embraces a community of selves. That there is a measure of truth

in both forms of representation we are not disposed to dispute. But that the latter is the more adequate view follows, I think, from the immediacy of the experience in which the unification is realized. The self begins to become objective and self-transcending in the social intuition, and this process completes itself in the aesthetic intuition inasmuch as in it we have consciously realized our integral unity with a larger content of experience.

CHAPTER XI.

CATEGORIES OF THE SUBJECT-CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE fact is generally recognized that our knowledge of the world of self is not so clearly definable as is that of the objective world, and this, notwithstanding the fact that we are surer of the existence of self than we are of the existence of an objective world. Things may be illusions, but the self cannot be altogether an illusion. The impossibility of reducing our self-apprehensions to clearly defined terms leads in some instances to a refusal to apply the term knowledge to that which is apprehended only in self-consciousness, and is lacking, therefore, in the definiteness of an objective presentation. Now, while admitting that there is a degree of reasonableness in such a view we are not willing to allow that the position has been well taken. That a fact of which we are so sure as we are of our own self-activity should be denied the name of knowledge seems to indicate that our notion of what constitutes knowledge is in need of reconsideration. But, admitting that there is some difficulty here, it will help to dissipate it, I think, if we consider the question why the content of self-consciousness is not so clearly definable as that of objective perception. The answer will be found partly in the fact that self-apprehension is from the outset a function of a reactive consciousness, and that the self is realized in this reaction. But the reaction itself is from or

upon the objective; it is in no sense a reaction upon any subject term that has any analogy to a material object. The self-representation is lacking, therefore, in those features which are most characteristic of objective cognition. The self does not present itself as coloured, or round, or rough, or hard, and for this reason the self-intuition cannot be developed piece by piece as can an objective representation. If, then, we cannot piece together a representation of self, does it not seem reasonable to deny that any representation of self is possible? We do not say that a representation of self *is* possible in any ordinary sense. The reaction of the subject-consciousness is *a reaction as a whole*, and self-apprehension will be a function of this mode of reaction. When we say that we can realize no clear representation of self we mean one that is resolvable into parts and that may be apprehended in detail. In regard to all such representation Hume's challenge to any one who thinks he has such an intuition to point it out, is final. No such intuition is possible. The self-reaction is a whole that has no parts although it involves distinctions, and if it is to be grasped in an act of knowledge at all, it must be grasped as a whole. The significance of this for self-knowledge is obvious. The assertion that we are sure of our own activity and yet cannot know what that activity is, really involves two statements that are mutually contradictory. If we are sure of our self-activity we have that assurance because we grasp it in an act of immediate intuition. It cannot be disputed then that we know the fact of our self-activity. But we must distinguish between the *that*; the bare fact, and the *what*; the definition of the fact. There may be bare content of self present without our having or being able to acquire any definite knowledge of its nature. This may be admitted hypothetically, but how does it apply to the case in hand! If, in the reactive consciousness *self*-activity and not simply activity that has no label, is revealed; then it is clear that we have a qualification of the content as a whole which renders it not merely a *that* but a *what*. The fact

that the activity is taking the form of a *self* shows that it is not formless, but is defining itself as a whole. This being conceded, it follows that there may be a mode of knowing which consists in defining a content as an indivisible whole, whose representation cannot, for that reason, be achieved piecemeal or broken up into parts. And if this much be granted, as we think it must, the impossibility of reducing the content of self-consciousness to the definiteness of objective representation has been accounted for, while, at the same time, the possibility of another type of knowing, to which this content may be amenable, is left open.

In order to trace fundamentally the categories of the subject-consciousness, we must recall at this point the three forms of psychosis to which we found consciousness in the last analysis reducible. Employing the term cognitive in a broad sense as a name for any knowledge-element whatever, we may say that these forms of psychosis may be distinguished as cognitive, volitional, and emotional, and the designation of each will be determined by its overt, explicit character. Thus, while it is true that every psychosis is complex, and involves cognitive, volitional and emotional elements or germs, yet it is true, on the other hand, as a fact of mental history, that some one of these elements will dominate and determine its outer character. Now, it is evident that among these forms of psychosis the one of special epistemological value is the one that takes the form of cognition. This psychosis will represent the form which consciousness will take whenever it is attempting an act of knowledge. And in connection with the various stages which the knowledge-activity passes through in its apprehension of the world, this psychosis will take the forms successively of the mathematico-presentational, the dynamic, and the aesthetic categories. This is important for the determination of the categories of the subject-consciousness, on account of the close connection which has to be recognized as subsisting between the objective and subjective in the development of knowledge. These successive forms of

the cognitive consciousness are to be conceived, moreover, in connection with other conscious elements and as responding successively to the motives of volition and feeling.

The special problem here is to trace the forms under which the subject-consciousness progressively apprehends itself as a whole. If we confine our attention to that stage in the conscious life in which objective experience is purely presentational under forms of space and time, it will be clear, I think, that the subject-consciousness, so far as it asserts itself at all, will take on the form of time and will be simply a flow of conscious life. This will be the form taken by the inner life of the young child or the chick so far as it is conscious of it at all. Now it is clearly very difficult to conceive any special forms of subjectivity as arising out of this simple consciousness. The feeling of self-hood will be so vague and so completely merged in the stream that it will cut no figure in the life of the individual. The germs of self-consciousness must be conceived as present even here, but they do not develop into any definable forms of apprehension. They simply remain in solution till some element is introduced which alters the psychic relations and induces something analogous to a precipitate. The real beginning of the subject development occurs at that point where the *I* breaks through the temporal stream and begins to assert itself in relation to the flowing consciousness as a whole. We saw above that the self at this point, which is that of the origin of the dynamic representation of the world, asserts itself as an agent, and in various phases of agency determined in their form by the different species of the objective categories. We do not need to travel this road again, but what we are interested in here is how the life of the self which begins overtly at this point to assert itself, gives itself formal expression as a whole. This question introduces us to the distinctive categories of the inner life, such as individuality, self-identity, and personality. The first and most fundamental of these is, doubtless, the category of *individuality*, for if the self did not assert itself as an individual it could

not assert itself as anything at all. We are not concerned here with the principle of individuation, which will come up for treatment in another connection, but rather and specifically with the form in which the self asserts its individuality. This problem must be considered in the light of the fact that the categories of self-activity will all be modes of apprehending self as a whole, and will be irreducible to parts. What we mean by the individuality of the self is, then, its most fundamental assertion of its own indivisibility, an assertion that is central in the very notion of the *I*. The *I* is centrally a pulse of indivisible oneness, and this is the explicit nature of the first assertion of the self against the stream of flowing states. The appearance of the *I* forever vetoes the possibility of the breaking up of the mental life into parts. Whatever else the self may become or assert itself to be, its first and fundamental assertion is its own inseparable oneness. Nor does this assertion of individuality leave the sphere of content unmodified? The assertion of oneness declares that there shall be no floating unrelated content, but that all the elements of the experience-world shall henceforward range themselves around and relate themselves to, the *I* as their centre. The *I* asserts itself as a rallying point, a point of self-relation for the whole world of content. The category of individuality is the form, therefore, in which the self asserts itself as the unitary centre of an experience in relation to which all its parts become united and related in one being.

Now the self as an individual is capable of performing causal functions and of developing the distinctive consciousness of causal agency. We do not delay on this consideration here but go on to the next distinctive category of the subject-world, namely that of *self-identity*. The notion of self-identity could not originate until the self has not only distinguished itself as an individual from the flowing stream in which it has been hitherto merged, but has again re-entered the stream and conceived itself in connection with different sections of it in time. The *I* must have a yesterday

as well as a to-day before the notion of self-identity can arise. The notion of self-identity involves, in short, the notion of *persistence*—the self's conception of itself as a persistent point of departure for actual and possible experience. We see then that the notion of self-identity is the subject-aspect, and we may say, the final point of reference of the category of substance. But the self does not assert itself specifically as a substance or thing, but rather as a persistent individual, the same yesterday and to-day, leaving the process by which persistent points are determined as things, open. The self's assertion of its self-identity is rooted therefore in its assertion of its individuality and is essential to its being. We could not conceive a real solution of self-identity that did not carry with it a solution of individuality. I am of course not oblivious of the phenomena of double, triple, and alternating personality in which a breach of identity seems actually to take place. But the vital point in these experiences, namely that these different personalities do not intermingle but reassert themselves, each as continuous with its own type of experience, is confirmatory of the doctrine we have been maintaining. A real breach of self-identity would involve the dissolution of the bond which holds the elements of our experience together, in the event of which there would be no conceivable reason for supposing that the elements would ever reassemble again as parts of the same conscious experience. The phenomena which present the appearance of a breach of identity are in fact illustrations of it. They apparently present the unusual and astonishing fact that more than one self-centred experience may be connected with the same physical organism, and this involves a mystery which science is at present unable to explain. But conceding the possibility of this, the law of self-identity is seen to prevail without breach in case of each personality. It remains self-centred and continuous with itself, and does not manifest the slightest tendency to lose itself in the stream of other personal experiences.

Individuality and self-identity are categories of the life of the self as a whole. They are inconsistent with its resolution into parts. In fact such a resolution would mean its destruction. The same is true of *personality*, which is not to be confounded with individuality and self-identity. These latter categories do, in fact, enter into personality as moments, but do not constitute its whole significance. Originally the term *persona* was used for the dress, and especially for the mask, of an actor, and meant a mode of appearance or expression. We find a corresponding but deeper root in the Greek term *λόγος* from *λεγω*, to speak or utter, a term which involves the notion of a form in which some inner nature is uttering or manifesting itself. The term *λόγος* came to mean the self-manifesting reason of the world, and was taken up in Greco-Jewish, and later, in Christian reflection, and employed to express the manifested nature of God in distinction from his inner essence, and as a principle of symbolizing or defining the essential forms into which this manifestation is distinguishable. When the Latin tongue succeeded the Greek in our western life as the language of religious thought, the term *persona* and its derivatives became the vehicles of this profounder significance which still constitutes the inner sense of our modern notions of person and personality. In truth, however, the modern conceptions of personality have been vague and confused, and have left much to be desired in the way of clearness. The derivation and history of the term are sufficient to indicate the fact that its special significance is that of a mode of expression. Personality is a kind of language or symbolic form in which an inner nature expresses itself and reveals itself in and through the expression. The presupposition of personality is some nature that is individual and self-identical, and in relation to this nature it is a fundamental mode of self-manifestation. By any one's personality we do not mean every manifestation of his activity, but only such an expression as will reveal his real nature. Let a man act in some truly characteristic fashion, and we say that he has given a true personal

expression of himself. But if he does not act in character he belies his inner nature, and his manifestation is not truly personal. What, then, are we to understand by the notion of personality? It is clear in the first place that personality involves some inner nature, and that this nature must be a self. There can be no person apart from a self. It is also clear that the nature involved must be individual and self-identical, these being, as we have seen, the fundamental categories of the subject-consciousness. There can be no question then that the notion of personality must include or presuppose an individual, and self-identical nature; in short, that it must be a category of a real self. Taking this for granted, then, we may go on to inquire what the notion of personality involves in reference to this real self, and the answer will be, I think, that the self becomes personal when it takes on some fundamental mode of self-expression. In order to realize what is meant here, let us recall the analysis by which consciousness has been reduced to three fundamental forms of psychosis, each of which is a concrete expression of the complex nature of consciousness, and is distinguished from other forms of psychosis, not in content, but in form, as being overtly and explicitly either cognitive, volitional, or emotional. This will, I think, give us a clue to the real differentia of the notion of personality. The personality of a man will be such an expression of his nature as embodies itself in the form of one of the fundamental psychosis of which his consciousness is constituted. That is, a man may give himself a personal expression in either an intellectual, volitional, or emotional form. He may express his nature through the channels of thought, or will, or feeling, and his personality may take on the intellectual, practical, or aesthetic form. This will be intelligible if we remember that there is no abstract psychosis of either thought, will, or feeling, but that all psychoses are complex and concrete, and that the form is determined simply by the element that dominates. This will make it clear how an inner nature can give itself a

concrete expression in any of the forms we have indicated, and will, therefore, enable us to conceive the double nature of personality, (1) as an expression of the inner nature as a whole, and (2) as an expression of this nature in a plurality of forms. On the first point we do not need to dwell at length. That the self is individual and self-identical, and that each psychosis is a concrete embodiment of its nature are, as we have seen, fundamental articles in a doctrine of self. Personality being a mode by which this indivisible nature expresses itself, will necessarily be unitary in its root-significance. It will be the expression of the nature of the self as a whole, not of any part or aspect abstracted from the whole, and it will be a fundamental expression of nature, not a mere flash in the pan which signifies nothing. Personality is an expression of real nature as a whole. The second point may need somewhat more elaborate treatment. The insight that personality has an aspect of plurality has almost lapsed in our modern thinking. The presumption that personality is unitary has seemed to shut out the supposition that it may be plural, and it is true, of course, that in the sense in which it is one it cannot also be many. The real question is not whether personality involves unity, but rather whether it is not one of those categories which involve unity in diversity, or rather diversity in unity. It seems to me that a true analysis of consciousness commits us to this latter view, and that the notion of personality carries with it not only the presupposition of a unitary nature that is seeking self-expression, but also that of the possibility, and in view of the complex nature of consciousness, the necessity even, of a plurality of modes of expression. The multi-personality of the manifested life of the self seems to follow necessarily then from the complexity of consciousness, and it is difficult to conceive any aspect in which the plurality of personality is less adequately grounded than its unity. In view, then, of the double aspect of personality, we may define it as *a fundamental mode in and through which*

"self-identical and individual self manifests or expresses its nature as a whole.

The question of *personal identity* then will not, in view of this definition, be precisely the same as that of self-identity. The category of self-identity is that of the persistence of the self as a unitary individual, while personal identity involves that and something more. When we assert personal identity what we affirm precisely is the persistence of the same self identical nature through all personal variations. The same nature we conceive to be capable of various forms of manifestation, or to put the matter more empirically, we find experience expressing itself in an almost infinite variety of forms, and tracing these variations back to their source in consciousness we find them to spring primarily out of three fundamental forms of psychosis, each of which is a concrete embodiment of conscious nature. To each of these root-forms we apply the term personal, and say that consciousness may have as many distinct types of personal expression as there are fundamental elements in consciousness which embody its complex nature. Connecting the result of this reflection with the doctrine of the self-identical and individual subject of the conscious life as already developed, this plural manifestation is connected with a unitary nature which it presupposes, and the notion of personality completes itself in that of a plural manifestation of a unitary self. The category of personal identity is one that involves the sameness of the nature which expresses itself as a whole, but not the absolute unitariness of the form of manifestation itself, which may be manifold and variable.

The question as to what is involved in the maintenance of personal identity is one of some difficulty. That it involves absolute continuity of consciousness is an assumption that has been largely given up on account of the practical difficulties with which it is beset. If continuity of consciousness be a necessary condition of the maintenance of personal identity, then we must suppose that consciousness

continues unbroken during sleep and during those apparent lapses caused by accident and disease. Moreover, the phenomena of alternating personality seem to interpose serious obstacles to that assumption. In fact the doctrine of the unbrokenness of the conscious stream seems to be untenable, and we have to seek an idea of personal continuity which will be consistent with the existence of temporal gaps and breaches in the conscious life. Now, it seems to me that we have in memory an example of the maintenance of such a continuity. For memory connects the present self with its former content, not by traversing and reinstating the links which connect the present with the moment in the temporal stream to which the past experience belongs, but rather by finding some point of identity in the two experiences which leads to their immediate coalescence and integration into one conscious experience. The psychological process by which this is effected is given in the hand-books, and begins with a feeling of *familiarity* in connection with some element of present content which arrests attention and induces consciousness to put out its feelers, so to speak, in search of its past connections. This leads to the re-integration of the past with the present in a unitary state in which the feeling of familiarity has developed into the consciousness of the identity of the life of the present with the past in the unity of a present experience. Now, if time may thus be ignored by memory, and the past integrated with the present without any regard to the temporal continuity of the conscious stream, what reason have we to suppose that any such temporal continuity is in any way involved in the maintenance of the identity of the personal life? We have seen in our doctrine of space and time that the point of present departure for time as well as space, is one that transcends the stream and in relation to which the notion of the stream itself becomes possible. That conclusion fits in with what memory reveals to us as to the actual way in which experience integrates its past and present, and favours the doctrine which we are about to

enunciate here; namely, that the maintenance of personal identity is not an affair of time-continuity at all, but rather an experience which in its roots transcends the temporal stream. In short, the maintenance of personal identity is the conservation by the individual self of its relation to the temporal stream as a whole. This relation is conserved by the inclusion of all the parts of the temporal stream as elements of content in one experience. And this involves the possibility at least of the reinstatement, under certain conceivable conditions, of all the parts of the temporal stream that have actually been connected with conscious experiences. But it does not carry with it the implication that every part of a continuous temporal stream shall have been filled with our experiences. We cannot assert for our experiences an unbroken stream of time at all, we pick our time up by pieces, so to speak, and there is no continuity of actually apprehended time. It is only when we conceive time ideally that it presents itself as an unbroken continuity, and even here this continuity is not absolute, but is resolvable largely into other elements. We have seen that time is conceived as a universal and necessary form of a possible experience, and this is the point of view from which it seems to be absolutely continuous. But the intuition of universal necessity resolves itself, in the last analysis, into a perception of the necessity that any experience that would persist and complete itself must, as one of its conditions, conform to the requirements of time: that is, it must be an experience whose content in one aspect of it will be realized in the form of a time-succession. Even this does not involve the necessity that time should be continuous, or that in a finite experience every moment of a continuous succession should be filled with content. We have not broached the question here whether from some point of view the absolute continuity of time may not be necessary, or whether on that supposition an absolute experience may not be found to be necessary. We take our standpoint here from our own finite experience, and the conclusion to which

we seem to be driven is that the maintenance of personal identity is an affair of the self, and is essentially a category under which it maintains the unity of its life in and through a temporal experience that may be in itself fragmentary and incomplete.

It is to this subject of experience which maintains its being as a persistent and individual self amid the fragmentariness and plurality of its personal life that the term Soul is applied. Soul is therefore a perfectly concrete and intro-experiential term. When we speak of the soul we are characterizing experience from the point of view of its unitary and personal self-hood. Now it may be that the psychologist does not need to recognize the soul in his treatment of the facts of consciousness, though I am at a loss to see how he is to avoid some implicit recognition of its existence; but I feel sure that the epistemologist will come to a point in the development of his science where the recognition of the soul will become a fundamental necessity. He will see that without the assumption of a soul as a unifying and integrating subject of experience its parts fall into fragments and its world of content becomes chaotic. He will find, in fact, that without the assumption of a soul the very problem which he has started out to solve, namely, that of knowledge, has become impossible and absurd. For the only point of view from which a cognitive experience can be conceived as possible is that of the subject of experience itself. It soon becomes apparent that knowledge cannot arise in experience except as a function of a personal and persistent self. If, then, we assume the soul as the centre of the subject-activity in experience, the function of the subject-categories as means or modes of defining its nature as a whole will become clear. The soul is, in the first place, a self that defines itself in opposition to and yet in co-relation with a not-self. Its consciousness includes with its own agency, therefore, that of the other, and it becomes by its very constitution a *socius* and an integral part of the social organism. We have followed in detail the process in

and through which this soul realizes and defines its objective world of content. And in these later chapters we have been developing a concept of self-knowledge and have been endeavouring to unfold the nature of the categories by which this knowledge is realized and defined. We have seen that the categories of the soul-life are forms of its unity and characterize it as a whole, and in the categories of individuality, self-identity, personality, and personal identity we have unfolded the rubrics under which the soul as the central organ of experience is to be conceived as real. There remains then for consideration the question as to how far and in what sense the objective categories are applicable to the life of the soul. That the category of space is not applicable in any direct form is obvious. We could not quantify the soul specially without destroying its indivisible unity. We have also seen that time only applies to it externally, and that its essential life is transcendent. The fragments of the soul-life are temporal, but the soul in its self-maintaining individuality transcends and comprehends the temporal experience. The dynamic categories seem, however, to assert a more fundamental relation. The notion of cause, as we saw, involves as its essential part the idea of agency, and a causal term in an objective series was represented as a conditioned antecedent which holds in it the initiative of a change or change-series. The notion of substance involves that of persistent agency, and objective substances were conceived as persistent points of departure for the organization or reinstatement of actual or possible experiences, and therefore as centres of objective qualities. Finally, the category of interaction was seen to involve the reciprocal and internal agency of a plurality of co-existent parts or elements under the notion of a community. We have seen how the dynamic categories as a whole arise as objective forms of volitional experience and define the world-content under dynamic relations. In their roots, therefore, they are specially related to the soul in its effective agency as will. It is to the soul as will, specially,

that the category of agency is applied therefore, and under this it is conceived on the one hand as a patient or recipient of stimulations or modifications from its other, while on the other hand, as active, it is a conscious initiation of a series of effects. The soul relates itself specially as cause to its own volitional activities, and the relation between its volitional pulses or choices and the modifications which ensue are conceived under the category of cause and effect. Again, the soul conceives itself as a substance, specially in view of its volitional activity and in the sense that it is the persistent subject of experience. But the notion of substance must be construed in the light of the subject-categories under which the real nature of the soul is cognized. It can be a substance; that is, maintain itself as a persistent agent, in the same sense only as it maintains the continuity of its life. The notion of temporal continuity must be read out of both notions, and the soul must not be represented as a substance in any other respect than that which is involved in the maintenance of its individuality and personal identity in and through its volitional activity.

The application of the category of community or interaction to the life of the soul leads to profound modifications of our conceptions of its agency. Did the soul conceive itself as standing alone in its activity, then it might have a sense of absolute agency. It might realize itself as containing the absolute initiative of its own acts, and it might feel itself to be a self identical individual in the absolute sense of that term. But the soul does not stand alone, nor is it conscious of itself in isolation. We saw in developing the objective category of interaction that it has its spring in the community-consciousness of the subject of experience. The soul is not conscious of itself as standing alone, or as excluding its other, but it is conscious of its own agency as including and responding to the agency of its other. The fact of collision which is the most external phenomenon of social relationships, we have seen to be essentially internal and leading to internal modifications of the colliding

elements. It is this internalness of the social situation, entering as it does as a real moment into self-consciousness, that exerts the profoundly modifying influence on the soul's sense of its own agency of which we have spoken above. As a *socius* the soul is conscious of its status as a unit in a community of interacting parts or individuals, and this consciousness determines its whole conception of its individual agency. Philosophers have been too much given to representing the volitional agency of the soul as that of a self-sufficient and self-isolated individual, and little or no account has been taken of the social consciousness that must enter into the conception of such agency. One effect of this mode of representation has been a persistent but fruitless effort to ascribe to the soul a kind of freedom which it is not conscious of possessing, the freedom of absolute initiative which lifts the spring of its choices above the sphere of motives, and makes it, in the last analysis, absolutely self-determining. Were there only one soul in the world the ascription of such agency to it would perhaps be necessary. But inasmuch as the soul's consciousness of its own agency includes in it its relation to the agency of others, its sense of initiative must always be modified in its consciousness by the sense of the initiative of its other. Its consciousness of its agency, and consequently its concept of its agency will be that of a reciprocal activity, in which the initiative of each individuality will include in it the moment of modification by its other. There will then be no absolute initiative in such a system, the initiative of each element will be, in the last analysis, relative, and the sense of freedom which accompanies conscious initiative will be inseparable from the feeling of dependence which springs out of its relativity.

The application of the categories of the dynamic consciousness to the soul's life do not enable it to overcome the dualism of its experience, although the chasm is profoundly bridged in the social consciousness which includes the other along with the self. Now the work, not of closing the chasm,

for it remains, but of uniting its two moments by means of a unifying bond, is completed in the aesthetic category of unity. The notion of unity springs as we have seen out of the feeling-consciousness, and is, therefore, an emotional bond. The effect of the application of this bond to the subject-consciousness is the soul's sense or feeling of its unity with the life of others. This feeling is developed into cognition by the emphasis which feeling puts on self-consciousness, which in its highest development asserts itself as a unifying principle of the conscious life and agency of the self and its other. Self-consciousness is essentially a function of the *socius*. It is only in and through his relations with his other that man becomes conscious of himself, and although it is possible by an act of abstraction to conceive himself apart from and in opposition to his other, yet this abstraction itself presupposes the broader concrete consciousness which arises out of a synthesis of the elements that are conceived to be separate. Self-consciousness has its genetic root in a consciousness in which the social situation is central, and in which the internal sense or feeling of interacting agency gives rise to the sense of the inseparable unity of the terms of that agency in the individual life. In self-consciousness, then, the soul obtains a cognitive grasp of the unity of its life with that of its other, and this it is that constitutes it consciously and definitely a *socius*, and not an isolated unit.

We do not need to travel over again the road by which the soul comes to the realization of itself, as an individual and self identical personal being. Nor do we need to dwell longer on the method by which the soul comes to a realization of the nature of its agency in the system to which it belongs, or on the final achievement of the unification of its life with the life of others in the unitary category of self-consciousness and the bond of feeling. It is only necessary to connect this representation of the subject-consciousness with that of the objective categories, through which its world of content is realized. We will then have a vision of a

dual world: on the one side a sphere of objective reality gradually defining itself under the forms of the presentational, dynamic, and aesthetic consciousness; as a world of space and time, cause, substance, and interaction, and as a world that finally integrates and completes itself under the category of unity. On the other hand, we will have envisaged before us the rise of the subject-world, the development of the soul from the simple spontaneous flow of consciousness in time through the successive stages of the definition of its individual and personal character, up to the point where it asserts itself as a *socius*; a life that is essentially bound up with the life of others, and exercising an agency that is profoundly involved in the agency of the other. The two worlds, while they remain two therefore, and their dualism is not suppressed, become one through the mediation of the categories, which in addition to their function as defining principles of the real, also mediate the duality of subject and object, and reduce them to the unity of one system.

CHAPTER XII.

THE WORLD OF INDIVIDUALS.

THE world of experience, the development of which we have been following, is a world of individuals. We have nowhere in it struck a principle the logic of which involves the suppression of the individual in behoof of any universal interest. On the contrary, the whole trend of experience seems to be in the direction of, *first*, defining the real in individual forms; and, *secondly*, correlating them into a unitary system of reciprocally interacting parts. Now, the question may arise at this point why this world should take the individual form? Why, in short, there should be such a universal *penchant* on the part of reality to turn out individuals and nothing else? And we might answer, that for this experience is not responsible, inasmuch as it does not create its individual content, but simply finds it. This answer is in one sense perfectly true and will be insisted on at the proper place, but just here we propose to set it aside, in order to see whether and how far the question admits of any other kind of a reply. In the first place, it is important that we should recall the representation in the preceding pages of the process by which experience defines its world of content. This process, as we have seen, is mediated by the categories, whose main function is that of defining content in realizable forms. And we saw that under these defining principles the content tends to assume

the individual form. This is not so manifest, of course, in the sphere of simple space and time presentation, but in the conceptual sphere it becomes more pronounced, while the categories of the dynamic and aesthetic consciousness are distinctively principles for the defining of individuals and their inter-relations. We do not need to be told at this point that the subjective consciousness is individualistic in its character, since in the soul that is central in it we find the point of departure for the whole individualizing activity, so far as experience is concerned.

Now, if we designate this whole cognitive activity by which experience reaches its apprehension of the world, a thought-activity, we may say in view of the result that thought is an individuating principle, and we would mean by that statement that it is of the very nature of thought to conceive individuals, and the question, therefore, why thought individuates, becomes as futile and unnecessary as would be the question why thought thinks. Again, I think we will have to admit that the answer has validity. For if thought does individuate in the very form of its activity, we have no special right to ask it to account for its own essential nature. This answer, however, tends to bring to the front a consideration which, as I think, has been at the heart of the question from the beginning; namely, why should the particular individuals be defined that are actually defined? Not the individual or the function, therefore, but the *selective* function that is involved in it is the point in question, and we must admit, I think, that here we have a real question. Does the selective motive rest in thinking itself, or is it to be sought for in some other region of experience? In seeking the answer to this question, however, we must recall the first consideration, and take into account its bearing on the whole situation. It is true that experience is not the creator of its own world, nor are we the creatures of our own experience. The processes of experience, so far as we are conscious of them, are those of discovery and realization, not those of absolute origination.

We are unable to conceive, in fact, what absolute origination is or may be, and the best we can do toward reducing it to intelligibility is to represent it under some approximate symbol. The world that we realize is, therefore, not a world of fancy or caprice, but one of strict and inevitable necessity. In the broadest sense we realize the one world, because there is but the one world that, so far as we are concerned, can be realized. It would appear then that the question, why this particular world? is, after all, absurd, and that we have absolutely no option as to our own world. Such a conclusion is felt by every one to be extreme, inasmuch as it takes away from the soul even that relative initiative in its world of which it has so strong a sense, and reduces it practically to the condition of a slave.

In order to meet this difficulty we may suppose, applying the principle of Leibnitz in a different sphere, that thought has, in spite of the fact pointed out above, a certain initiative or free relation toward its world, and this may take the form of conceiving other possible alternative worlds which are virtually set aside in the selection of this particular world. This is, of course, possible, but its futility and aimlessness cannot but be manifest also. A more pregnant suggestion is that of Royce, who supposes on the part of thought the ability and, in fact, the necessity of conceiving the hypothetical opposite of what it actually thinks as real. This seems to be indisputable, and this negative mode of conceiving no doubt serves as an important principle in defining reality. But, after all, a negative conception does not of itself determine a real act of selection without the interposition of a more positive motive. There must be something in the world of experience that determines it as our own world, otherwise it could not be real, but would be the *simulacrum* of a world in relation to which our experience has no agency. Such a situation would reduce both the world of experience and the transcendent world to unreality. From this dilemma it is clear that the power of conceiving and excluding the hypothetical opposite will not

deliver us. We must go deeper, I think, and connect the knowing activity with its volitional roots in order to find a selective motive that shall be adequate.¹ We believe, with Schopenhauer, that the will-impulse is deeper than that of cognition, and we have tried to show how the knowledge-activity is primarily motived by volition. But we do not believe that will is mere blind impulse. Will has its own category of survival, or good, or whatever we may see fit to call it, that mediates its relation to the world and defines it as a selective activity. To us, then, will is a selective activity, and supplies an important motive, as we saw, in the cognitive apprehension of the world. Here we are interested in will principally as a selective motive in the relation of the soul to its world as a whole. It is true that the world-representation that arises is a necessary one, and we have no option as to whether it shall define itself as this kind of a world or some other. But from the standpoint of will the activity of the soul is to be conceived as one of appropriation or rejection under the gradually defining category of the good. There are appropriations of content, but there are also rejections and exclusions, and the net outcome of this process is that out of a gross world involving the possibility of a much larger and, in fact, wholly indefinable or conceivable content, a world has been volitionally determined composed of selected elements standing over against a dark negative background of elements and possibilities which have been excluded.

It is, as we have endeavoured to point out, in connection with this volition-world, and as presupposing it, that the cognitive activity arises and unfolds its world-representation. It will be clear, then, that the selective motive of the cognitive world will not be found in the cognitive activity

¹ The connection of this section with Royce's profound and subtle discussion of the Principle of Individuation in the last part of his *Conception of God* will be obvious. I take pleasure in admitting obligation here, though my own doctrine has been independently developed and for it I alone am responsible.

itself, but in the volitional activity which underlies it and in a sense precedes it. We must then make a distinction between the question of individuation and that of selection. The question of individuation is answered by pointing to the nature of the thought-activity in its principles of positive and negative definition. And the process by which the individual is progressively defined is that of the categories. We cannot say that space, or time, or cause, or substance is the special principle of individuation. The categories as they arise and in their own sphere are defining and individuating principles. But the world of individualities as it finally emerges is a result in which they have all participated. The soul itself supplies, no doubt, the type of individuality, and the form which it assumes under the subjective categories is doubtless the form to which the individuals of the objective-world are gradually approximating. The soul's individuality expresses itself ultimately in the form of a *socius*, and this determines, as we have seen, the final stage in the conception of the individual constitution of the world. It might be said, then, with some reason, that in the soul itself the ultimate motive of individuation is to be found, and this is no doubt true. But when we have distinguished the soul as a thinking activity from the soul as a voluntary agent, the former is no longer completely explanatory. It answers the question of individuation, and therefore enables us to see that it is inevitable that the world should become defined in individual forms. But it does not answer the question of selection which we have found it necessary to distinguish from that of individuation. For the selective motive of the world we must fall back upon the soul as a voluntary agent which, through the activities of appropriation and rejection, is progressively realizing its ideal of the good. This volitional activity is presupposed in the cognitive, and our world, which we realize, is felt to be one in regard to which we have some option. In spite of its necessity, the part of it which we actually realize has in a sense been selected from a much

larger sphere of possibilities. It is at least a world toward which our wills have had an opportunity to take an attitude, and this answers our question, so far as it can be answered from our human point of view; why this particular world?

That the question is not completely answerable from our human point of view every one will admit. There is no point of absolute initiative anywhere in experience. The volitional agency of the soul is one that is qualified by its inter-relations. The individualities that arise in the objective representation of the world are, as we saw, in their subjective relation, *posit*s of the central activity and presuppose it, while in relation to the soul itself the world and its individualities are necessary. If there is any point from which absolute initiative can be conceived and, therefore, absolute freedom in relation to the whole world of experience, this point must be one that is transcendent of any human individual experience but not necessarily one that is transcendent of any possible experience. Related to this consideration is the question of more speculative than practical importance, how we come to know and affirm other individuals besides ourselves. The common answer, which is confined to our knowledge of conscious beings like ourselves, is that we reach this knowledge by a process of inference from external signs, and this is, no doubt, true as far as it goes. But it does not go very far. If we distinguish the general question as to the basis of our knowledge of other individuals from the special and altogether local question as to how we come to specialize this acquaintance in becoming aware of some particular individual, it is easy enough to see that the popular answer has the latter mainly in view, and that it is relatively satisfactory. That the individual in question is my son Jack, and not some other boy of my acquaintance, I know by the interpretation of a multitude of outward signs. But the question how we come to assert other individuals besides ourselves is a phase of the more profound question how the content of our experience comes to individuate

itself. The final reason for this we do not find in our experience, inasmuch as we have seen that our experience-processes are not creative. They do not absolutely originate the individuals which they apprehend, and the profoundest function of initiative that they do exercise with respect to them, is, as we have seen, that of volitional selection. But though this be true, the fact that the whole cognitive process is one of individuation has been made clear. The root-intuition of individuality is to be found in the soul itself. We do not puzzle ourselves over the question how we apprehend ourselves as individuals. Our whole representation of self takes normally the individual form. Our trouble is about others. But why should we vex ourselves about this question? Have we not seen that the soul is essentially a *socius*, and that its consciousness of itself includes the recognition of its other? In the act, then, in which the soul asserts itself, it also posits its other; that is, another individual. Also, in regard to objective experience, we have seen that the fundamental inner act in the cognition of things is a posit in which a point of individuation is affirmed, for this is the meaning of the experience-act which takes place under the notion of substance. Things are, therefore, constitutionally individuals, and can in the nature of things be nothing else. That we know the not-self in individual form is the result of the constitution of our experience, and that we should cognize some individuals as other selves is provided for by the nature of the soul, as not an isolated unit but a *socius*. The truth is, as we have seen, that the spontaneous tendency in the untutored consciousness is to regard all others as other selves. This tendency springs directly out of the social constitution of our consciousness, and the fact that we make a distinction and conceive some individuals as things and not selves, is a result of the tutoring of experience. The tendency to posit the other in all cases as a being like ourselves, is checked and modified by our experience of the objective world in which some individuals

fail to behave as beings of consciousness and will, would be expected to behave, and this experience leads gradually to the notion of things as individual agents without consciousness and will. Instead, therefore, of puzzling ourselves over the question how we come to recognize some individuals as beings like ourselves, we ought rather to ask how it comes to pass that we do not regard all individuals as beings like ourselves, and the answer to this question will be found, if at all, in a careful analysis of the processes of objective knowledge.

The last topic which we shall discuss in this connection is the question of the reality of the world whose representation we have been unfolding. We saw in the first section of this book that to be real is, in the last analysis, to be realized content of experience. And to be objectively real is, therefore, to be realized objective content of experience. But in working out the definition of reality we were careful to show that under the term, realized content of experience, we meant to include not merely content that has been or will be actually realized but also, and in fact we may say, rather, the whole sphere of possible content of experience, together with the necessary implications which may be involved in the experience-content itself. In the only true sense that is conceivable the meaning of a thing includes its implications and the application of this common-sense principle to experience itself leads us, not to the affirmation that anything may be transcendent of experience when that term is conceived in its absolute sense, but rather that in any actual or possible content of experience there may be terms whose implications are transcendent of experience of that type. Now it is in the light of this larger section of reality that we wish to consider the question of the world which we apprehend in our experience. And in view of this the first step of our answer will consist in distinguishing between the world of defined content which arises normally and necessarily out of the processes of experience as a whole, and any world of fancy, or caprice, or disordered cognitive

activity which fails to bear the tests of reality that we are able to devise. We do not need to enumerate these tests but simply to accent the fact here that experience has means of testing its own results and that these tests are in the main sufficient to enable us to distinguish between reality and illusion. The real from this point of view is then, that representation of the world which, having arisen by normal processes, is able to bear the ordeal of the tests that experience itself applies to it. But it is clear that this does not completely satisfy us as to the reality of our world. The very nature of our experience is such, as we have endeavoured to show, that nothing *final* can arise in it, and in view of this relativity it may be possible for our world to bear all the empirical tests and to vindicate itself as a normal product of cognitive activity, and at the same time to be purely subjective: that is, purely an affair of our experience. The incurable root of illusion and scepticism in subjective idealism arises here. It may accept the world of experience as valid for experience and as able to bear all the empirical tests, but its insistence on the pure relativity of the representation reduces its world to illusion by a logic that is irresistible. The notion of reality is satisfied only when we are able to dispel the illusion of pure relativity by anchoring our world of experience to points of transcendence where it becomes evident that the experience-processes, in the last analysis, are not creative. In its profoundest significance our experience *finds* its content, and in regard to its world as a whole in the largest sense, it has no option. It must find what it does find. Now, it is this inevitableness of things; this coerciveness of our world by virtue of which it leaves us no option as to whether we shall apprehend it or some other world; it is this inevitableness, I say, that satisfies us of its reality. And to the objection that this inevitableness itself may be purely subjective in its origin and be simply a reflex in consciousness of the uniform mode by which we realize our world, we can only say that such a supposition is

incapable of any demonstration, and has against it the whole weight of the intrinsic relativity of our experience. The shallowness of subjective idealism is evinced in its inveterate tendency to regard the experience in which the world of content arises as itself absolute and only the experience-content as relative. This being the case it becomes the simple creation of the experience-activities. Then by a dialectical feat worthy of a logical acrobat the objective reality of the content is denied on the ground of its pure subjectivity, when in fact its absolute reality ought rather to be affirmed. We have found on the contrary that the experience-processes themselves are relative. The cognitive activity has a very limited sphere of freedom within the broad outlines of its world, and it finds its world in the main compulsory. Its activities as it becomes conscious of them are nowhere creative or originative, but everywhere acts of discovery and definition. When we relate the cognitive activity to that of voluntary agency we reach a sphere of larger freedom where our world is in a sense the outcome of our own choice. But even here we find, as we have pointed out in another section, that volitional agency as we are conscious of exercising it, is only relative, and qualified. Our wills have no absolute initiative, they are not creative but selective and assimilative, and the initiative which they do exercise is modified by the social consciousness which renders them patients and incorporates the impulsions they receive from their other into the central motivity of their own agency. From the point of view of volitional agency then, as well as from that of cognitive activity the inevitability of the world springs from the relativity of the experience-activities out of which its representation arises. We have only to trace our experience to its last resorts in order to discover an exhibition of its relativity. The points of its initiation are invariably found to be points of transcendence, in relation to which experience has no option, but which it must receive in the spirit of a little child. The world is accepted as real in the first instance

therefore, if it is able to prove itself normal by submitting to all the tests which experience is able to devise for the guaranteeing of its own content. It is accepted as real, in the last analysis, if it rebukes and punishes all our attempts to rebel against it or to treat it capriciously as a creature of fancy, and forces us to approach it submissively and in the true spirit of a learner.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF COMMUNITY.

IN the preceding chapters we have seen how the world of experience resolves itself ultimately into a world of individuals and how the relations among these individuals are reducible to the category of community or interaction. In the analysis of interaction we have also found that the notion makes necessary at a certain point, a transition from the concept of external to that of internal influence. *A*, in order to really influence *b*, must in some sense become internal to *b* so that the pulse of *b*'s activity shall contain in it the moment supplied by the modifying agency of *a*. This transition from the notion of external to that of internal agency is identical with the passage from the mechanical to the teleological, as we shall see later on, but the point of interest here is not so much the characterization of the change as the determination of its nature. What is involved in the notion of the agency of the other becoming internal and included? Clearly it means that the mode of *b*'s being influenced by *a* will be determined by the capacity of *b* to receive impressions or their equivalent from *a* and to translate these impressions into impulses to activity. In short, the influence of *a* must enter into the life-activity of *b* as part of its motivity. The question how this is possible naturally suggests the analogy of conscious activity, but it is clear that we come upon this mode of activity in nature

before the stage of internal consciousness is reached, or at least before we can affirm the internal presence of consciousness. The description of the form of internal agency as realizing itself through the inclusion and assimilation of the influence of the other, might be taken as a provisional definition of life, and we are clearly dealing with the form of individual agency to which the term living is ordinarily applied. Our question, therefore, becomes; what is living agency in its essence, and how is it to be distinguished from the form of agency which we call mechanical or non-living? There are, of course, various points of view from which *differentiae* might be developed, but we are seeking a basal distinction and we will find it, I think, in the notion of individuality already developed. The world of content is reducible to a plurality of interacting individuals. Now, it is only necessary to suppose that there is an inherent tendency on the part of the individual toward self-assertion and self-realization, a tendency which we shall seek to ground at a later stage, in order to be able to connect the form of agency we call life, with mechanism on the one hand, and with conscious directive agency on the other. Let us suppose that what we call mechanical activity implies the *minimum* of individual self-assertion and that this minimum is involved in the notion of force or that which includes in its definition simply the moment of forward pulsion but not in any sense the end or outcome of its action. Mechanical activity will be conceived therefore as internally pulsive but not internally selective or directive. It will be clear in the light of this conception that the individuality of force will consist mainly in its supplying a point of departure for a mechanical process, and this will give us the notion of individuality in its lowest terms.

Let us suppose now that the agency of the individual reaches a point where it begins to include not only the moment of straight-forward pulsion, but also a disposition to be selective and assimilative. As a result it begins to be choice of its company and manifests this by admitting some

kinds of stimulating influences and turning away from others. It is clear that this kind of agency is beginning to be end-conserving, and that there is beginning also to be a centre of contained motivity in the individual itself and that this will make it necessary for us to enlarge the concept of individuality beyond the point required by mechanism. For the individual can no longer be represented as simply a point of departure for a straight-out pulsive force, but it must now be regarded as a point of departure which is at the same time a centre of selective and assimilative activity. The activity of the merely living individual thus becomes end-seeking, but not consciously so, inasmuch as it does not in any direct sense contemplate an end, but its activity, in so far as it is selective and assimilative, works out in the form of action that seeks an end. The real motive of the activity is, however, a pulsion that has in it the moment or potency of selection and assimilation. That we here come upon a form of individuality that is capable of being internally influenced and through this, of acting selectively and teleologically, is the important fact, and to this form of individuality as well as to the agency that it manifests, the term *organic* is applied to distinguish it from the mechanical and inorganic. *An organism is therefore an individual that is susceptible of being internally influenced by its other and that through this internal susceptibility develops a form of agency that is both responsive and selective.*

We reach in this way the notion of the biological individual pure and simple, as distinguished from that higher form of life that is accompanied with consciousness. The living individual, by virtue of its internal and selective character, becomes an interacting centre of a peculiar kind. The problem of its inter-activity is no longer that of a mechanical clash or composition of external forces, nor yet that of chemical composition, but it is that of an individual which has developed a power of receiving its other into itself, and, through this receptiveness the capacity of responding to its environment in a way that

is at once self-conserving and adaptive. Now, it is in view of this form of individual agency, which we call living, that the categories of organic activity are to be construed. The temptation of the biologist will be, in the first instance at least, to imagine too wide a gap between the mechanical and the organic, and to suppose that it will be necessary for the organic to develop a set of brand-new categories of its own. He will find, however, that the categories he uses are for the most part the old concepts of mechanism modified so as to adapt them to the transformed agency which we call life. That this is true a brief analysis will be sufficient to prove. So far as space and time are concerned no appreciable modification takes place. The relations of the organic to space and time, in so far as they do not involve consciousness, will not differ appreciably from the time and space relations of the inorganic. It is only when we take into account the categories of agency that we will find important modifications necessary, and even here the change will be largely one of form, while the principle of the category remains unchanged. For if we enter into biological thinking on this point I think we will find that the concept of agency assumes two leading forms. (1) That of a causally conditioned series in time, and (2) that of a system of co-existing and interacting individual organisms. Out of the first will arise the concept of organic evolution, with its complemental notion of heredity, which is the form taken by substance, or the moment of persistence in an organic series. The second notion, that of interaction, when applied to co-existing organisms, will yield the categories of differentiation and integration on which the fortunes of organization are so vitally dependent, while the combination of the two notions of agency will yield those categories of co-ordination and equilibration which characterize the biological movement as a whole. It is only necessary, then, to attain an intelligent concept of the difference in the forms of individuality, which are involved respectively in organic and

inorganic science, in order to become convinced that the categories of the organic may be regarded as, in the main, transformations of concepts that are fundamental in the science of the inorganic.

We come at length to the point where consciousness arises and becomes internal to the organism and transforms the biological individual into the psychic and social. The biological situation involves, as we have seen, an individual in responsive relations with its other, which is represented as external. The biological individual is directly pulsive in its activity, and only indirectly, and by a secondary intention, end-seeking, through its selective susceptibility. To the conscious organism, however, the selective motive becomes internal. Consciousness, as we have seen, is never simple, but internally complex, even in its lowest forms. It involves a rudimental duality, and there is included in it a subject-centre of individual activity related to an objective other with which it is in responsive relations, and it is through this internalization of what is partly external to the biological individual, that the psychic and social individual is able to translate a biologically-outlying environment into an internal world of realized content. Let us suppose, then, that the individual has become internally conscious and psychic; by virtue of the same transformation, it also becomes social. Now, the social nature is not wholly absent from the plant, for wherever there is *kind*, and the basis of genus and species, there is also the germ of possible sociality, but in a non-conscious organism the motive of kind can be only pulsive and indirectly end-seeking through its selective susceptibility. In order to be consciously apprehended, and to enter into the individual activity as a real determining motive, the end-seeking must become direct through the selective activity becoming conscious. This is what happens when an individual organism becomes conscious; the pulsive energy and the selective susceptibility unite in one conscious impulse to appropriate the object which has become internally represented. Conscious activity

is therefore end-seeking, and it is so primarily because the object that is external to the biological activity becomes internal to the conscious activity.

In order to realize how the object-term becomes internal to consciousness we have only to take account of the whole cognitive activity of consciousness, in which, viewed objectively, a world becomes internal through impressions that are worked up by the presentative and conceptual activities into the idea or representation of the object. This idea or representation *is* the environment, the external other of the biological situation become internal, and we do not require to be told that it is of the very nature of consciousness to incorporate this internal object-representation with the pulsive activity, and thus to translate the whole into the form of conscious end-seeking activity. Conscious activity is therefore directly and immediately end-seeking, and does not become so by a kind of second intention. The dialectic, that is external to the biological individual and relates it to a non-included object, thus becomes internal to the psychic individual and relates it to an object-term which it is the nature of consciousness to internalize and render an included factor in its end-seeking activity.

Now, just as the end-seeking activity in the biological individual is also kind-realizing, so we find the same to be true in a higher sense of the conscious activity, and the thought occurs to us that here we may be very near to the spring of the sense of kind itself. The truth is, an end-seeking consciousness may, in the first instance, be represented as a consciousness whose activity is motived by a sense of kind, and when we seek to trace this motive to its root we find that biologically it merges in the selective susceptibility itself, and that the root of this susceptibility must be referred, in the last analysis, to the primary individual nature that we have to presuppose as the ground of all processes. In like manner we are obliged to trace the primary root of the sense of kind to the self in some primary individual nature that in becoming internally

conscious, becomes also the "frontal type" of all the ends which it seeks objectively. The sense of kind, or, in a more developed form, the notion of kind, is thus in the last analysis the sense or notion of that which is *congruous* with the feeling or notion of self, while the absence of the sense of kind would involve the absence or failure of this sense of congruity. We seem in this way to be able to establish a fundamental analogy between the assimilative activities of the biological organism and the kind-sense of the *socius*. The kind-sense is simply the recognition of the social material that is congruous and therefore assimilable, whereas the absence of the kind-sense indicates non-assimilable social material. The sense of kind will thus arise in view of socially assimilable material, and we have seen that the frontal type of the assimilable is to be found in the last analysis in the nature of the self. Right here, however, we must connect this result with one obtained some way back: namely, that the end-seeking activity of consciousness is constituted by the incorporation of the notion of the internally represented other with the pulsive energy of consciousness. This is the essential constitution of a conscious activity, and we cannot conceive any activity that is conscious in the full sense, other than in this form. Genetically, then, the antecedent of such activity must be either purely biological and unconscious, or it will be what we call instinctive, which is simply conscious activity with one leg as yet buried in the slime. Instinct may be regarded as consciousness that is conscious of its pulsive energy but has not as yet made its object completely internal, and is not, therefore, consciously end-realizing. Instinct will therefore be the true genetic antecedent of full consciousness, and it will be necessary here to represent consciousness as going on to full realization, and to this end, as passing inevitably through the stage of half realization which we call instinct. Taking this as settled, we find it necessary then to regard the moment of object-inclusion and end-seeking, as an essential part of the constitution of individual conscious activity, and it must,

therefore, enter constitutionally into the determination of self.

Let us now put our two conclusions together and see what the result will be. We have found in the first place that the sense of kind has its fonsal spring in the sense of self, and we have seen in the second place that consciousness is constitutionally inclusive of its object, and that the representation or notion of this enters into the conscious pulse of self-activity. Right here we come upon that duality which, as we have seen in another connection, determines the form of that modified agency of which we finite beings are conscious, and which here exhibits to us that inner dialectic between the self and the object or other, which constitutes man a *socius*. The result of this dialectic is that the self and the other are mutually and reciprocally determining. The self is determined as self through the entrance into it of the modifying sense or concept of the other, and the other is determined as other through its inclusion of the sense or concept of the self. The self-consciousness of the *socius* is thus constitutionally reciprocal and dual. Returning, then, to the consideration of that sense or notion of kind which, according to Professor Giddings,¹ is central in the social consciousness, we find that its roots are dual. It arises out of an inner dialectic between the sense or notion of self and the sense of an other that is congruous to self, but we have to avoid the supposition that either term in this duality is absolutely fixed. They are mutually modifiable, and the incorporation that takes place is the result of mutual adjustment. The sense or notion of kind is, therefore, the sense or notion of *the other like ourselves*, which becomes incorporated with our sense or notion of self and internally moulds it into the sense or notion of a self that is a *socius*. The internal dialectic between the self and the other like itself, thus underlies the social con-

¹ Art. "Sociology" in Vol. VII. of Johnson's *Cyclopaedia* and *The Theory of Sociology*, in which the positions are fully elaborated, and a good beginning made in sociological theory.

sciousness which it constitutes, and when we seek to analyze the mode of this dialectic and the steps by which the social consciousness is achieved, we are directly in the domain of social psychology, and may take as our guides such pioneers in this field as Tarde and Baldwin,¹ who find in *imitation* the mode by which the self-activity enters into its other, and thus in the end renders it internal to itself as part of its own constitution. It is through attempts to imitate, these writers contend, that the child's realization of its objective world is mediated, and imitation becomes a category in the development of the social consciousness just in so far as it mediates the realization of the other like ourselves. The problem of genetic social psychology may from this point of view be represented, then, as that of the development of the consciousness of kind through that imitative activity which enables us to enter into the inner life of the other like ourselves, and by means of this objective moment, to make the sense or notion of the other internal to our own consciousness.

We may conceive now that the social self-consciousness has been achieved, and this will supply us with the form of individuality that is central in the sphere of social activity. It is an individual whose self-conscious activity—we may call it the primary pulsive energy of the conscious self—has incorporated with it the consciousness of the other like itself, and the incorporation of which determines the social consciousness to be an end-conceiving and end-seeking activity. A conscious end-seeking activity is, as we have seen, an activity the sense or notion of whose object has become internal as a motive for its own realization, and a social end-seeking activity is surely this same form of agency in which the object is one of *kind*. The social individual is therefore one that is brought into conscious end-seeking relations with others of his own kind, and whose con-

¹ Gabriel Tarde, *Les Lois de l'Imitation*, 1890. Baldwin, *Mental Development*, 2 vols. In both these works, and especially in the latter, the function of imitation as a building category of sociality is emphasized and elaborated.

sciousness of these relations constitutes the ground of the sociality of his nature.

There is an aspect of the process by which the social consciousness is developed that has been too much overlooked, and that is yet of vital importance. We have seen, in dealing with other phases of experience, that it is necessary everywhere to distinguish between the subject and object activities in experience, and it will be necessary to observe this distinction here in order not to overlook one whole side of the social situation. The dialectic of the social consciousness is one in which the subject or self develops into a *socius*. This may be called the subject-moment of the activity. But the dialectic would not be conceivable if it did not include also a moment of objective activity which is determinative of the nature of the other. The peculiarity of the situation is that it is a compound dualism; the subject-determination resulting in a self that is a *socius*, while the object-determination, in which, as we have seen, the moment of self is included, results in an object or other that is a *self*. The whole social situation must include, then, the representation of a subject that is a *socius* in dialectical relations with an object or other that is a social self, and the dialectic will be simply the reciprocal or interacting relations of these self-terms in which each not only distinguishes itself from its other in the fundamental differentiation of the self from its object, or not self, but also *identifies* itself with its other in the sense or notion of kind. In short, the social situation is a modification of the general psychic situation brought about by the incorporation into consciousness of the sense or notion of kind. This will not, it is clear, effect any change in the relation of the object to the conscious activities, but will only modify the nature of the object itself, making it an objective *socius* rather than an object of another kind. The point which it seems necessary to emphasize here is that the object of the social consciousness is a *socius* as truly as is the subject, but that it is a *different socius*. If we take

into account only the process by which the self becomes a *socius*, then it will be hard for us to conceive why the other should not be completely absorbed into the subject-self, and there would be danger of a kind of social solipsism, whereas by taking into account the objective activity also, we are able to see how the other *socius* objective to us is as essential to the situation as the *socius* that is ourself, and this will supply us with a true basis for social interaction.

The notion of the community-consciousness is not identical with that of the individual *socius*, but it is rather the notion of a consciousness that develops out of the conscious interaction of the social self with his social other. We have simply to view the social situation objectively in order to reach the idea of a community of interacting individuals of the social type, and of the communal consciousness as the consciousness that arises out of the experiences of social interaction. We are not concerned here to trace the agencies in experience which lead to its development, but there are two fundamental moments of the social dialectic for the theorizing of which the present point in the discussion seems to furnish a most favourable opportunity. I mean the moments of egoism and altruism. The dialectic of social interaction must be conceived as having two distinctive moments, that of *objective identification with the social other* in which we are conscious of entering into the life of the other, and that of *the rebound or return from the other* and the assertion of the self as distinct from the other, in which we are conscious of including the other, or of incorporating it into ourself. The moment of *egoism* is therefore a pulse of self-realization through the appropriation of the other, while that of *altruism* is a pulse of other-realization through self-inclusion in and identification with the life of the other. The impossibility of separating the two moments thus becomes obvious, and it also becomes clear that normal egoism is not abstract individual self-assertion, but the self-realizing pulse of a consciousness that includes its other; nor on the other hand is altruism pure

abstract otherness, but a pulse of other-realization in which self is included. The form of egoism which we call selfishness or self-seeking arises only when some subject-self attempts to ignore the objective side of the dialectic in its feelings or life-aims and seeks to absorb the wealth of the other without in turn returning its own wealth to the other, and it is clear that extreme altruism is an opposite abstraction of the same type.

What we call the community-consciousness, then, is a consciousness which, proceeding on the general sense or notion of kind, arises out of the interaction of social individuals, and embodies itself in the opposite and alternating moments of egoism and altruism, as above explained, through which it progresses towards maturity. We are not specially interested here in the means by which this result is achieved, except to remark that when the situation is objectively conceived it becomes obvious that the moment of difference will assert itself as well as that of identity, and that *collision* and *conflict* will perhaps share the honours with *imitation* in bringing about social results. Historically, of course, this is verifiable, but we are here seeking to show how such a situation has its grounds in the human constitution. A class of modern thinkers, from Hobbes to Benjamin Kidd, have espoused the doctrine that the nature of man is purely egoistic and self-seeking, and that the restraint of altruism must be imposed from the outside—Hobbes finding it in an absolute State and Kidd in Religion. And a logical deduction from this theory of human nature is the conclusion that the natural state of man is one that is pre- and anti-social; one in which the egoistic wills simply fly at one another's throats, and that sociality is a superinduction brought about either by force or by the instinct of self-preservation. In such a scheme there is no common ground, but the isolated units clash together in a conflict that cannot be mediated except from without. The doctrine of these thinkers rests on a false and defective analysis of human nature, which might have been avoided by a study of the

ever-wonderful Greeks and more especially of the *Politics* of Aristotle, which distinctively defines man as by nature a political animal. The freshest results of modern investigation are tending to confirm this Aristotelian insight, and to establish the constitutional sociality of man's nature.

We proceed now to consider the categories of the community-consciousness. In treating of the biological individual we saw how the taking into account of the nature of the living organism enabled us to see that the principal categories of the organic sphere are simply transformations of the categories of the inorganic and mechanical. A similar insight will come to us here if we take into account the nature of the individuals which constitute our social community, namely: that their own individuality has been achieved through the inclusion of the mechanical and organic as moments in their own more developed consciousness. And the proposition which we wish to state here as capable of proof, but which we shall not stop to prove, is that the leading categories of the mechanical and organic are, when so modified as to be adapted to the more developed form of individuality to which they are related, also leading categories of the social consciousness. What I mean is that, allowing for the difference of the *socius* from the mechanical or biological individual, in dealing with and organizing the materials of our social world into the forms of knowledge we make an application of the categories of cause, substance, interaction, and unification. We have seen, however, that interaction is the category *par excellence* of the social sphere, and this is what we would be led to expect when we consider that as the point of individuality becomes emphasized so will the inter-relations of individuals tend to rise into prominence. From another point of view, however, the category of cause, or rather that of conditioned causation in time, becomes prominent, and constitutes the point of view from which we conceive historical and genetic evolution. Taking the objective view, we may conceive the whole contents of the present social consciousness as the

last link in a chain of causal developments in a time-series, and then it will be incumbent on us to apply to it the methods and principles of historical and genetic analysis. On this aspect we do not dwell here, since, important as it is to the investigation of social phenomena, it is only when we conceive our content under the category of community or interaction that we are able to grasp the fundamentals of the social situation. To this point of view we return, then, for the final considerations of this chapter.

We have seen that in the last analysis the social consciousness resolves itself into a dialectic between a self that includes its other and an other that includes the self in its larger scope, and that the meaning of the terms egoism and altruism must be determined in the light of this relation. Now, we may go a step farther, and, observing that we subjectively apprehend the self that includes its other, whereas the other that is inclusive of self is objectively apprehended, we may apply distinctions already recognized as fundamental, and may represent the two terms as the subjective and the objective selves, and in view of this the terms of the social dialectic will be a subject and an object self. The result of this situation will be, that the self that includes its other finds itself related to the other in which it is itself included, as to an objective social world. The objective self will be the world of social individuals in which its own objective life is included, and the dialectic will take the form of reciprocal action between the subject-self and the objective social world of which it is a part; and it is important that we should take into account here that this objective social sphere; while in the last analysis it is a community of interacting individuals, is also the world of social grouping and organization, though we are obliged to assume it here without further analysis. As a result, we have the social individual as a subject self or ego, including the other in its own consciousness, standing in functional relations with society, or the social organism in which its own objective life is included, and that functional relation expresses itself

in a dialectic between two opposite moments, the one egoistic, in which the objective social is regarded simply as the nourishing mother of the self, and as tributary to the self-realization of the ego: the other altruistic and objective, in which the ego identifies itself with and becomes included in, the objective life of society.

It is clear, I think, that we have a situation here out of which will develop some of the most fundamental features of our human experience. We are not concerned so much with the actual mode in which the various forms of social consciousness have developed, or with the conditions that may have influenced and modified that development, as we are with the, to us, more fundamental consideration, the structural conditions out of which these forms of social consciousness have arisen. In regard to this root-problem, as it may truly be called, an insight into the real nature of the social dialectic is fundamental, inasmuch as it enables us to see how the individual can, and in fact must, regard himself at the same time as an individual unit and as an included part in a social organism. The fact that man is conscious of himself as both an individual unit and as an undivided part of a larger and objective whole is the most fundamental fact of his social life. It not only supplies to him a point of independent status as an individual, and thus secures him from complete absorption into the socio-political organism, but it relates his ego to a larger and richer whole in which its own life is objectively included, and which from this very relation is destined to perform an all-important part in the economy of its own life. The very fact that its own subjective experience is in a sense isolated and apart from that of its fellows, while its objective experience is an undivided part of a larger and richer common life, tends to destroy the equi-balance which we might expect to find existing between the two moments, by subordinating the subject-consciousness of the ego to the object-consciousness of the community and investing the latter with quasi or real legislative authority. The point we are making here

is not one of mere speculation, but is the normal outcome of our experience as beings that are conscious of our social relations. We are not considering at all at this point the relatively external and accidental function which mere force and violence may have performed in bringing about the subordination of the individual to the community, for what mere force has done may be undone in the same manner. The real problem here is something deeper, and we are seeking, in fact, the *rationale* of the supremacy of the objective consciousness of the community over that of the subject individual, in the fundamental relations of the social situation itself. Taking this as settled, then, we have only to recall the conclusion reached in a former chapter; namely, that the principle of rationality, which, as we shall see in the third division of this work, is also the rational ground of all authority, is simply the principle of the unity of our experience as a whole; in order to be convinced that in a situation that is constituted by a dialectical relation between the consciousness of a lesser subjective whole called the ego or self and that of a larger objective whole called society or the objective self, the demand of the latter would seem to the former to be more rational than its own self-affirmation, and would, therefore, exert the pressure of authority. We do not consider here external sources of authority at all, but simply that intra-conscious authority which the objective consciousness of the social claims over the subject-consciousness of the ego, and which the ego recognizes. Were it not for this internal assertion and recognition of authority founded on the sense of a higher objective rationality, it would be difficult to conceive how any externally constituted authority could obtain and hold permanent internal recognition. The internal recognition must have its own intrinsic grounds, and these will have their root in the recognition by the ego of the larger rationality of the objective self.

The claim of society upon the individual rests, therefore, on solid grounds of essential rationality, and the individual feels that in recognizing it he is yielding allegiance to a

higher reason that has the right of prescription over him, at least within certain limits that will be defined by the legitimate assertion of his egoism. The individual will always be conscious of, and will exercise his right to regard, the social organism as a nourishing mother to his self-realization, but in thus making society tributary to his personal good he will at the same time recognize his subordination to the claims of the objective social world in which his own life is included, and the claim of this world will assert itself as law to his will. Now, it is in this connection that it will be most clearly seen, I think, how the moment of social law develops and yet how in connection with it the individual consciousness is always able to maintain a standpoint transcendent to, if not outside of, law. The moment of law is the point where the subject-consciousness admits and recognizes the superior claim of the objective social consciousness, thus placing it in the seat of Legislation, whereas the moment of transcendence is simply the pulse of egoism itself in so far as it involves the individual's assertion of its own distinctive reality and its right to make society tributary to its own good. These are the fundamentally legitimate pulses of the social life, and it is only, as we saw, when egoism attempts to repudiate the objective claims of society that it becomes false and selfish, just as, on the other hand, the claims of society become despotic in so far as they tend to deny or encroach upon the legitimate claims of egoism. The whole of social history may be regarded, in one aspect of it at least, as a manifestation of this inner dialectic.

We wish to dwell a moment longer, in conclusion, on the concept of law reached in the last paragraph. It is not claimed here that other factors do not enter into the determination of the consciousness of social law, but merely that here we come upon that point of inner origination which enables us to connect its claim with a general scheme of rational experience. The right of the stronger to rule must be in the last analysis resolvable into the right of the better and higher, if authority is not to remain forever purely

arbitrary. If we suppose, then, that the objective social consciousness, by virtue of its higher rationality, is legislative, and has its claim recognized by the subject-consciousness, we will find in this act of recognition by the subject-consciousness, a germ of *conscience* that will contain both juristic and distinctively ethical moments. The juristic will arise in the ego's recognition of the right of the objective consciousness to prescribe rules for the organization and regulation of its objective social life, while the distinctive moment of ethical authority will arise when the claim of the objective acts as a direct pressure or restraint on some motive or impulse of egoism. And this leads to the final insight that we have been leading up to for some time, namely, that it is the function of the juristic conscience to define directly, in terms that shall be prescriptive to the subject-consciousness, the content and standards of objective social good, while the function of the ethical conscience will be rather to define the subjective good of the individual in terms (prescriptive in common with those of the juristic conscience) that shall bring this good into harmony with the requirements of objective social good. The distinction here reached enables us to see why it is that the ethical must always, in the nature of the case, be a more *personal* interest than the juristic, inasmuch as it bears directly on the egoistic motives and the ideal of individual good, while the relation to these of the juristic requirements is only indirect.

With this result we bring the second division of our work to a conclusion. It would be interesting to follow the development of these juristic and ethical roots out into some of their matured forms, but this enterprise does not lie within the permissible scope of the present work. In another chapter in Part III. we expect to resume the ethical topic, and it will be our endeavour there to show that morality has another root besides the social, or rather, transcending the social, and that the complete ground of morality is only achieved in a correlation of the social with the transcendent.

PART III.

THE TRANSCENDENT FACTOR IN KNOWLEDGE.

CHAPTER I.

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.

THOUGH the plain man of common sense is not in general given to distinguishing very clearly between what he knows and what he merely believes, yet in the heat of controversy he is liable to have the need of such discrimination forced unpleasantly on his attention, and in moments of subsequent reflection he will perhaps endeavour to make clear to his own mind the difference between an act of knowledge and one of belief. The first conclusion that his reflection reaches will probably be embodied in the dictum that what we know is the objective fact or truth, while belief simply expresses a subjective state of the one who entertains it; and this will do well enough in practice, inasmuch as it will enable the plain man in any subsequent controversy in which he may become embroiled, to challenge the mere opinions of his opponent and demand that they be shown to be objectively true before they can be regarded as binding on any one but him who may happen to entertain them. Further reflection will show, however, that the plain man's distinction, however true it may be and valuable in practice, is, after all, superficial, and does not yield much insight into the real difference between an act of knowledge and an act of belief. We do not have to carry our scrutiny very deep in order to see that neither can an act of knowledge be completely differentiated from belief nor can belief be ab-

solved from assuming some relation to objective facts. When we know, we know something to be true, and when we simply believe, we believe something to be true. How, then, shall we distinguish between knowledge and belief in a way that will enable us to realize their characteristic differences? In order to reach an answer that shall be in any sense adequate, we must bear in mind the respects in which the knowing and believing functions are the same. For it is obvious, in the first place, that both knowing and believing involve an act of judgment, either in its germinal or developed form. Whether we perform an act of knowing or simply one of believing, the psychological core of the experience is that personal appropriation or endorsement of content that in some way presents itself, to which the name of judgment has been applied. Now, we have seen in preceding analyses that what judgment asserts in its activity is either the truth or falsehood of some presented or proffered content; and this brings us to the second point of agreement between knowing and believing. They are both appropriations of content—endorsements of that which is presented as true or rejections of it as false. The two activities thus have a common relation to the categories of truth and falsehood.

We have seen that the truth or falsehood of proffered content consists in its congruity or agreement with the whole content of experience as we conceive it; or, to state the matter in its broadest possible form, when we accept anything as true we accept it as being congruous with or agreeing with experience as a whole, and as that which will therefore be able to bear the tests which experience may apply to it. It is obvious, now, that whether we assert a thing as a fact of knowledge or as one of belief simply, we commit ourselves to its objective truth in the sense above indicated. We either know or believe a thing to be objectively true or false. And in both knowledge and belief there is some content that is a candidate for adoption into the commonwealth of reality. It would appear, then, that in many of

their essentials the two acts are the same, or at least similar. Where, then, shall the differentiae of knowing and believing be sought? It seems to me that we have to seek the principal ground of difference on the subjective side of the general situation. A belief as well as an act of knowledge determines the relation of some candidate for admission into the kingdom of reality, to the content of experience as a whole, and the ground of its acceptance or rejection will be its ability to harmonize with the unity of experience. But in an act of knowledge, and in so far as it *is* an act of knowledge, the relations that will determine the congruity will be the categories under which the world of content has been defined and reduced to unity. This we might express by saying that the relations which we are determining here are logical, were it not for the danger that the term logical might be taken in a too abstract sense. Let us say rather that the congruity is determined here in view of the epistemological relations, those categories which have shown themselves to be structural principles of all knowledge. The judgment-act in knowledge is then a personal acceptance or rejection of content, in which the dominating, and in fact the sole determining motive, is in the last analysis, epistemological congruity or harmony of the presentation with the categorized content of experience as a whole. Now, it is true that the epistemological relations and the epistemological motive enter into belief. But they are modified by being brought into relation with another set of motives which arise on the side of volitional experience. We have seen how the will, acting in the interest of survival, and under the categories of assimilation and rejection, develops gradually its objective categories of good and bad which constitute the objective aim of its activity and supply it with motivity. The volitional world will then present a system of content in which the determining motives will be, not those of the true and the false, but rather those of the good and the bad, and a candidate for admission into this commonwealth will have to submit to

the *criteria* of the good and the bad. If, now, we suppose a coalescence of the volitional and epistemological spheres and interests, we will be able to conceive a situation in which the volitional motive or interest in the good, which tends to shape itself into an ideal demand, will coalesce with and modify the epistemological motive, which also tends to shape itself into an ideal of truth. The whole motive will thus be partly volitional and partly epistemological. Now, such a coalescence is inevitable. We cannot keep the interest in good from mingling with the interest in truth, and the result is in most cases a somewhat turbid stream. But the point of special interest here is a distinction which we wish to draw between a motive in which the volitional demand is subordinate to the epistemological, and one in which the volitional motive asserts itself as equal to or greater than the epistemological, and thus tends to dominate. It is here, I think, that we will find the real subjective distinction between belief and knowledge. An act may be one of belief and knowledge at the same time, and it is not in dispute that every act of knowledge is also one of belief; but the point where the act ceases to be an act of knowledge and becomes one of belief simply, is the point where the volitional motive begins to dominate the epistemological and to determine the judgment in view of what the ideal of good may demand. Or, if we call the volitional motive a consideration of worth, and the epistemological a consideration of truth, our judgment will cease to be a judgment of knowledge, and will become one of belief simply, at the point where the consideration of worth gets the upper hand in determining it. I do not mean to say at this point that a judgment of worth may not also be a judgment of knowledge, or at least be translated into one; nor do I mean to say that a belief as such has no objective epistemological value, for I believe both statements to be false; but I am interested here in pointing out what seems to me to be the principal subjective difference between an act of knowledge and one of simple belief.

Thus on the subjective side we find a motive which is mainly instrumental in determining our judgment as one of belief rather than knowledge. This motive is a practical interest which reinforces the theoretic interest and leads to an affirmation that fails to be cognitive. The subjective motive alone is not sufficient, however, to differentiate the judgment of belief from that of knowledge. We may be able to affirm that as true which we have the strongest motive for believing, and our judgment may be one of knowledge, and not one of simple belief. We may have the strongest possible motive for believing that we are about to fall heir to a large fortune, and yet the judgment in which we affirm that prospective good may be a judgment of knowledge. We may know whereof we affirm. There must then be some important objective difference between a judgment of belief and a judgment of knowledge, and this will be found, I think, in the quality of objective *coerciveness* which is inseparable from the judgment of knowledge, but is not essential to the judgment of belief. This coerciveness arises in the first instance from the demonstrability of the judgment of knowledge. We say that its truth can be exhibited, that it can be proved. But in the last analysis the coerciveness of a judgment of knowledge springs from that which makes it demonstrable, and when we ask what this is we find on analysis that it consists in the possibility of reducing our judgment to one that is immediately presentational or necessary. Thus, if I say the stone is hard, the judgment may be presentational. I may have the stone in my hand. But I may see the stone without touching it, and my judgment will still be one of knowledge, because it may be reduced to the presentative form. I know that all I have to do in order to experience the hardness of the stone is to touch it. Or I say that change is impossible out of time, and this judgment is reducible to the form of immediate necessity, inasmuch as it is impossible to conceive change apart from time as its form. It is this reducibility of the judgment of knowledge

to the form of immediacy, either of presentation or necessity, that renders it capable of objective demonstration or proof. Clearly this is the essence of the matter, for when I have discovered the quality in a judgment that makes it objectively coercive, I have discovered the source of its coerciveness to myself and to all others. The same quality that coerces me, coerces others. The social test proper, the concurrence of the judgments of others with my own or their failure to concur, while it would have an important influence on my subjective state of mind, yet could not in any sense be regarded as primary. The first presupposition of knowledge is that there shall be relations of immediate coerciveness to which its judgments are reducible, and the sole value of the social consists in the degree to which it is tributary to that result. The social test is an important part of demonstration, but in common with every form of demonstration its possibility rests on those primary relations of judgments which constitute them acts of knowledge.

That a simple belief is lacking in this objective coerciveness is clear enough. There may arise a kind of subjective necessity in connection with beliefs, due to habit, and it may become practically impossible to resist certain habitual states of mind or feeling. But this form of coerciveness is clearly distinguishable from the objective species which enters into knowledge. We may say that the final tests constitutive of knowledge are immediate presentation or immediate necessity. If any judgment is reducible to this, it is a judgment of knowledge, and what we call the objective coerciveness of a judgment of knowledge as distinguished from an act of simple belief, is the effect of the immanence of these relations in the truth affirmed. How then shall we exhibit the absence of these relations in an act of belief? There will be little disposition, I think, to deny that the act of simple belief is not forced in the same sense as the act of knowledge. There is a sense of objective freedom or option attaching to belief that is one of its most marked char-

acteristics. We may feel subjectively bound by our belief, but we do not have the sense that it is objectively binding on others in the same way that an act of knowledge is binding, and this recognition of the freedom of others has its root in our own feeling of freedom with reference to the objective content of our belief. And when we submit this feeling of freedom to analysis we find it reducible to the implicit recognition of the possibility that our judgment of belief may not be true; in short, that things may be different from what we believe them to be. The possibility of failure in the sphere of judgment introduces the element of contingency which enters constitutionally into the judgment itself. I do not mean to deny that judgments of knowledge are also affected with contingency. But this very important distinction is to be observed. The judgment of knowledge may be contingent in fact, but it is not a judgment of contingency. It is a judgment from which contingency is excluded by the immanence of immediate presentation or necessity. This renders it coercive, whereas the judgment of simple belief does not involve the immanence of these relations, and hence is affected with inner contingency, the sense that it may possibly be untrue.

Now, the contingency of simple belief rests in the last analysis on the failure we have pointed out above. It is a contingency which affects its inner constitution rather than its outer relations. Let us now consider how this contingency may arise. We have had occasion in the earlier part of this work to distinguish between judgment and those presentational and conceptional activities which supply judgment with the materials upon which it works. We saw that judgment is an act of "personal endorsement" or repudiation of proffered content of presentation or conception. And we saw that the activity of judgment proceeds under the objective categories of the true and the false, a proffered content being decided true or false according as it proved itself congruous or the reverse, to the whole content of experience. In view of this we may say further at this

point that immediate presentation embodies one form of congruity, while immediate necessity embodies another. A judgment of knowledge is coercive, therefore, because there is immanent in it one or other of these forms of congruity, and a simple belief is characterized by the absence of these objective forms, an absence which is due to the fact that the content of the judgment of belief has not as yet been reduced to the form where this inner congruity realizes and asserts itself. The failure here may be for either one of two reasons, either the content is reducible by a further process to the knowledge-form, or it is not. In the former case our judgment of belief may possibly be translated into a judgment of knowledge. But what needs to be done in order that this result may be achieved? Let us take as an illustration a belief which has turned out to be partly true and partly false. The ancients believed that the earth was a flat surface surrounded by water, but they had no means of reducing their belief to knowledge. These means have been discovered by the moderns, and it is now known that the part of the earth known to the ancients is a continent surrounded by water, but that it is not flat but spherical. How was this result achieved? By supplying the steps of reduction necessary to bring the content of the judgment into immediate relation to experience. The result is the rejection of one part as no longer credible, while the other part becomes a coercive judgment of knowledge. Or let us suppose that the belief takes the form of a hypothesis not as yet verified. We have here another form of the same thing, and the reduction of the hypothesis to a judgment of knowledge will consist in bringing it into immediate relation to presentation or necessity.

Let us suppose, however, that our judgment of belief is one of the latter sort, and that it is not reducible to a judgment of knowledge. It is clear that in this type of judgment we have the point of real departure between the spheres of knowledge or possible knowledge and that of simple belief. Let us take an illustration regarding which

there will be no dispute. Christians believe in the existence of disembodied spirits. But they are unable to conceive how a disembodied spirit can be possible. There is no form of experience to which the content of this belief is reducible, and it must continue to lack the inner confirmation of either presentation or necessity. The root of the difficulty lies, no doubt, in the impossibility of achieving any concept of a disembodied spirit to which any of the knowledge-tests of our experience is applicable. Could some definite concept be achieved it could then be tested, and could some concept be achieved that would commend itself as authoritative it is very likely that the root of this authoritativeness would be found identical with some of the fundamental relations of knowledge. But so far as we can see, the belief in disembodied spirits is destined to remain a simple belief, because the content of it lacks those basal relations to experience that are necessary to constitute a judgment of knowledge.

Going back then to the beginning of our inquiry, the plain man would find himself very far afield from his point of departure by the time he reached the above conclusion, and he would begin to have some inkling of the complex situations which sometimes confront the philosopher. I am inclined to think also that his reflection would not be altogether unprofitable even from the standpoint of the plain man. He would have learned, in the first place, that the tendency of our beliefs to outrun our knowledge has its root in the depths of man's constitution. For it is the nature of our volitional, and we may also say our emotional, nature to express itself in certain demands, which, acting in view of the objective ideals of the good and the bad, inevitably enter into and affect our objective judgments. For this reason it is natural and inevitable that our demands on the objective should outrun slow-paced knowledge, and that a part of our world representation should develop in immediate response to the subjective requirements of our nature and without special reference to the objective criteria of the true and false. He would see moreover that this subjective reason is

sufficient only to explain the fact that belief tends to outstrip knowledge. It would not give him the final *differentia* of belief, inasmuch as any judgment, whether it be motived by a pure epistemological interest or by a consideration of value, may become a judgment of knowledge, provided the objective conditions of that result be present. He would thus be led to seek in the objective situation the real point of difference, and he would find it proximately in the quality of objective coerciveness which is present in a judgment of knowledge and absent from a judgment of simple belief. This discovery would lead him on to a deeper analysis and to the further discovery that the coerciveness of a judgment of knowledge springs from the immanence in it of its relation to either the presentational or the necessity test of experience. A judgment of knowledge is one, therefore, that is reducible to this basis. But a judgment of simple belief he would find to be one which lacks this objective basis either because a number of steps are yet necessary before it can be brought into relation to the necessary tests, or because in the nature of the case the application of the knowledge-test is impossible. He would see then that there are two classes of beliefs which need to be distinguished, those that may possibly be reduced to the knowledge-form, and those that are irreducible and constitute a different species.

One of the important results of the preceding analysis is the conclusion which may be drawn from it to the effect that the only species of belief that is likely to possess any independent value for metaphysics is that species which is irreducible to knowledge. Any belief that is reducible to knowledge by any possibility of experience may be regarded simply as an imperfect form of knowledge, and may be treated accordingly. But in the belief-species proper we have a distinct form for the expression of subjective conviction. The simple species of judgment are reducible, therefore, (1) to the knowledge-form which speaks coercively through its immanent relation to the immediacy of experience, and (2) to the belief-form which fails of this objective

relation and speaks mainly with the force of subjective conviction. Taking this distinction as settled, we may now proceed to consider the method by which experience reduces the content of its knowledge and belief activities to intelligible form. We are not about to thrash over the old straw of the categories, but, on the contrary, there is a distinction between two different modes of representation to which up to this point we have not alluded, I mean the distinction between the *concept*—using that term in a sense broad enough to include the whole activity of cognition—and the *symbol*. It is necessary only to mention the conceptual form of representation in order that it may be briefly characterized. The cognitive mode of realizing the world-content is a mode which proceeds by means of internal definition and distinction under certain objective principles called categories. A content of reality has been conceived when it has become defined to our intelligence, and conceptual definition as a rule touches internal and common characteristics, so that when an individual is realized its type has also been determined. Now, between this mode of realization and that expressed by the symbol there is a well-marked distinction. A symbol is in the first instance a form that represents something without directly defining its inner nature. To represent strength by the lion and swiftness by the antelope is the result of later reflection, and such symbols are also definitions. Now it is doubtless true that there are no symbols that are not also, in some senses, definitions; but a symbol, in so far as it is purely symbolic, will be a form or object that will have no direct defining power, but will represent by means of association or analogy. A nation's flag may be an emblem which has been arbitrarily chosen and whose whole significance comes through its association with national life and history. The first signs of language are not pure symbols. They may and do have defining elements in them which render them truly cognitive or conceptual. Thus the sign by which the Indian represents a man on horseback is partly at least a descriptive imitation.

The sign-language is from the first largely presentational or conceptual in its nature. Furthermore, the leading theories of the origin of spoken language trace its roots to sounds that are in some respects definitive of the feeling or state which they are meant to express. Thus the harsh emotions tend to utter themselves in rough or guttural sounds, while the gentler emotions tend to express themselves in the softer cooing tones. There is nothing symbolic about this: it is truly and directly representative of inner meaning, and naturally develops into perceptual and conceptual forms.

A symbol, in so far as it is purely symbolic, may on the other hand be defined as a form or object that represents meaning or inner nature indirectly through some kind of suggestion. Suppose we deny this, and seek to conceive some intrinsic representative power in the symbol. We simply confuse it with the concept or directly defining mode of representation. If the symbol is to be anything characteristic it must not attempt to do the work of the concept on its own ground, but it must do the work in its own way, and that cannot be other than the way of indirect representation. We have seen that a symbol may be arbitrarily chosen, as in the case of a nation's flag. I may choose to let a certain colour represent my affection for my wife or child. But the arbitrariness is an accidental, not an essential feature. Why should the bread and wine have been chosen as symbols of the spiritual communion of the Christian with his Lord? Possibly arbitrarily, but almost surely in order to represent communion under the figure of a meal whose sustaining and invigorating function in its physical economy was to represent indirectly the essential function of the spiritual communion. The meal thus becomes symbolic. It represents content indirectly by means of its power of representing other content directly. At this point I think we are perhaps justified in making a further distinction, and saying that an arbitrary symbol would better be called an emblem, thus ruling arbitrariness out of the meaning of symbol altogether, and retaining the

name symbol for *any form or object that is employed to represent content indirectly through its direct representation of other content*. This definition is sufficient to show how profoundly the processes of imitation and analogy enter into the construction of the symbolic. In truth we might define symbolism as an analogical mode of representing meaning.

Now, the relation which exists between concept and symbol is not always the same. The symbol may be simply a half-way station on the way to the concept. I mean by that that the use of indirect representation may form simply a stage in the development of direct representation. The use of the lion to represent strength may be dispensed with in time for a more direct mode of representation. In the development of knowledge the concept tends more and more to supplant the symbol as a mode of defining content. If this were the only relation which the symbol bears to knowledge, to serve as the pioneer of conceptions, then, important as it would still remain, the metaphysician might leave its consideration to the students of psychology and philology. But it is a fact of the vitalest import that the symbol stands at the end as well as at the beginning of knowledge. A point is reached in the higher stages of reflective experience where the mode of direct representation begins to prove inadequate, and the mode of indirect representation comes in as a supplement and in a sense as a substitute. In short, there is a higher symbolism as well as a lower, and in this higher use of the symbol it can no longer be regarded as a purveyor of concepts, but as itself the only accessible method of grasping the nature of content that is not directly and immediately definable. The metaphysician has been slow, we must admit, to recognize the necessity of the symbol in this higher sense, and this reluctance has not been due, as a rule, to any disrespect which he may happen to entertain for the symbol, but rather to a largely mistaken fear that its recognition would in some way open the door to a flood of abuses. We do not share this apprehension, but believe

that the symbol will be found a help rather than a hindrance to true knowledge.

The question then arises, at what point in the progress of reflective experience does the symbol become necessary as a supplement to the concept? The answer to this is vital, and I think we will find it at that point, or rather those points of transcendence which are necessarily presupposed in the realizable content of experience. I do not mean that these points of implication lead to the transcendence of the notion of experience itself, for I do not believe that to be possible, but rather that there are points in our finite form of experience where something transcendent is clearly presupposed. Without going into detail at this stage, which would be superfluous in view of what is to follow, it will be sufficient here to indicate one or two of these points of transcendence. In treating of the form of agency that develops in our experience and of which we become conscious, we found that in the last analysis it is relative and not absolute. There is nowhere in experience agency whose initiative is not bound up with the modifications of other agency. But that the notion of such agency is not final and that it has a necessary presupposition in absolute agency or activity that is free in its initiative, is not only an unavoidable implication of our experience, but one that Aristotle pointed out two thousand years ago in his doctrine of self-activity. Again, we find in the sphere of objective experience that cognition everywhere strikes a point where it loses its freedom and becomes simply receptive and necessitated. The abdication of creative or originative function thus becomes necessary, and we are obliged to admit the essential relativity of our cognitive activity. It is clear then that we here strike another point of transcendence where the self-originating and free, asserts itself as a necessary implication of the relative form of our own experience. If we define our experience as *finite*, and we mean here by the term finite, simply not final but involving unfulfilled implications, then that which transcends may be characterized as

infinite, while if we designate our experience as *relative*, meaning by that term that which is not self-dependent but dependent on other, then that which is transcendent may be called *absolute*. We thus strike the points in experience where the finite and relative present unfulfilled implications and where in a very intelligible sense, therefore, the necessity of something that is infinite and absolute asserts itself.

Returning then to the question of the relation between concept and symbol, it is clear that the necessary implication of transcendence is an immediate certainty of experience. That some infinite and absolute is necessary we need no symbol to inform us. That is a truth of direct intuition and comes to us in ordinary conceptual form. The function of the symbol will arise, if it arises at all, in helping us to define the nature of this transcendent term. It may be that in this attempt we will reach a point where the direct mode of conceiving and defining content will break down, and where our only resource will be that indirect analogical mode which we have called symbolism. And that such a point will be reached is, I think, in the nature of the case certain. For when we come to consider it, however sure we may be that an infinite and absolute experience is necessary, and however certain we may be that such an experience embodies the only possible idea of completeness and perfection, we do not find that the nature of such an experience is directly definable. In short, we find that no direct concept of the infinite or absolute is possible, but when we seek to realize the meaning of these terms we are obliged to begin with a finite and relative experience, and tracing this down to the last analysis where the points of transcendence appear, we have to consider these points of transcendence in order to discover what necessary thing it is which the finite and relative lack. Now, in general we find that what it lacks is self-contained completeness of being, while in detail we find that it lacks from the point of view of its agency, self-dependence or self-initiating activity, while from that of

its cognitive activity and in the objective sphere it lacks self-originating power, so that its posits are not constitutive but only re-constitutive of that the origin of which is a pre-supposition. An absolute and infinite experience must then be self-dependent and self-originative, whereas the finite is dependent on other and in the last analysis receptive of the posit of another. These conclusions we are able to reach by a direct process and they are impregnable. But the difficulty arises in our effort to determine the nature of this infinite and absolute experience which is at the same time conceived to be necessary. The first step in this direction will be of course the affirmation of some quality of the absolute and infinite, which the relative and the finite lack, and the absence of which supplies the negative criterion of their finitude and relativity. Let this qualification be expressed in the terms we have already developed, self-dependence and self-origination. Have we any definite concepts of self-dependence or self-origination or are we able to develop any by any direct process? We are obliged to answer both questions in the negative. Our experience is simply lacking in the data necessary to the formation of concepts through which we can realize an intuition of infinite and absolute nature. Here the agnostic thinker is disposed to stop and say, "that settles it, we can go no further." But can we go no further? We have seen that the absolute and infinite are necessary, and the total block which the agnostic conclusion puts in the way of any intelligible attempt to reach any conception of what the nature of this necessary being may be, puts the human mind into a dilemma where it is doomed to remain. We will perhaps be able to catch a glimmer of light if we return to experience and consider the nature of the terms in it which we have characterized as relative and finite. If we consider the nature of our agency as we realize it in experience we will find that it is not lacking in the pulse of self-dependence which is the moment that expresses itself in our sense of freedom, but that this moment is irreparably involved in another which gives us our sense of dependence

on other. Our self-dependence is, therefore, modified by dependence on other, just as our sense of dependence on other is modified by the moment of self-dependence. It is not true then to say that we have no conception of self-dependence, but rather that we have no conception of absolute unmodified self-dependence. Nevertheless our experience teaches us that an absolutely self-dependent agency is necessary. *Now we have the germ of a conception of absolute self-dependence in our concept of our own modified self-dependence, and we may and actually do make the effort to conceive absolute self-dependence by conceiving the progressive removal of the limit or modification from our own agency.*

We can never reach the end of this process in an *intuition*, to be sure, but we do actually follow the method of gradual approximation, and then by a leap like that which the mathematician makes in completing his infinite series the goal is reached and the absolute agent is affirmed. This may be taken as representative of the process of infinitation in general. It is a process where judgment is reached by performing an operation of gradual approximation, or a concept which involves the notion sought in a modified form. It is true that the notion is not completely achieved, and that we do not realize an intuition of absolute nature. *But starting on the assumption of the necessity of an absolute nature we have formed a concept in our experience of such a character as to serve as a basis for an approximating conception of that nature.*

Now, it is in the achievement of approximating definitions of the absolute and infinite nature that the metaphysical use of symbolism is involved. The method of approximation is not itself symbolic. It rests on a basis of the strictest necessity. We can no more escape that approximative effort to conceive the necessarily transcendent than we can escape cognition. But the symbolism enters when we apply our approximate concepts as actual defining principles of absolute nature. We recognize the fact that our principles do not define the inner nature of the trans-

cendent in such a way as to give us an intuition of it. But that they define this nature in some way is certain. And when we ask how we are led to see that the absolute nature is not directly accessible, and that it is only indirectly defined, *we find concepts like that of modified self-dependence in our own experience, and applying the method of approximation, as above indicated, to them we reach proximate concepts of self-dependence or self-origination.* Then we apply these as defining principles to the nature that is directly inaccessible. This is a symbolic method of defining the inner nature of reality. It follows then that symbolism enters into the very texture of our conceptions of the transcendent. We cannot think metaphysically without symbols, and therefore, some would argue, we can do no real thinking at all in the metaphysical sphere. Mr. Herbert Spencer recognizes only one kind of legitimate symbolism, that which leads on to direct knowledge, and he stigmatizes the results reached by the higher symbolism as "symbolic conceptions of an illegitimate kind" and as "pseudo conceptions." If, however, the above analysis be true, this way of representing the metaphysical application of symbolism is certainly inadequate. The mathematician does not doubt the validity of his formulae, even though they do not give him a direct intuition of the infinite. The symbolic conceptions of metaphysics are reached in the same way, and though they lead to no intuition of the nature of the transcendent which can have the coerciveness of that which is directly represented or conceived, they yet determine for us the direction in which these intuitions lie if they could be achieved, and they do not leave it at all uncertain that the way towards these intuition-points is the only pathway of intelligibility.

The last topic which we wish to notice briefly in concluding this chapter is that of the relation of metaphysical symbolism to the distinction between knowledge and belief. There is a sense, of course, in which all metaphysical judgments regarding the nature of the transcendent would fall

under the category of belief rather than under that of knowledge. If we refuse to allow that symbolic conceptions may give valid knowledge, and insist on confining the term knowledge to the results of the direct cognitive processes, then clearly enough the whole of metaphysics with the exception of its basis, the intuition of the necessity of the transcendent, would fall outside of knowledge and into the category of belief. The question is partly one of nomenclature, but not wholly so, for if we propose to rule symbolism out of knowledge we must exclude everything that is not ultimately reducible to intuition. This, I think, would not only defecate mathematics but would also leave physics in a bad way. As I understand it the chemist has no intuition of his atoms, and it is certain that the physicist has no intuition of the ultimate forces on which his system rests, and much less of the ether which is perhaps more of a luxury than a necessary of life. But, in general, if from physics and mathematics all the elements which are held under proximate conceptions were eliminated, I tremble for the result. I fear that the physicist in particular would not have a rag to cover his nakedness, and that even the rocks, which under more favourable conditions he might seek as a covert, would have vanished in the general wreck. These considerations lead me to think that symbolism cannot be excluded bodily from knowledge, but that under it we must distinguish a sphere of knowledge from one of mere belief. And reverting to the distinguishing mark which in the last analysis we found to separate belief off from knowledge, I think we may include under symbolic knowledge those proximate concepts of the transcendent which embody necessary presuppositions of experience, and are reached by a vigorous application of the indirect method, while for the category of symbolic beliefs there would be left that large body of judgments which are not strictly reducible to this form, mainly because the terms in experience with which they start are not reducible to the knowledge-form. This body of symbolic beliefs, while

resting on a less secure basis than the judgments of symbolic knowledge, will be found to possess different degrees of certitude, and to include much that is most precious in experience. It is clear then that under the symbolic procedure of metaphysics there must be included elements of both knowledge and belief.

CHAPTER II.

SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS.

AN ordinary conception of the relation of science and metaphysics is one that represents the latter as concerned wholly with the transcendent while science confines itself strictly to experience. This conception is at least partially false. We have seen that science deals with the transcendent and that metaphysics has something to do with experience. Without attempting at this point to say anything final on the subject, it seems to me that the discussion of the preceding chapter has put us in a position to see that one of the points of difference consists in the fact that the aim of science, in so far as it finds it necessary to recognize the transcendent at all, is simply to employ the concept of it in determining the nature of the relative in experience. This accounts for the fact that science stops in its attempt to define the transcendent at that point where that process ceases to be necessary to the definition of the relative. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is directly concerned with the determination of the transcendent not so much as a principle for the definition of the relative in experience, as for the complete determination and satisfaction of the relative experience as a whole through the grounding of it in that which is absolute and complete. Having for its aim then the grounding and completing of the relative experience itself in the nature of that which transcends it, the

determination of this transcendent nature becomes a matter of direct interest to it, and its attitude toward the transcendent is from the outset, therefore, different from that of science.

An essential point of distinction between science and metaphysics arises, then, in the different use which they make of the transcendent in experience. Now it is our purpose in the discussion of this chapter to attempt an exhibition of some of the most fundamental points of distinction and agreement between the notions of science and metaphysics, as a preliminary to a broad definition of the two conceptions. That one cannot be characterized as purely empirical, the other as non-empirical, except in a very narrow sense, will be obvious from the fact brought out above that both deal with the transcendent and both treat it as a term arising in experience. It is very likely that we will come upon some of the points of fundamental relation if we consider (1) the constructs or concepts, and (2) the fundamental motives of science and metaphysics. By a construct we mean a concept which has its rise at the point where experience becomes conscious of the transcendent. We have seen that both science and metaphysics involve transcendence, and the point here is to determine, if possible, how the basal notions of each arise out of this consciousness. If we consider how science originates we will find that as a matter of fact it arises piecemeal—little bits of research being instituted at this and that point in experience in order to meet some immediate practical emergency to which ordinary experience has proved itself unequal. This emergency may be real or imaginary. Thus the search for the elixir of life and the philosopher's stone led to the birth of chemistry, while mathematics in all probability originated in the practical need of a calendar and a means of anticipating eclipses and other portentous phenomena. These bits of investigation, instructive as they may be as indicating the point of departure for science in the inadequacy of ordinary experience to meet some demand that has been made upon

it, are yet not to be considered real science. Science originates in reality when the notion of it becomes self-conscious in experience; that is, when it begins to be recognized that ordinary experience is in general inadequate from the epistemological point of view, and that, in short, its content is not final in any sense but requires to be referred to something more fundamental than itself. The feeling of the inadequacy of ordinary experience from the point of view we are now considering, may arise from the instability or the unmediated plurality of its terms, or it may arise from the pressure of some new problem which it is unable to solve, as when Socrates demanded of Aristodemus a definition of justice. Let this be as it may this sense of inadequacy will lead to the notion of something more fundamental with which the terms of ordinary experience are to be connected or to which they are to be reduced, and this will give us the concept of science. Science means the reduction of phenomena, or in general the contents of experience, to law; that is, to some formula or principle that will express their inner nature. The great defect of ordinary experience is that it is too outer and superficial. The concept of science is essentially the idea of the removal of this superficiality by the effort to conceive experience-content not in its unmitigated plurality but under the notion of a law which, while it perhaps formulates a mere mode of behaviour, yet formulates it as *common* behaviour, and therefore as a manifestation of inner nature.

However the concept of science may arise, it will involve the notion of the reduction of things to laws which shall be expressions of their inner nature, and, therefore, of their truer selves. And these laws will be conceived as the early Greeks conceived them, as *archae* or first principles, and these *archae* will be employed in order to achieve a truer and more adequate conception of the nature of things. We know, of course, that the early Greek reflection was mistaken in many ways, and that its results are now of little value. But we do not know that they were of little value

to the early Greeks themselves, and it is open to us to know that the Greeks were responding to a real motive, and that the form which their response took was fundamentally right. I mean that with all their shortcomings they were exhibiting the essential form and spirit of science. We have to recognize the fact, however, that in this first notion of science there was no distinction recognized between science proper and metaphysics. The *archae* of the early Greeks were concepts of transcendence, but in them no account was taken of a distinctively scientific or a metaphysical form and use of these concepts. It was only in later reflection, and particularly in that of Aristotle, that the notion of science came to its birth. Suggestively enough, in this birth the concepts of science and metaphysics arose as twins, for it was in the same reflection of Aristotle that, under the notion of Philosophy as the broadest possible category of knowledge, a distinction arose between the sphere of ordinary philosophical reflection which proceeds discursively to reduce the content of experience to concepts or laws that have only a relative finality, and that of First Philosophy in which reflection takes up and develops the principles of ultimate finality that are presupposed in the relative procedure. We have here not only the germ of the distinction between ordinary science or philosophy and a discipline which has for its special function the consideration of what we have called the concepts of the transcendent, but a fairly well-developed idea of the distinction which has been maintained with greater or less fidelity from Aristotle's time down to the present.

Without dwelling further on the genesis of the distinction between science and metaphysics we may go on to determine the nature, limit, and aim of what we have called the constructs of science and metaphysics respectively. Science, as we have seen, involves the consciousness of the transcendent, and we have maintained that the basal concepts of science arise in connection with this consciousness, and are in a sense formulations of it. We are interested

here in determining the special modes in which these concepts arise and the special forms which they assume. Now it has been shown in the analysis of the dynamic categories that these are all reducible to the notion of some kind of agency. The notion of cause is that of conditioned initiative or origination. But we have seen in this connection that right here we touch a point of transcendence, and that the notion of conditioned origination rests on that of unconditioned or self-origination, and by that we mean a first spring of causal activity. It is at this point that a basal concept of science emerges in the notion of primal forces or centres of force, which we postulate as original springs of causal energy and define in the *formulae* and laws which express their modes of behaviour. The notion of a force is then the notion of a cause incorporated with its point of transcendence. Again, we have seen how the category of substance arises as the notion of a persistent point of departure in experience for the organizing energy of things. This also we have found to have a presupposition, inasmuch as it is the posit of some absolute starting-point of experience. Now science reaches here another of its basal concepts, its notion of the indestructibility of matter or force, by incorporating the category of substance with the notion of transcendence with which it is connected. For science would be a clear impossibility if its foundations did not include the presupposition of the unconditioned persistence of the elements with which it deals. Again, we have seen how the category of community is reducible to the notion of interacting agencies, each of which is suffering internal modifications, and therefore passing out of one state of nature into another. This modifiable agency has its transcendent presupposition in a nature to which all these modifications are internal, but which in its whole inner essence persists unmodified and self-identical. In this connection it is easy to see that science reaches certain basal concepts when it connects its notion of the interaction and consequent internal modi-

fiability of its causal forces with their transcendent presupposition. For out of the coalescence of the intuition of the internal modifiability of interacting causal forces, with the necessary presupposition of a common nature that is transcendent of this mutatiousness and preserves its self-identity, emerge those concepts of correlation and conservation without which the foundations of science would crumble to atoms.

Science thus achieves a set of conceptions that are fundamental to its existence, and it is interesting to consider what, precisely, reflection has been doing in this achievement. We have seen that the whole scientific activity awakes in the demand for *archae* or first principles of things, and we have also seen that the scientific consciousness, when it has once waked up, does not and cannot rest satisfied until it has incorporated the principles which it discovers in experience and uses in order to define its world and reduce it to law, with their transcendent presuppositions which have the effect of giving them unqualified validity in their application to experience. It does not enter into the aim of the reflection of science to develop the transcendent terms in its data further than may be necessary in order to give unqualified validity to its categories of experience. If it be true, as we have pointed out, that the notions of cause, substance, and interaction must be incorporated with their transcendent presuppositions in order that science may achieve the concepts of force, persistence, and conservation which are necessary to her foundations, then it follows that science is obliged to recognize the transcendent so far at least as it proves itself necessary to the constituting of fundamental principles. But that science as such is obliged to go beyond this in her recognition or in the development of her world-view, we cannot say. It is not, in fact, the business of science to make a transcendent use of her principles or to develop a doctrine of the nature of the transcendent presuppositions of experience. But having employed these presuppositions in order to achieve concep-

tions that are fundamental to her own procedure, which is the definition of the content of experience under intra-experiential categories, she has discharged her duty to the transcendent and may go about her business with a quiet mind.

With metaphysics the case is different. If the question be asked why metaphysical reflection may not rest satisfied with the basal concepts of science, and why it should strain itself in the seemingly vain effort after something more ultimate, the answer must be that metaphysics is not able to find in the ultimate concepts of science precisely the kind of a category she needs. And that this reply does not beg the question will be clear if we consider the fact that science does not profess to investigate the nature of the transcendent, and her principles are not designed for that kind of use. We may expect then to find on investigation that an ultimate concept of science will show itself defective at points which are vital to metaphysical reflection. For example, we have seen that science incorporates the notion of a transcendent nature into its conception of ultimate persistent forces or atoms. But when reflection fastens on this concept and attempts to treat it as absolutely final ; that is, as the very last conceivable term in reality, we immediately come upon this difficulty. There has been no attempt to define this transcendent nature, but it has simply been assumed and incorporated into a relative procedure. Consequently whether we take the notion of force or that of the atom as representing finality, we soon involve ourselves in contradiction. For the very notion of a force as a final term involves that of activity. But an active force is unthinkable except in terms of successive pulses of causation, and this considered as final, lands us in a relative series and abolishes the notion of transcendence which was in our premises. The atom fares no better since the point of transcendence in it is a transcendence of dimension. We have seen that in the last analysis our space conceptions lead us to a point of departure which is itself not spatial.

But in the atom this point of transcendence is included in the presumption of its finality; but the concept itself is the embodiment of an effort to conceive the dimensionless under the notion of dimension. It thus includes the starting-point of dimensional experience, but in a concept which involves a self-contradiction if we attempt to take it as absolutely final.

The above results will make clear what we mean when we say that the last terms of science cannot be taken as metaphysically valid although even metaphysics is interested in affirming their validity for the use which science makes of them. What I mean is that they are not adequate or valid for metaphysical reflection and that metaphysics is obliged therefore to develop concepts that will be adequate to her own requirements. Nor will the metaphysical procedure in this respect be aimless or without reference to the concepts and procedures of science. Metaphysics involves a form of reflection that has the whole of experience for its object. It is related, therefore, to ordinary experience and to other interests besides that of science. We do not forget this general relation when at the present point of our discussion we confine our attention to the special relations between metaphysics and science. Metaphysical reflection will find its point of departure in the transcendent terms involved in the basal concepts of science, and its aim with reference to these terms will be to develop them in their relation to experience as a whole, and to define their nature as far as this may be possible. It cannot be taken as a matter of surprise, then, if metaphysics does not find the terms with which it starts completely satisfactory. There would in that case be no demand for metaphysical reflection, and the transcendent term would not be developed at all but would be left imbedded in relativity. No direct effort would have been made to define its relation to experience or to determine what it may be in its inner nature. It would not be known, therefore, whether such an effort would be fruitful or not, or what the outcome of such an investigation

might possibly be. But neither would it be known what science can accomplish in her field except as she puts forth her efforts. That the object of investigation exists, however, and that there is a demand for metaphysical reflection and vital concerns at stake in the venture is certain, and in view of these exigencies, metaphysics has the courage of her convictions and decides to essay the solution of her problems.

Now, the basal concepts which metaphysical reflection will develop are concepts of the nature of the transcendent presuppositions of experience and of their relations to that which is intra-experiential. If we take the basal categories of science we will find that the absolute term involved in them is that of transcendent agency, in the sense of self-origination. Or, if taking our departure from the subject-side of experience, we consider our own agency, we see that its transcendent presupposition is that of absolute-ness or self-dependence. Now, it is the business of metaphysical reflection to make these concepts of transcendence its objects, and to develop, as far as its resources will render possible, a method of conceiving and defining the nature of the transcendent, or in other phrase, the transcendent nature of reality. And it is in the furtherance of this aim that scope will be found for the application of that indirect method of definition which has been described under the term symbolic in the preceding chapter. We do not claim for metaphysics, at least not in this stage of our investigation, the possession of any direct mode of conceiving or defining the nature of absolute or infinite reality. If there were such a method the absolute would not be a transcendent term in experience, and its nature would not be distinguishable from finite experience. The inner nature of the absolute would then be directly deducible from data within experience and an intuition of it might be achieved. We do not claim the possibility of absolute intuition, but rather, on the assumption that this is not attainable, we have endeavoured to show how in the constitution of experience there is provision for achieving proximate concepts of absolute nature, just as the

mathematician deals with his infinite series by approximation. By the application of this method of approximation or, as we may call it, the infinitation of the concepts of experience, metaphysical reflection aims to supplement the reflection of science, and by that means to achieve a doctrine of reality in which the transcendent nature shall be included.

In order to reach a concept of the aims of science and metaphysics in their relation, let us return to the illustration of our plain man in the preceding chapter. We have already followed him in the reflection to which he was prompted by the exigencies of debate. His primary situation before the reflection was entered upon, may serve as an illustration of the conditions of ordinary experience which create the occasion and the necessity for science. That there is some difference between knowledge and simple belief, and that the simple belief of another cannot assert the same claim on my assent as a fact of knowledge, is something that even ordinary experience may tell me. But in the case of the plain man of the illustration, who may be taken as a type, this distinction is felt but not understood, and the whole objective aim of his reflection is to ground his feeling of difference in a clear knowledge of the nature of the distinction. We have here a typical example of the relation of science to ordinary reflection in the motive that prompts the scientific activity, and in the kind of service which science renders to ordinary experience. It need not set ordinary experience aside, although this may be the result in special cases. But in all cases it will remedy the superficiality and relative instability of ordinary experience by the discovery of a deeper and more satisfactory principle for the construction of its world. Now in order to determine where metaphysical reflection would arise as a necessary supplement of the procedure of science, we have only to suppose that our plain man, in view of the important part which the distinction between the true and the false has played in his reflections, should begin to ask himself what in the last analysis the distinction between

truth and falsehood can be. He would discover from reflection that the standards which our experience supplies are relative. In view of them any proffered content will be taken as true that fits in with the whole of experience as we conceive it. But our conception of experience and its requirements is a variable quantity. Can the standard of the true and false be conceived as in the last analysis variable? This would involve a contradiction and the final collapse of the distinction. At this stage then the plain man's reflection comes upon a point of transcendence in experience, and his further reflection will be an attempt to develop the notion of an absolute standard of truth and falsehood. And the outcome of this process, if it reaches a definite, positive conclusion, will be the reference of the distinction to its source in *some* transcendent nature which he will probably be led to conceive as the subject of an absolute experience. The reflection we may conceive as ending here in a concept of transcendent nature that is adequate to the exigencies that arise within experience.

The service which the metaphysical reflection will render our plain man will consist in the grounding of something in his experience which otherwise would have no ultimate foundation. In the question of the ultimate ground of the distinction between truth and error, whether we approach it from the positive side, as did Augustine in his refutation of the academic scepticism,¹ or from the negative side as Royce does in his discussion of truth and error in the *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*² and in *The Conception of God*, it will be found that the sands of foundationless expediency can be escaped only when in the last analysis the ground of the distinction is found in some transcendent nature. Our plain man has been led to this highly metaphysical result by the pressure of demands within experience, and were he to reflect a little beyond the point where the

¹ *Contra Academicas.*

² *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, chap. viii. ; *The Conception of God*, Part I.

practical necessities of the case end, he would realize the fact that the recognition of the transcendent as the pre-supposition of experience has led to the generation of a new concept within experience, namely, the concept of perfection, in the light of which every part of experience takes on a different meaning. The old sophistical doctrine of the final relativity of truth and error was and always will be, the logical outcome of that view of experience which denies its relation to the transcendent and seeks to make the relative sufficient unto itself. For in that case analysis of the distinction simply leads down to a vanishing point where truth and error become one. The distinction will thus appear to be groundless and conventional, and every part of experience will, as a consequence, be affected with instability. It is a sense of this inadequacy of the relative that invariably leads to the Socratic effort to find principles of stability in experience itself. This is the enterprise of science which finds its concepts to be, after all, only relative, and the genius of a Plato is needed to develop the concepts of the transcendent as the ultimate principles of reality. This result creates in turn the demand for an Aristotle to restore the transcendent to its relation to experience by showing that the relative can be reduced to stability only in and through its connection with transcendent nature.

But the problem which the plain man has been considering has its negative side. He has, up to this point, been chiefly concerned, we may suppose, with the development of a positive concept of truth. The possibility of truth carries with it, however, the possibility of error, and the question arises how anything can be false or erroneous. Now, we have seen in the discussion of truth that the true to us, is proximately that which harmonizes with our whole of experience, while ultimately it is that which conforms to the standard of a transcendent nature. In like manner we may define error as proximately that which is incongruous with our whole of experience, and which is therefore excluded as negative. It is possible, however, that some one may assert

our error as his truth, and there are no clear grounds for denying that from the standpoint of pure relativity one man's truth may be another man's error. But can we accept this as final? If what is true to one may, in the last analysis, be false to another, then the distinction between the false and true reaches at last a vanishing point. My truth is, in the last analysis, your falsehood, and your truth may in turn be the falsehood of someone else. There is no assignable limit to such instability, and it is clearly impossible to ground the true in the transcendent and at the same time to stop with a purely relative conception of the false. If anything is to be really false to you and to me and to the man in the next township then it must be that the false cannot be, in the last analysis, purely relative. If the false is relatively your and my incongruous and inconsistent, then, in the last analysis, the false must be conceived in relation to a transcendent nature. The objectively false will find its ground in the concept of that which is incongruous and inconsistent with a transcendent nature. If the distinction of truth and error or falsehood involves transcendence at all, then the concept of error involves transcendence. There must be an objective standard of error, and this will be the notion of that which would be excluded as incongruous and inconsistent by a transcendent nature. If we ask, then, how any such standard can be determined and are met with the statement that an indeterminate standard of error is valueless, we can only reply: (1) that the question of determinateness and the question of necessity have to be distinguished here. That a transcendent ground of the true is necessary follows from considerations that are independent of the question whether or not the transcendent nature can be determined. If this be true of the positive conception there is no reason why it should not be true of the negative; (2) that an important function of the transcendent in its relation to the relative is to ground concepts of stability in experience, which would otherwise be impossible. The demand for stability we have seen to be the birthcry of both

science and metaphysics, and we have also, by detailed analysis, shown that concepts of stability are possible only when the transcendent is assumed as the ground of experience. The consideration of error is a special case of this general truth, and it is found that an objective standard of error involves the notion of that which is transcendently false or erroneous.

Returning then to the main topic of discussion, that of the respective motives of science and metaphysics, we have seen that they both arise in view of common qualities of ordinary unreflective experience, its instability and its inability to answer the questions which we found it necessary to ask. Science carries the investigation up to the point where the transcendent becomes plainly involved, and then hands over the problem to metaphysics which seeks a final solution of the problems in the development of certain concepts of transcendence, through the mediation of which, the shifting sands of experience are reduced to stability. The common aim of both science and metaphysics may, speaking broadly, be said to be the development of a comprehensive and adequate concept of experience. In attempting to achieve this we have seen that both disciplines are led to a common recognition of the transcendent, which enters into the constitution of the fundamental concepts of both science and metaphysics. While science employs the transcendent in order to ground principles which have as their aim the direct investigation of experience and the direct definition of its content, metaphysics, on the other hand, seeks a further and indirect interpretation of experience by referring its content to its ultimate ground in a transcendent nature in connection with which alone it can reach a basis of ultimate stability.

CHAPTER III.

JUDGMENTS OF TRUTH AND JUDGMENTS OF VALUE.

WE are indebted to Kant for the first conscientious attempt of modern philosophy to distinguish between judgments of truth and judgments of value. A judgment of truth is one which pronounces on content in view of its worth for the intellect, while a judgment of value is one that pronounces on content in view of its worth for will or feeling. This distinction was substantially made by Kant for the first time, and it grew out of his fundamental separation of the theoretical from the practical consciousness. I use the term separation advisedly, inasmuch as Kant's persistent attempt to prevent the motives and process of knowledge from becoming mixed up with or modified by the motives and processes of will or feeling, amounts practically to a divorce. The theoretical is kept so pure that epistemology is perpetually in danger of losing its real content and becoming little more than formal logic, while, on the other hand, the practical is kept so purely practical that it is in danger of losing all epistemological insight. The judgment of truth is, in Kant's view, one that springs from a purely logical motive, and is wholly abstracted from considerations which arise in the sphere of the feelings or will. The judgment of value is, on the contrary, one in which these considerations are the sole determinants. The result of the divorce is peculiar: on the one hand an epistemology that

has little practical value, inasmuch as it fails to justify theoretically any of the practical interests; and, on the other hand, an ethic that lacks epistemological worth, for while it asserts the reality of the objects demanded by certain practical interests, it postulates these as practical necessities merely, and denies to them all epistemological value. It was reserved for the subtle mind of Lotze, however, to develop the distinction of Kant and give it its final philosophical expression. Lotze separates off the ethical and aesthetic motives and aims, from the motives and aims of knowledge, and designates the former considerations of worth, the latter considerations of truth. The judgments in which these respective motives and aims are embodied he designates judgments of worth and judgments of truth. Lotze here makes a valuable distinction, but one which some of his successors have used to justify the Kantian divorce of the practical from the theoretical, and ultimately of the whole sphere of religious experience and doctrine, from metaphysics.¹ It is needless to say, however, that Lotze himself does not contemplate any such divorce, but simply maintains the necessity of the judgment or consideration of worth in order to complete the metaphysical basis of religion. This appears clearly from his *Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion*,² in which he shows how on the general theoretical grounds of metaphysics a spiritualistic and broadly theistic conception of the world is established. But religion is not simply a theoretic interest of the intellect, but a practical interest of the heart, and from this point of view the distinctive basis of religion is found in the idea of God as *good*. But Lotze endeavours to show that in the light of purely theoretic considerations the issue between optimism and pessimism cannot be settled. We cannot determine by purely metaphysical considerations, and as a simple question of truth and falsehood, whether

¹ Ritschl and his school, who distinctively repudiate the metaphysical ground of religion.

² See Ladd's Translation.

there is goodness at the heart of the world or not. In order to reach a solution, argues Lotze, we must include the demand of our practical nature which regards goodness as the one consideration of supreme worth, and the notion of God without goodness as involving a supreme and intolerable contradiction. The consideration of worth thus determines our judgment, and in the postulate of a God of goodness the basis of religion is completed.

Without following the history further we may preface our own discussion by distinguishing between two species of what may be called judgments of value. The one is the Kantian species, which simply affirms the practical necessity of its content in a moral or aesthetic postulate without asserting its truth as a judgment of knowledge. The other species is one that employs practical motives in order to reach epistemological conclusions: that is, in order to assert judgments of knowledge. Now it is with the latter species that we are most concerned at this stage of our discussion. What we wish to determine, if possible, is the epistemological value of the considerations of worth. It is possible at this point to make a still further simplification of our problem by eliminating from it all those judgments which originating as judgments of practical worth are at some stage translated or shown to be translatable, into judgments of knowledge. Thus the homesick mariner may embody the desire of his heart in the practical proposition that the coasts of his native land cannot be far off, and this may be translated into a judgment of knowledge by the testimony of the log-book or the sight of some familiar object. We may neglect judgments of this species just as we neglected those affirmations of belief that are capable of translation into knowledge. And we may single out for the special object of consideration, the judgment of worth that is not translatable into a judgment of knowledge. Limiting ourselves to this species it is evident that it is divisible into two sub-species according as the motive or consideration involved amounts to clear practical necessity or falls short of

that standard. The consideration of practical necessity is of course the strongest form of worth, and if it is ever possible for the motive of worth to turn the epistemological scale in favour of affirmation or denial it will be when the consideration takes this extreme or supreme form. Let us revert again to the Lotzean basis of religion. We have here an instance in which a theoretic balance is reached so that, epistemologically, it is impossible to decide between the optimists and pessimists and to say whether good or evil is dominant in the world in the sense of representing the victorious tendency of things. Let us suppose here that Lotze's ground is well taken and that the question is impossible of solution on purely theoretic grounds, but that, as he argues, there can be a strong case of practical necessity made out in favour of the optimistic view; namely, that goodness must be at the heart of the world. Let us suppose that it can be shown that the highest category of morality is the good, and that if good be not supreme in the world and attainable by moral beings then the respect in which reality becomes of supreme worth to us is an illusion, and the whole moral conception of life becomes unreal. Let us suppose that this can be shown: it is clear that we have a plain case of practical necessity in which the validity of life in its aspect of supreme worth and highest value, is at stake. Here if anywhere will be a situation in which the practical motive may rightfully become a moment in the determination of an epistemological judgment, and we may affirm as true that God is good. The necessity is so clear and so pressing in a case of this kind that to persist in maintaining the theoretic balance in face of it would threaten the rationality of our whole world. As much therefore to escape a lapse into irrationality as to affirm the truth of what we feel to be supremely valuable, we redress our scales in the light of the motive of value and affirm goodness to be a central feature of the world.

I do not say that the situation could not be altered by the shifting of the terms or that all the terms possess

necessarily a fixed value. The pessimist in whose mind the theoretic balance does not exist, may not find the practical necessity so coercive even when its force is acknowledged. For in the first place, he is not concerned to affirm the rationality of the world. In truth it seems to him to be supremely irrational and its irrationality is the root of the misery and evil of which he complains. He too would like to see the good triumphant, but from his point of view the whole inner constitution of things would have to be revolutionized in order to make such an end attainable. Clearly we are here at the dividing of the ways where the human spirit has a supreme option and may choose its whole conception of the real. For if a man chooses the pessimistic view and is radical enough in grounding it, his position will be unassailable. But he must accept the logic of his position and must surrender all pretensions of maintaining any sort of rationality in his world. Pessimism when radical rests on the postulate of irrationality, which is as unassailable as the postulate of rationality. Now if the issue of good and evil could be clearly reduced to this basis it would be possible to assert goodness in a judgment of knowledge, inasmuch as its denial would be tantamount to absolute scepticism or the denial of all knowledge. But there is a third alternative that comes in to render the situation more complex. This is the alternative of indifference. If, as Lotze argues, there is a theoretic balance, this may mean that the world at its heart is indifferent to both good and evil, and that what appears as good and evil in the world may be accidental or at least not part of the real meaning of the world. It is this possibility of indifference that enters in and renders it impossible to assert the goodness of the world as a truth of knowledge unless it could be shown to be clearly possible to reduce the postulate of indifference to an aspect of universal scepticism. In that case goodness might be affirmed in a judgment of knowledge. But short of that, however pressing the necessity might be, it could not become a judgment of knowledge, but at best would take the form of a necessary belief.

We seem to have reached a conclusion of some value here. In order that a consideration of worth may be sufficient to turn the balance in favour of a judgment of knowledge, its coerciveness must be so great as to involve the postulate of irrationality with reference to our whole world. If the refusal to yield to the practical consideration be tantamount to asserting the essential irrationality of the world and, therefore, the wreck of all knowledge, it must be allowed to turn the balance in favour of knowledge. If, however, the pressure does not reach this point or cannot be shown to reach it, the judgment into which it enters will fall short of positive knowledge, although it may have the form and cogency of a necessary belief. It may be said then that while the consideration of worth, standing alone, can never constitute a judgment of real knowledge, yet at the top of the scale where its force is strongest it may turn the scale of a theoretic situation in favour of the judgment of knowledge. In general, however, the epistemological function of the motives and considerations of worth, will be confined to the determination of beliefs rather than of judgments of knowledge.

We have seen in the analysis of the first chapter that the subjective condition of belief arises when there is a dominance of the practical interest over the theoretic, and we have seen here that where the practical motive is a consideration of real necessity the belief that it motives will be a necessary belief. And the force of the belief-judgment will, other things being equal, correspond to the subjective worth of the practical consideration by which it is motived. When we have reached the conclusion that considerations of worth have in general, except in the extreme cases indicated, as their normal function the generation of beliefs and practical convictions, the question of the value of beliefs becomes one of vital importance. We are considering here only the question of epistemological value, of course, and the point of interest is, in what sense and to what degree may a belief be taken as a valid form of

objective affirmation. In the extreme case where the denial of the belief would overthrow the rationality of the world, the belief has as we saw the force of knowledge, and we may rest in it with the certainty that it is assailable only by an absolute scepticism which is self-destructive. But we are concerned here with beliefs that fall short of the certitude of knowledge and with that species of belief that is not translatable into knowledge. What is the certitude-value of the judgment of belief in general? Can it be determined, and can we discover any criteria which will be of general application? Some things may, I think, be determined which will help at least to bring relative order into the situation. In the first place we have seen that, objectively, a belief can never be reduced to a cognitive basis. We can never bring the content of belief into immediate relation to objective cognition or necessity, and it cannot therefore be reduced to an intuition. But we can apply a negative test here of considerable value. We can say that the situation contemplated in the judgment of belief must not be inconsistent with the world as we know it. The system of things as we know and conceive it must not be inconsistent with the content of the belief, or to put the matter in the form of utmost generality, the content of the belief must not be inconsistent with the objective rationality of the world, that rationality being expressible in our sense or concept of the internal unity and consistency of the world-representation as a whole. But this is only a negative criterion at best, and can have little to do in determining positive conviction. A stronger objective criterion would be the fact that our world would seem less rational if the belief were not true; in short, that it adds to the objective rationality of the world. This is a consideration of some value in the positive determination of belief, but it is probable that in most cases it is resolvable, in the last analysis, into some of the subjective tests which we shall now proceed to consider.

The distinctive subjective generator of belief is, as we have seen, the motive or consideration of worth, and this

motive arises primarily out of volition and feeling, and voices some demand of our nature in view of the practical issues of the good and the bad. In short the worth-motive is primarily a demand for the good, not for the true, and it has only a secondary interest in the truth of its object, as a condition of its realization as good. Now we have seen how the whole system of epistemological relations rests on and correlates with the system of practical motives and relations involved in volitional and emotional experience. In view of this there may be two sets of considerations arising respectively in view of the good and the beautiful. Confining ourselves at present to the volitional end, the good, we find that in the large sense we categorize our whole world-content under the volitional category and demand that it shall be good, and that a large part of this content may be cognitively apprehended as good. But there will be a point reached as we approximate the sphere of the ideal and complete, where cognition breaks down and the practical motive is left to bear out its demand mainly by its own force. In this connection it is clear that the form of the question ought to be, what is the epistemological value of a practical consideration of good? Is it ever sufficient to justify a belief in the objective truth of its object, in the absence of convincing proof of the theoretic kind? Two cases may be conceived in this connection: (1) where the belief-judgment is practically necessary; (2) where it is not necessary but highly reasonable. Now it is clear that under the head of practical necessity would fall such judgments as the Kantian postulates; for without stopping to argue the soundness of Kant's positions, it will be sufficient for our purposes here to state the postulates hypothetically and say, if the validity of the category of practical good unconditionally demands that man should be a free self-determining agent, then we must in the interests of morality assert the reality of free self-determining agency. Or if the attainableness of the good that is practically necessary, has as its indispensable condition the immortality of the soul, then we must in the

interests of morality affirm that the soul is immortal. In connection with these judgments we have seen that Kant endeavours to affirm their practical truth while denying to them epistemological validity. But what we maintain here is that a practical judgment cannot escape the reference to truth and must have epistemological value of some sort. In the above judgments, assuming the conditions out of which they arise to be valid, we cannot stop with the Kantian conclusion, but must say that the postulate justifies some attitude toward the theoretic truth of what is affirmed. If it be true that the validity of the practical end, the good, depends on the immortality of the soul, then the denial of immortality is tantamount to the denial of goodness, and the failure to affirm immortality is tantamount to a failure to affirm goodness as a reality in the world. If now we assume the truth of our hypothesis we will have an instance of a judgment the denial of which would involve the suppression of the rationality of the world, and therefore a judgment of worth that is equivalent to knowledge. We say this would follow provided the conditions were not in any sense hypothetical, and we could say with the infallibility of intuition that the validity of the good is unconditionally staked on the immortality of the soul. If the postulate of immortality cannot be affirmed as a judgment of knowledge, it is because the practical necessity on which it rests may be debatable, and thus theoretic uncertainty may enter into its very foundations.

But admitting for the sake of the argument that immortality cannot be affirmed as an unconditional certainty, the practical consideration may still be sufficient to render it a necessary belief. If it can be made obvious that the denial of immortality and the termination of our being with the temporal death of the body, would inevitably rob life of its value and tend to dry up those springs of inspiration which condition the realization of the good even in the present life—if this could be made clear, then just so far belief in immortality would become practi-

cally necessary, since its denial would involve the defeat, or at least the peril of the defeat, of the practical good in this life. We are not concerned here to prove that any particular belief *is* necessary, but rather to vindicate the possibility of a class of necessary beliefs and to show the grounds on which such necessary affirmations may rest. The pressure of the consideration of practical necessity, on the question of the truth or falsehood of the object of the practical demand, will lead to a belief that the practical object must be true and real, and the affirmation will be valid in so far as the practical necessity is beyond dispute.

(2) The second case is that of a judgment of worth which commends itself simply as reasonable, not as absolutely necessary. If, for example, the immortality of the soul be asserted as a necessary belief, then the belief that there will be mutual recognition beyond the grave between souls that knew each other in this life, becomes reasonable. In other words, that belief is supported by the analogies of present experience and is in no sense out of harmony with anything that our experience has taught us. But the belief is not necessary, for we do not and can not know what changes may be involved in the passage through death. The physical basis of conscious life may be so profoundly modified as to involve, if not a total, yet a partial lapse of memory, and that lapse might involve an indefinite portion of the relations of the present life. We are acquainted with temporary lapses of this kind and cannot say that they may not be total. Such a belief cannot, therefore, take the form of necessity. We cannot say that there must be mutual recognition beyond the grave, but rather that it is reasonable to think that there will be such recognition. The belief is conditional on a prior belief in the immortality of the soul, which, being assumed to be true on its own ground, it becomes reasonable but not necessary to believe that the truth of the life beyond the grave also includes the mutual recognition of souls that have known each other here. And we can say in this connection that the practical motive,

which is here the strong emotional requirement of our nature, that we should not be finally estranged from those we have known and loved, is sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that the event we call death will not involve the necessity of such estrangement.

The notions of belief and authority are very closely associated in our thoughts, and the relationship is in fact so close as to render this a favourable point for a brief consideration of the subject of authority. There are two species of this category: authority for action and authority for conviction, only the latter of which enters into the scope of our present inquiry. Again the relation of authority to conviction involves a number of aspects, some of which may be excluded. In general it may be said that authority is a condition of belief but not of knowledge, since in the respects in which it seems to be a condition of knowledge it is in reality only a first step in the process of knowledge. Let us specify one or two of these aspects. In the first place it is commonly urged that all our knowledge rests in the last analysis on authority, inasmuch as its validity depends on our acceptance of the testimony of our faculties. This is in fact a reversal of truth, for knowledge rests ultimately on our perception of its own grounds, and scepticism, which may arise of course, is in the last analysis cured by the test of the same perception. How do we get rid of disbelief in our own faculties? Simply by finding that they normally give us knowledge rather than illusion. There is no other cure. Again, it is urged that all historical knowledge rests ultimately on authority. But this is true only in a very secondary sense. Our acceptance of historical content generally rests in the last analysis on our perception that it conforms to the conditions of possible knowledge. We do not need to be told that Munchausen lies, since it is obvious that his statements violate the conditions which render truth possible. That historical content conforms to the conditions of possible knowledge, is the first ground of its acceptance. The second condition of our acceptance is its

congruity with the whole of our present experience. We could not believe in antipodes if we thought with the ancients that all bodies gravitate in some absolute direction. The historic representation must be congruous with our present experience as a whole or it will be rejected as incredible. Then again we must satisfy ourselves as to the competency and reliability of the narrator. How is this to be done? Well, we must get to know something about his means of information, his ability to select his materials, and above all his capacity for putting a correct construction on his materials. And with reference to his veracity we must have means of satisfying ourselves that he is honest and truthful. In all this process where does authority begin? It is clear that it must be excluded from the sphere of the objective grounds. These are grounds of direct certitude of a cognitive character. When we come to the subjective grounds we find that we employ various means to satisfy ourselves as to the competency of the historian, and these will be of the nature of direct knowledge, in so far as we can make up our minds from first-hand data and reach an independent judgment. And the same will be to some extent true in regard to the question of veracity. But at some stage we will reach a point where this process comes to an end and we accept the whole on the simple faith that the historian is telling us the truth. We seem to have come to the authority of the historian as the last ground of our acceptance of his story. But we have in truth been reversing the order of experience. The act of simple faith, when it takes place at all, is the very first step of experience and not the last. We receive the message with any degree of belief that may attach to it; this is indeterminate, and then we proceed to reduce our epistemological attitude towards it, so far as may be possible, to one of knowledge. This leads to the development of all the considerations spoken of above. In the end we are able to say, if the result has been positive, that we know the historian's message to be true or

we believe it to be true, and our belief will be epistemological rather than practical.

We find then that in the case of historical knowledge sheer authority comes first instead of last. The first act is belief on purely ethical grounds, but the last act is a judgment that rests mainly on epistemological data. The same conclusion applies without much modification to our relation to the whole body of knowledge and belief, including the products of special and expert investigation. Authority is a first comer, and stands at the portal of knowledge. We receive with what degree of faith may be, and then proceed to translate our judgments by which the content is affirmed into the epistemological form. It makes no difference, so far as the essential relations are concerned, that with many and perhaps most of us the judgment of simple acceptance remains practically the last act. It would not be so if we were not convinced that the content was in conformity with the conditions of possible knowledge or if in any way it seemed to be inconsistent with the whole of our experience. It would not be the last act did we not feel justified in believing in the competency and veraciousness of the investigator who supplies us with the increment of knowledge. If we are ready to assert that the conditions of reducing our judgment to the epistemological form are available, and on that ground make the act of acceptance the last act so far as we are concerned, our conduct is rational, and mainly so because we have recognized the rightful place of authority in such matters as the first and not the final ground of certitude.

It is clear then that authority when it enters at all is not a condition of knowledge but rather a first step in the process of knowledge. But is there not some sphere of conviction to which authority bears a more vital relation? Let us consider the relation of authority to belief. I said by implication at least at the beginning of this paragraph that authority is a condition of belief. That statement may have to be modified. For we must bear in

mind here that we are considering belief only in its epistemological aspect as an assertor of truth and not as a judgment of practical good. We have seen, however, that judgments of practical good may have epistemological value, and it is the epistemological aspect of belief that is under consideration here; beliefs, in short, as assertors of truth. Let us take, for example, the Christian belief in the resurrection of the body. This belief is doubtless at first an act of simple acceptance on the authority of the Founder of Christianity. In the first instance the Christian believes simply on the testimony of Jesus. But is this true in the last analysis, and can this simple testimony be taken as the last reason for believing? It is clear, I think, that it cannot. St. Paul betrays the necessity of grounding this belief on something more than mere personal assurance in his plea that if Christ be not risen then would the hope of the Christian be vain. In short, St. Paul is willing to admit that simple assurance is not sufficient in this case, but that it is necessary for the one who asserts the resurrection, to exhibit the truth of what he is affirming in his own body in order that his followers may be convinced that he knows whereof he speaks and has power to bring it to pass. St. Paul is certainly seeking to produce conviction by arguing that if Jesus is able to realize the resurrection in his own case he is also able to do so in the case of his disciples. Doubtless St. Paul himself had at one time received the doctrine of the resurrection by a simple assent of faith. But he had reached a point in his experience when he deemed it necessary for himself as well as for others to seek rational justification for this belief. He finds the needed confirmation in the attested fact of Christ's exhibition of the possibility of what he asserts and his power to bring it about in his own resurrection. Now it is not necessary that every one should look precisely where St. Paul looked for the "holding turn" to his conviction. But it is evident that every one must look somewhere. Even the disciple of the Johannean type who approaches his

Master in the relation of intuitive love will believe the Master's assertion of the resurrection of the body mainly on account of his knowledge of what that Master is and can do. Authority is a means to assurance, never the last ground of assurance, and it is therefore as a means, as a first and not a last step in knowledge and belief, that it is to be considered as a term in an epistemological world at all.

Having reached this conclusion we are in a position to determine the place that authority may rightfully hold in a system of knowledge and belief. We may accept things because they are good and not because they are true, but in so far as we accept things as true we perform an act which we call epistemological, and it expresses itself in a judgment of knowledge or a judgment of belief. Now we have seen that in so far as authority enters as a factor in the process it is a first and not a last step. Assent to authority is always preliminary to assent to that in which it is grounded. The settlement of this fact does not, however, determine the question of the value of authority as a factor in conviction. The truth is that authority has different degrees of value in connection with different species of certitude, and it has greater value in general for belief than it has for knowledge. The root of authority is in the will, and it is given to will to exercise the exclusive prerogative of speaking authoritatively; that is, of laying down the law and requiring obedience. We will be led to expect then that in belief, in which the will-motive is stronger than it is in knowledge, there will be a larger sphere for authority than there is in knowledge. The will to know expresses simply a readiness or a determination to exercise the faculties of knowledge. But the "will to believe" is more ambiguous. That one should will to believe something by sheer force of dogged resolve, is at least a conceivable state of mind, and that one should succeed in the end is not incredible when we take into account the power of habit. Now the mere will to believe has no epistemological significance, since it is possible to will to believe anything, but where the will to believe

terminates in actual belief then it will be true that we either believe simply without any reason, or that our belief has rational grounds. The former would be a case of belief on pure authority since authority is the expression of pure will, and it makes no difference whether the will be our own or that of another; while the latter might have the moment of authority in it but would ultimately rest on epistemological grounds. The will to believe, in itself considered, is then the pure motive of a belief that rests on simple authority, and the question of the validity of authority as an ultimate ground of conviction will be bound up with the question of the validity of the will to believe as a motive for accepting anything as true. Let us then distinguish the will to believe from the epistemological motives of belief or knowledge, and we have a simple case of the judgment *that a thing must be true because it is good*. The will does not act apart from some end-category of volition, and we have seen that this is the good. To say that we will a thing because it is good is inaccurate, for what we will *is* the good as we conceive it, and we will the good just as we affirm the true. The will to believe is not the resolve to accept anything as good, for this is involved in willing it at all, but rather the *determination to assert its truth on the ground of its being good*. So far as the pure will to believe is concerned this must be the only and final consideration. To the Moslem it seems to be the greatest practical good that when he is killed in battle fighting for his religion he should go straight to the Mohammedan paradise, and, therefore, he affirms and believes in it as true. He may have other reasons for his belief, but so far forth as it is a pure case of will to believe, this will be his motive, and he will believe it to be true because it is good.

Now, I am not attempting to deny here that beliefs are formed on this basis. Nothing is more common than for men to assert the truth of things on the ground of their practical value. They begin by wishing that they were

true, and end by affirming that they must be true. This is the natural history of a large proportion of the most cherished beliefs of the race, and there is no disposition here to challenge the validity of many of the beliefs so formed. But the question here is not whether the will to believe may or may not lead to true beliefs, but rather whether the will to believe, the determination to assent to the truth of a thing because of its practical relation to good, is a sufficient final ground for any belief. And in order to reach an answer it will be necessary to revert to some conclusions already reached in former sections. In the discussion of the epistemological value of motives of practical worth we found that it was necessary to apply the general test of rationality, and we found in general that it is possible for what Kant calls a postulate of the practical reason to take such a form that the denial of it would be tantamount to a denial of the objective rationality of our world. In this case we saw that our postulate acquires the force of knowledge. Again, we have found that a practical postulate may assume such a form that the denial of it would be tantamount to a denial of the subjective rationality of our world; that is, to an overthrowal of all standards of value. In this case the belief takes on the form of necessity. In the case of other practical postulates, as for instance that there shall be recognition beyond the grave, we saw that the conditions of necessity are not present, and that only a degree of probability could be asserted. Now, the conclusion which I wish to draw from these considerations is just this: that while the fact that the will to believe is a generator of beliefs is not in dispute, yet when the question of the legitimacy of beliefs thus generated comes up it cannot be answered by simply claiming the right to believe a proposition because its affirmation carries with it a practical good. This would inevitably throw wide open the floodgates of credulity and superstition. But what is needed is such a criticism of the grounds of belief as will enable us to determine the relation

of the good involved to our world as a whole. If the good is of such a nature that it is involved in the rationality of our world, and its denial would be tantamount to a wreck of that rationality, then we have the strongest reasons for believing it to be true, and the same is true in regard to beliefs that may be asserted as necessary or as only probable. *The final ground of their affirmation is not the fact that they are good, but rather our conviction that they are implicated either necessarily or in a lesser degree, in the rationality of the world, and that their denial would leave the world so far forth, irrational and absurd.* And this conviction rests in the last analysis on our intuition of the truth that the ultimate harmony of the good and the true, so that the good shall be true and the true good, is involved in the essence of that idea of rationality the denial of which means the wreck of all knowledge.

There are two spheres into which the moment of authority, or assent founded on will-demand, may enter: those of belief and conduct. In the latter sphere the end-category is, of course, the good, and the claim is for obedience rather than mental assent. Now, while in ordinary usage the notion of authority is taken in the concrete as including the grounds of its validity, yet these may always be analyzed out, and it will be found that the final grounds of obedience, the basis of the right to be obeyed, are to be found in the assumed goodness of the enjoining agent. In the last analysis the will yields its allegiance only to the good. There is no binding force in evil as evil, though it may be able to coerce by superior force or guile, but the source of practical authority, in the sphere of conduct, is ultimately traceable to the end-category of the practical, the good. It has already been made clear in reference to authority in the sphere of belief that while the term may be concretely employed as including the grounds of its claims, yet these when analyzed out will be found to take the form of considerations that are directly related to the good and indirectly and ultimately to the true.

The will to believe is, then, a first and not a final motive of belief. The final ground will always be some reason that will serve as its justification, and in the absence of which the belief will have no epistemological significance. In common usage, however, the phrase "will to believe" is employed indiscriminately so as to include legitimate motives, as well as others that are not adequate, and nothing is more needed than a discriminating analysis that will supply us with some criterion which will enable us to distinguish legitimate reasons for believing from those that are unsound and misleading. And in this we have also said a final word respecting authority. The term is used with the greatest indiscrimination, so as to include all the grounds, valid or invalid, for the acceptance of any content as true. In view of this the great need is a critique that will enable us to determine the place and value of authority in a scheme of knowledge and belief. When we have seen that the pulse of authority, so far forth as it is involved in a scheme of knowledge and belief, is bound up with the will to believe, we will be prepared to recognize the distinctions arrived at above, and to admit that while authority may be, and no doubt is, an important and in some spheres, even a necessary factor in belief, yet its true place is at the beginning rather than the end. The last grounds of belief must be grounds that will also justify the authority by which they are enunciated.

CHAPTER IV.

THE TRANSCENDENT AS EXPERIENCE.

IN this chapter we return to the main line of metaphysical reflection in the development of the doctrine of the transcendent. We have in former chapters exhibited the presence of the transcendent in experience and have shown its necessary relation to both science and metaphysics. Here it is our purpose to develop as far as may be possible the concept of the transcendent itself, and the heading of the chapter will indicate the general trend of the discussion. There are two questions here: (1) that of the connection of the transcendent with experience and (2) the question as to the nature of the transcendent, whether there are sufficient grounds for conceiving it as itself a form of experience. The first question has already been argued to some extent. We have seen that at various points in experience the transcendent is involved, and we have pointed out in certain connections how the transcendent leads to the formation of intra-experiential concepts and principles which are necessary for its reduction to unity and stability. It is only necessary here to enlarge on these same considerations. Let us suppose the denial of the transcendent in experience and then consider what follows. In the first place it would be impossible to find any adequate basis for the consciousness of the transcendent that asserts itself concretely in religious experience and more abstractly in those

notions of the perfect, the infinite, and the absolute which are as inexpugnable as any of the concepts of relativity and also impossible of reduction to them. Why should we have the transcendent in consciousness if there is no transcendence in experience? The logic of the situation is coercive. There is no deduction possible of the concepts of transcendence from the relative. The notion of relativity itself is possible only in view of the concepts of the transcendent. Conceding the element of transcendence, we have only to exhibit the points where it asserts itself and the bearing it has on intra-experiential elements. Now, we have seen that the transcendent asserts itself in both an objective and a subjective manner. In the sphere of the objective consciousness we find not only a point of presentation, but also one of conception, under each of the categories, at which the transcendent makes itself known in consciousness. The presentation will arise in connection with the space and time world, as well as with the world of the dynamic and aesthetic categories. The space world is not an absolute creation. This is involved in the immediate consciousness in which it is apprehended. That the presentative experience in this sphere is in the last analysis non-origenerative, is an immediate implication from the coerciveness or the unqualified inevitability of that experience. Ultimately our relation to the transcendent must be receptive. The same is true of the spontaneous experiences of the dynamic categories. The world of energies is not a creation of our own energy. This is involved in the coercive nature of the experience, and is expressed in its immediacy, in the consciousness of resistance and the persistent agency of the resistent terms. Again the unity of the world has a point of inevitability at which our control ceases. That our world is unified is not altogether a function of our thought or even of our will, but thought and will are brought into relation with some term that puts the stamp of necessity on their procedure and in relation to which they are not free.

The conceptual points of transcendence are equally clear. The transcendent element in the concept of space and time is found at that point where dimension lapses and the initiative is taken by the non- or ultra-dimensional. We have seen in our treatment of conceptual space and time that the genesis of dimension involves a point of dimensionless initiative. The significance of this is, surely, that at the point where our experience touches and defines the objective under the forms of space and time, being asserts itself as transcendent to these operations. The absolute origin of the content that is realized in space and time is therefore a presupposition of the experience in which it is realized. The dynamic categories speak a similar language. The notion of cause is that of conditioned origination, but it has wrapped up in it the concept of unconditioned or absolute origination. We call this *self*-origination, and it means simply that in the last analysis there must be a first point of initiative for things. The necessity of this is involved in the very concept of cause. The concept of substance involving the point of persistent organization in the objective sphere, utters more clearly the consciousness of the transcendent. The objectively persistent necessitates the distinction of the object from our mental constructs of it in so far as the self-assertion of the object as such a point, introduces the element of coerciveness or inevitability into our experience. The notion of substance is not exhausted, we may say, in that of successive posits in our experience, but the consciousness in which it is affirmed posits its own transcendence in the consciousness that the content it realizes under the substance-category, is in the last analysis, not its own doing, but the deed of its other. Lastly, in the category of interaction we find that the modification of causal agency which the idea of community involves, necessitates the concept of internal rather than external activity. The a's in order to be able to affect the b's must become internal to them, and this as we have argued, renders it necessary that the terms

of the interaction should include an internal point of departure for the reception of impulses and the organization of responses. Now, the reflection of Lotze comes to our aid at this stage, and enables us to see that the concept of interaction has led up to a point where the notion of objective *things* begins to merge into that of *subjects*, and our world becomes peopled with individualities analogous to the Leibnitzian monads. But the Leibnitzian monad is in its very nature a self-transcending conception inasmuch as it is a relative agent in an interacting system of mutually modifying agencies, which yet involves a point of departure for its activities that shall be absolute.

The notion of objective agency thus involves the point of transcendence where the function of something unconditioned and absolute is plainly implicated. We have seen that the whole of objective experience is pervaded with this implication. If we enter the sphere of the subject-consciousness we will find that the situation there is not materially different. We will find that the self is conscious of itself as a *socius*; that is, as the bearer of a modified, relative agency in which its point of initiative is correlated with, and modified by, the initiative of the not-self. But the very concept of experience implicates the notion of an absolute centre in relation to which every part of it may be unified, and the agency of which shall not be dependent on other, but self-determining. We have, however, in experience a plurality of selves presented under the category of community, and exercising a reciprocally modifying influence upon one another. This activity is accompanied by the consciousness of its relativity. And yet there is in relation to it all, a point of transcendence in the concept of an absolutely free and unifying agency, which it renders necessary. The point of transcendence which is, in some sense, extra-conscious in the objective sphere, becomes intra-conscious and fully realized in the experience of the subject. In connection with the consciousness of our own form of relative individuality and agency there arises necessarily the consciousness of a transcending

individuality and agency, and it is true here, as it is in the objective sphere, that the general concept of the transcendent is a necessary outcome of experience. It is so interwoven with the processes of experience, subjective and objective, that its elimination would reduce experience to chaos, and it is so obtrusive in every department of consciousness that the failure to see it is good evidence of metaphysical blindness.

Let us consider, then, in a brief paragraph the intra-experiential bearings of this element of transcendence. We have only to recall at this point considerations that have already been urged. We have seen that the basal concepts of science involve the transcendent, and that these concepts are necessary in order to render scientific knowledge possible. And we have seen that the respect in which they are needed to render science possible, is as a means of transcending the internal instability of the relative and achieving a stable basis of certitude. The transformation which the principles of transcendence produce in the sphere of relativity is, therefore, a necessary condition of the existence of science. Now, we have seen that the same necessity arises at any point in experience where we begin to reflect and follow our reflection out to a satisfactory conclusion. The plain man's reflection on the distinction between knowledge and belief, which led him ultimately to the consideration of the ground of the true and the false, is an illustration which we may generalize, for it will be found that there is no halting place for reflection in the mere relative, and that the reason for that is the fact which we soon discern, that there is no satisfactory answer to our questions in the mere relative. The general instability of the relative can be overcome only by anchoring it to some absolute ground, and that this instability should be overcome is a condition of the possibility of true science. There can be no relative science of the relative. But in the last analysis science must ground itself in a principle which enables the transcendent to enter into and transform the whole constitution of the relative.

We come then to the point where the second question arises, as to the nature of the transcendent; can it be determined as itself a form of experience? It is here that we come upon the favourite position of agnosticism; namely, that nothing can be determined regarding the nature of the absolute. The Positivistic denial of the necessity of the transcendent has been dealt with in our answer to the preceding question. But Herbert Spencer and his school tell us that the nature of the transcendent, the existence of which they postulate as necessary, is and must remain inscrutable; that since all our categories are relative we have no resources left for the determination of absolute nature. Now in regard to this position it may be urged (1) that the ability to affirm the necessary existence of any being involves some concept of its nature. We could not say that the transcendent is necessary if it were not possible to conceive some points of difference between it and the relative. The agnostic will admit this much, but will take the ground that, after all, we have reached only negative determinations of the absolute. We can say only that it is not relative but can go no farther. That there is a measure of truth in this contention we are willing to admit. When we characterize anything as non-relative and non-finite simply, we do no more than deny that it possesses the attributes of relativity and finitude, but leave undetermined the attributes which it may possess. Were the transcendent an isolated term in experience there would perhaps be no possibility beyond this mode of negative determination. But it is just the reverse of isolated. We have seen that it is so implicated with the relative terms of experience that these can be rendered valid only by relating them to the transcendent. The school of Spencer admits that the whole sphere of the relative and finite would become irrational if it were to be divorced from its transcendent ground. The absolute of the school of Spencer is not an isolated term but rather a transcendent that is implicated in the whole texture of experience. Now the point of our contention here is that

the determination of the transcendent as not isolated but as necessarily implicated in the very texture of experience, this kind of determination, I say, is impossible without some positive insight into the nature of the transcending term. It may be an unknown x like that of the mathematician, but it cannot be an unknowable x , at least we cannot affirm it to be such, because in that case, our term would in the last analysis be isolated and unrelated, and it would not be possible for us to say whether it were a necessary ground of relativity or not. The respect in which the transcendent becomes necessary to the relative must itself be intelligible; in other words, it must align itself with positive as well as with merely negative aspects of experience. There must be something in the positive experience-content itself that supplies the basis for intelligently conceiving the transcendent nature. We find these positive terms in the concepts of relative agency which develop in an objective and subjective experience. For example, we have seen that the concept of objective agency involves the notion of self-initiative or self-origination modified and as we may say relativized, by the internal influence of an agency not its own. This is constitutional so that our consciousness has at its core a sense of reduced activity or agency, determined in part by the agency of the other. Now, I have admitted in another connection that we have no intuition of absolute agency and that we cannot therefore fully conceive the nature of absolute agency. But we have a moment in our consciousness; that which gives us the sense of initiative in our own activity, which supplies a basal insight for conceiving the absolute. Without this moment it would be impossible for us to conceive an absolute at all, whereas with it and in the light of it, we find the concept of absoluteness necessary, and we have only to apply to this moment that method of approximation or infinitation which has been elaborated in another connection, in order to reach an intelligible conception of what the absolute nature, in this aspect of it, must be. In short, by the progressive removal of the modifying influence of

other co-ordinate agencies, the moment of free self-initiative asserts itself, until it reaches the point of absoluteness. We have only to analyze the processes of our consciousness closely enough in order to see that this is true. I do not think that we need carry this line of reflection further. What has been made obvious here is this, that *the whole ground in experience out of which the necessity of the transcendent arises, also contains the ground of the intelligible conception of the nature of the transcendent, and the extent to which the absolute may be intelligently conceived will be determined by the positive data in experience in which the implication of the absolute is contained.*

The questions then come up; is it necessary that the transcendent should itself be conceived as a form of experience? are there valid grounds for the adoption of this concept of its nature? The answer to these questions involves certain general as well as special considerations. In the first place, there is the line of reflection involved in St. Augustine's doctrine of truth and in Professor Royce's discussion of truth and error in his *Religious Aspects of Philosophy* and his *Conception of God*. This reflection sets out from the position of the plain man in ordinary experience and the quest in the case of Augustine is for a standard of truth. If the distinction between the true and the false is not purely relative and conventional, then in the last analysis, the ground of the distinction must be transcendent. This we have also concluded in the course of the plain man's reflection. But a transcendent distinction cannot be an ultimate abstraction. If truth is not relative, but involves an absolute basis, then there must be some nature whose content is the truth. Augustine draws the theistic conclusion here, but we are not concerned with theism specially, but rather with the broader question whether the necessity of a transcendent ground of truth justifies or renders necessary the conclusion that the transcendent nature must be a form of experience. The same consideration is central in Royce's reflection, only Royce makes his approach from the negative side. Some

deny the existence of truth, he says, but everyone admits that there is error.¹ Now, we may ask what does the possibility of error involve ? and the substance of Royce's contention is that the possibility of error necessitates the truth, and an ultimate standard of the true which can have its ground only in an absolute ; that is, in an errorless experience. I am only attempting here to give the core of the argument, and much of the juice of the original has, I fear, been lost. But allowing for individual differences, the two lines of reflection are substantially one. Both the early and the later thinker, starting like our plain man with the consideration of knowledge, which leads on in a quest for an adequate ground of the distinction between the false and the true, are able to find this ground only in the postulate of an absolute experience. The inference seems to be inevitable. If we are not able to ground the distinction between truth and error in pure relativity—and we have seen that this is impossible—then the necessity of a transcendent ground is plain. But what can a transcendent ground of the distinction between the true and false be, other than a nature in which it is primarily affirmed and recognized, and what can such a nature be if it is not absolute experience ?

But there is another line of reflection which may be expressed in the following question : if the transcendent be not a form of experience why should the whole of the relative express itself as experience ? We have found that the real, in order to get recognition at all, must come under the forms of actual or possible experience. The whole form of conceivability is an experience-form. Now, if there must be anything that lies beyond the scope of this form that thing is wholly indeterminate. We could not say, in the first place, that it is, and in the second place, if we admitted that it is in some sense real, we would be unable to conceive any relation that it could bear to experience. It is clear that such a term may be safely eliminated from our calculations. The real transcendent is one that is so related to the intra-

¹ *Conception of God*, pp. 1, 2.

experiential as to be implicated in the determination of all its concepts. The primary motive of experience in asserting the transcendent, apart from the direct consciousness of its presence in experience, is its necessary relation to the processes of experience itself. This being the case, the logic of the situation shapes itself into the following argument. If the transcendent has as its necessary function in experience, the grounding of the experience-processes by supplying to them those concepts of absoluteness which are needed to give them stability, we may conclude that the transcendent itself is a nature which expresses itself in those concepts of the absolute—that is, an absolute experience.

These general considerations may be confirmed, moreover, by the implications of special points of experience. In the sphere of objective agency we have seen that the moment of transcendence is the sense we have of the necessity of some point of absolute self-initiative in connection with the relative initiative in experience. Now, we have only to analyze this relative initiative in order to see that it has in it a point of free spontaneity which is modified, however, by the internal influence of co-existing agencies. We have only to conceive this modified freedom as absolved from its modification, in order to reach the concept of absolute agency or unmodified free initiative. That this concept is not completely attainable we have admitted. But that it may be approximated along intelligible lines has already been demonstrated, and here the question is ; to what kind of a nature does our approximate conception lead us ? and the answer is clear enough : a nature in which the agency we are conscious of in a modified form, is free and unmodified. What else can such a nature be but one that realizes itself in an absolute experience ? If we take into consideration our subjective agency the inference seems to be even clearer. We have found that our self-consciousness is constitutionally social and communal, and that what we realize in it is a self-agency that is internally influenced and,

to a degree, determined by the not-self. This gives rise to the feeling of dependence and the consciousness of relative self-determination. The moment in this experience which involves the transcendent is that of self-determination or, as we may say, self-initiative, and we reach an intelligible concept of the nature of the transcendent by raising this term of self-determination to the point of absoluteness, where the moment of dependence lapses altogether. The notion of the transcendent thus becomes that of an absolutely self-determining agent which realizes itself as an absolute experience. *From whatever point of view we approach the transcendent then we find that it is only transcendent in its relation to our finite relative experience, but that it is included in the notion of an absolute experience.*

Let us, then, take up the question as to how far the nature of absolute experience may be determined, meaning by determined, intelligibly conceived in the light of proximate conceptions. And we may first ask how much of our analysis of consciousness can be taken as valid also for the nature of the transcendent? In reply to this, I think we will have to accept the results of that analysis in which it was found that consciousness is not internally simple but complex. This result was developed as a doctrine of consciousness in general, without respect to the mode in which it might express itself. Now, the doctrine of the internal complexity of consciousness involves, as we have seen, the internal duality of consciousness; its cardinal disposition to shape itself into a subject-consciousness in relation to an object-consciousness of content. That this is involved in the very notion of consciousness will become clear on reflection. What James calls "sciousness," in so far as it has any intelligible meaning at all, must simply be the attempt to conceive consciousness as, in the last analysis, absolutely simple and structureless, but we have seen that this is impossible, and to conceive consciousness as absolutely simple is tantamount to denying to it all internal nature and thus destroying the possibility of even mechanical response. The

notion of consciousness involves internal complexity, the primal expression of which is the distinction of subject and object forms. If, then, the tendency to duality of expression in subject and object forms is inherent in the nature of consciousness, we cannot refuse to allow that the transcendent experience will involve this distinction so far forth as it is to be conceived as conscious at all. We admit the possibility of denial at this point, and the force of the considerations that may be urged against conceiving absolute experience as involving consciousness. But when we come to consider the question ; what an experience could be that was devoid of consciousness, we find ourselves wholly unable to answer. We find that the notion of the unconscious is not an ultimate conception. For the unconscious must be conceived either as standing by itself or as in relation to the conscious. In the former case, we simply conceive it as a thing, or one of the objective forms of being. The concept of matter, for example, is the notion of that from which consciousness has been eliminated. But when we proceed further in the analysis of the notion of matter we find that we can only conceive it as part of the objective content of experience, and that its intra-experiential status depends ultimately on its relation to a subject-activity in which it is posited. That this is conscious we need not argue. And, further, when we trace it to its transcendent ground we find this to be a moment of transcendent positing which can logically be referred only to a subject-activity in the transcendent sphere. We are thus obliged to ascribe a conceiving activity to the transcendent, and when this is conceded it seems to me that all motive for denying consciousness to it will disappear.

That the internal complexity of consciousness carries with it the tendency to duality of subjective and objective experience in the transcendent, may then be assumed. We may consider in the next place the validity for the transcendent, of our analysis of consciousness into the three concrete forms of psychosis : the intellectual, the volitional, and the emotional.

When the question is brought down to the last analysis and it is asked whether any of the elements, thought, will, or feeling, can be eliminated from our concept of transcendent experience, the answer must, I think, be in the negative. Thought and volition seem secure, and the point of real debate would seem to be whether feeling can be ascribed to the transcendent. The central difficulty arises from the seeming impossibility of dissociating pleasure-pain from the notion of the agency of the not-self, and in this difficulty thought and volition are to some extent involved also. The difficulty will be escaped, however, if bearing in mind the tendency which we have found in relative experience toward the resolution of all activity into internal agency, we conceive this process of internalizing as absolutely carried out. We will thus arrive at the notion of an all-comprehending experience from which modifying influences have not been eliminated, but in which they have been included. The transcendent thought will be an all-inclusive thought, and the transcendent will and feeling will also be of the all-including species. Now, we find in our own experience that just in proportion as our thoughts, feelings, or volitions cease to be special and tend to become all-inclusive, in the same proportion they tend to become responses to the internal motives of our whole experience. Let this law be recognized and it will supply a basis for intelligibly conceiving the possibility of absolute feeling, as well as absolute thought and volition. We do not propose here to deny but rather to affirm, the possibility of special thoughts, feelings, and volitions on the part of the transcendent. But the pivotal point in the argument is the establishment of the possibility of internal motivity, and if this be conceded, there is no reason to deny that thoughts, feelings, and volitions may specialize themselves internally.

There is no counter necessity then to prevent our yielding to the necessity of ascribing the capacity for thought, feeling, and volition to the nature of transcendent experience. What remains to be considered in this connection is the question

as to what limitations of our ordinary experiences of these activities must be removed in order that they may become absolute. We have seen that one of these restrictions is that of external motivity. The motive must become internal. Let us take the three forms of activity and see whether we can determine reflectively their points of absoluteness. To begin with feeling, we find that feeling is reducible in the last analysis to some form of interest, which in its relative forms is never free from the moment of simple responsiveness. But interest is not responsive through and through. There is a point of free initiation in it which asserts itself in connection with the modified form of responsiveness. That this point is real we assume when we conceive a passive moment of capacity for feeling, as prior to the actual response. We have only to free this moment from its relation of passivity and conceive it as wholly active in order to achieve the notion of a self-active spring of emotional interest. That this concept is not completely attainable we again admit, but it supplies the point of approximation which renders the ascription of interest to the transcendent, intelligible and possible. In the case of will the problem is not so difficult. It is easy to select out of the relative agency of will the moment of self-determination and to conceive this as raised to the absolute. For we have only to regard the motives of will as becoming completely internal in order to see how complete self-determination may be realized. For absolute self-determination is not to be confounded with arbitrary or motiveless determination. In truth the self-determination of the absolute must rather be conceived as motived by the whole internal nature of the absolute, and as more completely motived, therefore, than is relative choice. Lastly, we may ask for the point of absoluteness in thought. Now the ordinary relative form of thought is that of the presentation or concept. The presentative function is largely passive and ascriptive, but it involves in it as a condition of its possibility, a moment of potency or latent initiative which has only to be raised to the point

of absoluteness in order to become an activity of free self-originating representation. The concept is less passive and more free from the outset. But we have seen that it involves, nevertheless, that point of coerciveness where it becomes passive and receptive. This is the character of ordinary relative thinking of the objective type. There is an *Anstoss* that overcomes its initiative and reduces it in a sense, to the position of a copyist. But there is in conception the moment of free initiative which only needs to be raised to the absolute by the method of approximation already indicated, in order to render the notion of absolute intellection intelligible as that of a function in which the conceptual activity is self-originative.

There is a difficulty here that may not have escaped the observant reader. We have seen that the transcendent is necessary in experience in order to reduce the unstable relative to stability. But here we seem to be freeing the transcendent from restriction and asserting for it an absolute freedom of initiative which would seem to threaten our whole world with a reign of caprice. But we have only to consider that what we have actually accomplished is the liberation of the absolute from the dominance of external motives, and that we have accomplished this not by abolishing motives but by rendering all motives internal. Spinoza conceives the infinite as acting from the internal necessity of its own nature. We reach a conclusion of the same type here when we assert the absolute freedom of intellection, feeling, and volition in the transcendent experience. What we do affirm, is the absolute's independence of external motives and its complete self-initiative and self-determination. Now when we undertake to determine what absolute self-initiative and self-determination involve, we find no other conception possible than that of an activity whose internal motivity is complete; that is, whose activity is the function of the whole internal motive, or of the internal nature as a whole, so that every act shall be completely and absolutely characteristic. The distinction between freedom and necessity lapses in the

absolute and that which is absolutely free is also that which is absolutely determined by internal nature. This being the case, it is clear that our apprehensions of a world of caprice are not well grounded. The absolutely free is the absolutely stable, and we have only to relate our principles to their springs in absolute nature in order to render them principles of the utmost stability.

It is clear, then, that the necessity of ascribing thought, feeling, and will to the transcendent has no counter necessity to oppose it. Is there, then, any further relative modification which must be removed in order to make this trinal concept of transcendent experience completely tenable? There is, no doubt, one to be found in the partial separation and conflict which may and do arise in our relative experience. Nothing is more common than the appearance of individuals in which either the volitional, intellectual, or emotional element predominates and yields as a result the practical, the intellectual, or the contemplative mystical type of mind. These variations are inevitable in a world of finite individualities. Again, in the same individual the emotional, intellectual, and volitional may not always harmonize. There may be a sense in which the finite nature will express itself in psychoses which will not be inclusive of the whole, and there may be and is, not uncommonly, such a thing as schismatic and divided individual experience. But it is clear that all this must be excluded from the absolute. The variations of individual experiences must be merged into the one complete experience, and whatever differences may survive must become internal, and the schismatic dualisms or trialisms of the finite experience must be conceived as transcended in the absolute nature. This being the case, we may ask what relation between thought, feeling, and will such transcendence involves, and the logic of the situation will lead us, I think, to this conclusion. *The internal unity and solidarity of transcendent experience carries with it the internal unity of its processes, intellectual, volitional, and emotional, and this internal unity conceived under the category*

of absoluteness involves the notion of thought, will, and feeling as moving along common channels, so that what is conceived is also loved and willed, and what is loved is also thought and willed.

This unity of the processes of transcendent experience is not to be conceived in a one-sided way as excluding the activity of negation but rather as including it. Royce takes the ground in his *Conception of God* that the power of conceiving the hypothetical opposite of what is realized cannot be denied to the absolute. The case for the negative admits, I think, of an even stronger statement than Royce gives to it. That the affirmative activities of thought, feeling, and will have their negative side, which is necessary as a means of determination, no one will dispute. But we have seen that what these relative activities lack is: (1) the power of complete self-determination to the true or good, and (2) a final criterion of the true and good in the exercises of the thinking, feeling, and willing functions. In order to raise these activities to the absolute we must conceive the removal of the limits to self-determination so that the determination of the transcendent shall inevitably embody the true and good. If, however, no discriminative insight were presupposed on the part of the absolute and its determination of the true and good were not supposed to be accompanied with some apprehension of their truth and goodness, the action of the transcendent would lose all rational and ethical character and would be more the action of a stone than that of a conscious agent. In order to preserve the type of activity which embodies itself in the psychic processes of thought, feeling, and will, we must include in its notion, negation and rejection as well as affirmation and appropriation. The activity of the absolute will not be capable of grounding the relative activities of experience at all if it does not have in it the root of the discrimination which makes these activities possible and intelligible. We have to consider, then, not whether the absolute must distinguish in some way the true and good from the bad or false, but rather what the form of

this discrimination may be. Now, from the very nature of the concept of the transcendent which we have reached, we will be precluded, it is clear, from supposing that the negative activity can be aroused by the presentation of anything that can be said to have independent reality of its own. All reality must be conceived as dependent and, therefore, as internal rather than external to the absolute. The absolute activities, so far forth as they terminate on realities at all, must find them internal and contained. It is evident, however, that in speaking of an absolute activity as terminating on things that are already real, we are missing the primal activity of the absolute which can be conceived, if at all, only as the *prius* of the reals on which it is supposed to terminate, and as, therefore, the spring of their being as reals. In the last analysis the question concerns the relation of the negative to this primal activity, and it is at this point that I think it becomes necessary to suppose that the act in which anything originates and becomes real will have a negative moment or aspect, in which the hypothetical opposite or inconsistent will be present in conception and will be negated in an act of judgment, as false, and in an act of will, as bad. To deny the presence of the false and bad as hypothetical possibilities in the primal intellections of the transcendent would be tantamount to denying to it any intellectual or volitional function at all. But the reasoning here proceeds on the supposition that these psychic functions are to be ascribed to the absolute, and the point at issue is whether the absolute can be conceived as exercising them in an affirmative and not also in a negative manner.

The primal activities of the transcendent will involve, then, the presentation of the bad and false as hypothetical possibilities, and their negation and rejection as such. This conclusion seems to carry with it the force of demonstration. Now, it is in this two-edged activity that we find the source of distinctions that are vital to the relative. If the realizing activity of the transcendent experience is accompanied

with the presentation and the rejection of the false and bad as hypothetical possibilities, then absolute determination of its own content as true and good, will not be the product of blindness but of intelligent insight and choice. And this being the case, the transcendent distinction between truth and falsehood, good and bad, which the relative demands, will rest in the last analysis on intelligent discriminating insight and choice. In other words, what the absolute judges and chooses as true and good, will be the ultimate truth and good, and what it judges and decides to be false and bad will be the ultimate falsehood and evil. The ultimate ground of the true and good are not to be found, therefore, either in abstract arbitrary will or in abstract intellection without will, but rather in that concrete activity of discriminating judgment and choice in which the absolute determines the content of its nature as at the same time real and true and good. Now, the plain man of our illustration having traced the distinction of the false and the true to its root in some transcendent nature will, if he carry his reflection far enough, be led to this formal question ; how such a distinction can be conceived as having its springs in such a nature, and his answer, if it be adequate and finally satisfactory, will include two steps. He will be led, in the first place, to see that such a root-distinction could arise only in an absolute experience, and this would lead, as the last and final step, to the conclusion that the primary activity of such an experience must be one in which an intelligent apprehension and choice of the true and good, involving the rejection of the false and bad, enters as an essential part of its nature.

The conclusions which we have reached in the preceding sections will shed some light, I think, on the relation which we will be led to conceive as subsisting between subject and object in the absolute experience. We have seen that this distinction is involved, in its germ at least, in the very notion of consciousness, and that it cannot be denied to the absolute. We cannot admit that this distinction lapses in the absolute

nature, inasmuch as we have found it impossible to conceive any nature as internally simple, while the beginning of complexity marks the rise of this fundamental distinction. We do not mean at this point, however, to re-argue that question, but, assuming it to be settled, to ask how the distinction is possible in an absolute experience. Let us first consider the form which it takes in our own relative experience. We have seen that the subject in our experience becomes conscious of itself as a *socius*, that is as one of a fellowship of co-existing and interacting individuals. Again, we have seen that the objective content of our experience in general defines itself in individual forms. The individuating activity seems to be everywhere essential, but the special feature of these individualities, which determines our experience as relative, is that, in the last analysis, they assert their independence, and our attitude toward them becomes passive and receptive. Now, in view of these characteristics of the relative we may say, in the first place, that the transcendent subject cannot be conceived as a *socius*. The absolute has no fellow. This is involved in the very notion of absolute-ness or unmodified and independent agency. I do not mean by this that internal distinctions may not be possible in the nature of the absolute which will supply an adequate ground for a plurality of personal manifestations. But the contention here is that the distinctions must be internal rather than external, and that the plurality of personal manifestations must be consistent with the individual unity of the absolute nature. The absolute can have no fellow in any sense that would involve modified agency. Again, it would be impossible to conceive the content of absolute experience as presenting individuals that would be in any sense independent of the activity by which they are posited. The notion of absolute experience does not exclude individuals. We have seen that the objective content of our own experience is reducible, in the last analysis, to individual forms, and that the point of relativity arises in the fact that our posits are not absolutely creative but rather receptive and

reproductive. This is the modification that must be removed from the individuals of our experience in order that the individual of absolute experience may be conceived. There is involved, not the suppression of the individual, but the elimination of coerciveness, so that the individual becomes the out and out posit of absolute activity. This reduces the individual to a relation of dependence on the experience in which it is realized, not only for its relative realization but for its origination. The individuals of the absolute experience are to be regarded, then, as more completely internal and dependent than the individuals of our relative experience. But the point of difference involves, not their individuality, but their externality and independence. That the activity of experience should express itself in individual forms is, we are convinced, necessarily involved in the notion of experience itself, and, in the last analysis, no other deduction of the individual is either possible or necessary.

Let us dwell a moment longer on this point as it involves a consideration of fundamental importance. There have been two opposing tendencies in philosophical thinking which have marked it from the beginning: the one a tendency to suppress the individual in the interests of the universal; the other a tendency in the opposite direction, to the suppression of the universal in the interests of the individual. The result is that philosophy has been presenting us with two different types of world: the one a world in which the individual exists by mere sufferance, the other a system in which the individual monopolizes everything and the universal has no recognized *status*, and we are left to choose between them or to mix them together as best we may. Now I think it will be evident that the only way to transcend this dualism of contradictory conceptions is through the adoption of the concept of an individuating experience; for, if it is found that experience is individuating in the very constitution of its activities, we may universalize our concept of experience without impairing the status of our individuals. That the

individuating activity is fundamental, our whole analysis of the experience-processes teaches, for we find everywhere at the heart of things that positive function which is individual and individuating in its essence. No wonder then that our world becomes a world of individuals, and that being everywhere tends to take the individual form. What other form could it conceivably take? Admitting this, we are able to see that the universal does not involve the transcendence of individuality, but the reduction of the plurality of individuals to the unity of dependence on some common activity, and it will be apparent that this activity itself may not be conceived as transcending individuality, but rather as absolved from the dependence and modified agency of the relative. The individuating quality of the experience-activity thus survives and peoples the absolute world with individuals. In fact, when we recognize those special features of relativity which must be removed from the individuals of our experience in order to reach the conception of the individual of an absolute experience, we are not left in doubt as to the security of the individual in its relation to the absolute. The fact that individuals cannot be external and independent in their relation to the absolute arises from the nature of absolute experience in which all world-content must be internal and dependent. But let us admit this in connection with the insight that the activity of absolute experience is individuating in its nature. It will then become apparent that the true ground of individuality is to be found in the activity of absolute experience. We have seen how the freedom of the absolute is identical with necessity: that is, with the requirement of its whole nature, and is therefore a principle of stability rather than of caprice, and here a similar conclusion is reached respecting individuality. If the activity of absolute experience is individuating in its nature, then it is true that we find the ultimate ground of the individual in the absolute. In the relative sphere the individual, though so fundamental, presents the appearance of instability. Nature seems to be constantly producing individuals in order

to recklessly sacrifice them until we are tempted to believe that the individual is not an end but simply an expedient which serves a temporary purpose and possesses no further value. The same kind of a difficulty arises here as that which troubled our plain man in his reflection on truth and falsehood. The instability of the relative led his reflection to a final anchor in the nature of the absolute, just as ours here leads us to the same goal. For if we are in doubt as to whether the individual is a mere accident or a well-grounded reality, we have only to discover the individuating activity in our own experience and follow this as a clue to its source in the nature of the transcendent. There we will find its ground in the individuating activity of the absolute, and, if the completed inclusion and dependence of individuals in their relation to the absolute might seem to us to militate against their stability, we have only to reflect that the free activity of the absolute is simply the necessary expression of the whole nature of the absolute, and that the absolute's posit of the individual has the whole unitary force of the absolute nature behind it. What better security could be conceived or demanded ?

We have determined the concept of transcendent experience far enough, I think, to enable us to reach some conclusion as to its bearing on the ultimate relations of the true and the good. We have already found reasons for concluding that the absolute nature must be internally harmonious so that what is thought as true shall be willed and loved as good, while that which is willed and loved as good will be intuited by the intellect as essentially true. The spheres of the good and true thus tend to coincide, and, in fact, must coincide to an extent that will justify the affirmations that nothing that is essential to the realization of the good can be conceived as resting on an outside limbo of theoretic falsehood ; or that nothing that is theoretically true can be practically bad or evil. The truth of these affirmations follows from the concept of transcendent experience which we have developed. Now, in the preceding

chapter we have found that in the sphere of our own finite and relative experience we cannot assume the identity of the true and the good, except under very rigid restrictions. That a thing is of practical worth may not ordinarily be taken as a sufficient guarantee of its theoretic truth. But we saw that there is at least one species of practical judgment which carries with it the force of positive knowledge, while in other cases it may supply justifiable grounds for a necessary belief. Taking the extreme case we find that where the denial of the practical demand amounts to the overthrow of the rationality of our world and the reduction of it to chaos, in that case the theoretic truth of the content of the practical judgment is guaranteed beyond the possibility of cavil. And we saw that the principle on which the theoretic truth of such judgments is asserted rests ultimately on the conviction that in the last analysis the concepts of the good and the true are completely harmonious, so that what is fundamentally good will also be theoretically true. We were forced to leave this statement in a large measure unsupported because, as is now evident, the proof of it involved the considerations of the present chapter. Having reached our present point, however, in the development of the concept of transcendent experience it is possible to trace the conviction of which we have spoken to its true ground. It is simply one of these fundamental affirmations which arise in connection with our consciousness of the transcendent, and it is in reality a judgment which is unconditionally true only in the transcendent experience. It embodies the concept of an experience in which every act will be a function of the inner nature as a whole, and which, therefore, will be valid for the will and feeling as well as for the intellect. The notion of such an experience is necessary to the grounding of the conviction that in the last analysis such a relation subsists between the good and true as will justify us in the denial that any ultimate inconsistency can arise between them.

Moreover, we find in this notion of transcendent experi-

ence the ultimate ground of our concept of rationality. We have found this concept obtruding itself into our reflections and asserting itself at various points as a final consideration. In the chapter on the aesthetic consciousness, in the middle section of this book, the result of our analysis served to show that the principle of rationality arises in view of the whole of our experience expressing itself in its unity. Whatever presentational or conceptual content proves itself to be congruous with the whole of experience is accepted as rational and is integrated with the true body of experience-content. The principle of rationality was seen to be the last and highest criterion of the true and the false, and the embodiment, therefore, of the highest expression of the demand of sufficient reason. But it is clear that the principle of rationality itself only possesses relative value so long as we regard it simply as a product of our own finite experience. It does not enable us to transcend the instability of our knowledge in general. We cannot be sure, in fact, that what may seem rational to any finite experience will, in fact, be rational, or that different individuals may not adopt conflicting standards of rationality. It is clear, however, that any appeal to reason is nugatory if reason may in the last resort be in conflict with itself. There must be some court before which our antinomies may be adjudicated and resolved, and no other tribunal is conceivable that could in any sense be regarded as final, except that of absolute experience. The rationality to which we appeal is not any relative form of reason, but that reason which expresses the unity of an absolute experience, and the fact that such is the nature of our appeal is betrayed whenever we are called on to show that anything is rational rather than irrational. We find ourselves unable to refute the proposition that the distinction between the rational and the irrational is, in the last analysis, conventional and unreal, so long as we confine ourselves to the notion of a relative experience, inasmuch as here final antinomy and conflict are possible. But the concept of an absolute experience supplies us with the

grounding which our principle needs in order to give it final and real validity.

The preceding discussion will be sufficient, I think, to demonstrate the incompatibility of the notion of experience with that of the internal simplicity of being. That the absolute is to be conceived under the notion of transcendent experience is what I am contending for here, but that such a conception of its nature is wholly inconsistent with the internal simplicity of being, in its last analysis, will be obvious. The very possibility of experience rests on the notion of certain internal distinctions, and the conclusion is absolutely coercive that if we postulate the internal simplicity of being we must give up the notion of experience.

Not even the logical ingenuity of a Bradley could avoid this dilemma. The notion of experience involves complexity of nature, and if we propose to identify the absolute nature with experience we must accept the logical consequences and admit the internal complexity of its nature. But internal complexity, as we have seen, supplies the principle of a true phenomenal expression. If, then, we find reasons on one hand for grounding the phenomenal and relative in an absolute experience, the inner complexity of the absolute supplies on the other hand the guarantee that the phenomenal and relative shall not be mere *Schien* or illusion, but a true expression of the nature in which it is grounded.

CHAPTER V.

THE TRANSCENDENT OBJECT [COSMOLOGY].

IN the Kantian cosmology we find that Kant's method is to take the categories for which he has demonstrated an empirical use and applying them transcendently, to show that it is possible to demonstrate of the world so conceived, two sets of opposite and incompatible predicates. For example, he argues that if we take the space and time world to be a thing in itself—that is, a transcendent object—we may prove to our satisfaction that it is both limited and unlimited in space, and has a beginning and is beginningless in time. We may also prove that it is infinitely divisible, and that there is some final limit of divisibility, and so on. We do not need to dwell on this ingenious reasoning, which might possibly be found to be intrinsically unsound; for Kant has himself pointed to the true way out of his difficulties in the contention that the world be not conceived transcendently, but as an object of experience. Inasmuch as transcendent in Kant's terminology is used as a designation for the ultra-experiential, or that which transcends the concept of experience, we are prepared to follow the Kantian suggestion, and endeavour to show how a cosmology that will be free from internal contradiction can be developed on the basis of a transcendent experience.

In the Kantian doctrine the categories themselves are conceived to be ultra-empirical in their origin and nature,

but as having legitimately only an intra-experiential use. We have endeavoured to reform this position by showing that the categories are intra-experiential in their roots as well as in their functions, and that the only sense in which a transcendent use could be asserted for them would be in relation to some form of experience that transcends our relative and finite experience. From this modified standpoint we will be justified, I think, in spending a little time in the effort to determine whether the logic of the categories involves the elimination of the transcendent, or simply an altered conception of it that will bring it into harmony with the notion of experience. The first two groups of categories which Kant designates mathematical, and which we have shown to be constitutive of the quantitative consciousness, are primarily those of space and time, out of the reflective activity of which arise the principles and concepts of mathematical thinking. Now, we have shown in the discussions of the second part of this book how space and time arise as formal determinations of content in the experience-process, and this ground need not be again traversed. What we wish to bring out in this connection may be stated under two propositions—(1) that the exposition given there, may be taken as an exhibition of the fact that space and time are forms or, as we may say, functions of a developing experience, and that in their origin and nature they are, therefore, completely experiential; (2) that this, so far from carrying with it the conclusion that these categories are therefore in their scope and implication, purely relative and finite, is in fact consistent with the notion of transcendence. The first proposition may be accepted on the basis of the preceding analysis without further debate, and we may go straight to the consideration of the transcendent implication of space and time. Now, reverting to the former analysis, we have found that the experience of both space and time is traceable back to a point of departure where these categories are transcended; I mean a point of dimensionless activity, in which the space and

time posits are made. This is true of both presentational and conceptual space and time. The initiative of both must be assumed to be dimensionless, and we have the intuition here of the dimensional originating in the dimensionless, on the one hand, and on the other, the dimensionless becoming dimensional in its very first outgo. But that the dimensionless point is itself an experience is evident when we reflect upon it, for it is reducible to a formal pulsation of consciousness individuating itself in a dimensional form. It would seem then that in the point of space and time origination, we become consciously aware of two things—(1) of being's transcendence of space and time determinations, and (2) of the necessity that dimensional determination should express itself spatially and temporally. We strike the point of transcendence here on the subjective side. Objectively the situation is very much the same. Space and time as categories are formal definitions of content, but if we take the notion of objective content, that of matter say, and follow its analysis far enough, we will reach a point where the persistence in dimensional determination will involve contradiction. What is matter in its ultimate constitution? The effort to conceive this leads to a point where we are obliged to drop the notion of dimension, and regard the primary matter as dimensionless. We may attempt this by translating our concept of matter into that of force, but here the difficulty of time-dimension will arise, and we will find it necessary to track being to its lair in a moment of self-origination, which is the logical *prius* of activity in time.

When we consider the significance of this we find that the notion of the dimensional leads necessarily to the point of its own transcendence, and that it is necessary to suppose that dimensionless reality is the *prius* of dimensional experience. But when we ask whether this transcendence of dimensional experience involves the transcendence of experience itself, we are led to see that this is impossible. The activity which defines the dimensional

content can be nothing but a posit of the subject in experience, while the moment of dimensional transcendence objectively considered, is simply the point where dimensional determination has its beginning, and in which matter of reality is still presupposed. It involves, therefore, transcendence of dimensional experience, but not transcendence of experience as such, for, as we find on further reflection, the presupposed real persists as experience-content, and in fact utterly refuses to be separated from the primal experience-activities in their springs. The doctrine maintained here that the transcendence of dimensional experience does not involve the transcendence of all experience, is consistent with the principles of mathematical thinking, as well as with their utmost application. Mathematical thinking, as we know, is an activity of dimensional determination. It is always defining things under quantitative categories and relations. But the mathematician knows better than any one, no doubt, that his starting points in this dimensional activity are themselves dimensionless. The dimensional always in the last analysis, strikes a point of transcendence where the dimensionless must be presupposed. This does not, however, involve any real limit to mathematical reflection, for the mathematician has only to conceive his categories and principles as intra-experiential in order to perceive that there can be no internal limit to the scope of his operations. I mean by this, that if the mathematician does not embroil himself with the claim that in the last analysis there is no other way of conceiving being than the dimensional, and if he is willing to regard the universe of mathematics as intra-experiential, no assignable limit can be fixed to the business of dimensional reflection.

If we pass from the mathematical categories to those of the dynamic consciousness, we find that the main considerations here are two, involving the question of agency and that of necessary being. The question of agency is that of the dynamic categories: cause, substance, and community.

We find in this connection that Kant's procedure is not quite identical with the method followed in treating the mathematical categories. Assuming the intra-experiential function of the dynamic categories his contention here is that within experience they must be conceived as without limit, and as exclusive of all other forms of agency. But he is willing to admit the possibility of a sphere transcending the world of experience in which forms of agency transcending the category-types, may prevail. This concession impairs the force of the antinomies which he had developed in connection with the notions of freedom and of necessary being transcending the sphere of contingency. But we may for the present neglect this consideration and confine our attention to the main situation as Kant conceives it. Here, as we have seen, Kant's contention is that within experience the categories are exclusive of all other types of agency, while any implications which they may have of any higher form of agency will lead to the transcendence of experience into a region where the categories of experience are, therefore, inapplicable. In this region absolved from the "carking cares" of this sublunary sphere, freedom, for example, may disport itself and enjoy all the tranquillity of the gods of Epicurus. Now, there is one criticism on Kant's procedure here that it is important to make, and that concerns his failure to develop a psychological doctrine of the agency of the self in experience, as a basis for his discussion of freedom. The failure to do this not only renders the cosmological discussion unnecessarily vague, but also precludes the possibility of reaching any positive notion of what is involved in freedom. The result is that the freedom which Kant is willing to admit as a possibility, is wholly indeterminate, and amounts in the last analysis to the notion of something that we do not possess, and the nature of which we cannot imagine. I do not say that Kant leaves the concept of freedom finally in this undefined state, but in his cosmology the notion is wholly vague and indeterminate.

Passing over this difficulty, however, and confining our attention to cosmological considerations, we find Kant maintaining that the form of determined and dependent agency expressed in the dynamic categories has no transcendent implication which is not also ultra-experiential, and, therefore, beyond the scope of determination, either as to its reality or its nature. It is only necessary, however, to consider what form the dynamic agency takes in the last analysis, in order to see that such a conclusion cannot be maintained. The objective world is resolvable, as we have seen, into a community of interacting individuals, which we may designate either things or in terms of the elemental forces or atoms which they imply. These interacting terms are mutually modifying, and we have seen that ultimately the modifying function must be conceived as operating internally so that the agency of any individual in the group will be an activity into which the agency of the other will have entered and become internal. This, in the last analysis, is what we mean by conditioned activity. It is activity into which the determining influence of the other enters as an essential moment. Again, we have seen that conceiving the world from the point of view of substance, or matter, or force, or any of the terms which science uses to designate the ultimate in its operations, it presents an aspect of coerciveness and inevitability that not only evinces the relativity of our conceptions, but also the necessity of presupposing something that is absolved from the limitations which they impose. In other words, our concepts of the ultimate constitution of our world all involve a point of transcendence and the presupposition of some non-relative ground of relativity. We reach then, as the last terms of our relative experience, the notions of conditioned activity and dependent being, and the question here is whether the transcendent implications of these will lead to the postulate of an absolute that transcends experience, or rather, to the affirmation of absolute experience. Kant takes the former alternative. But we have only to analyze the situation as it presents

itself in order to be convinced that the latter presents the more tenable position. Conditioned activity, as we saw, is activity that is modified by its other. It has in it, however, the moment of self-initiative, which, could it get full and unimpeded expression, would express truly the freedom of unconditioned activity, and we have only to conceive this moment as freed from its limitations in order to reach the notion of a self-initiating, self-determining activity. And it is clear that such an activity, arrived at in the way indicated, would be the function of an absolute experience. A similar result follows from the examination of the second notion: that of dependent being. That being is dependent means in the last resort that there is some other being in relation to which it is compelled to be passive and receptive. This other being will then possess the active originative function, the lack of which renders itself relative. When we consider dependent being, however, we do not find its dependence pure and unqualified. The truth is that the notion of dependence is essentially a qualified conception. The dependent can be conceived as dependent only in proportion as the initiative that must be in it is forced to lapse into passivity in presence of the agency of another. In this case the other is a transcendent other, but we will not need to argue at length here that the concept of the agency of this other is to be reached by conceiving the initiative that is in the dependent to be freed from its modification and given full unimpeded scope. The transcendent thus realizes itself in a free activity whose potential germ is contained in the relative experience.

The conclusion that we draw from this is that the categories of the dynamic consciousness do truly involve transcendence, but not a transcendence of the concept of experience. The points of transcendence are terms within experience which are made relative by the modifications of other agencies, and we have only to conceive the removal of the conditions of these modifications in order to reach the notion of an absolute experience in which these transcendent

functions shall be normal. The bearing of the conclusion arrived at here on the problems of freedom and necessary being, cosmologically considered, is clear enough. The doctrine of cosmological freedom is, stated broadly, the proposition that somewhere either in the world or out of it there is unconditioned activity or absolutely free self-initiative. Kant admitted the possibility of this in some hypothetical sphere outside of the world, but denied it a place in the world of experience. We, however, demand a reconstruction of the notion of experience such as will render it large enough to include both the relative and the absolute, and we affirm that in this broader concept of experience and of the experience-world, must be included the absolutely free self-initiative which we call freedom. We contend, moreover, that this cosmological freedom is an absolutely indispensable term in our world, being necessary in order to ground the relative processes and to render them either conceivable or possible. The doctrine of cosmological necessity, stated in equally broad terms, is that either in the world or out of it there is an absolutely necessary being; that is a being whose activities are all self-moved and free from passivity and dependence on other, a being, therefore, whose activities are all strictly self-determined by the inner necessity of its own nature. Kant was willing to concede the possibility of such a being outside of the world, but denied it a place in any scheme of actual or possible experience. We contend, however, that the concept of experience must be made all-inclusive and that it must contain necessary as well as contingent being. For we have seen that the notion of contingency or dependence on other is impossible without clothing the dependent individual with a potentiality of inner self-origination that has been reduced to passivity by the conditions of its relative existence. And in this connection also we maintain that the cosmological postulate of a necessary being is indispensable to the world of relativity as the only principle that is able to reduce it to the stability required in an object of knowledge.

Let us proceed then to the determination of the transcendent object of cosmology, so far as this may be possible. Let us start first with the concept of energy or that of the world-forces operating under the category of time. This will give us in general the notion of a world-process or world-evolution in time. The question here is whether the notion of evolution as a process in time can be taken as final. Is the notion of a world-stream which generates and completes everything, an absolutely final conception? I am not here calling in question at all the fact of evolution, for I believe in it as one aspect of the real, and I am ready to believe that in the sphere of production it is supreme. It is a different question, however, when we ask whether cosmology can ground itself in the concept of evolution. This is equivalent to asking whether time itself and the series of conditioned changes in time, can be regarded as ultimate. Now, as to time itself, I shall not repeat again what has been said more than once before, but shall content myself with pointing to the timeless presupposition of time in order to show that in time we strike nothing final. It is impossible to reach any final construct of experience that does not involve the transcendence of time. The notion of time supplies us with a genetic form for the conception of a process of generation, but holds in it no final concept of reality. Let us then consider the other notion, that of a series of conditional changes. It is clear that we have a whole nest of conceptions here requiring analysis. What about the change-series, and what about the notion of the conditioned? We have seen that a change-series is not conceivable unless it be connected with persistent points of initiative which ground the changes and render them intelligible. In other words, change is not conceivable at all as something which ranges itself into a series like the links of a chain. It is only conceivable as the internal modification of some nature which has the principle of persistent individuality in it. This being the case, it is evident that the conditioned change-series must be reducible to the world of individuals, inasmuch as it is

only in the notion of an individual that any permanence can be realized. The notion of a change-series must, it is evident, be translated into a phenomenon of individuals of which the changes are internal modifications. Now, in relation to the world of finite individuals conceived in time, we have to ask (1) how far the notion of time is adequate to explain the individual series, and how, if at all, is it transcendent? (2) What are the implications of the notion of a conditioned series?

The first question involves, of course, the point which we have already considered, as to whether the category of time can be taken as a final construction of reality, and the negative answer to that question is here assumed. But the special point in this question as put above is whether any series or system of things can be conceived as absolutely beginning, that is, absolutely contained in time. We may, as Royce suggests in his ingenious reflection,¹ conceive a cycle of being in which there is a self-contained system of movements that are eternally repeating themselves, and there might seem to be no contradiction in supposing this to be completely contained in time. If, however, our system be conceived as completely self-contained, it could not be maintained without contradiction that it could be wholly contained in time. The supposition that it could would involve the assumption of an absolute time prior to all content of time, and, in fact, prior to all reality whatever. At this stage of our procedure it is not necessary to argue the untenability of such an assumption. Now, if we cannot regard time as absolute it must be conceived as the form of a series of changes, and this series will have no assignable limits. I mean that the attempt to think the real under the category of time inevitably drives us out in an endless regress on the one hand, and in an endless progress on the other. The real in time takes the form of an unending series, and the question here is whether this endless series gives us an adequate concept of the real or whether there is not some-

¹ *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 323-36.

where a point of necessary transcendence. Let us ask the question, then, why it should be necessary to push our thoughts along this limitless chain of progressive or regressive links ? and the answer is that we find neither the beginning nor the end of being in time. It is not time that forces the endless series, but rather the real in time, which in its beginning, its first initiative, transcends every moment of time, so that every moment necessarily refers back to a preceding moment, which also says, the beginning of the matter is not in me. There can be no end to this process, inasmuch as the transcending point of one moment of time is the transcending point of time in general, and endless time is no more capable than is the smallest moment of finite time, of grasping the initiative of the real. There can be no absolute beginning in time. Nor can there be an end in time. The real is going on to some goal, and the spring of the protensive movement is in the nature of being and not in time. The beginning of things is the self-initiative of being, which in its nature transcends the notion of time. The end can be nothing else than the ideal of self-completion, to which the real is tending. Why should there be an onward flow of time ?—not because of any necessity contained in the notion of time, but because the real chooses to go on. Why, then, does the choice of the real to go on involve its refusal to be satisfied with any assignable limit of the time series ? Simply because the notion of end is like that of beginning, it is transcendent of any moment of time, and is therefore transcendent of the whole time-series. The forward moving series becomes necessary in view of the fact that to any assignable time limit the notion of end is transcendent. In both its beginning and its end, therefore, the world content will transcend the time-series.

We have seen how the world of reality transcends the time-series as respects both its beginning and its end. The time-series is nothing absolute. It does not include the springs of being, nor, in the last analysis, the destiny of being. If, however, we assume the moment of beginning, of

self-initiative, the whole history of being, in so far as it manifests itself under the categories of growth and development, will belong to the time-series. Time is necessary in order to afford scope for change and movement, and wherever the world takes the form of progressive change, there time and the time-series become indispensable. When we ask why it should be indispensable, we find that we are again sent to the *real* in time, and not to time itself, for the answer. The initiative of motion is in the real, not in time, and we find that in the last analysis the time-series is necessary because the real has taken the form of the conditioned series of changing parts. In short, we find ourselves on the relative side of things, where the conditional series is fundamental. We are thus led to our *second* problem, that of the implications of the notion of a conditioned series in time. Now, it is evident that the notion of evolution rests on that of the conditioned series in time, and the question here in reality is how far the concept of evolution is adequate to the real, and in what respect, if any, it involves the transcendent. Reverting to the consideration of time, it is clear that what we are interested to know here is how far the concept of evolution may be considered self-sufficient, and in what sense, if at all, it implies the transcendent. The notion of evolution is that of the development of being, in and through a conditioned series; that is, a series of stages, each of which is conceived to be dependent on some preceding stage. The central thought in evolution, therefore, is that of a progressive causal series in time. If, then, we assume a beginning at any point; that is, if we assume that any set of conditions contains in them the point of self-origination which we have seen to be necessary, we may then represent as possible a progressive series in time, each stage of which will develop out of the preceding. But the validity of the whole representation will depend on the assumption made at the outset, some stage in which the absolute initiative is supposed to have been present, because without this assumption

tion no initiative of a series of changes can be conceived as possible. Let us take, as an illustration of this, the principle of Mr. Herbert Spencer and his school of evolutionists, according to which the evolution process is traced back to a point at which the matter and motion of the universe are conceived to be in a state of absolute homogeneity. No distinction has arisen in the diffused mass, and no positive tendency to differentiate or aggregate is as yet predictable of it. It is true that Mr. Spencer points to what is termed the instability of the homogeneous as a negative cause of the processes which are set up in evolution. But as he represents it, this instability means simply a condition of rest that is very easily disturbed, so that only a very little cause is needed to do the business. The vital point, however, is that this very little cause has not been provided for in the homogeneous mass. It lies there motionless and without positive tendency, and is by hypothesis the whole universe. There is no reason in the mass itself why any change series should be set up, and we can only wring our hands and pray that the very smallest accident possible may happen in order to break the deadlock. It is plain, however, that if anything does happen it will be a rank miracle, and not includable in the homogeneous conditions of the universe.

When we seek for the root-difficulty in such a conception, we find that it amounts to the assumption of the absoluteness of some term in the series of causal conditions in time. If, however, we are justified in assuming the absoluteness of any term, we are for precisely the same reasons justified in assuming the absoluteness of all the terms in the series. This will appear if we consider that the state of homogeneity or any other state must be thought in connection with preceding states, and these will either be states in which something has happened or they will be states in which nothing has happened. On the latter supposition being will have remained stationary while time moves on, which is absurd. But the former supposition

simply connects the homogeneous mass with antecedent conditions out of which it grew, and it can no longer be taken as the *prius* of the evolution process. Here, I think, the real nature of the difficulty will be revealed. What the evolution process requires, in order that it may be rationally grounded, is an *absolute prius* which transcends the process as such, and which when postulated so conditions the series as a whole and every point in it, that its origin and progressive movement become not only conceivable but rational. We regard it as a true insight that leads Mr. Spencer to rest the whole sphere of the evolutionary on the postulate of an absolute reality, and our dissatisfaction with the doctrine at this point arises from what is manifestly a failure to realize the true point of connection between the relative process and its transcendent ground. If the evolution-process is one of condensation or, as Clifford says, "the falling together of the masses and becoming solid," the reverse of this process will be one of diffusion, and it will be possible to follow it back in thought to any assignable limit, in fact, to conceive the process as infinite. But it is to be observed that in so doing we are not following a real process, but the reversal of one, and in the second place it is impossible for us to say that the process we have been conceiving is not purely imaginary. If the masses have been falling together, then it is true that to conceive a reversal of this process will enable us, not to hit upon any real process of things, but rather to conceive the conditions regressively out of which the evolution movement has proceeded. All that this justifies us in saying unconditionally, is that evolution always presupposes some condition of things as its antecedent, and that this antecedent condition will represent a state of relatively greater diffusion. But we cannot carry this out into infinity and say that there ever was a time when the molecules were at an infinite distance and moving toward one another, for in the first place the notion is contradictory as it involves the supposition of a preceding

time when the molecules were still further apart, that is, a little more than an infinite distance apart, and in the second place the supposition has no ground of necessity, inasmuch as it is not necessary to suppose that the process of falling together and becoming solid has itself filled infinite time. The fact that the tendency of the material universe is thus to run down until it reaches a state where matter has been completely integrated, while energy has been completely dissipated, would rather bear out the supposition that any material system will come to a point where the initiative of a new order of things will be necessary, and that, therefore, it is likely that the present system had a beginning in time, and is finite. It is more reasonable to suppose this than to endeavour to connect an infinite past time of consolidation with an infinite future of dissolution. The difficulty involved in conceiving any material system to be infinite has led in both ancient and modern times to the substitution of the notion of cycles for that of the straightforward evolution and dissolution of things. Heracleitus and the Stoics postulate the fiery cycle which is constantly repeating itself in a ceaseless round of development and decay, and Mr. Spencer has reinstated the same notion in his doctrine of evolution and dissolution. The truth is, the notion of a cyclic process of evolution and decay has its chief merit in the fact that it removes the strain from the present system of things by enabling us to regard it as a finite process in time which has had a beginning, and will come to an end. This is a great gain, but the cyclic conception has its own difficulties if we attempt to conceive it as absolute and self-sufficient. It enables us to regard all material systems as finite by postulating a series of relative starting-points for movements. But each one of these starting-points involves the same difficulty as the one starting-point of the concept which it displaces. If we attempt to regard it as absolute we involve ourselves in a self-contradiction, whereas, if it is only relative, then it follows that the whole cyclic process

is relative. Nowhere in the cyclic process do we transcend the notion of a conditioned causal series in time.

Now, the impossibility of conceiving any process of development as other than a conditioned causal series in time, establishes the complete relativity of the notion of evolution in general, and the impossibility of regarding the evolutionary aspect of the world as final. The notion of development is one that we have found to be limited on the side of time and limited on the side of process. The world of evolution is a world of temporal conditions and phenomena. It nowhere holds its own initiative in itself, and at no point is it self-explanatory. In its beginning and at every stage of its progress it involves the point of transcendence, and we may now consider briefly the question as to how this point of transcendence manifests itself in our world. We have seen that the world-content is resolvable, in the last analysis, into individual forms. The world is constituted of its individualities, and the world-series is a series of individuals. If, now, we postulate the germs of individuality it will be possible to show how in the evolution process the growth of the individual is conserved and carried on. Physics and chemistry show us how the elements combine to form the inorganic world. Biology shows us how the living organism develops, and genetic Psychology gives us a natural history of the life of the soul. What each in turn is obliged to assume is the type of individual with which he is to deal, the chemist, his atom, the physicist, his force-centre, the biologist, his centre of organic life, and the psychologist, his point of conscious activity. If these be assumed the naturalistic process becomes possible, and the scientific book of genesis may be written. But in these assumptions the necessity of a transcendent grounding of the natural processes has been acknowledged, and when we imagine what kind of transcendence is involved we find that the points of transcendence in connection with the individualities of the series are unable to originate the individual norms or types of reality with which they build up their processes. But

these norms of individuality must be conceived as given in these moments of self-origination which, as we have seen in another connection, are necessary to the grounding of the relative in general. The individual type of real which in each sphere of organization is central in its characteristic activity, is precisely that which must be accepted in relation to the process in this sphere as a transcendent term.

We come now to the deeper aspect of the world which presents itself under the categories of cause and substance. The connection of cause with the temporal series falls under the general concept of evolution. But the world presents a deeper aspect to which science must penetrate in order to ground its processes. From this deeper point of view the world presents itself as an interacting plurality of individual substances, atoms or force centres. We have seen how the notion of community, or the interaction of a plurality of individual causal agents leads to the substitution of the notion of internal modification for that of external mechanical impact, and the point of special interest here is the question of the construction that, in the last analysis, must be put upon this kind of agency. It has been shown that the mutual internal modification of *a* and *b* involves the necessity of *a* and *b* becoming in some sense mutually internal and comprehended of one another. And in general it is true that the mutual modifiability of terms rests on the possibility of this act of internalizing by means of which one term is able to comprehend another and include it in its own causation.

When we make the effort to conceive what such agency must be in its internal nature, we find that there is only one model that is at all adequate, and that is the type of interaction that is exemplified in our own experience. In order to be internally modified by another, the other must be included and comprehended in some way in our own conscious life. Now, this comprehension may take place in an act of feeling, but we have seen that feeling involves presentative and conceptual elements. A feeling cannot be conceived as cognitively blind. In fact, the power of feeling

to include its other is a function of its cognitive character. Our own power of interaction thus depends, in the last analysis, on our ability to represent the other and its activity in presentative or conceptual terms. If I am to be internally influenced and modified by Richard Roe it will be because I am able to make some internal representation of Richard Roe and his agency, for no direct external interchange is thinkable. The reduction of the objective agency of the world to this form will carry with it the same necessity. The moment we transcend the notion of mere external impact, which we have found to be only relatively valid, we are in the sphere of agency that is intelligible only when we ascribe to our terms something analogous to our own conceiving activity. The *a*'s and *b*'s in order to be internally and mutually modifiable, must have some power of including one another in a concept so that *a* will determine *b* through the notion of *a* or his agency which he is able to form, and this may be generalized so as to apply to the whole world of objective agency. The result will be that the objective activity or rather, interactivity of things will have to be referred ultimately to some form of activity analogous to conception, and the application to this notion of the category of unity under which we find it necessary to reduce the plurality of our world to unity we will find that, in the last analysis, it is necessary to refer the plural activities of our world to some unitary comprehending activity analogous to that of conception, as their ground.

Let us, then, attempt to correlate the two aspects of our world. We have found that the attempt to represent the world as a conditioned causal series in time under the notion of evolution, is only successful when we recognize the relativity of the evolutionary aspect of things and its dependence on something transcendent. The necessity of the transcendent appears from the analysis of both time and the concept of causal development in time. We find the notion of the series essentially relative, and it has been made to appear that the points where the world concept

transcends that of evolution in time are the points where it asserts its individual and individuating activity. The resolution of the world into a plurality of coexisting individuals marks a deeper aspect of the real than that which is presented in the concept of evolution. We are thus led necessarily to the deeper aspect of the world in which its agencies become interacting individuals, and the notion of external causation has to be given up for that of internal influence. The logical outcome of this deeper view of the world, as we saw, is the final reference of the activities of the world to a unitary and comprehending agency analogous to that of conception. Now, the notion of substance as we find it in our world involves, as we have seen, the necessity of a transcending self-initiating activity as the persistent ground of the relative, and when we bring this conclusion into relation with the conclusion reached here, that the world-activities are ultimately referable to some unitary and comprehending agency analogous to that of conception, the two fall together into a concept of a self-active agency analogous to conception, as the transcendent and necessary ground of the relative activities of the world.

This brings us to a point where it will be possible to formulate what may be called the ultimate postulate of cosmology. In the second book of this treatise we endeavoured to show how the doctrine of the categories leads to the formulation of the ground-principles of construction in the mathematical and dynamical sciences. Again, in the chapter on the *Transcendent as Experience* in this third book we endeavoured to show how the principles of science lead, in the last analysis, to the postulate of something transcendent as the indispensable ground of their own procedure. This conclusion has cleared the ground for the discussions of the present chapter which have led to a further vindication and a further determination of this transcendent ground. We have found that the notion of objective activity, or agency, leads necessarily to the conclusion that the relative processes of the world are nowhere

self-sufficient, that they are nowhere able to comprehend the ground of their own activity but at every point relate themselves to a deeper and transcendent ground. And we have found reason for affirming that the cosmology of the world can be rationally grounded only in the *postulate of a self-initiating and unitary activity at the basis of its processes, analogous to the activity of conception.*

CHAPTER VI.

THE TRANSCENDENT SUBJECT [PSYCHO-THEOLOGY].

IN the development of his metaphysical conceptions Kant found it necessary to separate rational psychology in its grounds, from theology. The concepts of God and the transcendent subject of experience, could never be made to coalesce in his system and the outcome has been unsatisfactory for both psychology and theology. We do not propose here to follow these consequences, but rather to deal with their source and point out, if possible, how other and more adequate consequences may be deduced. The root-difficulty with Kant in this aspect of his philosophy is to be found in his inadequate and, to a great degree, mistaken treatment of the self in psychology. Kant, as we know, was unable to find any real self or soul in experience. It has a vicegerent, however, a logical concept of unity, which presides over the mental activities while itself is purely transcendent and, in the last analysis, indeterminate both as to its nature and reality. We have endeavoured to show in our treatment of the *Subject-Consciousness and its Categories*, the unsoundness of the Kantian psychology and the necessity that the subject of experience should be, not a pure logical abstraction but a real self that does and suffers everything. The initial result of the Kantian exclusion of the real subject from experience is the inability which he experienced, to determine the self as real or as in possession

of any conceivable nature. This result was to be expected, for if we take the self away from the warm activities of experience, where it does and suffers everything, and banish it to region where it does and suffers nothing that is thinkable, it is logically necessary that it should fade into an unreal abstraction in regard to which knowledge would seem scarcely worth while. In order that the self may be determinable in any sense, it must be the subject in experience, and in that case we have seen that both its reality and its nature lie open to knowledge. The first step that must be taken then in order to a real reform of Kantism is the recognition of the self as the intra-experiential subject of which the logical notion of unity of which Kant speaks, is an objective function.

Does this recession of the self into experience as its real subject destroy the notion of transcendence and render the self of which we are conscious, the actual subject of our experience, all the subject that our world demands? There is a sense, of course, in which the Kantian concept of transcendence will have to be given up. We cannot harbour the notion that anything may transcend the notion of experience, or that the contents of our world may be conceived other than as intra-experiential. That there is any conceivable self that is transcendent of experience in the absolute sense is of course unthinkable, and this carries with it the dismissal of the thing in itself in so far as it claims to be ultra-experiential. The notion of transcendence that survives the reform which we are seeking to effect, is that of something that transcends the limits of relative and finite experience, and is necessary for the grounding of its processes. This sense of the concept of transcendence is not touched by the dismissal of the thing in itself, but survives and everywhere asserts itself as necessary. Now, it is precisely this kind of transcendence that we hope to be able to prove necessary for the grounding of the metaphysics of religion, but at this point we are more directly concerned with a further criticism of Kant. Having relegated the real self of

experience and psychology to an inaccessible region, Kant finds it necessary to develop his theology on purely objective grounds. This he does first, by a logical development of the notion of the world as a totality of conditions, the application to which of the method of disjunctive reasoning leads to the concept of a subject of which all the parts may be predicated in a disjunctive judgment. This is complicated enough, but Kant proceeds unappalled to translate this notion of a mere logical subject of disjunctive predicates into that of a real subject of qualities, and to characterize the notion of the world-subject thus arrived at as that of an *ens realissimum*, a most real being, and in truth the being that is conceived in theology as God. Now, without entering into the intricacies of Kant's reasoning, it is only necessary to point to the fact that the process starts not with a real self, but with a logical notion of objective unity which is first applied to the plurality of existing conditions in the world in order to reduce these to the unitary ground that is necessary in order to make our world rational. This we have also found reason for doing in our cosmological reflection, though on somewhat different ground. But what we wish to call attention to here is the fact that Kant is as yet on purely logical ground. He has simply affirmed the necessity of a logical unity of the world. But at a certain point in his argument, without giving any warning, he transforms this logical unity of the world into a real subject, of which the predicates become qualities, and affirms this subject to be God. Where is the clue, we may ask, to this transformation? We find it in a paralogism into which Kant suffers himself to fall at this point. Having developed his concept of the unitary ground as logical subject of a disjunctive world-system, and having present in consciousness the notion or, we may say, the intuition of a real subject of experience which does and suffers everything, the two concepts unconsciously coalesced and became one. The transformation was thus effected, and the unitary subject of the disjunctive system becomes a real subject of which the

disjunctive predications become qualities. Had Kant been conscious of the paralogism involved in his procedure he would no doubt have reformed it, but at all events he would have escaped some of the pitfalls of his subsequent procedure; for, having achieved in this illegitimate way the notion of a real world-subject that is in all essential respects convertible with the notion of a subject of experience, Kant feels it incumbent on him to cramp this real subject into the limits of a mere logical subject. Everywhere in his effort to define his concept of God and to determine his nature and relations to the world, his efforts are reduced to illusion by the concealed fallacy in his premises. He has no difficulty in finding the notion of such a being necessary, but it is impossible to show that the notion stands for anything real. In spite of all his efforts Kant finds the object he is searching for slipping away from his grasp, and his efforts to reach an intelligible concept of the nature of the transcendent subject has no better result. It resists all efforts of definite conception and vanishes slowly but inevitably into the mists of the inconceivable.

It will be evident, I think, that our analysis has supplied us with a firmer and more fruitful basis for the development of a doctrine of the transcendent subject. We find our starting-point in that from which Kant was cut off, namely, in the notion of a real self as the subject in experience. We do not need to go over again the ground on which the real self is affirmed, but assuming it as real, we may go on to show how it enables us to solidly ground a postulate of a transcendent subject whose nature is rendered intelligible by the application to it, under the method of approximation which is also familiar, the categories under which we define our own subject nature. It will not be necessary to debate here the fundamental considerations which engaged us in the chapter on *The Transcendent as Experience*. That the transcendent involves the fundamental distinction of subject and object, and that its internal nature must be conceived as complex rather than simple, need no further consideration here.

And that the transcendent psychosis involves the three moments of thought, feeling, and relation may also be taken as settled. It is on the assumption of the results of the foregoing chapter that the entire discussion of the cosmological and theological aspects of the transcendent proceed. Let us then, on the basis of these results, make a survey of the inner world in order to determine what it can justify us in saying, *first* as to the inner ground on which the transcendent subject is postulated, and *secondly* as to the nature of this subject so far as it is conceivable or definable.

There is a sense in which the whole life of the self can be conceived as history and arranged under the categories of development as a conditioned series in time. This view of the inner world has been made familiar to us in genetic psychology, and to our contemporary way of thinking the study of the history of the self is more interesting than the analysis of its inner nature and content. There is no disposition here to deny, but rather to magnify the importance of the genetic inquiry. The view of the present self which resolves it into a conditioned and developing series in time and regards its content as in some way the product of its past experience, is one that has shed much light for us on the question of the nature of the present self. Just as we are enabled to understand a law or a custom or a social or political institution better if we are able to approach it from the point of view of its origin and history, so in the case of the contents of our minds a new light is shed on the question of their nature by a study of their history. All this is conceded, but the main question we are debating here does not concern the value of the genetic concept of mind, but rather its finality. Can the view of the self which resolves its content into history and ranges its life in the terms of a conditioned series in time, be taken as in any sense final? The answer to this is, I think, obvious. The whole discussion of evolution in its objective aspects as a world-process applies here, and we may say in general that the concept of the psychic life as a flowing stream in time cannot be taken as

final. But let us specify the argument a little more in its bearing on the inner world. We have said that the content of the present self may be ranged in a historic series in time, and we are willing to admit that the points of origin of most of that content may be found within the limits of the series. But what we find the series unable to explain in the sense of locating its origin somewhere in the series, is the quality of the series itself. I mean by this that characteristic individuality which determines or predetermines the form of all its results. To be plain, the series does not explain the kind of soul that is in it and that individuates all its results. But on the contrary the presupposition of this soul is necessary in order to make the series itself conceivable and its progress possible. This being the case, it follows that there is nothing final in the historic series. If we suppose it to be grounded and grant it the initial norm of the individuality which it is realizing, we may commit ourselves to it with a whole heart and may accept all the treasures it has to give us. But it is clear that the value of the genetic concept and its results depends, in the last analysis, on our recognition of its conditioned and relative character.

We find then that the notion of the mind-series, as we may call it, is not final. It does not include the moment of its own origination or the secret of that individual world which predetermines the character of all its results, just as in the objective world we are forced to go deeper and for substantially the same reason. The form of conditioned causality in time cannot be taken as a final form of agency. The individualities of the time-process transcend that category; they point deeper and we must follow their direction. Now we find when we go beneath the temporal stream that we are immediately in the sphere of the self and its agency. Every part of the stream we find related to the self, and through this relation alone it derives, in the last analysis, its psychic character. The genetic point of view thus leads in the act by which it is transcended to a point of view in

which the inner world presents itself, no longer as a flowing stream, but rather as a sphere, every part of which is related to a unitary centre. This inner world, including unitary centre as well as peripheral parts, we call the world of self. It is the world in which the self asserts its real agency and in which the inner world becomes known, therefore, in a truer and deeper sense than before. We may ask then what form of a world do we find here, and the answer can be obtained only by a study of the form of agency of which we become conscious in our experience as a whole. We do not at this point need to go over again the considerations which have led to the conclusion that man's consciousness of his fundamental agency is that of a *socius*, a self that includes in its constitutional point of view the concept or idea of the other, however rudimentary in form, and whose self-agency is therefore constitutionally modified by the moment which we call the influence of the other. In short, there is a moment of passivity bound up in the nature of our psychic activity which prevents us from becoming agents in the absolute sense and reduces our agency to the relative form. The subject-world, then, so far as we are conscious of our agency in it reduces to the form of a plurality. Our consciousness of ourselves and our agency are inclusive of the other and its agency. Our subject-world is a world of plurality and relative agency, and we touch no point of final realized unity or of unqualified self-activity in it.

Now it is this relativity of the deeper world of self that leads to its transcendence. We do not need to go into details here, for we have already shown in a former chapter how this transcendence is effected. It is not true that we have not the consciousness of something higher than the form of agency that we realize. The vital point of our doctrine here is that we have a norm of absoluteness in our own consciousness. The self is not conscious of exercising or of being able to exercise, the function of unchecked, unmodified initiative, for there is ever present the moment of passivity, but it is conscious of the presence of the moment of self-

initiative in all its activity. There is that in it which has been thrown into latency, which, could it assert itself in an untrammelled way, would realize the notion of absolute or transcendent agency. The ideal of self-determination, for example, is not absent from human consciousness; in truth it is ever present as a characteristic feature. But what is realized, and the agency we are conscious of as being capable of exercising, is not unimpeded self-determination but determination modified by the initiative of the other. Our agency is at best an undivided interest in a joint-stock concern. Such agency, it is clear, is not final, but has a presupposition, and the nature of that which is presupposed is clearly determined by the moment of latent self-initiative that is ever present in our consciousness. This moment inevitably asserts itself in an ideal of self-initiative and self-determination, and forms the norm in consciousness out of which the concept of the transcendent subject or self is developed. We do not need to dwell at great length on the mode by which the notion of transcendent nature is unfolded. We have seen how the infinitation of concepts is effected by conceiving the absolute term as freed from the modifying limit which reduces it to a term in a relative system. In this case the modification of the agency of the other as an externally initiated determination is conceived as removed. By applying the method of approximation to this norm in consciousness, the notion of unmodified self-initiation, we are enabled to reach a proximate conception of a being in whose activity this form of agency becomes real and expressive of the whole nature. The procedure here indicated, let us say, involves nothing arbitrary. Anyone who cares to follow the course by which his consciousness reaches out to and includes, the transcendent term, and, in particular, the method which his thoughts naturally adopt in their attempt to render the concept of the transcendent intelligible, will soon begin to realize that what has been unfolded above represents a normal trend of consciousness.

The outcome of the above reflection is the conclusion that the psychic agency, as we are conscious of it in our experience, is not final, but that it necessitates the presupposition of a transcendent agency on which it depends and in which its own ideal of absolute self-agency is realized. This supplies us with a point of view from which the real significance of the reflection involved in Kant's reasoning can be appreciated. Kant, as we have seen, starts with the logical concept of a necessary unity of experience as involved in the subject of a disjunctive judgment and then makes an abortive effort to translate the notion of this logical universe into that of a real one. This is the significance of the *ens realissimum*, and we have traced the source of Kant's failure to his neglect of the psychological subject in experience. Now, in the foregoing considerations we have sought to remove this difficulty by showing how an adequate recognition of the subject in experience leads necessarily to the postulate of a transcendent agency as its ground. But the great vantage of the situation arises out of the fact that the transcendent term which we thus attain supplies a real basis for further reflection analogous to that of Kant. What we have shown so far, is that some real agency transcending our own is necessary. If, now, we connect this conclusion with the Kantian reasoning, and suppose that the reflection has a real rather than a merely logical centre, it will become clear that Kant was simply applying to the situation the category of unity or unification, which we have seen to be as coercive as that of causality itself. We admit that, logically, this category expresses itself in a disjunctive judgment which resolves the members of a totality into the disjunctive predicates of a subject in which they are unified and comprehended. But there is no way to translate this logical unification into real unification except by connecting the whole logical process with some term in reality. This we are here able to do. Instead of abortively attempting to deduce a real world from one that is purely logical, we are able here to find the transcendent

real as a term presupposed in experience, and applying to it the category of unity, as we must, we reach as a result the postulate of a unitary agency transcending the plurality of the subject-world of experience, just as it has been shown to transcend its relativity. That it is necessary to conceive this transcendent agent which is thus absolutely and unitarily related to the subject-world, as a transcendent subject, the disjunctive process is sufficient to show, and that this subject will be an *ens realissimum* follows now from the fact that it has been reached as the unitary subject of a real world. The transcendent subject must be conceived as world-subject and, therefore, as *ens realissimum*.

The notion of *ens realissimum* is not achieved, however, by simply relating the transcendent subject to the world-content in its unmodified and relative form, and by regarding this content as the content of the absolute subject. This would be pantheistic, and while we do not object to Pantheism as such, yet at this point the pantheistic method shows defective insight. We have seen all along that the transcendent is only reached through the supposition of a modification of the relative content of experience; a modification that is effected by the removal of certain limitations that determine things as relative and finite rather than absolute. The road from the relative world-content to the transcendent lies necessarily through this removal of modifying restrictions. Shall we suppose, now, that in the reverse process the passage from the transcendent, the point of relativity can be neglected, and the content of our world of experience be conceived as in its relative form, the content of the transcendent world also? There would be a most fatal defect in such reasoning. For if the content of the relative world may be conceived without modification as the content of the transcendent world, it would follow that the distinction between the relative and the absolute is not real, and may, in the last analysis, be set aside. If, however, we adhere to the point of view which has been developing into clearness throughout these

discussions, it becomes evident that we cannot commit logical suicide at this stage by admitting that the unmodified relative may be conceived as content of the transcendent. The notion of *ens realissimum* is qualitatively different from the notion of the relative and finite, and could never be reached quantitatively by conceiving some subject of which the totality of the relative should be regarded as a qualification, and as therefore predicable of it. The notion of *ens realissimum* clearly contains the implication of the transcendence of relative limitations, and the raising of the terms of relativity to perfection and completeness. To realize it then involves the application of that infinitating method which is described elsewhere, to the content of relativity, and the raising of it to the point of ideal completeness. In other words, the predicates of the transcendent subject will be *predicates of perfection*, and we will be justified in representing it as an *ens realissimum* only as we recognize the necessity of raising the content of our relative experience to the standard of ideal perfection before regarding it as predicable of the transcendent subject.

With this important qualification the disjunctive process becomes necessary, as it amounts simply to the demand that our world shall be a world of thought-relations as well as one of volitional agency. The application of the process of disjunctive unification is simply the effort of thinking to render the real situation intelligible. It is tantamount to the claim that if there is to be a world of transcendent agency, then in order to be conceivable at all, it must conform to the form of disjunctive thinking, and so stand in the relation of subject to a world-totality, the parts of which are to be conceived as its predication. The remaining question to be considered here is then: how the relative content is to be conceived as related to this absolute subject or *ens realissimum*. Shall we conceive two worlds and two contents, one relative, the other absolute, and shall these two worlds be represented in such a way as to be, virtually at least, exclusive of each other? To take such a position would be

to betray a lack of insight at the opposite pole from pantheism, and to condemn our world to absolute dualism? Shall we conceive them, on the contrary, as absolutely one in the sense that there is no difference of content, but the relative is to be regarded as absolute from perhaps a merely altered point of view? This would lead us again into the pantheistic blindness. The only course of true insight here, I feel sure, is to assert a distinction between the two worlds, but to deny its absoluteness. There must be some pathway from the relative and finite to the absolute and infinite, by means of which our thinking can travel from one to the other—a veritable Jacob's ladder on which the angels of reflection may go back and forth between earth and heaven. Now, the connection of the relative with that which transcends it has, we think, been exhibited in this whole discussion up to this stage, and also the mode by which our thinking, finding certain points of departure in the relative, is able to travel the road toward infinity. That the reversal of the process involves the retracing of the road in the opposite direction must seem obvious, and also that this return will involve the origination and imposition of the modification which constitutes the *differentia* of relativity. Why should we halt in the presence of such a necessity? The *ens realissimum* is the transcendent subject of an ideally perfect and infinite world. The content of such a world must partake of this ideally perfect and infinite character. But we must relate this ideally perfect world to the relative and infinite world, and in the last analysis there cannot be two worlds. The mode of reverse-relating must not then involve at any point an absolute breach of continuity, so that the two worlds will at any point fall absolutely apart. The demands on an adequate metaphysic at this point are two and not one. On the one hand the unity of the two worlds must not be broken, and on the other the distinction must be recognized as real. Even the absolute cessation of insight at some point would not justify the denial of either demand, since each rests on its own irrefragable ground, and

the fact that thought is in a dilemma may be the result of our own imperfect thinking.

I do not think, however, that insight does break down absolutely at this point, although I am not claiming omniscience for any mode of thinking. Here, however, I think, we may find an important clue to the insight we need in the sphere of relative experience itself. We have seen on both the objective and subjective sides of experience, that the relative begins to be transcended at the point where plurality and dependence begin to merge into the unitary and independent, and we have seen that the modification that reduces the agency of things in experience to relativity arises out of the mutual modifications of the parts of an interacting system. This needs only to be restated here. The moment of dependence seems to be determined then by the plurality of co-ordinate agents, and the overcoming of this plurality would also involve the overcoming of the dependence. In short, just so far as the real asserts its unity it also asserts its non-relativity and independence. But we have seen that the passage from the relative to the transcendent is essentially a transition from plural to unitary agency. Shall we not say, then, that the point of origination for the relative and dependent is identical with the beginning-point of plurality and differentiation, and that if we are seeking the origin of the modification which determines the relative to be relative, we will find it at the point where being ceases to be one and begins to become many? The conclusion seems to be necessary.

But right here I think we will find one of those pitfalls of reflection which Kant was not always successful in avoiding. The point of plurality and differentiation with which we are concerned here is not to be regarded as a point in logical thinking merely, but as a distinction of the real. We must remember that the distinguishing feature of our reflection here is that the notion of real agency is central in it, and that the predications of our thought are predications of real activity. When, therefore, we say that

the root of relative agency is to be found in the beginning of plurality, we do not mean mathematical plurality simply, but a plurality of agents or activities. This being conceded, it will begin to become clear, I think, how the origin of relativity can be found in the beginning of plurality. We have already reached the insight that the beginning of plurality is also the point of initiation for the individualities of the finite world. The original posit, as it has been called, in which the finite begins is an individuating activity, and manifests itself as such in the whole history of the relative. Let us carry this insight with us, then, when we go on to the next insight, namely, that the beginning of plurality marks a breaking up of the world-content into parts, and a *finite being may therefore be defined as an individual whose content is only part of the world-content as a whole.* The beginning of plurality marks, therefore, the beginning of a partition of content, not in the sense that there can be no common content, but in the sense rather that no individual shall be able to comprehend *all* content, and thus achieve virtual absoluteness. In all this, however, we have simply been trying to render a situation intelligible, and have ventured no suggestion of a final reason for its existence. What we have aimed at here is to develop the situation as one that is real and not simply logical, and also to make clear the fact that the dependence of the relative has its root, perhaps not the sole root, in the plurality of individuals which determines them as finite through the partition of world-content which it involves.

Returning then to our main question, how the relation of the two worlds is to be conceived, we may assume here, as a point to be taken up later and investigated, the fact that the agency of the transcendent at the point where it touches the finite world is individuating in its character, that is, its first posit is a germ of individuality which predetermines all the individuation of the world of experience as we know it. This being predicated, the relation becomes, in a measure, at least, conceivable. The Transcen-

dent Subject is an *ens realissimum*, and that means that it is an absolute subject of a world that is infinitely complete and perfect, a world, therefore, of ideally complete and perfect activities. In order to translate this into more intelligible terms, let us say that the notion of an *ens realissimum* is that of a world-experience in which the subject is related to and comprehends the world-content as a whole. There is thus no partition and exclusion in such an experience, and, therefore, no limitation. Its activities are determined by the world-content as a whole, and being self-sufficient and self-contained, they will all be self-initiative and self-determining. We thus realize the notion of a transcendent world of absoluteness and infinite ideality. Now, the first point we wish to make regarding the relation of this world and the sphere of relativity is that the transcendent world must be considered as comprehending and including the relative. The sense in which the relative is external to and exclusive of the absolute must be qualitative and not inconsistent with the notion of inclusion within experience. The transcendent experience could not, therefore, be other than all-inclusive. The qualitative distinction between the relative and the absolute will be a distinction that will render them non-identical, while the relative remains content of the absolute experience. The only method by which the achievement of absoluteness is conceivable is that of inclusion and unification of content, and this inclusion must be *all-inclusive*, inasmuch as it is the notion of excluded content and external agency that enables us to determine the *differentia* of relativity. I am perfectly aware of the fact that there is a temptation to flinch at this point in our reflection on account of the apparent implication of pantheism. But I am prepared to deny the necessity of the pantheistic inference. What is the point in the pantheistic inference that would be objected to here? Not certainly the fact of inclusion, but rather what that fact on the face of it seems to carry with it, the suppression of all real individuality and

individual agency except that of the absolute. I acknowledge that such a disaster is to be avoided, but why should inclusion contain this implication? The root of the whole difficulty is to be found, I take it, in the assumption that to suppose a point of individuality as internal to a consciousness that comprehends it is tantamount to suppressing its real individuality and reducing it to the position of a mere mode of the containing consciousness. Were this true it would be impossible to conceive anything as relative or dependent without destroying its individuality. We have seen that the relative is determinable as relative by virtue of something that transcends and comprehends it. There is no other way by which relativity can be determined. There is always some limit of reality in the relative which must be conceived as removed in the absolute. The notion of the complete contains that of the incomplete, while that of the incomplete implies that of the complete as transcending and comprehending it. Otherwise the absolute could be no ground of the relative, and no principle for its explanation. But why enlarge on this point? The truth of the matter is this. If we assert that the relative is excluded from the absolute we thereby assert the absoluteness of the relative, for we have cut the relative off from the possibility of any absolute grounding, and have therefore forced it to become absolute. The very notion of the relative is of that which requires internal grounding in the absolute, and which must be conceived therefore as included in it. And we will find no reason for being scandalized at such a conclusion if we do not make the mistake of supposing that individuality, in order to be real, must be absolute. The kind of objection we are considering here does not contemplate a complete solution of bonds between the finite individual and something absolute on which it depends. Thinkers who make the objection are in nine cases out of ten theists who regard the finite individual as a creature which owes its existence, if not its continuance, to a creative act. Thinkers of this type as a rule assert the omnipresence of God while they

seem to forget that God cannot be conceived as being present in any other sense than consciously, and that conscious omnipresence can be realized only by the comprehension of everything *in* consciousness. How can a being be consciously present to anything from which its consciousness is excluded? Not in any real sense, surely. What the theistic thinker is concerned to deny, in order to maintain the reality of the finite individual, is not the dependence of the finite on a transcendent agency which includes and grounds its own; not the inclusion of the finite individual in the interpenetrating consciousness of the divine, but rather such a construction of this comprehension and inclusion as would be inconsistent with the reality and persistence of the finite individual. Any concept of inclusion that involves the reduction of the individual to a mere mode of the absolute is one which the theistic thinker abhors, and in this we confess that our sympathies are with the theist. To us an individual that is neither real nor perdurable has no value whatever.

Waiving the further discussion of this question for the present, we go on to the second point in the determination of the relation of the two worlds. This we may call the internal posit of individuality. We mean by the internal posit of individuality the same thing that our analysis of relative experience has made us acquainted with as that individual posit which constitutes the point of transcendence in the relative sphere. The world of individualities is reducible in the last analysis, as we have seen, to these points of transcendence. Now it is this same posit of individuality that we are approaching here from the standpoint of the transcended itself, and to this we have applied the phrase, internal posit of individuality, in order to indicate (1) the internal grounding of the individual. The finite individual is posited by that which transcends it, and to which it is therefore in a sense external; but we have already argued that this transcendence and externality are not to be construed as inconsistent with the conscious

inclusion of the finite by the transcendent. (2) The phrase is intended to imply that individuality is in the last analysis a posit of the absolute, and therefore rooted in absolute nature. We have seen that individuality is not a passing phase of the finite world, but its deepest truth, and that it has its roots in the transcendent. What we affirm here is that it is in this transcendent grounding rather than in anything in the nature of the individual himself that we are to look for the last ground of his reality and perdurability. We cannot go the length of Leibnitz in conceiving the finite individual as in its nature a self-sufficient being, for then the finite individual would itself become absolute, and we would be involved in a fundamental contradiction from which the Leibnitzian resources would not be able to deliver us. We are shut up to the notion of the finite individual as essentially relative, but as having its roots in the absolute nature, and it is there that we are obliged to look both for the source and the guarantee of the individual existence. (3) The next point of relation which we wish to note is a negative one. That the finite and relative are comprehended in the absolute and infinite experience we have already maintained. Here we wish to add that the distinction between the absolute and the relative is ineradicable. It has its root in that breaking up of content which determines the relative as both relative and finite. The transcendence of this would involve the lapse of the finite and relative in the one absolute nature. But there is not anywhere in experience any tendency for distinctions to lapse. The real tendency is that of transcendence, which is the name of a process in which experience asserts the unitary comprehension of distinctions which, instead of being thereby abolished or set aside, are in truth grounded and rendered valid. The notion of lapse in this connection is wholly misleading. If we follow the actual processes of experience we will travel a road of transcendence and conservation rather than one of submergence and lapse. When experience crosses a bridge her wont is to take her belongings with her. There is no

reason to suppose then that the distinction between the absolute and relative is other than ineradicable, but, on the contrary, the whole trend of experience tends to confirm what is also a necessity of thinking; namely, that the grounding of any distinction in the absolute is the highest guarantee we can have of its reality and permanence.

We admit that there is still room for doubt as to the possibility of real and permanent finite individuality within the absolute experience, and it is in view of this lingering doubt that attention is here recalled to a fundamental distinction in the nature of absolute experience which was considered in the chapter on *The Transcendent as Experience*. I mean that distinction of subject- and object-consciousness which is fundamental to the notion of experience. The absolute experience cannot be conceived otherwise than as involving this distinction as basal to all its processes. Otherwise the notion of experience would have to be dropped entirely, and some other category applied to the absolute nature. We have seen, however, that the real choice is either the concept of the absolute as experience or an agnosticism so radical and sweeping that even the notion of final ground becomes a fiction. Taking this distinction then as fundamental to the concept of absolute experience, the consideration which we wish to advance here is that the finite individual is to be regarded as a *posit of the objective consciousness of the absolute rather than as a posit of its subject-consciousness*. We have seen that the subject-consciousness of the finite individual is rendered finite and relative by the fact that in the consciousness in which it becomes aware of its own activity it also becomes aware of the modifying activity of its other. It may be said then that in the same pulse of consciousness in which it realizes itself it also posits its other. This would, however, be manifestly impossible to an absolute consciousness, which must in the nature of things stand alone in the sense that it could have no self-modifying term which asserts itself as a not-self. The apparent over-subtlety of this distinction will

be condoned, I feel sure, for the sake of its importance, since it involves the whole difference between an absolute and a relative experience. It is not conceivable that there should be any subjective posit of the finite individual at all. The self posits itself or its co-ordinate and self-modifying other. We have seen that the positing of a self-modifying other is excluded by the very notion of absolute subjectivity, and it only remains then to admit that the absolute self can posit subjectively; that is, be self-conscious, of nothing but itself. (This reasoning does not, however, preclude the possibility of internal self-distinctions in the subject-consciousness of the absolute, a topic which will be reverted to in a subsequent chapter.)

The *pou sto* of the finite individual must be sought then in the objective consciousness of the absolute. It is here that the breaking up of content takes place which determines the plurality and at the same time the relativity, of the individuals of our experience. And on the transcendent side of the problem it is here that the posit takes place in which finite individuality originates and we thus reach the conception of the absolute activity objectively taking the form of a positing of individuals. Now it is in this connection that we can put the question as to the final status of the finite individual with the best hope of reaching a satisfactory answer. Is there anything anywhere in the realms of experience or thinking that is not consistent with the supposition that a direct objective posit involves finitude and relativity by virtue of the fact that it is an objective posit? We fail to see that there is anything that is inconsistent with such a supposition. It may be urged, of course, that the absolute itself is a posit of the finite, but this is not true in any real sense. The posit of the finite, which in this case can be nothing more than an affirmation of absolute being, does not constitute the absolute, which must be recognized as being in the last analysis a presupposition of the finite rather than its posit. There is no exception here, and if we seek our analogies in that

which is truly posited in our experience, we will find that no exception can be thought even as possible. Let us distinguish, then, between the immediate content of a posit and that which is primarily a presupposition of the positing activity, and we will find that whether we regard the posit as a pulse of volition or a pulse of thinking or a pulse of feeling, as a direct objective posit, it involves a finitation, or splitting up of the whole content of experience, an act of exclusion and differentiation as well as one of inclusion and integration. This finitation is involved in the very constitution of the objective individual and is fundamental to its nature. It may be urged, of course, and this is admitted in advance, that the positing activity has another side, and that thinking as well as willing and feeling are activities that overleap the barriers which they make in the very act of making them. But it is to be observed that this overleaping aspect has been partly explained at least as presupposition which is to be distinguished from the immediate positing activity. The whole consciousness involved in thinking, feeling, or willing includes the presuppositions of these activities as well as the content on which they directly terminate, and it is through this consciousness, as we have seen, that our finite experience realizes its connections with the transcendent. We find, then, that in connection with our objective activities we must think the transcendent, in order to avoid imprisonment in our own finitude. But when we pass over to the subjective side of our own experience we are confronted with a similar situation. The thought of the transcendent is our only mode of escape from our finite selves. We might be tempted then to take the form in which transcendence asserts itself in our finite experience as essential to the activities of any conceivable experience, were it not for the fact that in connection with the subjective consciousness of the absolute we are obliged to deny it. The very notion of an absolute subject of experience precludes the consciousness of transcendence. The absolute *is* the transcendent, and its

subject-consciousness will be the self-consciousness of the transcendent. Plainly our category must be modified here, and the distinction that is necessary to the life of the finite processes must be conceived as transcended in the absolute self-consciousness and thereby rendered internal, as possibly the feeling of the dependence of the finite and relative upon its own objective activities.

When, however, we come to consider the objective consciousness of the absolute experience, the same necessity for regarding the presupposition of thinking as internal to its positing activity does not arise. The presupposition of the objective activity of the absolute is, of course, the subjective activity of its self-consciousness. The positing act of the absolute will therefore have its transcendent presupposition, which is the self-consciousness of the absolute subject. There is no difficulty here, and we may say then that in the last analysis the consciousness of the transcendent which pervades all our activity and connects it with its absolute grounds, is subjective rather than objective. The transcendence of the object is traceable ultimately to the consciousness of the transcendent subject, and all transcendence is, therefore, in the last resort, subjective. From this point of view it would appear then that the objective activity of the absolute may be connected with a transcendent term, the consciousness of the absolute self, which will render it truly an infinite and absolute function, while at the same time it may be conceived as in its immediate positing act essentially finitatis if not finite. And it will be possible at this point of our reflection, therefore, to generalize and to say that *all objective activities in experience are, as concerns their immediate objects and apart from presuppositions of the transcendent, both individuating and finitatis in their essential nature and constitution.*

In this conclusion it seems to me that the ground of the difficulty referred to some time back has been completely removed. The point of that difficulty was to see how the finite individual could be regarded as internal to the absolute

experience without danger of absorption into the absolute subject. We have seen that a distinction is to be made between the subject- and object-consciousness of the absolute, and that the finite individual is to be regarded as a posit of the objective consciousness. We have found reasons for concluding, furthermore, that the objective positing activity of the absolute is individuating and finitizing in its very nature. There are no obstacles then in the way of accepting the logic of the situation and regarding the world of finite individuals as included in the absolute experience. A final consideration comes up at this point with which we shall close this chapter. We have seen that the absolute consciousness cannot include the sense of anything transcendent, but there is nothing to hinder the supposition that it may be conscious of its own transcendence. In truth it would seem that the objective activity of the absolute involves necessarily the consciousness of self-transcendence of its processes in that presupposition of subject-transcendence which we have already developed in connection with these processes. The absolute subject will then have a consciousness of its own transcendence in relation to its objective activities, and the point of interest here relates to the form in which this consciousness will embody itself. We have spoken of the possibility of the distinction between the absolute and the relative as internal in the absolute consciousness, and here we meet the same thing as not only possible but as apparently necessary. How then are we to suppose that an internal distinction can exist by virtue of which the absolute subject may distinguish itself from the relative terms included in its experience? We may fall back on psychological analysis for our answer. Locke tells us that in connection with the objective activities of the mind simple notions or ideas of these activities arise in consciousness, and on these he constructs an important element in knowledge. That Locke has here struck a fundamental process in consciousness no one will deny. He is here simply laying the foundations of all epistemology in

the faculty which consciousness has of shaping some sort of a representative of all its content. That this is a feature of consciousness as such, and not peculiar to its relative or absolute forms, may be taken as certain, since it is deducible from the very notion of conscious activity. Applying the insight of this analysis to the question in hand, we are led to the conclusion that the absolute subject will inevitably be, not only conscious of its objective activities, but will also develop in connection with them a concept or notion of the functions themselves, and if these activities are both individuating and finitizing, which *ex hypothesi* they are, these concepts or notions will take the form of concepts or notions of finite individual existence. And by virtue of the fact that the consciousness in which these concepts are supposed to arise is not temporal but absolute, the priority involved will be logical and the concepts of the activities may be conceived as co-existent with the functions themselves. The consciousness of the finite and relative will thus be co-existent in the absolute experience with the activities in which the finite and relative forms of existence arise, and the distinction of relativity and transcendence will thus be internally grounded in the consciousness of the absolute.

We thus arrive at the intelligible notion of an absolute subject of an absolute experience whose objective activities are essentially individuating and finitizing and in which the concept of these activities is necessary and fundamental. This completes, so far as I can see, all that is necessary in order to vindicate in general and render intelligible the notion of a transcendent subject of experience, and we propose in the next chapter to consider further the doctrine of the transcendent which has been developed here as a basis for a metaphysical doctrine of the grounds of religion.

CHAPTER VII.

THE TRANSCENDENT GROUND OF RELIGION.

RELIGION arises in the first instance as an experience, and it is only when reflection begins that we seek to understand this experience and follow it back to its ultimate grounds. It is important then to determine the essential nature of this experience in order that we may be able to discover the true point of transcendence, if there be any, that is involved in it. This seems a hopeless task in view of the multitudinous forms which religion has actually assumed in the experience of different men and nations, and more especially in view of the apparent failure of those who have attempted to define religion to reach any substantial agreement. In spite of all this difference, however, we shall not be deterred from attempting to discover the core of religious experience, and our courage for this enterprise is somewhat stimulated by the reflection that what we are seeking is not a definition but some central fact of religious experience. In a book entitled *Human Progress*, published several years ago, the author, Mr. Thomas Blair, finds this central fact in what he terms "spiritual communion."¹ There is at the heart of all religious experience, he thinks, even in its most rudimentary forms, the germ of this spiritual communion. Now without stopping to consider whether the phrase "spiritual communion" be the best possible designation for

¹ *Human Progress*, N.Y., 1896. Introduction, pp. 7-11.

the fact involved, I am free to admit that I feel myself in substantial agreement with this author as to the nature of the fact itself. We may regard religion as of purely supernatural origin, or we may agree with Herbert Spencer that it originates in dreams of ancestors, or with Tyler in his ghost theory of its origin. However the germ of the experience originates, it consists in its very nature in some sort of intercourse between the soul of the savage, let us say, and some being or power with which he has somehow become consciously related, and which he regards as alive, and able to assume human or quasi-human attitudes towards him. This is essential to the existence of the type of experience we call religious, and it is easily reconcilable with the diversity of forms in which the religious consciousness expresses itself. That the being with which the religious consciousness connects the soul of the savage is not at first regarded as transcendent in any appreciable sense of that term is perhaps true, but inevitably the sense of transcendence develops and proves itself to be essential. The truth is, the germ of transcendence must be involved in some degree in the very earliest experiences of religion, and even where it cannot be clearly traced, as otherwise it would be difficult to say why the religious consciousness should distinguish itself from the social. From this point of view the ghost would supply a more adequate starting-point than a dead ancestor, inasmuch as in the notion of the ghost the germinal consciousness of transcendence is already involved.

To the developed form of religious experience Mr. Blair's designation of spiritual communion unmistakably applies, and that this communion involves one term of transcendence is also made clear by the developed forms of religious experience. To this feature of religious experience—its consciousness of transcendence—we will now turn, in order, if possible, to show the ground in experience for the development of the metaphysical basis of religion. That the notion of transcendence is not completely apprehended in the lower forms of religion, is obvious. So long as the religious devotee

believes that the object of his worship is in any sense under his control, so that he may coerce him as he is able to coerce his social fellows, the sense of transcendence is not complete. It is only in the higher forms of religion of the more spiritualistic type, such as Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity that the notion of transcendence does reach in any sense a complete development. But in the lowest forms—in the savage's attitude towards his fetich, or the ghost which claims his attention—there will be the sense, however vague, of some transcendent power, in relation to which he is simply passive and relatively helpless. This feeling will be mingled, of course, with a belief, however vague, that this fetich or ghost is somehow subject to his power, so that in addition to effects that may follow from the exercise of propitiatory observances other effects may be brought about by coercion. But this element soon drops out of consciousness, and the sole method of influencing the god, that is felt to be available, is that of propitiation. This notion of propitiation may be crude enough, but it is the normal form which the religious intercourse takes in what may be called the middle stage of religious development, and it survives in the higher stages in some form as an essential feature of religious experience. But in the higher stages it becomes spiritualized, and tends to merge gradually into what may be regarded as the supreme form of religious experience—the consciousness of relationship with a being who is at the same time our spiritual fellow and our transcendent other.

Religious experience plainly involves, then, a relation to the transcendent, and we are specially concerned here with the further consideration of this relation, in order to develop in its light a doctrine of the metaphysical groundwork of religion. The entering of the transcendent as an internal and fundamental moment into religious experience renders it possible to correlate the grounds of religion with the basal principles of our metaphysic of the transcendent in general. It is not reasonable to suppose that the transcendent object

of religion should, in the last analysis, be conceived apart from the transcendent ground of reality in general. When it does happen that a dualism exists in our conceptions it will be found to result, either from the fact that the grounds of our metaphysics and of our religion have not been fully considered in their relation, or else from some failure on the metaphysical side of the problem, in which case we may either become sceptical and agnostic as to the possibility of metaphysical knowledge or we may conclude that metaphysical reflection is too rationalistic, and may be led to repudiate its connection with religion in the interests of mystical intuition or considerations of moral value. But, in any case, where our reflection has proceeded normally in both channels a point will be reached where the demand for a metaphysical interpretation of religion will arise, and we will be led to see that the metaphysical grounding demanded, can be effected only by correlating the grounds of religion with the principles and concepts of general metaphysics, and the problem of the grounding of religion will in the first instance be that of connecting it as an experience with that element of transcendence on which the whole of metaphysics rests.

That religious experience does involve the element of transcendence will be obvious from analysis as well as from the considerations advanced above, for it is clear that the religious consciousness would never differentiate itself clearly from the social consciousness did not the sense of something transcendent enter into it. We have only to consider this in order to see that it must be true. The social consciousness is that of the mutually modifying influence of co-ordinate factors. The other of the *socius* is a being like ourselves and on the same plane of activity, and no sense of subordination is involved. But the most characteristic feature of the religious consciousness is the absence of this sense of equality, and in its place the feeling of relationship to an other that is superior to us, and whose agency transcends ours, and this sense of the transcendence of the religious

other is the basis of that feeling of dependence which rests at the very heart of the religious consciousness. This sense of the transcendence of the object of the religious feeling is thus implanted in the very heart of religious experience, and this fact is vital in its relation to the interpretation of the rudimentary manifestations of religion. In the absence of any adequate psychological analysis it might be difficult to refer rudimentary religious phenomena in all cases to their real grounds, but with the clue that analysis puts in our hands we are able to do so and also to avoid certain mistakes regarding the connection of the grounds of religion with other phases of experience into which some, including the student of social phenomena, are liable to fall. One of these is the tendency to identify the root of religion with that of social experience in general. Because religion arises in social soil and has social aspects it is assumed that it is in its origin an offshoot of sociality. Now, we are not disputing here the close connection of the social and the religious in man's nature, but on the contrary affirm it with as great emphasis as any. But what we are interested in affirming is that religion has its own individual and characteristic root; that whereas the social consciousness arises out of our recognition of an other on the same plane, the religious consciousness involves the recognition of an other on a plane that transcends our own self and its agency. The social consciousness never could develop the religious out of itself, nor on the other hand could the social develop out of the religious pure and simple. The truth is that we find in religion a form of experience that is primary and irreducible to any other.

Another interpretation of religion which, true and valuable as it is from certain points of view, is yet, I cannot help thinking, mistaken as to the central pulse of religious experience, is that represented by such thinkers as Benjamin Kidd and Henry Rutgers Marshall, who represent religion as being essentially a principle of altruistic restraint on egoism, which tends to sacrifice the interest of the general

to that of the individual. Mr. Kidd thinks this regulative principle a superinduction on human nature, from some supra-mundane source, while Mr. Marshall regards it as a fundamental instinct of human nature. There can be no hesitation in admitting that an important aspect of religion is here brought out, or that this aspect is in need of emphasis, but in spite of our high appreciation of the value of the work of these thinkers, we cannot admit that what they emphasise is the most primal fact of religious experience, but must regard it rather as an important derivative aspect. In this we are taking no novel position, inasmuch as the psychologists are showing us that egoism and altruism are themselves not primary aspects of sociality, but rather out-growths of a social nature or a social consciousness, in which man in the same pulse becomes conscious of himself and his other. What the psychologists have aimed successfully to do is to show that there is a primary consciousness of which egoism and altruism are simply aspects, and this is precisely our own purpose here in regard to religion. That religion should exercise a restraining influence on the egoistic impulses will become obvious as its normal tendency when we connect it with the more primary fact that the religious consciousness is one in which the self is related to its transcendent other. Naturally and necessarily the feeling of this relationship will open the way for the influence of the other with which we are thus related, upon our own motives and actions. And such an influence will be in a sense social, inasmuch as it will tend to modify the impulses of pure egoism. But it will also be different from the social restraint in just that respect which our analysis of the religious consciousness enables us to interpret. The restraint of the religious consciousness is one that is associated with the sense of transcendence. It is characteristically religious only so far forth as it involves this sense of transcendence; that is, the feeling that the restraining other is a superior to which we sustain a dependent relation, rather than the co-ordinate relation of the social conscious-

ness. The recognition of the primary fact of religious experience thus enables us to ground not only the restraint exercised by religion but also the point in respect to which it is characteristically different from the social restraint.

Another mistake for which Kant is no doubt primarily responsible, but in which many of our recent thinkers seem to be involved, is the tendency to deny the primacy of religion in the interests of morality. Everyone will recall Matthew Arnold's characterization of religion as "morality touched with emotion," which is manifestly a definition of religion in terms of one of its effects. Kant refuses to allow to religion any first-hand acquaintance with its object, and claims that we can be related to the object of religion only through our sense that this object is essential to the realization of moral good; and some other more recent exponents of the ethical consciousness show a tendency to carry the Kantian principle farther than Kant himself intended, and to deny in the interests of morality that religion has any real, distinctive basis in our nature at all. Now, it is to be borne in mind that the question here is one of the true analysis of experience. What we have to consider is whether the experience we call religious is identical in its roots with the experience we call ethical, or whether it has a characteristic difference that marks it off as original. The answer to this I do not regard as extremely difficult. The moral experience may in its last analysis involve the transcendent object of religion. This we do not debate here, but in its primary and direct form all that can be gotten into it is the pressure of some restraint in the individual consciousness, which is resolvable on analysis into a feeling that we are obliged to do or choose this or that and eschew the other. Or in its more general form, that there is in general something that we call good or right which we feel obliged to choose and something that we call evil or wrong which we feel obliged to reject and avoid. This is all that can be gotten into the ethical consciousness as its immediate content. Its relation to the transcendent, so far as it is real,

is implicit, as is also its reference in the last analysis to the transcendent object of religion so far as that reference is real. This analysis of the ethical consciousness enables us to distinguish the religious from it and to indicate the distinctive feature of the religious consciousness, while the ethical may, and, as we think, does involve by implication, a transcendent relation. Yet this relation is not immediate and constitutive in the ethical consciousness, but in the religious consciousness it is immediate and constitutive. The religious experience is religious by virtue of the immediate relation of the finite consciousness to a transcendent other which it involves. If we abstract this we destroy the unique basis of religion and render religious experience impossible, whereas this might be eliminated and leave the ethical consciousness, for aught we can see to the contrary, intact. It is not possible, then, to identify the primary religious consciousness with the moral without destroying it altogether.

Having vindicated the experience of the transcendent other as primary and fundamental to religion, we may now proceed to consider how far this transcendent object of religion may be reduced to the basis of intelligible conception. And here we may, I think, as the result of a very short reflection, identify the object of religion with the absolute subject which has been arrived at in general metaphysics. We have only in this connection to consider that this subject has been arrived at in view of a general investigation of the transcendent in experience, and that it has been determined as the subject of an absolute experience which our finite experience generally presupposes as its ground. Again, a brief reflection will be sufficient to show the absurdity of supposing that there can be in the last analysis a plurality of transcendent subjects. The absolute, as we have seen, can have no other, and all distinctions must be internal. But from the very nature of the religious experience of the transcendent it cannot stop short of that absoluteness that is exclusive of external plurality. We

admit that religious experience does as a matter of fact stop short of this, just as rudimentary metaphysical reflection stops short of it, and that the recognition of it is clearly reached only in monotheism. But the point of interest is not now, what the primary religious experience really holds as content, but rather how in the last analysis the transcendent object of religion must be conceived as related to the absolute subject of metaphysics, and the conclusion is that they must in the last resort be identified, and the object of religion be conceived as attained by a further characterization of the absolute subject of metaphysics. We do not need to enlarge on this consideration, but, identifying the transcendent object of religion with the absolute subject of metaphysics, may go on to consider that further determination of this subject which religion requires. We have seen how, in order to conceive the transcendent term in the objective sphere, it was necessary to transform our categories, and that this transformation was rendered inevitable in the last analysis by the necessity we were under of conceiving a unitary transcendence of external plurality. The transcendent activity could not be represented under the category of a plurality of interacting agents, but must, on the contrary, be regarded as one independent and self-initiative agent. Taking the relative category then, which in general is that of conditioned agency, the requirement of absoluteness does not involve the dropping of the notion of agency, but simply the dropping of the notion of conditionedness or limitation. The concept of agency survives, and has only to be represented as unitary and originative. Passing over to the subjective side, we find the conditions to be substantially the same. Our relative self-consciousness is that of modified, and therefore, in a sense, of passive and determined agency. In order to reach the conception of an absolute subject we are obliged to drop, not the notion of self-agency itself, but the notion of dependence and determination. The notion of self-agency survives as that of a unitary and completely self-determining subject of an

absolute experience. Now, in the second part of this volume, in dealing with the subject of our relative experience, we found that its intelligible determination involved the application to it of the categories of individuality, self-identity, and personality, and the question here is as to the applicability of these categories to the subject of absolute experience. In the first place then, with regard to the category of individuality, the only modification of this category that seems necessary is the removal of the limit imposed by the inclusion of only a finite content. Individuality has two aspects—it is including and excluding—and what the finite individual excludes is other content that is conceived as real. Now, in order to reach the notion of absolute individuality it is necessary to preserve this moment of exclusion as essential, but to avoid conceiving the excluded content as real. There can be no real content absolutely outside of the absolute experience. How then can this moment of exclusion be real if there is no real content to exclude? I think we have here to fall back on that activity of negative thinking, feeling, and willing, which we have found to be essential to the conception of these processes, either in their relative or absolute forms. We have only to remember here that positive inclusive activity involves the activity of negation and exclusion, and that the absolute subject in the activity by which it thinks itself will also, necessarily, think the opposite of itself, not as real, but as hypothetically possible, in order to see how the conditions of true individuality will be fulfilled. What the absolute thought thinks as hypothetically possible but as opposite to the real, will be repelled and hated in the moment of feeling and rejected and cast away in the moment of will. But in the meantime individuality will have defined itself, and the absolute subject will have determined itself consciously as an individual. From another point of view it is of course impossible to conceive an absolute subject of experience and not to ascribe to it an internal unitary character that implies its individuality, and the above reasoning may be taken

simply as a demonstration of the possibility of that which on other grounds is necessary.

We do not need to dwell at much length on the category of self-identity. We have found that self-identity in the relative sense does not involve absolute continuity of material substance, but rather conscious continuity through the feeling of sameness. This consciousness, as we saw, is not dependent on material continuity in time, and the unbroken stream is not one of its conditions. We found, on the contrary, that the special feature of the consciousness of self-identity is its ability to defy and ignore such breaches. What is involved in the preservation of self-identity is that the subject of experience shall maintain its consciousness of sameness in its relation to an included individual content which is exclusive of all other content. Thus, to use Professor James's illustration, Peter and Paul may sleep in the same bed and may mix up their personal lives to any extent, but this does not give rise to any confusion of identity or any tendency toward an intermixing of content. If now, we ask, how an absolute subject can be conceived under the category of self-identity, we find it necessary to separate two considerations. On the one hand, it is difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to conceive the absolute as not being self-identical. But when we ask how the absolute can be consciously self-identical, the burden of proof rests on ourselves, for to the absolute there cannot be present that differentiation of temporal content which supplies so important a factor in our own consciousness of identity. We have, however, only to distinguish what is absolutely essential to the consciousness of self-identity from that which may be stripped off from it without destroying it, in order to see how this category is applicable to the absolute. It is not necessary to this consciousness that the self should be able to distinguish its content from other real content in time, but rather that it should as an individual be conscious of the sameness of its internal and real content as distinguished from hypothetical opposite content, which is

excluded. The conscious self-identity of the absolute involves then the maintenance of this distinction, and when we say that the absolute is consciously self-identical we mean that in the absolute consciousness there is no tendency for the real and its hypothetical opposite to intermix or become confused, but that the mutual exclusiveness is absolute.

The question of personality is one involving more detail, if not greater difficulty. We have seen that while personality is rooted in self-identical individuality, its distinctive idea is that of a manifestation of internal nature. The notion of personality is that of a form or mode of manifestation, and we have seen how this notion of a form of manifestation is connected with the complex content of our consciousness giving rise to the possibility of a plurality of personal expressions in different individuals and to some extent in the same individual. The variations of personality are connected, as we have seen, with the variations in the dominating elements of the concrete psychoses which constitute the individual consciousness. What we have to consider here, however, is the question of the essential requirements of the notion of personality as distinguished from what may be stripped off from it without destroying it. Now when we ask what it is essentially to be a person, more than is involved in the concept of a self-identical individual nature, we are led to answer; some characteristic mode of manifesting or expressing this nature. And the question as to the mode that will be characteristic will have to be determined in view of our concept of the internal constitution of that nature. In view of this we may fall back on the results of preceding analysis, in which the conclusion has been reached that while the complexity of content must be conceived as persisting, so that the absolute consciousness will have in it the elements of thinking, feeling, and willing, yet the mutability in the relations of these elements in the concrete psychoses must be eliminated as inconsistent with the

stability involved in the notion of the absolute. It remains then that while we are to regard the internal nature of the absolute consciousness as complex, yet the complex elements must be conceived as bearing stable relations to one another, so that absolute intellection will be found to be in stable harmony with absolute feeling and willing. By this we mean to say that we must conceive the absolute as invariably willing and loving what it thinks positively, and as rejecting and hating what it thinks negatively. There must be a stable order and relation maintained among the complex elements of content in order that the manifestation may have the steadfastness and uniformity required. We may ask then what bearing this requirement will have on our notion of personality, and the answer will be that it does not affect it essentially. The root of manifestation, and of the possibility as well as the necessity of manifestation, rests in the internal complexity of nature. Where this internal complexity exists, expression of some sort will be both possible and necessary, and where the nature is a conscious one and involves a primary distinction between the subject- and object-consciousness as well as complex elements of thinking, feeling, and willing, there can be no question that this manifestation must take the personal form. The manifestation called personal may be defined as *the mode in which an individual, self-identical, and conscious being characteristically expresses its internal nature.*

It only remains then to consider what modifications must be removed from the notion of finite personality in order to render it applicable as a category to the absolute nature. In the first place then we must conceive as removed, all that mutability which has its source in the variations of content. This liability to variation is of course due to the fact that there is always external content that may become internal and bring about a change in the relations of the internal. But to the absolute there is only *one* content, and that is the whole of reality. The internal relations and the personal manifestations will therefore be stable. Again, it will be

necessary to exclude from the notion of absolute personality everything that is due directly or indirectly to that feeling of limit which arises out of the social situation. Out of this arises the sense of modified agency, or of agency turned into passivity by the co-ordinate agency of the other. Now the absolute will be conscious of unimpeded self-activity, and this will express itself in the power as well as the freedom of the personal manifestation. The absolute energy will not be hampered or restrained by any of the limitations which arise out of modifications that are imposed on our finite energies by the co-existence of other energies not our own. The personal manifestation of the absolute must then be represented as not only stable and uniform, which we may express in the one term *immutable*, but also as without limit of power, or *almighty*. Then again there are the restrictions which arise from that sense of relation to the transcendent which renders our manifestations of activity dependent and subject to that which is above us. Not only do we lack the power of initiative in our activity, but in its manifestations it is for ever running upon barriers which are insurmountable, and which must be respected. The finite personality is subject in its manifestations, therefore, to the law of the higher. But from the absolute all this restriction must be removed, and the personal manifestation will be not only independent, that is, *free*, but also itself the highest, that is, *sovereign*. Again, we have found that our agency, subjectively considered, is lacking in complete self-determination. We are conscious of the moment of self-determination, but always as modified by the sense of determination by other. This restriction must be removed from the notion of absolute agency, and it must be conceived not only as free and sovereign, but also completely self-determining or free in the subjective sense. On the objective side we have found our agency modified and rendered finite by that feeling of the coerciveness of things which springs from our lack of absolute initiative. Instead of constituting things in our processes, we are only con-

scious of reconstituting them, and our activity is modified by the moment of receptivity. But the notion of absolute agency is inconsistent with this, and we must represent the absolute processes as originative, or, in other words, *creative*.

We thus arrive at the notion of a subject of absolute experience that is individual, self-identical, and personal in its nature and manifestations—a subject, therefore, that is in all essential regards a self. The transcendent other of the religious consciousness may be regarded, then, as a transcendent self, provided always, that we bear in mind the necessity of freeing the categories under which it is conceived from their relative and finite limitations. The transcendent self of religion is not simply our own other, or even an ideal self in which the idealization has proceeded along finite lines. We will never reach it by following the simple unmodified categories of our own experience out to ideal completeness. This would give us the ideal of sociology but not the object of religion. There is a difference of kind, not simply of degree, which must be recognized, and it can be reckoned with only by freeing the categories themselves from the qualitative limits imposed by their finitude. The observance of this requirement will make it possible for us to conceive how the idealization of the real along finite lines may be possible without peril of the lapse of the finite at any point into the infinite self-consciousness, while on the other hand it enables us to see how categories which arise in our experience in the first instance as forms of the finite and relative may contain in them the possibility of application to the transcendent, in the sense that they will enable us to reach an intelligible concept of its nature. The principal objection to the application of the notion of personality to the absolute subject has had its root in the assumption that personality is a purely finite form, and that to conceive the transcendent subject as personal is tantamount to conceiving it as finite. We have shown, as I think, the fallacy of this supposition, and have exhibited the kind

of transformation necessary in order to render the personal form applicable to the absolute nature.

The application of the categories of individuality, self-identity, and personality to the absolute nature leads to the representation of it as a transcendent or absolute self, but they do not enable us to complete the concept of the object of religion nor to completely identify the God of religion with the transcendent self of metaphysics. Modern religious thought is indebted to Lotze for a very important consideration which he has developed at this stage of religious theory. The God of religion is not simply or distinctively, a being of infinite intelligence, or of infinite power conceived under purely rational categories, but he is above all a being who wills and feels. If we designate the organ of will and feeling as the *heart*, and represent the heart as the spring of ethical and aesthetic interest and motivity, we may say that the God of religion is reached when we conceive a being in whom the principle of infinite intelligence is conceived as inseparably united with the heart, the spring of ethical and aesthetic attributes and motives. Owing to the dominance of what Matthew Arnold calls Hebraism, the ethical has largely superseded the aesthetic in our religious conceptions, and our tendency is to conceive God on the practical side under the moral attributes almost to the exclusion of any other. But in truth the deification of the ethical at the expense of the aesthetic, represents a one-sided tendency in religion, and there are no adequate reasons for supposing that the interest of will is in the last analysis any dearer to the absolute than the interest of feeling. Let us then endeavour to hold the balance at this point, and bearing in mind the results of a preceding analysis, in which the principle of the emotional activity was found to be that of love and its opposite hate, and the principle of the will, self-appropriation or rejection, let us correlate these principles in view of some end-category that will comprehend and satisfy the whole practical interest. We thus arrive at that notion of good, which, as we saw in another connection, holds a co-ordinate position with the true,

and is the basis of what are styled considerations and judgments of value as distinguished from considerations and judgments of truth. The end-category of the heart will then be the *good*, just as the *true* is the end-category of the cognitive intelligence.

What Lotze has made clear in this connection is the fact that the God of religion is a being whose nature must contain both the interest of truth and the interest of value. In short, he must be conceived not simply as the divine intelligence possessing infinite knowledge and power, but also and distinctively, as the divine heart of goodness which pulsates in willing and loving the good of the individual creation, as well as in excluding and hating its evil. In the God of religion there must be a synthesis of the divine intelligence and the divine heart of goodness, and in order that the identity of his being with the transcendent subject of metaphysics may be achieved, and the transcendent basis of religion be completely developed, it will be necessary therefore to discover grounds sufficient to justify the application of the category of goodness to the nature of the absolute self. We may ask then what is involved essentially in the notion of the good, and we will find on analysis that it is simply conservation and unification viewed on their practical side as related to the practical interests of being. When we will the good of any being, the end-category which we have in view is the conservation and completion of its life. We will that its life shall be filled with rich content and rounded out into completeness. And when we love any being we desire either the unification of its life with our own or our own unification with its life. Love in its innermost motive is a unifying principle. The good then as the end-category of the practical is simply the notion of conservation and unification as the objective aim of our activities. We have only to consider, then, at this point in our inquiry, the question whether the notion of goodness is one that is compatible with the nature of a subject of absolute experience. This subject we have found reasons for determin-

ing as an individual and personal self that is related to a sphere of objective activity, and we have seen that the objective activities of the absolute are individuating in their nature, so that through or in them, the absolute self is related to a world of individuals. Now the question whether either truth or goodness as an end-category is compatible with the notion of the absolute self is practically one, and the considerations that settle the one will be sufficient for the other. Let us ask again what it is to be interested in the truth or the good of things, and to make these aims of our activity. It is in the first place to have distinguished between the true or good, and the false or evil. Now we have seen that there inheres in the very constitution of the transcendent nature, as we have been led to conceive it, the necessity of conceiving the negative and opposite, in connection with thinking as well as with willing and feeling, as presenting itself as hypothetically possible and thus leading to the determinate choice of the real as one of possible alternatives. The distinction we have spoken of is involved in the very constitution of things; the absolute distinction between the true and good and the false and evil, is secured. The content of the absolute experience, that which the absolute self chooses to realize, thus becomes from one aspect, the true, and from another, the good. And in general, to ascribe goodness to the absolute is simply to assert that the absolute wills the object of its activities as good in contradistinction to a hypothetical evil which is refused admission into the universe of being. No reason can be assigned why the category of goodness, in the general sense, should not be regarded as compatible with the absolute nature, inasmuch as it simply implies that the absolute aims at the conservation and unification of things in general.

It is only when we conceive this aim as specialized and as contemplating individuals that great difficulty seems to arise. We are wont to think that the absolute may be interested in the conservation of general good, but that it would be derogatory to its infinitude to conceive it as

interested in individual good. But when we consider the matter carefully some of our most formidable difficulties will disappear. We have already seen that the objective activity of the absolute must be regarded as individuating in its nature, so that, objectively, the content of the divine consciousness will always be some finite individual. This is a result of the very first order of importance, inasmuch as it enables us to determine the true status of the finite individual in the system of reality. If the objective activities of the absolute have as their content finite individuals, it will follow that the true as well as the good, objectively considered, will be bound up with the fortunes of the world of finite individuals, and it will be open to us to say, as the mediaeval thinkers were fond of affirming, that the absolute finds its objective good (and its objective truth also) in the plural individuality of the finite world. This was the doctrine of St. Thomas, who goes on to argue that the world must embody itself in an infinite plurality of individuals in order to fully express the divine nature. From this point of view it is clear enough that an interest in individual good cannot be regarded as incompatible with the nature of the absolute. It is reasonable to suppose that the very activity in which the individual originates will contain in it the idea of the individual in its complete realization and unity, and that this idea will be a spring of practical interest and love. No one in view of this can say with any degree of reason that the notion of the good as an end-category, even in its individual application, is not compatible with the concept of absolute nature.

On what grounds then may the heart of goodness be actually ascribed to the absolute? We may concede the compatibility of the notion and yet doubt its reality. And in connection with the question whether as a matter of reality religion is right in ascribing the heart of goodness to God, great practical difficulty arises from the existence of evil in the world. The presence of evil in the world involves a limit to either the power or the goodness of the

supreme disposer of things, it is argued, and the reply of Leibnitz that while evil is unmistakably in the world, yet in the last analysis, it is not real, seems a kind of solemn trifling with a matter of serious import. We cannot solve the problem which evil suggests by denying the reality of evil, but rather by determining the kind of reality it possesses and its relation to the system of things. For the present we shall have to postpone the direct consideration of these questions, but indirectly they will be involved in the direct treatment of the problem of goodness as an attribute of the absolute, to which we now return. What are the direct considerations that bear on this problem? In the first place we have reached the conclusion that evil in the absolute sense is not an included term in the universe of absolute experience, but is excluded as the hypothetically possible opposite and negative of what is realized. In this sense, which is the only absolute sense conceivable, the principle of evil is one of negation and destruction, inasmuch as the hypothetical opposite of being is that which contradicts and excludes it, which would therefore reduce it to non-being. This absolute negative is excluded from the realized universe, but we have seen that it performs the function of definitely determining the absolute choice, so that the being of the real content of the world is chosen in preference to its non-being. Here the very subtle question whether the notion of good is to be conceived as prior to or dependent on the distinction of the real from its hypothetical opposite, comes up and requires some consideration. We have spoken of the hypothetical opposite of the realized content of absolute experience, as possible. But it is strictly only the *possible not to be*; that is, the possibility of non-being. In connection with any given thing, and with the real in general, the alternatives of being and non-being must be recognized as real, and somewhere in connection with everything there must exist the possibility not to be; but with reference to the whole content of the real this possibility will be, not the alternative of

some other type of reality, but the negation of all reality. From the absolute standpoint the hypothetical opposite of the real is that which negatives and suppresses it, and the *real* alternative before the absolute consciousness will be the world that is actually realized or no world at all. It is clear then that the hypothetical opposite of the realized world becomes in its relation to that world a principle of destruction and dissolution, as opposed to the positive categories of conservation and unification.

We may in view of this, answer the question propounded above in the following way. The distinction between the real and that which is destructive of it, is absolutely primary and underlies all other distinctions. The notion of the good or rather the distinction between good and evil and true and false are so far as we can see, first determinations under these formal categories. The evil and the false are from two different aspects that which is destructive and dissolutive of the nature of being, that which contradicts and thwarts its conservation and unification, while the good and the true are, in the last analysis, that which is congruous with and furthers the conservation and unification of being. The distinction of the good and true is thus an intra-experiential one, and there can be no other conceivable meaning for either the good or the true, in the last analysis, than that which applies them as first qualifications to the content of absolute experience. To ascribe the heart of goodness to the absolute subject of experience would from this point of view be tantamount to asserting that the absolute chooses and loves its own objective content. When we have once conceded the power of the absolute to choose and love, the above is practically a self-evident proposition.

Now, this general conclusion will carry with it the solution of one aspect of the problem of evil, inasmuch as it will be necessary to deny the absoluteness of evil as an intra-experiential term. The only sense in which evil can be conceived as absolute is one which regards it as an ever-present alternative which is excluded by the positive nature

of the real. Evil as an intra-experiential term must be derivative and therefore relative. We have thus reached an important distinction. The good is intra-experiential, but as a principle of the positive conservation of the real it is absolute and has its first seat in the heart of absolute nature, whereas evil by virtue of its negative, destructive character is excluded from that seat and determined as relative. Evil as an intra-experiential term has a presupposition, and that is the good. This brings us to a point where we can consider the more special problem of the heart of goodness; namely, its relation to the finite individuals of the world. That the absolute hates evil may be taken as established, but that the absolute should hate the finite individual involves a self-contradiction. Hate is dissolutive and destructive, but not of being: it is the negative of a negation and that negation is evil. The hate of being would involve its destruction and, therefore, the admission of the principle of absolute evil into the world. We cannot, then, allow that there is a real alternative here at all. To suppose that the absolute could choose to hate being would be to suppose that it could become an absolute impersonation of evil. The notion is intolerable. We must rather conclude that the absolute's choice and love of being involves its choice and love of the individuals into which objective being resolves itself. Even science affirms this in its refusal to allow that any matter or energy can be ultimately lost, and in its invincible faith in conservation. It is the absolute's choice and love of the individuals of the world, that is the ground of their conservation. The faith of science and that of religion are one, and in asserting the perdurability of the individual each from its own point of view, each, in substance, asserts the immutability of that choice and love in which the individual has its origin.

We may assume then that there are adequate grounds for ascribing the heart of goodness to the absolute, and, therefore, for regarding the absolute as the God of religion. And this will practically complete the transcendent basis of

religion while at the same time it will place the problem of evil in a somewhat different relation to the religious view of the world. We have already concluded that evil as an intra-experiential term can be regarded only as relative, and we have also seen that as a relative term it is not co-ordinate with good but has good for its presupposition. The notion of disease presupposes that of the sound organism, and the presupposition of the abnormal is the normal. What bearing, we may then ask, have these facts of the relativity of evil in relation to the world of experience in general and in particular relation to the good, on the interpretation of evil as a feature of a finite and relative world? We do not propose to go into detail here, but simply to make some suggestions by way of answer. Jonathan Edwards, in his profound treatise on *The Nature of True Virtue*,¹ defines the good as in its last analysis, *consent to being or being's consent to entity*. In this abstract phraseology this great thinker expresses his conviction that good is an ultimate conception and identical with the principle of reality itself viewed from the standpoint of will. We have reached the same conclusion in our analysis and have endeavoured to show how this primary choice of good is involved in the notion of absolute experience. To the mind of Edwards, had he considered the negative side of the problem, evil would have appeared in its absolute form as the denial of this consent and therefore the negation of reality itself, a moment which, as we have seen, must be conceived as present, but excluded from the content of absolute experience. St. Augustine denies the absoluteness of evil not only in his rejection of the doctrine of the Manichaeans but more specifically in his own doctrine developed in the *Confessions* and *De Civitate Dei*,² in which he ascribes the origin of evil to an evil will, which, as he says, has as its antecedent a good will, and

¹ *The Nature of True Virtue*, Chap. I., showing wherein the essence of true virtue consists.

² *Confessions*, Book VII., Chap. xvi. *De Civitate Dei*, Book XII., sec. 6.

he finds the ground of the possibility of an evil will in the defect or nothingness of finite nature. We find here a profound sense of the relativity and at the same time the gravity, of evil. It is relative as a feature of reality but seems to be bound up with the nature of the finite. I think we are in a position here to interpret this fundamentally true insight. If we conceive will broadly enough, it resolves itself in the last analysis into the principle of self-conservation, and this in its simplest form may be regarded as the pulse of self-assertion ; the inner nature asserting itself in a positive self-realizing pulsation. Will is thus to be conceived as the inner self-conserving pulse of being. It is here that evil originates if it is to be a real feature of our nature, and we have seen that it is a feature of relative, not of absolute nature. The question which Augustine only partially answered arises in this connection ; how does evil become possible, and, if possible, then possibly actual to a finite being ? To this question Augustine truly replies ; through its defectiveness or nothingness. I think we are able here to carry the answer a little further. The content of relative nature cannot be deduced from the notion of the absolute. We find that content experimentally and through psychological analysis, and following these lines we have been led to the insight that the finite individual is a being related, on one hand to its finite or social other, and on the other hand, to its infinite or transcendent other, and that both of these relations impose limits and modifications on its agency. We know also that the inner pulse of the finite individual is one of self-conservation ; it directly seeks its good. It is true, as we have also seen, that the final pulse of the finite is one of unification, through which it realizes oneness with its fellow and anchors its life in the transcendent. But this unifying pulse presupposes the pulse of self-assertion or egoism, which, as we now see, may in its straightforward aspiration for self-expression collide with the social and transcendent terms with which its life is connected. The possibility of this is inherent in

the straightforward pulsation of a finite will. The finite agency by virtue of its finitude, that is, by virtue of those respects in which it is modified and reduced to passivity by the finitude of its nature, is thus rendered liable to collision with other forces. We are thus able to translate the defect and nothingness of Augustine into more ultimate and, as I think, more intelligible terms. For it is easy enough to see how out of this situation the three most striking forms of evil may arise—pain, accident, sin. The collision needs only to be translated into biological terms, failure to adapt or maladaptation of the conserving life-impulses to their conditions, in order that the possible origin of *pain* may become intelligible. The same collision needs only to be conceived in connection with the straight out-push of a plurality of finite forces in order that what we call *accident*—that blind fatality and blind cross-purpose feature which plays so large a figure in human experience and drives so many minds to pessimistic despair—may become intelligible. Again, we have only to conceive the collision in its direct reaction upon the social and the transcendent will, to be able to see how *sin* originates as a rebellion against and opposition to, the social or religious other; that is, as rebellion and war against man and God.

We are thus led to conceive evil in its intra-experiential form as being a term of relativity, and yet as a very deep and radical feature of our finite experience. From this point of view it will also be clearly seen, I think, that the question why the absolute permits evil is essentially foolish and irrational. The profoundest religious consciousness rejects the notion of mere permission as a kind of paltering, and prefers to think that God is the author of evil as well as good; not however as a direct end like the good, for in this sense we have seen that evil is an excluded term, but as a relative condition of the possibility of finite good. Even sin may in this sense have a necessary place in the divine economy. The true solution of the difficulty which arises here will not be met, I feel sure, by any timid compromise,

but rather by the recognition of what we are led to by the whole analysis of experience; namely, *the fact that the egoistic pulse out of which evil arises is an abstraction when considered by itself, and that logically as well as really and essentially, the individual only exercises its real and true agency when the pulse of egoism is followed by that transcending pulse of unification which integrates and harmonizes the individual with its other, and brings the finite soul into harmony with man and God.* In the very constitution of experience the place of evil is determined in such a way that we are able to accept it as part of the constitution of things, and as therefore a real and profound feature of our world, in connection with the faith that the only end-category of being is the good, and that the heart of goodness in the world contemplates the realization of the good in and through the effort that is involved in overcoming the evil.

The consideration of evil leads directly to that of the mediational feature of religion. Evil in one of its forms is sin, and the consciousness of sin in its religious aspect is that of dissent from or disharmony with, the transcendent other with which the religious consciousness relates us. This sense of disharmony may arise from actual overt rebellion against the will of God, or from failure to realize the moment of unification with God. We feel ourselves to be sinners, in short, when we assert ourselves egoistically against God, or when we feel simply that we have not taken that final step of unification with the transcendent which our religious consciousness requires. The consciousness of sin thus arises, and leads to a complete rupture of harmonious relations between the finite soul and God. The soul begins to be weighed down with a feeling of guilt, and this leads to a sense of the divine wrath; that is, the sense of being the object of God's indignation and displeasure rather than of his complacence and love, and this sense of the Divine wrath leads to the feeling of infinite distance, of banishment from God's presence and to a foreboding of punishment as the just desert of our sins. Now, it is possible to interpret all this

in a purely subjective sense, and to regard it as largely an illusion of feeling, and, therefore, not in any real sense a genuine feature of religious experience. There is a fashion of this kind in our contemporary thinking. But I think we are in a position to see that what we have here described springs out of the very constitution of things. The relation of sin to the finite consciousness we have already seen, and all this result of guilt and alienation from God and apprehension of wrath and punishment, is the normal and necessary result of the serious disturbance of fundamental relations which sin brings about. Given, a finite consciousness related to a transcendent other and a sense of sin, and all the rest follows as an inevitable result. We think then that the reasons are sufficient for accepting this side of religious experience as an essential part of it, and it is in connection with this feature that the mediational element is developed. A study of the history of religion shows that the need of some kind of mediation has been recognized from the beginning. The sense of guilt and the apprehension of wrath have led to various forms of expiation and propitiation on the one hand, and on the other, to interposition of the priestly mediator and intercessor. The guilty soul, troubled with a sense of the Divine wrath, feels too distant and too unworthy for any direct approaches to the offended being, and the mediation of a third becomes necessary to render the expiatory and propitiatory acts effective in bringing about remission of guilt and reconciliation. Now, what I wish to accent here is the fact that in passing from the lower forms of religion which embody the more rudimentary religious experiences of the race, to the higher and more developed religions of the spiritual type, we do not find these features dropping away but rather becoming transformed and spiritualized. In Judaism, Buddhism, Islamism, Christianity, we find in a different way, of course, and one that is suited to the genius of the religion, a common emphasis of the mediational features, and this is what we would be led to expect when we have once come

to regard the experiences on which this feature is founded as fundamental rather than accidental.

It does not lie within the scope of this inquiry to follow the individual or historical aspect of this feature of religious experience into detail, but we shall conclude with a brief consideration of the metaphysical significance of the idea of mediation in religion. Mediation cannot be left standing as a solitary feature, but must be related along with religious experience as a whole, to the end-category of being the finite individual's realization of good through the unification of its life with that of God its transcendent other. Even in a universe where evil did not arise, the unification of the finite with its transcendent ground would be necessary, and this would require, not perhaps the historic working out of any scheme of mediation in finite and temporal forms, but without doubt the personal mediation of the absolute itself in relating itself vitally to the finite. I mean by this to reaffirm what has in substance been already asserted. We have seen that the absolute subject in its objective activities relates itself to the finite individual not only in the thought that conceives it but also in the selective will that realises and the love that conserves it. We have here only to remember that this all lies in the personal relation of the absolute to its world, in order to see how, in relation to the finite consciousness, the absolute may become, through its whole concrete relationship to the soul of the finite, the Father in which its life is conceived and purposed, the Son through whose volitional energy it is realised, and the Spirit in which it is conserved through the unifying force of love.

We are not considering here what grounds of personal distinction there may be in the absolute nature, but rather what distinguishable elements are involved in the personal relation of the absolute to finite existence, and we are able to see that in any system of things, irrespective of the presence of evil as a factor, it would be necessary to conceive the point of mediation and unity between finite and

infinite under the personal form. But in a system where evil did not arise we may suppose that this point of mediation would continue latent and the finite soul would consciously relate itself only directly and *immediately* to its transcendent other. The rise of the consciousness of evil, however, and especially that of sin, would force this latent moment into explicitness, and the emphasis of the mediational term would become necessary. Sin, by the rupture of relations it involves and the distance and alienation it effects and the load of guilt and demerit it entails, projects into the consciousness of the finite soul such a sense of its lost and ruined condition that all its finite resources seem to be worthless, and it realizes that its only help is in God. The constitutional necessity thus arises for the working out of the Divine mediation in a finite individual world; that is, in the form of a finite individual experience, and on a plane that will connect it historically with the evolution of the life of the finite in its social and historic forms—a mediation that will supply on its finite, human side the ideal of a redeemed and unified humanity, while on its divine side it provides an exhaustless spring of regenerating and conserving spiritual energy. The Christ-idea and the need of divine mediation in the sphere of religion are thus rooted deep down in the constitution of man's nature.

CHAPTER VIII.

GROUNDING OF RELATIVE CONCEPTIONS.

THE distinction which the conception of the absolute as experience enables us to make between its subjective and self-realizing and its objective and world-realizing activities is of the greatest value to us in enabling us to reach a true and adequate notion of our relations to God. The difficulty heretofore has been to satisfy the demand of the religious consciousness for nearness to God without incurring the metaphysical peril of absorption into the infinite consciousness and practical identification with the divine. Protest as the finite spirit may that its only desire is absorption into the infinite, it knows in its inmost heart that it is uttering a falsehood, and that the thought of this absorption into the subjective-consciousness of the absolute not only runs counter to its own instinct of self-preservation, but also causes the foundations of its being to quiver with the shock of irreverence. The finite soul shrinks from absorption into the subjective consciousness of God. But to be included in the divine experience as the object of the thought and conserving love of God ; that is a different thing. We cannot live too close to the objective thought and love of God, and we do not need to fear here that our penny rushlight will be extinguished in the central sun, for we have seen that this objective divine energy is the very individuating force which originates and conserves what we are conscious of as

our personal and individual self. Our metaphysical insight enables us to see how, in relation to the objective life of the divine, we may unite in the aspiration of the hymn, "Nearer, my God, to Thee," or in the profoundly satisfying statement of the inspired writer, "For in Him we live and move and have our being." Having once realized that we owe our origin and continuance in being to the objective individuating activity of the divine experience, we will be prepared to realize the fact that the religious aspiration for nearness and communion with God is but a form of the aspiration for greater fullness and completeness of individual life.

The remainder of this chapter we propose to devote to the development of the transcendent ground of certain concepts of the relative, in order to establish the general truth that even in their relative form they are not capable of any ultimately satisfactory explanation apart from their metaphysical ground. We bring up in this connection the distinctions of the good and bad and the true and false, in order to draw a conclusion or two which will be more obvious here than at any earlier point in our discussion. The final relation between the good and the true has already engaged our attention, and we have seen that from the standpoint of the absolute experience the same content is both true and good; true because it is congruous with the notion of the absolute whole of experience, and good because it fulfils the demand of the absolute to be satisfied in the content of its experience. The vital point here is that the same content is in one aspect of it true, and in another, good. It is open then from the standpoint of the absolute to say without qualification that what is good must be true, and, conversely, what is true must be good. The judgment of truth and the judgment of value would thus coalesce in the absolute. Now it is not possible to say in general from any finite point of view that the true and the good are one, and that because anything is practically necessary it must therefore be theoretically true, and the reason of this is now obvious. The very finitude of our experience renders it

possible that our cognitive and practical activities and aims should diverge and that our intellectual and practical content should not completely coincide, and this renders possible an antinomy between the good and true, so that in the extreme case, loyalty to truth may impel us in one direction while loyalty to goodness may be pulling us in an opposite direction. What we wish to show here is that although no unvarying rule is possible, yet the connection of the relative and finite with the absolute renders possible and legitimate the application of the principle of the identity of the true and good within certain definable limits.

In the first place, the identity, or at least the complete harmony, of the good and true in the absolute experience grounds the rational presumption that, in the last analysis, the good and true in an experience that is only relative, will be found to harmonize. That rational presumption works out in the assurance that what is clearly involved in the end-category of good, for the finite and relative, so that the event of its not being realizable would mean the virtual shipwreck of the good, cannot be regarded as untrue or unreal without reducing our world to a state of irrational confusion. We are already familiar with this principle and its application, and here we are seeking the ultimate ground on which it rests. The presumption has no other root than the notion of an absolute experience in which it becomes necessary. If the finite and relative are denied any connection with an absolute, then the presumption is baseless, and we may smile at it as one of those illusions with which the finite seeks to divert itself from the sense of its own unreality. We have seen, however, that the presumption is woven into the very texture of a rational scheme of things, and that its denial is tantamount to an ultimate denial of the principle of rationality in our world. Here we have gone a step further, and have realized the fact that an absolute experience is the only solid basis for such a principle, inasmuch as it is only in an absolute experience that it can be unconditionally true. In the

second place, we are able here to conceive the true relation between the considerations of truth and value in our judgments. The impossibility of a hard and fast separation of the two sets of motives will be apparent. The possibility of an actual separation of the content of the good and true is an affair of the relative, and has no place in the absolute. The rationality of the world is not in the last analysis expressible in *two* judgments, but in *one* which involves the good and the true. There can be no restriction placed on the freedom of an absolute experience to assert ; this is good and therefore true, or ; this is true and therefore good. And this unconditional unity of the good and true gives us the ultimate formulation of the principle of rationality. *The ultimately rational in our world is that which in relation to an absolute whole of experience is both unconditionally true and unconditionally good.*

Another relative distinction for which we have to seek a grounding in the notion of absolute experience, is that which is involved in the correlative concepts of *freedom* and *necessity*. The extreme difficulty of reaching any tenable idea of the meaning of these terms has become a commonplace of philosophical discussion. If we only knew what the terms freedom and necessity mean, there would then be a reasonable presumption in favour of our being able to determine the nature of their application to our experience. The truth seems to be, that in the notions of freedom and necessity we have a pair of concepts which, taken in abstract relation to a purely relative and finite experience, are, in the last analysis, unintelligible. The first hint of their intelligibility arises when we conceive them in connection with the notion of an absolute experience. We find this first germ of intelligibility in Spinoza ; only Spinoza was unable to avail himself of his riches because of his failures to recognize the reality of the finite and relative. Let us then take the Spinoza point of view, and ask what do freedom and necessity mean as categories of an absolute experience ? It will be clear, I think, that we here strike a relation similar to that between

the good and true. The absolute is free and necessitated in relation to one and the same content, and we have to ask in what sense are these categories applicable to one and the same experience? The solution of the knot will be found, I think, in the distinction already recognized as fundamental, between the subjective and objective consciousness of the absolute. The category of freedom is to be applied subjectively, while that of necessity is applicable only to the objective experience. In short, the presupposition of the objective experience is the subjective, but the absolute subject has no presupposition. We strike here the original spring of power and activity. Now, the absolute subject as the original spring of power and activity, must be conceived as absolutely self-determining. We mean by that, that the determination of the absolute subject-activity has no *prius* or condition external to itself, and it is to this self-originative, self-determining agency that the notion of freedom in its unconditional sense is applicable. It would be folly to say in connection with this self-determination that it is also necessary because the subject determines according to its own nature. The absolute subject *is* its own nature, and does not presuppose it. Self-determination *is* its primal activity. But the objective individuating activity of the absolute experience has a presupposition, and that is the activity of the subject, and when it is viewed in relation to the subject-nature of the absolute, this objective activity becomes necessary. The absolute is free; but objectively the absolute acts in accordance with its nature. Its nature expresses itself in an unimpeded objective activity, which from this point of view we call free because unimpeded. But, fundamentally, it is necessary, inasmuch as on the presupposition of the absolute subject-nature, it could not be conceived as otherwise. It is true then that God acts according to the necessity of his nature. But his nature is himself. Because he himself is absolute he is free, and because he acts in an unimpeded and unrestrained way his objective activity is

necessary, for *necessity in the last analysis means the unconditional expression in object-activity of the nature of an absolute subject of experience; while freedom in the last analysis means the self-originating and self-determining agency of an absolute subject of experience.*

From this point of view we may hope to be able, I think, to reach some intelligible conclusion on the problem of freedom and necessity in connection with our relative experience. That freedom is a category of subjective experience, and necessity one of objective experience, may be taken as settled. The question of freedom must be debated, then, in this sphere, in connection with the subject-activity of the finite and relative self. And in the consideration there will have to be included (1) the relation of the finite self to its transcendent other, and (2) the nature of its own internal agency. Let us suppose, to start with, that the finite subject is free, or would be free, unless there be something in its relation to the absolute that impairs or destroys this freedom. We may then ask what is the bearing of the absolute relation on the possibility of free agency? It is here, I think, that we meet a very important root of difficulty. Man has an inextinguishable feeling that in the deepest recesses of his nature he is free, but it is precisely in these recesses that his nature meets its inevitable, in the agency of its transcendent other. What we have to determine is whether the agency of this transcendent other renders the finite individual free or necessitated. Now, we have seen that it is the objective activity of the absolute that grounds the finite individual, and we have seen that this activity is necessary in its relation to the subject-nature of the absolute. Is it a second time over necessary in its relation to the finite individual? We answer that *the objective activity of the absolute does not suppose that there is an individual already there and that it is simply acting upon it; but its activity is in reality originative and constitutive of the individual which is there as the creature of this individuating activity.* Let us fully grasp the fact that

the objective activity of the absolute is constitutive and immediate, and then we will be ready to regard the finite individual *as the originating point of a new subjectivity that is free in its own subject-nature*, although admitting the dependence of that nature for its being, on the activity of the transcendent. If this be true we will then be able to understand the deep sense of freedom that is our imperishable possession, as well as the sense that we have in our religious experience that the near approach to God does not impede, but rather tends to complete, our own freedom. We come then to the question of the nature of our own finite agency, as that in which the final solution of the problem of our freedom will be involved. The actual determination of the form of self-agency is a task for the psychologist, and we have to thank him for the investigation which enables us to say that in its *form* the agency of the self is flawlessly self-determining. The mechanical notion of the activity of will which conceives the motive to be a causal entity distinct from the self that is determined and as external to it, is no longer tenable, and the psychologist has taught us that all motives in order to influence choice must become internal and a part of the determining self. The determining and the determined self thus become one. The form of self-determination is flawless, and self-determination is free-determination. Why should we not admit then that man possesses freedom in its unmodified sense? This would follow if this word of psychology were the very last. We find, however, that we cannot regard it as such, but must enter the sacred precincts of the inner nature of the self which determines itself in this form, and ask what this nature is that expresses itself in this way, and here we find an important ally in the genetic psychologist who is proving to us by his careful study of mental history that the self in us is not an isolated individual, but rather a *socius*; that is, a self that includes in its sense of itself also its sense of its other or not-self, and that its whole activity is a function of this self-other-including consciousness. We have accepted this result

elsewhere, and have made it fundamental in our own reflection. Here we recur to it again in order to lay down the proposition, that it is in and through this internal consciousness of the *socius* that those motives of volition which are admitted to be of extra-subjective origin are able to become incorporated with the self, and to perform a function in that determination which takes place in an act of will. Self-determination becomes in this way *partial determination by other*, and it is through this internalising of extra-subjective motivity under the consciousness of the other, that the agency of the subject of finite experience is related, and rendered in a measure subject, to the influence of the environment of individuals with which it is in responsive relations; and, from the point of view of development in time, with its antecedents through transmission and heredity. This opens the agency of the self to that modification which introduces the moment of passivity and receptivity into it, and renders it both agent and patient in one and the same activity.

It is clear then that freedom cannot be ascribed in any absolute sense to the agency of the finite self. The form of its activity is self-determination, and it is, therefore, formally free, but it is not really and unqualifiedly self-determining in the sense of being an unimpeded, unmodified spring of self-activity. Its activity is modified and partly determined by motives that have their spring in sources outside the finite individual experience. Relatively then, it may be said with truth from different points of view, of course, that man is both self-determined and determined by other, and the freedomists and determinists both have a case. But the truth of the situation is to be sought in a concept that will transcend while conserving the truth of both contentions. This will be achieved in the reflection, that, after, all the core of the experience is the pulse of free self-initiative which the self exercises by virtue of its constituted nature as an individual, and that the influence of the other operates as an internal modification by forcing it partly into passivity.

This being the case, the ideal of the finite agent is, not the suppression of the modification, for this would be to become absolute—and the finite soul shrinks from identification with the absolute—but rather an end-state in which there is such an integration and unification of the modifying other with the self-agency, that their motives virtually coalesce and become one. The freedom that is ascribable to the finite individual and that is attainable by it, is therefore (1) a spring of modified self-initiative that is in harmony with its social nature, and (2) an end-category or ideal that may be realized through the unification of the motives of the other with those that inhere in the central spring of self-activity.

The term necessity is not applicable to such agency. In so far as the agency of the self is determined and not free, it is determined under the form of freedom, and therefore the notion of determination must be distinguished from that of necessity. To be determined is to be moved to action by that whose source, in the last analysis, is not in the determined being's own nature. Determination may be effected externally and mechanically or internally and under the form of freedom. We have seen that the former is excluded from the sphere of self-agency. The only notion of determination applicable here is that of the internal influence of the other, operating in the form of motive. Now, necessity is a category of immediacy and excludes the notion of determination by other. Necessity applies to an objective activity that springs directly from some inner subject-nature. It must be connected directly with the spring of self-initiative, and through this immediate relation it becomes necessitated.

The notion of necessity then so far as it is a tenable one, must be applied to the objective rather than to the subject-activity of the finite. If it is a category of the finite it will apply only to that objective activity to which Locke and Hume vainly tried to limit the whole question of freedom, and in which Professor Paulsen seems to follow them.¹ It

¹ *Principles of Ethics*, English translation, chap. ix., pp. 452-472.

shows a complete misapprehension of the situation to assert, as these and other writers do, that man is free to act in accordance with his choice, for this can only mean that ordinarily he will not be prevented by any mechanical application of force from so acting. But such an assertion does not touch the real direct relation between subjective determination and objective activity, which is that of necessity and which would be absolute were the nature that determines itself to action, absolute. I mean by this that, given an absolute nature, then its objective activity is absolutely predictable in the light of that nature, inasmuch as all the terms of the activity have their springs in its depths. But the activity of a relative and finite self is not absolutely predictable, since some of its springs of activity are not internal to its nature, and this as we saw in the discussion of evil, introduces an incalculable element which has to be reckoned with and which reduces the notion of necessity here to the relative form.

Another pair of relative conceptions are those involved in the terms *mechanical* and *teleological*. The efforts of thinkers to determine the relations of these concepts have not been wholly satisfactory, largely because of their failure to determine the meaning of the notions themselves. One thing is clear at the outset, I think, and that is, that whatever the terms mechanical and teleological may signify ultimately; in their first and most obvious sense they apply to the notion of agency. And when we look for the point of characteristic difference we find it in a distinction with which we are already familiar; between self-agency and that of the other. The notion of teleology arises in connection with the thought of some conscious subject either absolute or relative, whose activity is motived by some end-category, the good or the true, which it is conceived to be realizing. This end-category entering as an internal motive becomes the aim or purpose of the activity. Thus a teleological activity is said to be one that is internal and contains its end within itself as a spring of interest and motivity. It is clear that the concept

of teleology will be applicable, in the first instance, to the absolute experience where alone it will be unconditionally true that every activity springs directly from the concept of it in the absolute mind. For we cannot separate thought and realizing activity in the absolute as they may be separated in the relative.

Mechanical agency, on the contrary, is directly connected with the notion of the *other*, and this notion, in the first instance at least, involves two concepts of agency, (1) that of externality of mode as distinguished from internality of mode. By this we mean that the notion of the mechanical mode of influencing or producing changes is, physically speaking, by outside impact, or at least by an agency that does not involve the internalizing of the impulse as self-determining motive. (2) The concept of mechanism does not contemplate the straight outflow of the activity of any inner nature, but rather the generation of changes, by means of the influence of one factor upon another, in a system composed of a plurality of parts. The concept of mechanical agency will differ from that of teleological agency as the externally operating activity of a plurality of terms differs from an activity internally motived by the apprehension of an end-category.

Now, there are two stages, as we may say, in the application of the concept of mechanism to the content of relative experience. The first arises when we apply the mathematical principles of quantitative determination to the world conceived as a causal series in time. It will present itself then as a developing system of causally-determined parts; that is, the several parts of the world-series will be conceived as having their conditioned rise in parts antecedent to, and outside of them, in time. The application of the mathematical calculus to such a series will develop the first construct of the world from the mechanical point of view. But this view of the world leads on to another that is more profound. We have seen that it is impossible to stop with the concept of a world-series in time, but that the content of the series must be resolved into a plurality of ultimate

individuals that are represented as in mutually modifying interaction. To this more ultimate concept of the world as a plurality of interacting individuals, the principles of mathematical determination may again be applied and there will emerge a higher mechanical conception of the world in which it is represented as a system of interacting individuals, either force centres or atoms, out of the reciprocal and combining activities of which, arise all the phenomena of the world. We have endeavoured to shew in the chapters of the second part of this treatise, which deal with the categories of the dynamic consciousness, how the principles of the higher mechanism are developed. But the common characteristic of both forms consists in their adherence to the notion of *external* as distinguished from that of *internal* agency, involving as it does the supposition of a plurality of mutually exclusive and external factors. Now, mechanism as thus far conceived, is a relative conception. We have seen in another connection how in the sphere of relativity there is a point where the mechanical is transcended in the notion of internal agency. But here we wish to consider another question, and that is, how the concept of mechanism is related to the notion of an absolute experience ? There is of course an indirect relation through the concept of teleology, but is there not also a *direct* relation ? We think there is, and that it arises in the notion of the content of experience as constituting an absolute self-contained whole. In dealing with the transcendent ground of cosmology we saw how the moment of transcendent agency is involved in all the ultimate concepts of science. Here we are supplementing the conclusions there reached by pointing out a kind of transcendence that is especially involved in the notion of mechanism. It is only in an absolute whole of experience that we can be unconditionally certain that no loss of energy will ever take place, but that what disappears in one form will reappear in some other ; or that the least particle of matter will never be subtracted from the sum total ; or that the individuals shall be perdurable and their relations uniform

and stable. None of these assumptions could be made unconditionally of a limited experience or of anything short of an absolute whole of experience. The concept of mechanism is therefore grounded ultimately in the notion of an absolute whole of experience in which the elements and relations are perdurable and stable.

Mechanism may thus complete itself directly in the notion of absolute experience and there is no need from this point of view that there should be any recognition of teleology. We mean that the notion of externally acting agency embodying itself in a quantitative form is one that may be carried out to ideal completeness, and this is evidence that in the mechanical aspect of the world we come upon a phase of reality and not an unreal appearance. The notion of mechanism is to be transcended, not because it stops somewhere, but because experience has other concepts that its notion does not include, and which in the last analysis are perhaps inclusive but certainly not subversive, of mechanism.

Now, in truth the notion of mechanism begins to be transcended when we reach a point in experience where a transition must be made from the concept of external to that of internal agency. We have seen where and how this transition becomes necessary. We find that the notion of external influence in an interacting system, or in any system in fact, is not tenable if we attempt to conceive it as *final*, but that the mode of influence must be conceived as internal, so that *a* influences *b* by becoming internal to *b*, and we have seen in the chapter on *The Transcendent Object* how this involves in the last resort an internal conceptual mode of activity which embodies itself in the objective rationality of the world. The mode of transcendence is *qualitative*, therefore, and leaves the notion of mechanism intact. Our world becomes teleological not because mechanism breaks down anywhere and proves itself invalid, but because mechanism has a presupposition on one side which leads to its own transcendence. The world becomes teleological because at a point in experience that may be determined, it

becomes necessary to supplement mechanism with the notion of internal agency, and we have seen that internal agency is the analogue of conceptually initiated agency, and that, therefore, the last principle of the world must be one of intelligence and rationality. This conclusion, mechanism itself is interested in affirming, because in the last resort its mode of agency becomes conceivably possible only when qualified by and grounded in, the mode which we call teleological.

We have seen that everywhere the content of experience is ultimately reducible to the individual form, and we are here in sight of an analogous conclusion with reference to the agency of the world. We may start with the notion of mechanism, which is only quasi-individual, although the germ of individuality is latent in it; but a point will be reached in our reflection where it will be necessary to make a transition from mechanism to the teleological concept of agency, and this transition is effected in the emergence into explicitness of the germ of individuality latent in mechanism, and in the completion of the notion of individual agency. The notion of individual agency is in the last analysis that of subjectively initiated activity. The notion of *teleology* has its root therefore in the concept of a *subject-activity in experience in which all objective activity has its source and ground, and the point of transition from mechanism to teleology is, in the last analysis, identical with that point in experience where it becomes necessary to pass from the notion of objective and external to that of subjective and internal agency.*

The last topic which we shall consider in this chapter is that of the finite individual, and what we shall have to say of its nature and metaphysical basis has been to a great extent anticipated in preceding discussions. We have seen how the experience-content resolves itself ultimately into individual forms, so that our world becomes a world of individuals. We have also in the preceding chapter found that the objective activity of the absolute experience is

individuating and finitizing in its very constitution, and we have called this *the principle of individuation*. Inasmuch, however, as the objective activity of the absolute has a subjective presupposition, the very last root of the individuating activity of the world is to be found in the individuality of the absolute subject of experience itself. If the absolute were not individual there would be no reason and no ground in experience for the individual. The religious consciousness tells us that we are individuals *because* God is individual. Starting then with finite experience as we know it, we find there a subject-activity that expresses itself objectively in an activity which is, in the last analysis, individuating and which reduces the content of experience to the individual form. Our finite world is thus a world of individuals, and it is upon this basis that science rests the ground-principles of its procedure. We found, however, on further analysis that the finite individuals of the world and the forms of their agency, have presuppositions which lead to their connection with something transcendent in which alone they can be completed and stably grounded; and the investigation of this transcendent presupposition leads to its embodiment in the concept of an absolute experience which comprehends and grounds the sphere of the finite. Furthermore, we find on analysis that a distinction must be made in the absolute experience between its subject- and object-activities, and that the world of finite individuals is related immediately to the objective activity which is individuating in its nature, and we are led thus to conceive the finite individual as constituted in an objective posit of absolute experience. That this objective posit should be individual we are forced in the last analysis to refer to its sources in that primal individuality of the absolute subject which determines its objective activity as individuating, and that it should be finite, we are forced to refer in the last resort to the essential nature of objective activity, which is *pluralizing*, and involves a partition in the content of absolute experience as a whole. We have seen how profoundly the notion

of plurality enters into the concepts of finitude and relativity. Presupposing the objective individuating activity of the absolute, the partition of content is directly involved in its immediate agency, and in this is wrapped up the being and nature of the finite individual. All this is either supposed or implicit in the objective posit in which the individual must be supposed to have its origin.

We have already admitted that the content of finite individuality cannot in the first instance be deduced, but that the organ of finite experience must be employed in order to discover what that content is. What we have maintained is that no concept of the absolute is adequate to a first-hand deduction of the nature and content of the finite. In this we split with the thought of Hegel, but we are perhaps anticipating the truer Hegel in our contention here that though the organ of finite experience must be our guide in the first stages in the discovery of content, yet in order to reach a final construction, Virgilius must give way to Beatrice. We have seen that the analysis of finite experience leads necessarily to the development of the postulate of absolute experience as its ground, and that the presuppositionless root of absolute experience is found in the concept of an absolute subject. And what we maintain here is *that the concept of absolute experience when once achieved becomes a necessary guide to the comprehension of the relative*. We do not need to enlarge on this principle so far as its application to the grounding of the individual forms of finite experience is concerned, for this will be obvious; but what we wish to maintain here is that the concept of absolute experience once achieved, enables us to ground the content of finite individuality. We have found the norm of individuality in the nature of the absolute subject, and in precisely the same way we find it necessary to refer the internal structure of the individual to the absolute nature as its normative spring. The objective activity of the absolute in the posit of which the finite individual originates, cannot be an empty activity, but must, as we have contended in another connec-

tion, be informed and guided by a concept which performs the function of end-category. Now this concept can be no less than an idea of the nature that is instituted in the act, and it cannot be a mere form but must have content. Can we say what this content will be? Manifestly, it can be no other than the thought of the instituted nature; that is, *an idea of an individual, self-identical subject that shall express itself in the objective activities of experience, and be in truth a real self.* This result must be connected with another insight that we have reached; namely, that the objective activity of the absolute experience is immediately individuating, but only meditately and indirectly finitizing. It terminates in a *finite* and *relative* individual by virtue, first, of the constitutive nature of its agency—the finite individual is its posit; and, secondly, by virtue of the plurality and partition of content which its activity involves. We thus find that while the individuality of the finite and relative is involved in the immediacy of the absolute thought, yet its finitude and relativity are there only as qualifications which must inevitably arise in the process of realization. We cannot say that the finite and relative as such are immediate in the thought of the absolute; but the individual is immediately in the thought, and the finitude and relativity are there as necessary conditions of the individual's becoming real.

With this result, that the nature of the finite individual has its prius in the idea that informs the positing activity, we need to connect another that arises on the side of the relative and finite. We have seen how lack of absolute self-initiative, combined with the modifications of content and agency involved in the plurality of individuals, determines them in their nature and agency to be finite and relative. That the determining conditions of finitude and relativity should arise not in the notion of individuality but in the *process of its objective realization* is confirmation on this side of the problem, of the conclusion we reached by deduction from the notion of the absolute—namely, that the

finitude and relativity of the individual is not part of the immediacy of the absolute thought, but only related to it as inherent in the realizing process. Taking this as settled, we are in a position to make a distinction of some importance between two kinds of content in the finite nature. If the relation of finite individuality to the conditions in which it arises are as we have represented them, we may expect to find in the nature of the finite individual (1) a content that comes there through the immediacy of its relation to the thought of it present in the activity by which it is constituted; and (2) a content put there by the modifying conditions that determine it as finite and relative. And the point which we wish to put the accent on here is that the content implanted through the immediacy of the absolute idea in the positing act, constitutes a germ of absoluteness in our nature which is the source of our inextinguishable sense of free agency as well as of our power to think beyond the limits of the finite and to develop the notion of an absolute experience as its ground. But while this is true, the content implanted by the conditions of realization is also an essential part of our real nature. We have seen that this is true in the sphere of agency, and what we maintain here is that it is fundamentally involved in our reality. We may conceive our absolute archetype as existing in the Divine consciousness, and the distinction here insisted on enables us to dissociate the immediate content of that consciousness from our finitude and relativity, so that God only "*remembers that we are dust*"; but we cannot conceive ourselves as we really are without these modifications, nor can we conceive that the end-category of individual reality should transcend these modifications. This end-category conceived as an ideal will not be that of an absolute nature then, for the idea of the absolute is a transcendent presupposition of the finite, but rather that of a nature which is finitely and relatively qualified and completed after its own kind. We have seen in the discussion of freedom how this ideal completeness is to be conceived in one direction, and in general the aspira-

tion that will be adequate to the whole life struggle of the finite would be one that completely satisfies the requirement of social unity on the one hand, and that of unity and fellowship with God, the requirement of religion, on the other.

It will not need to be pointed out that the doctrine of individuality developed above naturally suggests the question whether in the last analysis all finite individuals are to be conceived as of one type. We know the conclusion to which such thinkers as Leibnitz and Lotze have been led regarding the ultimate nature of the individual. The latter thinker, reflecting on the monad of the former, resolves all individuality ultimately into the psychic type, and conceives the world of individuals to be composed of soul-like beings. How shall we deal with this conception? It is clear that no direct help can be found on the finite side of the problem, and we are driven again to test the powers of the concept of absolute experience. We have seen that the thought or idea involved in the objective individuating activity of absolute experience becomes in its relation to the realizing process an end-category. What we mean by this is (1) that for the absolute the idea of the individual supplies a norm of realization for the will-activity in which the actual posit is made. The idea or thought of the individual thus becomes an end-category—conceived as internal motive—for the concrete activity of realization. But the process of realization is distinguishable into two moments, the first being that of *origination*, the absolute's posit of the finite individual, while the second moment is the *finite's own process of self-realization*. If we conceive the result of the first moment to be a real individual, we must regard the second as initiated in the new individual's nature. To the absolute thought,—if we distinguish here between a species of first and second intention, both moments will be present, but the second only mediately. The concrete idea with its mediate and immediate content will thus constitute the end-category of the individual in general.

What we wish here to achieve is the distinction of the part of this process of realization which belongs to the finite individual from that which it presupposes and which belongs to the absolute, and the object in making this distinction is to lay down the proposition, which will not be disputed if the distinction be admitted, that the part of the realizing process which belongs to the finite individual, is to be regarded as relative, and subject to the laws of relativity, and the question then changes its form and we have to inquire into the real point of differentiation between the relative and absolute in this sphere. On the basis of this distinction where is the line to be drawn? In the first place it will be evident without discussion that the process, viewed concretely, will include all the necessary conditions of the individual's being and realization. The constitutive act under the end-category of the individual nature will also be conceded to the absolute without demurrer. The real question here is what this posit involves as original and explicit content of the individual nature. In order to determine this we must suppose the subtraction from any knowable individual, of those elements that are due to the processes of relative and finite experience, and it will be the *minimum individuale* of which we shall be in quest. Now, in order that there may be any individual at all, there must be a persistent and self-identical centre of self-asserting activity. Less than this would not answer the necessary requirements of individual existence. This, however, will not be denied, but the real difficulty will arise in connection with the question, what more than this is involved as real individual activity? Is it not necessary for us to suppose that a thing in order to be an individual must be intelligent, and in short, have the germ of a consciousness? It must be remembered here that we are not considering composites but the primary elements of things. The question is as to that atom or this soul of mine in its first principle. We have learned in the earlier chapters of this discussion that in the investigation of the agency of things we are forced

to make a transition from the notion of external to that of internal activity, and we have seen, moreover, that this notion of internal agency is only intelligible when we construe it as internally conceived activity, in short, it is only intelligible when we connect it with its idea in some individual centre. But it does not follow from this that the individual centre must consciously apprehend and act from this idea. On the face of it there is only a necessity that the idea shall be there and that it shall exert a directive influence on the activity, and the question arises whether this is possible, and if possible, on what grounds it can be affirmed as true? Now I do not think the question of possibility will be so difficult to determine, inasmuch as we find in experience a form of agency called instinctive in which it is at least partially exemplified. Whatever instinct may be, it is certain that it implies a form of individual activity which is teleological, but at the same time not consciously apprehending the idea it is realizing. The mother bird may have learned much of the detail of nest-building from experience, but there will be much connected with the whole enterprise of nesting at a certain season and rearing and providing for her brood, that she does not understand, and her activity will be purposeless so far as she is concerned, and its motive a kind of blind impulse. We have in instinct a type of individual agency to which the idea it is realizing while internal and directive, is yet not consciously present in that activity. The only consciousness the individual has in relation to the idea is the blind impulse to act in accordance with an idea, which must, therefore, be in some way a present determinative factor. We have only to suppose then that the impulsive agency itself, or the equivalent of it, is possible without any consciousness of itself accompanying its activity. This is hard to realize; but if there may be teleological activity in which the idea is not self-conscious, then it is reasonable to suppose that there may be impulsion to activity of which the individual is not conscious. The one supposition

is not any harder than the other. As a result then we arrive at the notion of an individual agency whose consciousness is external and transcendent. This conclusion is reached by a process of reasonable supposition founded on data in experience. If we were to attempt, however, to reason away the *minima* of individuality we would find it impossible, since any infraction of the concept of a persistent and real centre of activity would be tantamount to the suppression of the individual.

If we concede the possibility of individual agency whose consciousness is external and transcendent to it, on what ground, it will be asked, may it be affirmed as true? There are at least two important considerations bearing on this. In the first place our whole doctrine of the transcendent grounding of the individuals of the world makes it possible for us to see how the idea which conceives the nature of the individual and becomes the end-category of its activity is, in the first instance, an objective idea of the absolute experience. The idea is, as we have seen, the *prius* of the realizing process, and the realizing process includes not only the institution of the individual but its attainment of its end-category, and it is only necessary here for us to suppose that the moment of institution does not involve the individual's internal consciousness of its own activity at all, but that this internalizing of consciousness belongs to the process of realization. In the second place there is, as reinforcing the above consideration, the requirement of mechanism that activity shall not be conceived teleologically as emanating immediately from a conscious idea, but rather fatally, if we may use the term, as the push of a force whose inner nature of course determines it, but from whose agency the mediation of internal consciousness in any form is rigorously excluded. Mechanism thus requires the very conclusion to which we are led by the first supposition, and science rests on the necessary postulate of idealess individuals whose whole consciousness is external and transcendent to them.

We may call the conclusion reached above the doctrine of *individua minima*, and we propose now to show its importance for another phase of scientific knowledge. If the *individua minima* involved in mechanical science include simply the moment of institution and not the power of realization, and if this is the fundamental reason for conceiving these *minima* as without internal consciousness, then the *process of realization belongs to the history of the finite, and one aspect of it will be the progressive internalizing of consciousness*. So that pure fatalistic activity will be followed by the initiating of a subject-factor or germ of internal consciousness that will manifest itself at first, perhaps, as mere irritability, then as impulse, and finally as ideally informed activity in the forms of sensation and the higher manifestations of conscious agency. *It will thus become possible to subsume the history of the finite under a Darwinian-Hegelian category of development, and to represent the whole course of finite activity as process in which the individua minima are tending to develop into full internal possession of their nature and end.* The notion of development thus rendered is simply that of the history of individual realization, and it is comprehensive enough to ground the categories of both physics and biology and also to enable us to conceive the nature of the transition in that history from the purely mechanical to the biological and ultimately to the spiritual categories.

The doctrine of individuality that we have been defining in the preceding discussions is that the institution of individuals is the central and essential pulse of objective activity. We saw in the beginning how the simple activities of cognitive experience are reducible, in the last analysis, to points of individuating activity, and how the development of this insight led to the notion of the finite world of experience as fundamentally a world of individuals. Then on the side of the transcendent we were led gradually to the conception of the objective activities of the absolute as individuating in their nature and as initiative of the individualities of the finite

world. Finally, we have been led to a distinction within the individual itself between the moment of institution and that of realization, and to the assignment of the latter to the stage of finite history. And we have seen how on this basis a concept of individual development is grounded that is adequate to both mechanical and spiritual science. Professor Royce, in the second part of his profound work on the conception of God, gives a memorable discussion of the principle of individuation, in which he traces the individual to its transcendent roots in the thought and selective purpose and love, of the absolute. This represents, I think, a fundamentally true insight, and the doctrine here developed is in substantial agreement with Royce's thought, only we have put more emphasis than Royce does on the central place which the individual holds in the objective activities of experience in general. It is in relation to the perdurability of the individual rather than to its institution, that we find it necessary to emphasize the moment of the absolute love. That the individual should be perdurable seems to be involved in its very constitution. The fundamental requirement of science is that its *individua minima* shall be permanent and imperishable, and that the formal relations among these shall be stable. There would perhaps be as little hesitation in admitting the perdurability of the soul as there is in admitting the perdurability of the atom could the claim of the soul to the status of elementary individuality be as clearly made out. The union of the soul with a decomposable organism tends to breed the apprehension that it may be decomposable, or in some other way, liable to perish. We think, however, that the doctrine of individuality developed here will tend to remove uncertainty, and vindicate the right of the soul to the claim of essential reality. A soul is simply an individual that has come into inner conscious possession of its own nature and end. That such individuality should be connected with a decomposable organism, which by virtue of its lack of individuality is subject to what we call death; that is to the falling apart of its

aggregated parts, does not seem to have any essential relation to its own destiny. We need to be sure in the first place that the soul is a real individual, and then its fortunes become one with that of the individuals rather than the aggregates of the world. Were it not that man is so vitally interested in his own perdurability the above considerations would no doubt be regarded as theoretically sufficient. But the very interests involved create a demand for greater assurance, and the satisfaction of this demand may be found, I think, from two different sources. As individuals our souls are related directly to the objective activity of the absolute, and Royce's discussion has helped us to see that this connection involves the moment of specializing love. This authorizes us to say that God loves us with an individual love, and we know that love is the principle of conservation, and that the relations of the absolute activities are stable. We have here a strong voucher for perdurability in the groundwork of our being. Again, we find that the perdurability of the soul is so rooted in the rationality of the world that its denial is tantamount to an assertion that the world is ultimately irrational. That the highest product of the individuating energies of the world, the individual in which the process of the world becomes conscious and self-realized, should be developed only to perish, can only mean that the world-activities result, in the last analysis, in illusion. To admit this is to deny reality and to impugn not the power alone but the goodness of the absolute. The soul's shrinking from the thought of its own annihilation is not wholly the reaction of the instinct of self-preservation ; there is in it also the recoil from a kind of blasphemy.

CHAPTER IX.

THE MYSTIC ELEMENT IN KNOWLEDGE.¹

THE source of mysticism in experience is to be found in the element of feeling which is never absolutely blind, but involves even in its lowest forms a germ of cognition. It is characteristic of feeling, however, that it is not overtly and explicitly cognitive, but that its seeing eye is more or less suffused with a mist of emotion which impairs its power of clear conceptual definition. The apprehension that is effected in such an organ may well be called mystical, and we find here perhaps an important linguistic motive for the selection of the term by which this type of experience is designated. For the real significance of mysticism we must, however, go deeper than etymology and seek its roots in psychological and metaphysical soil. Reverting to the analysis of the first part of this volume, we there found that the concrete psychoses of which our consciousness is composed include moments of thought, feeling, and will, and that the tendency of consciousness in its movement as a whole is to pass from a stage of lower immediacy called sensation, through the mediating processes of reflection, to a stage of higher immediacy that is characteristically emotional. The consciousness of this stage we

¹ The phrase *mystic element* is used here in a broad sense, as including (1) every mode of getting content in which feeling is the dominating factor and (2) any super-ordinary mode or organ of knowledge or belief.

were led to characterize as immanently rational, since some cognitive germ or idea functions at its heart, but overtly and explicitly, a form of feeling which, as we have learned in the analysis of the second part, is the special agent in the development of the subject-side of consciousness, and, in view of the fundamental distinction that exists in consciousness between its subject and object forms, to be classified distinctively with the former. It may be said that it is in the higher forms of emotional experiences—those which belong to the stage of the higher immediacy—that self-consciousness attains its highest level and most complete realization.

Now, mysticism, while requiring this higher form of self-consciousness as its condition, is not concerned immediately with the vision of self. Its special organ is to be sought rather in the consciousness of a transcendent other which we have found to be an inseparable accompaniment of self-consciousness, and the mystical intuition or vision arises when this consciousness has been raised to a point of intensity at which it becomes functionally active. In his remarkable work on *The Mystic Bases of Knowledge*, the author, Recejac, conceives this moment of functional activity to be one of "self-alienation," in which the *ego* abdicates itself and becomes one with the absolute. He also characterizes it from the ethical point of view as a moment of "disinterestedness" in which the ordinary egoistic motives are transcended and the impulse becomes purely altruistic, and his theory is that in this moment of self-transcendence our conscious activity becomes absolute and the true bearer of an absolute intuition. With much of Recejac's thought we find ourselves in complete sympathy, and dissent only arises in connection with the author's theory of the nature of the absolute, which he treats as a pure creation of the consciousness in which it is conceived and as having no other reality. Against this concept we have to place the whole doctrine of the transcendent as developed in these discussions—a doctrine that involves the assertion of the

reality of a transcendent experience as the presupposition and ground of the relative. If it be necessary to presuppose an absolute experience as the ground of the relative and its processes, it is plainly impossible to regard the absolute itself as the creature of any of the activities of which the relative is capable. It is true that Recejac prefaces the act of absolute realization with one of self-transcendence ; and were his position simply that the closest approach the finite consciousness can make to the absolute is through this door of self-alienation, the claim would perhaps be tenable. But this would not necessarily involve the assumption that the relation of the self-transcending consciousness to the absolute is one of identity, and that the absolute is constituted in this act and has no other reality.

The special organ of mysticism is, as we have seen, the consciousness of the transcendent raised to that point of intensity at which it becomes functionally active, and it is here, I think, that we strike the central *crux* in the interpretation of mystical experience. The question on which theories will diverge fundamentally will be whether the functional activity of the mystic consciousness is to be conceived as a subjective or as an objective activity. In other words, is it to be regarded as an extension of the activity by which we reach an inner apprehension of self, or is it rather to be regarded as an extension of those activities by which objective truth is realized ? If it is essentially a function of subjectivity, then we will perhaps have to admit that, in the last analysis, in order to apprehend the absolute, we must become absolute. But if it is objective, then we have seen that in its most essential nature the consciousness of the transcendent is the consciousness of an other than oneself. It is on this consciousness of a transcendent other, as we have seen, that the whole structure of religious experience has grown up, and it is clear that the suppression of the distinction by the identification of the self and the transcendent other, would be tantamount to the destruction of that which alone

renders religious experience possible. In our theory of mysticism, as in our theory of religion, we take the objective view in preference to the subjective, as being most in consonance with an adequate doctrine of experience. If an absolute experience is the undeniable condition of an experience that is relative and finite, then it must be that, in the consciousness of the finite, the absolute will be apprehended and conceived as a transcendent other, and that the whole experience of religion and mysticism will be best understood as an activity in which the finite self is seeking to adjust itself to that element in reality which it is conscious of and conceives as a transcendent other. The transcendent otherness of the real is a quality, therefore, which is not to be overcome without taking away the ground of the experience and of the aspiration that lives at its heart. We may utter the thought that in religion and mysticism we achieve absoluteness, or identity with the absolute, but we cannot suppress the inner shrinking from this virtual self-deification as irreverent and blasphemous, any more than we can escape the apprehension that it involves the suppression of the only possible basis of our religious experience.

How, then, shall mysticism be objectively interpreted? We do not mean to deny here that mysticism has its subjective aspects, but what we are concerned to assert is that mysticism as an organ for the apprehension of truth, is objective, and the question here is how this objectivity is to be understood. Let us then take as our starting-point consciousness in its ordinary state, which may be regarded, taken as a whole, as the organ of common objective knowledge. This it will be in its first intention, for we have seen that the impulse of consciousness is always to look out before it looks in. Taking this conscious organ of objective truth, let us suppose that it has been raised to a supernormal degree of intensity. This intensifying process will have two effects: (1) of rendering it subjectively more sensitive or susceptible to the influences of the objective, and (2) of rousing and intensifying its power of apprehension.

Let us suppose, now, that the element of objectivity in relation to which this super-sensitiveness has been induced is the transcendent other of the religious experience. What will be the result? Manifestly the whole consciousness will be in a unique state of susceptibility to influences from the transcendent, and will manifest a more than normal capacity for seizing impressions and reducing them to a greater or less degree of intelligibility. The special feature of this representation, it will be observed, is that it does not involve the setting aside of any of the normal conditions of experience. There is not involved in it any moment of specific self-alienation in which the self naturally becomes a cast-off garment, but on the contrary a raising of the ordinary self to a state of unique susceptibility and apprehensive power, a result that is perfectly intelligible. Nor is there involved, on the other hand, any self-identification with the absolute or any achievement of the moment of absoluteness, but on the contrary the supposition, which is perfectly intelligible, that objective influences from that aspect of the real which we call transcendent, which under ordinary conditions would find no response in consciousness, may find a response in a consciousness that has been raised to the mystical point of emotional intensity. It is conceded to be generally true that the intensification of consciousness in relation to any special sphere of objective reality has the effect of rendering it more susceptible and more capable in that sphere of truth. Every specialist in every field will supply an illustration to the point. And what we have been proposing here is the application of this common-sense principle to the explanation of the mystical consciousness.

As interpreted above there will be two moments in the mystical situation: the one a moment of excited and intense emotional attention or concentration in which consciousness is raised to a supernormal degree of efficiency as an organ for the reception and realization of truth; the other, the influence of the transcendent to which this excited consciousness is directed, and which will be capable of generating

content in the form of impressions to which consciousness would not in its ordinary moods be susceptible. If we suppose these two conditions then it is possible for us to account for the whole content of the mystic vision, as intuitive. We may call the first movement, that of the excited and concentrated consciousness, *inspiration*, and the second, that of the generation of the superordinary impression, *revelation*, and we will be able to see how the conditions of realizing that superordinary content of consciousness, on which the claims of mysticism are founded, will be supplied.

We go on then to consider two further points: (1) the form in which the mystical content is realized, and (2) the extent to which the criteria of knowledge may be applied to this content. The first point involves a consideration of the mode of conceiving and representing the content of the mystical consciousness which we have seen to be superordinary, and will not be disposable, we may suppose, by the ordinary cognitive processes, which are those of direct presentative and conceptual definition. There is no reason for denying that some of the content thus obtained may be amenable to the direct processes, and these will supply no new problem. But some of the content, and that the most characteristic, will resist these processes and will have to be conceived *symbolically* if at all. The symbol is, as we have seen, an indirect mode of representing and defining content. In its relation to the direct modes it may be regarded either as a preliminary method that is gradually replaced by the more effective direct modes, or as having an application at the point where direct definition of content ceases to be possible. It is the symbolic mode of representation in this superordinary field that we are treating here, and we wish to consider further the question of the nature of symbolic representation as well as its application to the content of mysticism. The symbol, as we saw, is a mode of representation that does not define content directly, but only by way of suggestion and analogy. The effect of this is that the symbol hangs more loosely to its content and may be

selected from fields of experience widely different from that in which the content is to be defined. The principal requirements of the symbol are (1) that it shall be more sensuous than the content symbolized, (2) that it shall be taken from some sphere of experience where it is not symbolic but directly representative and defining, and (3) that it shall be related to the content it is to symbolize either by suggestion or analogy, preferably the latter. Take as illustrations of the fine use of symbol, the vision recorded in Ezekiel xlvi. 1-12, in which the full salvation which Jehovah is promising to his people is figured as a river in which the water not only fills the channel and supports an abundance of fish, but overflows and fertilizes the whole surrounding country; or that other vision of Ezekiel, in which he represents the divine government of the world as a complicated system of wheels within wheels; or the numerous visions of Swedenborg, in which spiritual truth that could not be directly uttered is figured in sensuous imagery. Literature is full of symbolic representations of this kind, and pictorial art and sculpture make a larger use of this form of representation even than literature. Take the group of the Laocoön as symbolizing a union of despair and heroic courage, and the picture of the Sistine Madonna as figuring the divinely idealized relation of mother and child. The symbol is used here to express a meaning that could not be embodied in any directly defining representation. Nothing is more certain than the great extension which the symbol makes possible to our capabilities for realization and expression. We may figure to ourselves and, dimly at least, shadow to others, meanings that are directly unthinkable and inexpressible, and the mode in which this is effected is invariably by the use of imagery that is more sensuous than the content represented, imagery that has been taken from some field of experience where it has a direct application to content and which may be connected with the new content by some relation of analogy.

Now, while the symbol has a wide application in the ordinary fields of expression, its true home is in the mystical

sphere. We have seen that the very conditions under which the superordinary content of the mystical consciousness is obtained are conditions that would raise it for the most part above the level of direct representation. We would have to admit the possibility at least that this content would prove recalcitrant to the direct modes of representing and defining, and that the only possibility of bringing it into intelligible relations with experience would be through indirect definition of it by concept and figures that directly define some portion of experience between which and the new content an analogy can be traced. The general validity of such an application of the terms of one sphere of experience to another will not be denied, but the special use that is involved in their application to mystical content will be denied, and, in fact, is denied by influential thinkers. We have seen in another connection how the school of Herbert Spencer repudiates the attempt to represent the transcendent in any form and rejects the symbol in this sphere as a "pseudo-conception" that is wholly devoid of real significance. We have already considered this position in its general bearings, and wish here only to discuss briefly its relation to mysticism. The difficulty with the school of Spencer is likely to have its root in the denial that there can be, in the first place, any real content of consciousness that comes in through superordinary channels. This is also the denial of positivism. But this radical denial involves, as we have shown in another place, the cutting away of all grounds for recognizing any transcendent term in reality and the virtual assumption of the absoluteness of the finite and relative. We do not propose here to go into the argument in detail. But the general position will be clear at this stage of our discussion, that the only ground on which the transcendent can be affirmed will be some element in experience that necessitates its assumption, and we have argued that the data which render the postulate of transcendent reality necessary are also data which involve the norms of characterization, and the whole process by which

the transcendent term is developed and determined as absolute experience may be taken as our commentary on that position. Furthermore, in regard to positivism, there is the additional consideration that absoluteness must be found somewhere, and if it is not found as a transcendent presupposition of our finite and relative experience, then our experience itself must be regarded as absolute. But we do not need at this point to argue the essential absurdity of such a supposition. A completely rational view would seem to require the correlation of the mystic experience with experience in general, and the admission that in it none of the essential conditions of experience are set aside. Now, it has become abundantly apparent that in general, objective content originates in the first instance, in our experience, in the form of impressions arising from some extra-conscious source. This general condition differentiates our experience as finite from the concept of absolute experience, in which the spring of objectivity is internal and included. The condition we have indicated here, the reference of impression-content to extra-conscious springs, constitutes a differentia of the finite and relative as distinguished from the absolute, and must be regarded, therefore, as conditional of every form of objective finite experience. We have reached the conclusion that the mystical experience, in so far as it involves the getting of new content; that is, in so far as it is in any sense cognitive, must be conceived under objective rather than subjective categories. It is in truth a form of objective activity and cannot claim exemption from the differentiating conditions of objective finite experience. Admitting this, we are led to correlate the impressions received through the mystical channels with impressions received through other channels, and to say that these impressions, in so far as the content is superordinary, are received through the stimulating activity of the transcendent, operating ultra-consciously in our experience and producing effects there in essentially the same way that sensations are produced in the first instance. The transcendent impression will differ from the sensation

only in its content and not in the fundamental mode of getting into consciousness as experience-content.

The position developed above is all-important in its bearing on the general problem of the relation of the mystical content to the conditions of knowledge and rational belief. The doctrine here advocated does not involve the supposition that this superordinary content comes into consciousness, in the first instance, in any finished cognitive form. The presumption is just the reverse, that it comes as raw impression, and that the cognitive process by which it is reduced to intelligible form will be intra-conscious. Just here arises the importance of the reflection in which we reached the conclusion that not only does the higher consciousness involved in the mystic experience take the form of emotion informed with rational insight, but that this emotional organ is in an excited and highly susceptible state so that we may expect that its cognitive processes will partake of the rapidity and apparent immediacy of intuition. The mystic experience begins with raw impression which is reduced to cognitive form in consciousness with the rapidity of intuition, and gives the appearance of immediate reception in finished form. But this is never so, and is not at all conceivable. That with which our own conscious processes have nothing to do but simply to receive, must in the nature of the case remain foreign and unintelligible matter. The impress of intelligibility must be put on content by the activity of our own faculties. If this condition is universal and not to be set aside, we may ask what form it will take in the excited and intense condition of consciousness here supposed, and in the presupposition that the impressions have their spring in the stimulations of the transcendent other. Clearly, on the subjective side the term *inspiration* will be in greater or less degrees applicable, while objectively the term *revelation* will have corresponding degrees of applicability. Let us consider then what meaning we are to attach to these terms. Inspiration is manifestly a term that applies only to an excited emotional consciousness, but the

special point which it emphasizes in relation to this consciousness is not so much the strength and intensity of the feeling as the activity of the cognitive norm at its heart. The inspired man possesses, for the time, unusual powers of apprehension and an unusual faculty of realization; that is, of rapid translation into intelligible form. His cognitive powers seem to resolve themselves into a faculty of immediate realization, and just in proportion as they do so they also seem to become more purely objective. Clearly, we here come upon the essentials of inspiration, *a subjective condition that renders consciousness supernormally sensitive and cognitively active, and a functional activity that is objective in its character and operates on the new material supplied with the rapidity of intuition.*

If now we turn our attention to the other term, *revelation*, we find that we have already made progress toward the determination of its nature. We do not ascribe ordinary impressions of the objective species to revelation because we are conscious of the moment when they arise as raw material, and this is distinguishable in consciousness from the cognitive process by which they are developed into intelligible forms. Our ordinary world does not come to us as a completed product, but as a material which our faculties must work up into intelligible forms. If we were to suppose that ordinarily the processes of cognition were as rapid and seemingly as immediate as they are in the mystical activity, then no doubt our ordinary world would wear the appearance of being revealed to us. The concept of revelation, I am convinced, must not exclude but must rather include, the cognitive operation of our own faculties, and from this point of view it will be called revealed, because, owing to the extreme rapidity of our own processes it will present itself as more *completely objective*, and as seeming to come to us as a finished product. But there is another *differentia* of revelation that cannot be overlooked. The term revelation is ordinarily restricted to that content which we owe to the direct stimulation of the transcendent other, and we

need to seek at this point some intelligible notion of what is meant by the stimulation of the transcendent other. The special difficulty is not as great here, I think, as we may be led to suppose. In general we have been led to connect our objective experience with the transcendent and to conceive the finite individual as a posit of the absolute and as deriving its internal nature, which, of course, contains the norms of its activity, from the idea of it in the absolute consciousness, and which its own processes of realization render its own internal possession. In general then, we may say that the subjective limit of our susceptibility to impressions and our capacity to reduce these to intelligible forms will place an objective limit on our world ; that is, on the extent to which it may become experience-content. The general law of experience in this aspect of it is, then, that the extent of our world-content will vary with the susceptibility and activity of our faculties. Now we have seen that the mystical function involves a superordinary sensitiveness and power of active realization, and we have only to make an application of the general law in order to see how the apprehension of a new and superordinary content will be rendered possible. We are not required to consider the setting aside of the ordinary conditions of obtaining content in general, but rather the application of these conditions to a special aspect of experience. *The notion of revelation will be completed then in the idea of the direct function of the transcendent other in introducing a new and superordinary content into our consciousness, the subjective condition of the reception and realization of which, is that state of the subjective consciousness to which the term inspiration is applicable.*

That the mystical consciousness may be both inspired and revelatory is not open to successful denial. The confines of objective apprehension may be so enlarged as to admit impressions of a superordinary kind which the inspired organ will work into intelligible forms with the rapidity of intuition. Admitting this, there remains to consider (1) the relation of symbol to this revelatory process

and (2) the vital question of the validity of the super-ordinary content and the means of testing its truth which our experience puts at our disposal. With reference to the first question, it will be evident that the first resource of consciousness will be the symbol. The very character of the content as superordinary will render it recalcitrant, in the first instance at least, to the ordinary forms of direct representation. These will have been developed in reference to content of a lower grade. The only resource open, then, of immediate use and availability, will be the indirect application of some of the representative forms of experience to this new content, and the indirect definition of it by means of some analogy that is traceable between the superordinary content and content of a more ordinary character. The first representation will thus be symbolic. But it does not follow that the mode of representation shall *remain* symbolic. In the tendency of symbolism to give place to direct modes of representation and definition we come upon a general law of experience. The enlargement of the boundaries of experience involves, of course, the introduction of new content, and the general law is to draw first on the resources of experience in other fields for forms of representation that will be indirectly representative of the new content. But the law goes on to complete itself in the tendency to replace symbolism by direct forms of representation and definition, and thus to assign the new content a place in the context of ordinary experience. The new content of the mystical consciousness cannot be absolved from the operation of this law, and we will find a constant effort on the part of the human consciousness to reduce all its content to the ordinary form. That it will be in a measure successful we see no reason to deny, but the possibility remains that some of this superordinary content will be of such a character as not to be directly definable. The only mode to which such content will be amenable is the symbolic, and there will no doubt be a tendency to shade off gradually into a sphere where the use even of the symbol becomes

dim and shadowy. It is an open question which philosophy may perhaps never be able to close, whether superordinary content is possible of such a character that, while it takes possession of us and is in a vague but intense way realized, is yet unrepresentable by any conceivable mode, and therefore unutterable. The possibility of superordinary content of a transcendent species seems to carry with it the possibility of a content so transcendent that it defies all conceivable modes of expression. In this type of experience, however, we reach a point where the value of the content ceases to be general and becomes purely individual and special.

The second and more important topic here is that of the means which our experience supplies to us for determining and testing the validity of the content of the mystical consciousness. That this content may possess different degrees of value we would be led to expect, and that the vision itself supplies no criteria for sifting the false and worthless from the true, or for testing the value of the true, follows from the uniqueness of the experience. There can be no criterion of the unique on its own plane, but the tests of the unique must arise out of its relation to the whole of experience. It is just here, I think, that a weakness will be found in Recejac's attempt to absolve mysticism from science and the ordinary tests of truth and falsehood. This gives the mystic a degree of freedom that he could not otherwise enjoy, but he purchases it at the complete sacrifice of any scientific value which the mystical content might otherwise possess. Now I do not mean by this to say that the mystic ought to take his visions into the laboratory and submit them to the rigid tests of physical phenomena, nor do I say even that he is to submit himself unreservedly to the tender mercies of the experimental psychologist. There be things in heaven and earth that the touch of the laboratory not only dissolves but destroys, and some of these are our most cherished possessions. I should think it profanation to submit the love which comprehends wife and children, to the cold touch of the analyst; but what I wish

to be understood as actually affirming here, is the conviction that mysticism is carrying its justifiable protest against the application to its results of some of the narrower and more mechanical tests of science too far when it claims to occupy an inaccessible position from the vantage ground of which it can snap its fingers at all the ordinary tests of certitude. The truer method is, in my opinion, to bring the super-ordinary into as close touch as possible with the ordinary concerns of life, even though in so doing it should be brought into relation to some of the ordinary criteria of knowledge.

How then shall we test the spirits to see whether they be of God or of the evil one? In the first place it will be found that a portion, and perhaps a considerable portion, of the content that is superordinary in its origin will gradually, through the operation of forces on which we need not dwell, become assimilated with the body of ordinary experience. This will happen in all cases where it is possible to replace the symbol with the direct form of representation. It is clear that content that is capable of direct definition cannot claim exemption from the tests of ordinary experience. Let us suppose, however, that part, and that the most characteristic, of the content of mysticism will always defy the ordinary modes of representation and remain symbolic. Does the fact that content is symbolically conceived raise it above the possibility of being tested in any way by experience? The very origin of the symbol itself precludes this. We have seen that the symbol originates as a term of direct representation, and that it owes to this direct relation to one part of experience, its power to indirectly represent another body of experience-content. Only that, therefore, which resists symbolization can claim exemption from the ordinary laws of experience, and we have seen that such content can only be of particular and personal value. But so far forth as content can be symbolized, just to that extent does it confess its amenability to the laws of experience. We must not, however, take advantage of this to enforce the rules of

experience in the narrow spirit of martinets. A true sense of the situation will shew that the business of testing must be handled in a large and catholic spirit. Let us consider then the practicable ways open to us for testing the value of our mystical content. In the first place we must recognise a two-sided law of experience as a whole. We have seen that the test of truth in the relative sphere is *congruity* to our experience as a whole, construing this to mean our concept of the whole content of experience. But in connection with this it must be recognised also that any proposed content when once admitted becomes itself part of the whole experience, and will influence subsequent determinations of the true and false; and it is true also that rejected elements of content will have a negative influence in the same direction. It is this fact, as we saw, that renders all relative standards shifting and not absolutely valid. The cure of this instability of the relative has been sought, however, in the connection of the relative with an absolute experience. Bearing this in mind we may say that an important test of the value of the mystical content arises out of its relation of congruity or incongruity with experience as a whole. We have seen how the general principle of rationality is simply a formulation of this congruity in the broadest conceivable sense. The ultimate notion of rationality, as we saw, is that of congruity with the whole of our experience, in which the good and true have in the last analysis a content that is identical. It has been shewn in other connections that this principle is the final test of truth and falsehood, and that other tests may be regarded simply as special forms of this one principle.

It is evident, now, that the superordinary content, by virtue of its being open to symbolic representation, will have a relation to the whole body of experience that will render it amenable to this principle. In other words, the superordinary content must fit into a general scheme of rationality, it must be congruous with our notion of the content of experience as a whole. This is not the same as saying that it must be in agreement with any particular body of results

within experience. It may be impossible for us to work out the details of harmony between different elements of content both of which commend themselves as true. The incongruity of internal elements must amount to contradiction before it will be safe to say that either is false. The criterion we have in mind is not one of special but of general application. We have to recognise in this connection that there may be a fallible application of an infallible principle; but this is a contingency that besets all knowledge, and from which no body of content can claim exemption. The criterion of rationality may, however, be applied in both a positive and negative form, and we may say (1) positively and in general, that the truth or value of that which is superordinary must, in the last analysis, be determined by the general canon of rationality; it must prove itself able to fit congruously into the most adequate concept of experience that is possible, and it must be in complete harmony with the concept of absolute experience. (2) Negatively and more specifically, that it must not be in irreconcilable contradiction with the highest concept of experience possible to us, nor must it remain in unmediable contradiction with those special truths in experience which are able to bear the application of all the criteria of truth. In the application of these tests, however, it must not be expected that the superordinary content will always or even ordinarily submit to the rigour of scientific exactness. The tests to which it is amenable are those of rationality rather than of exact experiment or mathematical demonstration, and even in the application of the tests of rationality it is no thumb and finger method that may be applied. The tests of rationality must be broadly construed in view of the fact that all relative standards are shifting and unstable, and can only reach permanence in the absolute. It is only from the standpoint of an absolute experience which is approximately but not completely realizable, that the criterion of rationality becomes a test of absolute validity. Our experience as we realize it is not a fixed quantity but is constantly changing,

and it is possible that the introduction of new content may transform it altogether, and with the change make a modification of our standards of rationality necessary. There is no sphere where the tests of truth require to be more broadly and discriminatingly handled than in relation to content that wears the appearance, at least, of being superordinary. In respect to such content in general, it is likely that a true and adequate adjustment will be reached, if at all, not by any formal or mechanical application of even the principle of rationality, but rather as a result of that dialectic in experience which is perpetually going on between what is already established and that which is clamouring for admission and recognition. On one side of this process will be the achieved content of experience with its tests and measuring rods ready to try the pretensions of any new candidate for admission into the commonwealth of truth, and on the other will be the new content not only claiming admission but also requiring a reconstruction of the criteria of rationality.

It is in view of this dialectic that we wish in concluding this chapter to consider the claims of the superordinary in general. We have seen that, in the last analysis, the principle of rationality rests on the identity of the good and true, and it has been shown how this conception of the principle leads to the complete incorporation of the theoretic and practical interest into one, so that in the absolute the judgment of truth and the judgment of worth will coalesce into one judgment in which both moments will be included. In actual experience, however, the unity is not fully achieved but only approximated to, and it is through the dialectic spoken of above that the approximation is effected. The motive of the approximation is the presumption that in the last analysis our world cannot be dualistic, but that the content of the good and that of the true must be identical. The denial of this presumption would, as we saw, be tantamount to the reduction of our world to irrationality and confusion. Now it is characteristic of superordinary

content in general that its primary claim to consideration arises out of its relation to the good rather than to the true, and it will claim admission to the commonwealth of the true because of its relation to the good. And it is on the basis of this demand to be accepted as true because it is good that its claims can be most intelligently tested. We have reached a point here where it will be obvious, I think, that the hard and fast separation of the motives of theoretic truth from the motives of worth or value, which some are attempting to enforce in the supposed interest of scientific and religious truth, cannot be maintained. The distinction is only relative after all, and while mechanical science has its own proper ground-motive to which it must adhere to the exclusion of the ground-motive of teleology, yet we have seen that there is a point where experience and, along with it, our world, becomes teleological, and it is at this point that the notion of an end-category becomes a vital term. While, therefore, mechanical science must adhere to its mechanical motive and exclude the mystical and superordinary from its own proper domains, yet the problem of truth and falsehood, and with it science in the broader sense, must include also the teleological sphere of experience, and must recognise in fact that it is from this higher point of view that the final issues of truth and falsehood must be tried.¹ Taking our stand then at that point in experience where the end-categories of the true and good assert themselves with the greatest cogency, we may ask how, in the last resort, this claim of the superordinary to be true because it is good is to be dealt with. We can find no better answer than the following. That which claims acceptance as true because it is good may in the first place have its claim to being good directly tested by

¹ This is, in fact, my answer to the plea of Professor Münsterberg, who seems to advocate a complete divorce of the two sets of considerations: the result is a dualism that would be bad for both science and mysticism. Recejac seems to favour the divorce in the interests of mysticism. I am firm in the belief that what is needed is unification rather than divorce.

the application of the criteria of the good in general. The author of *The Mystic Bases of Knowledge* limits these tests to the ethical. Whatever can be brought under the category of *duty*, he thinks, is to be accepted as true. This is a restatement of the principle of the Kantian postulates, and is unassailable as far as it goes. But the restriction of the motives to the distinctively ethical would, in appearance at least, exclude interests which are legitimately included under the general category of the good. We are contending here for a broad concept of good that will include the emotional and aesthetic as well as the distinctively ethical, and what we would propose as an amendment to the position we are criticising is the substitution of the broader concept of good for that of duty, which will be included in its scope. From this broader standpoint the direct claims of the superordinary content will be tested, and if it can be shown that our world would realize a higher concept of good with the proposed content included than it could were this content excluded, the direct claim has been made out. There remains, then, the indirect claim to be true because it is good, and this is to be tried also on distinctively teleological grounds. We may presume here that the relation of the proposed content to the good is no longer in debate, and that this may be taken as a station for further procedure. If we assume, then, the ultimate identity of the content of the good and the true as a principle of absolute experience, together with the conclusion already established that the proposed content is unmistakably good, or tributary to the good, I think we will have a case for the application of the criteria developed in the chapter on *Knowledge and Belief*. The problem here is clearly not one of strict knowledge but rather of belief, inasmuch as the insight of cognition or immediate theoretic necessity is lacking. But there are gradations of belief, and if we can make out, in view of the relation of the proposed content to the good in general, that its denial would be tantamount to a denial of the principle of rationality and the reduction of our world to irrational chaos,

then we have grounds for a belief that is a substantial equivalent of knowledge. If, however, the certitude should fall short of this objective necessity, it may still possess legitimate degrees of acceptability ranging from the point of subjective necessity through the moment of probability to that of the merely possible but not provable.

It will be clear, I think, that while judgments which rest on the grounds thus indicated cannot be admitted into the sphere of mechanical science as such—and by that statement I mean that it is not open to mechanical science to get results in that way—yet the broader concept of science which includes the teleological cannot refuse their admission, inasmuch as there may be just as valid grounds for certitude of belief as there are for certitude of strict knowledge. Broadly construed, science is the organ of truth and must include the teleological as well as the mechanical, the judgment of belief as well as its sterner sister, the judgment of knowledge.

As a final question, then, we may consider the general relation of mysticism to the discovery of truth and the enlargement of the content of knowledge. It cannot be successfully denied, I think, that the mystical consciousness when functionally active and under certain conditions, may become an organ of new and superordinary impressions, or that these raw materials may be reduced to intelligible form with the rapidity of intuition. And in view of the general relation of experience to the transcendent, it will be open to affirm that the new content may take on an objective revelatory character. This being admitted as possible, the whole question of the nature and worth of the content will have to be to decide directly by its relation to the criteria of the good, indirectly by its relation to the tests of rational truth, and lastly, in view of that dialectic of experience which is the final arbiter of the issues of knowledge. Let us suppose, then, that the mystical content has borne successfully the test of this dialectical process, and has proved itself to be as persistent and as essential an element in experience as the content of mechanical science itself. It only

remains to admit it as recognized content in a broad scheme of knowledge, and to recognize the fact that to the ordinary channels of knowledge the superordinary must, under certain conditions, be added.

On the question of the value of the superordinary organs of knowledge two extremes are, I think, to be avoided. We can neither, with the mistaken champion of mechanical science, deny all validity whatsoever to the superordinary, nor can we go to the opposite extreme and, with the mystics, claim exclusive validity for the mystical organ as against the ordinary processes of science and metaphysics. In short, it is not necessary for us to become either positivists or mystical agnostics. But the claims of the mystical organs may be judged on the plane of general knowledge, and in a way that will not involve the overthrow of other legitimate interests of truth. From this broad standpoint it would seem in the highest degree rational to suppose, inasmuch as our finite experience everywhere touches on the wider sphere of an infinite and absolute experience, that the introduction of superordinary content into our experience is not only possible, but that under certain conditions of a unique character, it may actually take place. And if this be granted, and also the possibility of its assimilation to a comprehensive scheme of rationality through the dialectic of experience, it would follow that the question of the value of the content thus obtained could only be decided in view of the nature of the content and its relation to the end-categories of experience. In short, its value, in the last analysis, would be to decide as all other values are decided, in view of the function that it performs in experience and the interests that it conserves.

CHAPTER X.

TRANSCENDENT GROUND OF ETHICS—CONCLUSION.

IN the last chapter of Part II. we devoted some space to the development of the social root of the ethical consciousness. We saw in that discussion that the sense of social law arises out of the relation of the subject-consciousness of the *ego* to the objective social consciousness, and that the claim of the latter finds recognition from the former, in view of its larger and higher rationality. In this internal recognition the sense of law or obligation is born. We were also led to distinguish between the juristic and the more distinctively ethical aspects of law or obligation—the former applying directly to the content of objective social good and only indirectly to subjective good; while the latter reverses the order and applies directly to the determination of subjective good, its aim being to bring it into conformity with the requirements of objective good. The social root of the ethical consciousness thus becomes clear, but it has not as a rule found that recognition among ethical thinkers which its importance deserves. The tendency of the majority of those who recognize a social ground of ethics at all is to make exclusive claims for it and to deny the possibility of any extra-social sources of morality. And with this exclusive claim there usually goes an attempt to show how the fundamental ethical categories have been developed in a purely external manner until at some likely moment in the history of

experience they have struck in and become thenceforward internal. This is the device of the school of Herbert Spencer, in which the favourite mode of procedure is to show how through the pressure of external social, religious, and civic restraints, the *feeling* of restraint at length becomes internal as the feeling of obligation, and through the operation of association is related to certain lines of conduct. In view of this representation it is hardly necessary, I think, to argue at length that if there is no ground of inner response to these external pressures it is impossible to see how they can become in any true sense internal. We know well enough how something can be impressed upon us as habitual, and how it is possible to become even enslaved to habit. In this way the habit of conforming to an external requirement may become so strong that we not only yield to it spontaneously but it would be even difficult and painful to go contra to custom. All this is clear enough, and if we favour the concept of heredity of which Mr. Spencer is the most distinguished exponent, as against that of Weismann and his school, we will be prepared to admit that these acquired habits may be preserved and handed down by inheritance to succeeding individuals as instinctive tendencies to certain forms of reaction. All this may be conceded, and yet I fail to see how we have come in sight of the ground of a distinction that is truly internal. That which is truly internal must be grounded in experience in such a way that reflection will lead us to see its intrinsic rationality. But however closely the merely habitual may become incorporated into our experience, the tendency of reflection is to expose its true character and to reveal the fact that it has no intrinsic reason for its existence, but owes its place and acceptance to the fact that at one time in the history of experience it had the opportunity to repeat itself a great number of times until it had become habitual. Its status in experience is thus resolvable, in the last analysis, into a series of external repetitions which may have been to a great degree accidental. It may turn out of course that

the reaction that has thus become habitual, and then instinctive, is also rational; but this will be because of some intrinsic relation between it and the whole of experience, and will be only indirectly related, if at all, to the process by which it has been actually introduced into experience. If the notion of moral obligation is not to yield to reflection and be permanently resolvable into something that is not obligatory; that is, if we are not to be doomed to witness a dissolution of the ground of obligation, and a proof that the feeling or notion of ought in relation to practice is, in the last resort, without rational support, and, therefore, to reflection, an illusion, we must seek for it some ground that will be intrinsic to our experience. That ground, so far as the ethical consciousness is rooted in social soil, we have found in the recognition by the subject-consciousness of the *ego*, of the higher rationality, and, therefore, the obligatoriness of the claims of the objective social consciousness.

From the standpoint of social ethics there is far more rationality in the position of Mr. Leslie Stephen, who finds the basis of the sense of social obligation in what he calls the tribal consciousness (following Clifford, I believe) than there is in that of the school of Spencer; for in the tribal consciousness is involved that recognition of *kind* that is so fundamental to sociology, and a tribal consciousness is moreover a form of objective social consciousness, and would, as such, carry with it the authority of the presumption of superior rationality. We only feel disposed to demur to Mr. Stephen's term tribal, as not being adequate to characterize the whole objective social consciousness. That term seems, moreover, to carry with it the implication that the social consciousness is a sort of survival from the past rather than an intrinsic and indispensable element of the present consciousness. It must have been true at any former period as it is true now, that consciousness in becoming social involves the distinction of a subject-socius from a larger objective aggregate called society, whose requirements will seem to it to be law. This central

germ of sociality must be presupposed in order that any moral experience may be possible. If we assume then, as I think we must, that a germ of morality may and normally must develop out of social soil, the questions then arise (1) as to the form which the social-moral consciousness takes, and (2) the limit of obligation in pure social morality. In order to discover an adequate point of view for an answer to the first question, it will be necessary for us to revert to the precise situation out of which the ethical moment of consciousness originates. We saw that it has its origin in the point of contact between an egoistic impulse and an objective social demand. The ethical conscience arises, therefore, as a sense of some objective restraint on egoism, and not only so, but as a sense that this restraint has its source in the superior claim of the objective other which we call our social self. The restraint is therefore not only objective but also altruistic. We find here, without doubt, the ground on which Benjamin Kidd and his school base their claim, that human nature is purely egoistic and that the restraint of altruism is one that must be superimposed from without. If it were possible to divorce the egoistic consciousness from the objective consciousness of the other there would be plausibility in such a view. But we do not need to argue the impossibility of this disruption here. The fundamental mistake of these thinkers consists in making a cleft in human nature and lodging its altruistic moment in some outer and transcendent power, which is supposed to exercise its restraining function in a purely external and despotic manner. These thinkers do not realize, however, that their divorce if effected would immediately sweep away the whole social organism, and leave nothing but warring and irreconcilable fragments in its place. The concept we have reached here will also enable us to appreciate the truth in the contention of Huxley, that the ethical moment is not involved in natural selection, and at the same time to put a true construction on its absence from that process. We have seen in our

analysis of the biological individual in the last chapter of Part II., that while the living organism from which internal consciousness is absent is teleological, yet, inasmuch as it lacks the inner principle by which alone ends are conceived, there can be to it no distinction between subjective and objective ends, and hence no inner dialectic. The dialectic, so far as it can be supposed to exist at all, will be unconscious and external to the inner life of the organism, while to the organism itself the end will be undivided, and will involve in its scope without distinction both the individual and the kind. The end being thus one and undivided, natural selection, which is a name for that end-seeking principle of the living organism which, as we have seen, becomes incorporated with its pulsive energy, will have the appearance of unscrupulous egoism, since everywhere the organism, including the lower stages even of animality, will seem to pursue its own good through the ruthless disregard and destruction of other individuals. It is to be said, however, in mitigation of this view, that the spectacle even here is not purely egoistic, inasmuch as it will be found that the same activity that is individual-conserving will also be kind-conserving within limits, and that what the process lacks in order to make it truly altruistic is the moment of universality. The struggle in the world of the plants and the lower animals rages between limited groups called kinds and species and not between individuals as such. Here then I think we have the explanation of the ruthlessness of natural selection in terms that enable us at the same time to understand the absence of the ethical, and to recognize the fact that natural selection cannot be represented as purely egoistic, in view of the fact that it is kind-conserving in its very constitution. The ethical moment, on the other hand, is absent simply because the organism has not as yet become internally conscious and is incapable of that distinction between subjective and objective good on which the dialectic between egoism and altruism depends. It is clear, however, that when that distinction has once been conceived the

ethical situation arises, and it is equally clear that the altruistic will be an included moment in the constitution of the ethical. At this point we return to the main problem, that of the principle of obligation in the moral and juristic spheres. We have seen that in general the objective social consciousness claims authority over the subjective egoistic consciousness and has its claim allowed, and we have also seen that the species of obligation which we call *ethical* arises out of the direct pressure of the altruistic claim upon the egoistic impulse. The question then arises as to the ultimate grounding of this principle of obligation in experience, and it will be clear, I think, in the first place, that the pulse of obligation, if we may use the phrase, is one of will. The objective social asserts itself authoritatively over the *ego* and has its claim allowed. Here is the meeting of the objective demand and the subjective assent of will. This central point being determined, it would be very easy to go on and develop a purely volistic concept of the nature of obligation, tracing it to its roots, either in the notion of mere arbitrary *fiat*, or more philosophically, to the root-category of the practical, which is the good, and there would be a degree of rationality in the latter alternative. The central category of will is the good, and we may assume that the immediacy of ethical authority as well as of obligation in general, will be a pulsation of good, and the situation from this point of view may be truly characterized as the claim of the objective social good upon the egoistic will, which claim is allowed. This may be assumed, I say, and yet we will not have reached a completely satisfactory explanation of the whole fact of obligation. For we have seen that it includes not only the *claim* of the objective will but the *assent* of the subjective will, and that the feeling of obligation arises in the subjective consciousness. Why should the egoistic will assent to the claim and feel obliged as it does? Excluding the external methods of explanation as presupposing that which they start out to account for, it will be clear that the final explanation is not to be found

either in will or good, considered abstractly, but rather in some concrete principle that will voice the whole pressure of experience.

If we take the situation as it stands we find that we may describe it in the following terms. The claim of the objective social consciousness to legislate for the subjective egoistic consciousness, is the claim of a *larger whole* of experience to legislate for a *smaller whole* and one that is objectively included in the larger, and the assent of the smaller whole to the claim is its recognition of the right of the larger whole to take the attitude of authority. Now it is clear that this transaction of wills cannot, in its last grounds, be purely volistic, inasmuch as what we have to ground here is not the assent of will to the good but the assent of a will to the claim of authority put forth by the will of a larger aggregate of experience. We simply describe the transaction when we say that it is an affair of the will and that it is immediately related to the practical category of the good. The *deeper moment of assent to the claim of the objective will as right* finds no grounding in such a statement, and we only begin to have an inkling into its rationale when we recognize the fact that the legislative will whose claim is recognized as right is the will of a larger whole of experience in which the self that assents to it finds itself objectively included. There must be then at the bottom of this assent the feeling or insight that the whole interest of the self, as well as the whole interest of the other, will be conserved in the will of the larger and inclusive whole, while in the egoistic will only the interest of a part will be conserved, to the exclusion or at least the neglect, of the whole; and the assent of the egoistic will to the claim of the altruistic will be simply the recognition of the rationality of the claim that the whole, inasmuch as it includes the parts, shall take precedence over the egoistic will of the parts. The objective social will is the will of the larger and inclusive whole, while the egoistic will is the will of the smaller whole which, objectively, is an included

moment in the larger whole. This is evidently the principle that explains why *I* as a private individual assent to the claims of my family consciousness and as a family individual yield allegiance to my consciousness of the claims of society and the state. The phenomenon here is that of an ever-enlarging and comprehending whole in which the smaller wholes are objectively included and to which they therefore yield allegiance.

The authority of this principle will not be absolutely clear, however, until we have recognized the fact that it is identical with what we have in another connection called *the principle of the highest rationality*, and that this principle rests on the supposition of the ultimate identity of the content of the true and good. To be supremely rational is tantamount then to being in perfect congruity with, and therefore included in, both the categories of the true and the good, and the principle of the highest rationality will be open to two readings according to the species of content to which it is applied; that is, according as it is primarily theoretic or practical. In the problem before us the situation is primarily one of will, and falls directly under the category of the good. The theoretic reading will be the one then that applies here, for the assent of the will of the lesser whole to the practical demand of the larger and including whole can only be completely rational if it fits into the category of the highest truth also, and the point that we wish to emphasize is that the assent of the will of the smaller and included whole to that of the larger and including whole, *as right*, finds its complete justification only in the principle of rationality, which embodies the assumption of the ultimate identity of the content of the true and good. Ethical obligation involves in the last analysis the *ethically right*, and the concept of right is not a pure category of will, although it is this in the first instance; but in the last resort it implies a synthesis of the practical and theoretical in the presumption that what is really and fundamentally good is also really and fundamentally true. The

assent to the demand of the will of the larger and including whole *as right*, is therefore in the last resort the recognition of its congruity with the principle of the highest rationality, which in this instance involves the ultimate conformity of the good to the true. The notion of the right is in the last analysis that of the *theoretic truthfulness of the legislative demand of the will*.

We say with a measure of truth that the notion of right is in the last analysis, that of conformity to the Divine will, and less superficially, that it is the notion of conformity to the Divine nature. The latter is manifestly the more philosophical conception, but it requires a great deal of analysis to make its meaning intelligible. The position involves two distinct propositions: (1) that the concept of right involves the idea of conformity to some nature, and (2) that this nature must in the last resort be the Divine nature, or, speaking philosophically, the nature of the absolute. The first proposition is one that we may interpret in the light of results that have already been attained. To conform to a nature is, in the last resort, to be in harmony with the highest principle of that nature. Now we have seen that the highest principle of a nature is a principle in which the ultimate identity of what is true for it and what is good for it, will be embodied, and that we have called the principle of the highest rationality. The conformity of the concept of right to a nature will then be resolvable into its harmony with the highest rationality of that nature so that it will be an expression of it. The second proposition involves a further consideration on which we shall now enter. It is a point of controversy whether the moment of transcendence is involved in the ethical consciousness. A widespread tendency of the time is to regard the basis of ethics as purely social and to advocate its divorce not only from religion but also from metaphysics. To this tendency we have done full justice, I think, in recognizing the possibility of a ground of right and obligation in the constitution of the social nature. We do not deny, but wish to be understood

as affirming, that we have here a sufficient basis for a science of social ethics, and we admit the possibility of developing this science up to a certain point without taking account directly of its metaphysical presuppositions. But if the question be put in this form ; whether a complete ethical theory is possible without taking account of metaphysical presuppositions, we are prepared to answer in the negative. We have endeavoured to show that no science can complete its foundations without taking account of the transcendent, and it can be shown that ethics is even less able than other sciences to neglect its metaphysical presuppositions.

In order to make this demonstrably clear we have only to consider the ethical problem (1) in relation to the fundamental ethical situation and (2) in relation to fundamental categories of the ethical consciousness. If we consider the situation out of which the ethical experience grows we find that it is essentially the relation of a lesser whole of experience to a larger and including whole, and the ethical consciousness which is inner to the lesser whole, takes the form of assent to the legislative claims of the larger whole as right. It is clear that the determinative element in the experience is the concept of a whole of experience which is inclusive of lesser individual wholes, and that the consciousness of obligation arises out of the prior fact of inclusiveness. It is true, however, that the fact and the consequent feeling of obligation could be only relative if the whole in which the inclusion is effected were to be conceived, in the last analysis, as a fragment of a larger whole or as a whole that only included part of a larger content of reality. I say that if we attempt to conceive such a situation as *final* we reduce the fact of inclusion to relativity and impair the character of the moment of obligation. For the one quality of ethical obligation that has resisted all attacks and proved itself unassailable is its unconditionalness. Dr. Francis L. Patton has well said that there is a fundamental difference between the two propositions "You had better not" and "You ought not." The former leaves an option to

the will and contains the presumption that its injunction may be conditionally neglected or disobeyed, but the ethical "You ought not" leaves no alternative. The possibility of conditional neglect or disobedience not only does not enter by implication but is flatly excluded, and that, as we have shown, by the assenting consciousness itself in its recognition of the command as *right*. We are not advocating an absolute system of ethics here, but rather a system that will have the recognition of the absolute in it. And the point of vital interest is the fact that the unconditionalness of the central pulse of morality cannot be completely grounded unless we carry our notion of a whole of experience back to the absolute and conceive the absolute experience as an all-comprehending whole in which is included the entire content of reality. It is clear that in the last analysis a conditioned or finite whole can speak only with a conditioned authority, and that the individual consciousness may be able to assert itself against the command from a point of view outside of or transcending it. This is precluded by the very notion of moral obligation. It follows then that there is no possible standpoint of individual self-assertion outside of or transcending the final point in experience from which the moral authority emanates. There is no escape from the conclusion that the whole of experience that is presupposed, in all morality as the ground of its central category, is absolute. The finite social will legislates and has its authority recognized unconditionally in the human conscience only because the authority which it utters has its roots in an absolute and all-inclusive experience whose will is absolutely and unconditionally binding, and it is the entrance of this moment of absoluteness into the finite aggregates that makes it at all possible for them to voice our unconditional demand.

The principal objective categories of the ethical consciousness are the *right* and the *good*. In its relation to the ought or the category of obligation which we have considered above, the right is the ought conceived objectively

as content, and when the content of obligation is said to be right we mean, in the last analysis, that it is in conformity with the absolute will which expresses the absolute nature. There is, it is true, a relative right, or rather a right of which a finite will is the organ. The mandate of the social will is right to the individual *ego*. But it would be travelling the old road over again to show how, after all, the right of a finite will can be only relative, and will be recognized as such until it has been grounded in the will of an absolute experience, when it becomes unconditional. We are obliged to seek the ultimate standard of right just where we seek the ultimate standard of truth, in the nature of an absolute experience, and the point of immediate relation is the absolute's objective assertion of itself as will. If we consider the right, on the other hand, in relation to the good, it still remains a category of content, and qualifies the content of good from a somewhat different point of view. It is in its connection with the end-category of good that its relation to the ultimate principle of rationality is most clearly made out. To say that the content of good is right, is in the first instance, to say that it conforms to the will of a finite including nature, and, more fundamentally, that it is in agreement with the principle of highest rationality in that nature. But we have seen that to stop here would leave our right relative and uncertain by leaving open the possibility of a point of view from which it might not be right, or might be even positively wrong, and here, we see in its relation to the good, that to stop short with the finite would leave open the possibility of a point of view from which our right might not be good or might be positively bad. The very notion is irrational, however, and we feel obliged to go on until we have adequately and stably grounded the relation of the right and the good in the principle of absolute rationality, which involves the identity of the true and the good, and therefore guarantees that in the last analysis there shall be no point of view from which a thing may be pronounced right that is not included in a point of view from which it may also

be pronounced good. It is clear then that there is no stable and adequate ground for the category of right outside of the nature of the absolute.

There remains then the category of the *good* which is the end-category of the ethical consciousness. The good is that which satisfies the practical demand of an experience as a whole, it being understood that this demand includes the interests of feeling, and the good takes on ethical character when it is included in the content of a larger whole. Now, it is only when we abstract the notion of egoistic good from the larger content, that it will seem to be in a sense devoid of ethical significance. If we restore the relation, however, we will find the egoistic good included in the ethical notion of objective good, inasmuch as the ethical requirement arises, as we have seen, as a direct pressure upon the egoistic impulse. It is possible, of course, for the egoistic self to assert itself against the ethical and to conceive its good to be extra-ethical if not antagonistic to the ethical; but this, instead of taking it out of ethical categories, simply brings it under the categories of the *bad* and *wrong*. We may assume then that the ethical good in the wide sense in which we use the term in these discussions, will be inclusive of all real good. And the question we have to consider here is whether an ultimate and satisfactory concept of good is possible without taking the metaphysical principle of transcendence into account. Upon this question the results of the consideration of the distinction between the good and the bad have a direct bearing. We saw in that discussion that no stable and satisfactory concept of good could be achieved until we had referred the relative distinction back to its roots in an absolute experience; that otherwise, the good, as well as the true, would become the plaything of expediency. That conclusion bears directly here, and there is the additional consideration developed in connection with the nature of ethical obligation, that the claim of any good to be legislative, and the assent to that claim on the part of the egoistic will, involves, in the last analysis, the absolute

completeness of the experience whose content the good in question is. The considerations that bear on the category of good and which lead to its metaphysical grounding are thus parallel to those that bear on the other ethical categories. In ethics, in general, it is necessary therefore, in order to render its principles adequate and stable, that they be ultimately grounded in the concept of an absolute experience.

Lest this mode of considering the category of the good should seem to be too formal, it may be well to put the same consideration in a somewhat different form. We have seen that the whole socio-ethical situation is reducible, in the last resort, to the basis of a dialectic between an egoistic consciousness that tends to appropriate its other for its own self-realization and an objective altruistic consciousness that includes the egoistic good, and, by virtue of being the larger and including whole, takes the legislative attitude toward the egoistic self. We have said that ethically this claim is allowed, and that the assent of conscience is unconditional. Now, it is to be observed here that the social claim is not allowed in this unconditional sense. It is only in the ethical moment that the egoistic claim is completely waived as a separate claim. In the social and socio-political, this claim persists as an important and often disturbing element. We have seen in the chapter on the *Consciousness of Community*, Part II., how the maintenance of this point of independent self-assertion constitutes a vital point in the social and political situation. Here the dualism is in a sense a final term, and the whole of political and social theory is obliged to reckon with the inextinguishable claim of the individual *ego* to a right to act from an ultra-social and ultra-political standpoint. This dualism could be overcome only by conceiving an absolutely perfect state or society in which the whole interest of the individual would be completely included and conserved. In short, the concepts of sociology and politics are relative in their character, and can be metaphysically grounded only in the concept of the absolute. It is to be observed, however, that the connection of the

relative terms with their metaphysical implicates is mediate, and may in a sense be neglected, in the direct scientific treatment of social and political phenomena, whereas the relation of the ethical consciousness to the metaphysical is much more direct and immediate. In the ethical claim of the objective consciousness to be legislative, and in the unconditional assent of the subject to that claim, there is a moment of absoluteness involved. For the *unconditional assent and the complete waiving by the egoistic will of its claim as in any sense outside of and over against the ethical, is completely irrational and absurd unless we suppose that a recognition of the absoluteness of the objective claim enters as a constitutive factor into the determination of the ethical consciousness.* It appears, then, that the relation of the metaphysical to the groundwork of ethical science and ethical theory is even more close and vital than is its relation to the groundwork of science in general.

The relation of ethics to religion involves some considerations not directly included in the metaphysical groundwork. It will be clear, I think, from the discussion just concluded that the metaphysic of ethics grounds it in the nature and will of an absolute experience, and that it occupies in this respect common ground with religion. We have seen, however, that the religious consciousness arises, in the first instance, out of the finite self's conscious relation to a transcendent other, and that this relation is perfectly concrete and comprehensive and not distinctively a relation of will. There is central to it, of course, a relation of will, but the whole relation is more concrete than the ethical, and may be expected, therefore, to be richer in aesthetic and emotional elements. Morality must be touched with emotion and also with the sense of beauty, before it can become in the truest sense religious. The point of interest here is not, however, one of religious expression, but rather one of essential constitution. The ethical, as we have seen, is in the first instance an aspect of the social, and arises out of our consciousness of interaction with our fellows or

social others, while ultimately, as we have seen, it involves the transcendence of this social interaction in a relation to an absolute experience. The most vital and distinctive point of connection between the ethical and the religious arises, however, in the subject-consciousness through the sense of personal relationship with God. It is through this personal relationship—that is, a connection in which is included the originative thought and the realizing and conserving purpose and love of God, the object of religion—that our finite individuality is grounded and conserved, and this relationship, as we saw, is the basis of our feeling or consciousness, of both dependence and free, self-initiative activity. Right here, then, we discover the point of ultimate relationship between ethics and religion. The spring of both is the personal relation of God to the subjective individual consciousness, but the personal root of religion is the feeling of dependence, while the personal root of ethics is the feeling of individual freedom, the inner consciousness that the individual that asserts itself is real. We find here the ultimate distinction between the ethical and the religious, and it is also here that we find the ultimate point of relation and origination. For it will be clear that the two moments are inseparable, and that the soul of man only realizes its true status when it affirms in one concrete pulse its dependence and its freedom. It will be clear also that religion will be complete only when it includes in it the moment of free ethical assertion, and that ethics will be able to perfect itself only by including in its assertion of freedom the religious moment of personal dependence on the transcendent ground.

CONCLUSION.

THE course of reflection embodied in this volume tends to the justification of two propositions that are, in the last analysis, one. The first proposition is that the world is through and through, experience, and the second, that the world is through and through, rational. That the world is through and through experience we may be pardoned, I think, for regarding as demonstrated. There is no other concept that has even the same grade of efficacy in enabling us to interpret our world and render it intelligible. We have found it to be almost self-evident that anything in order to become in any sense thinkable must be brought in some way within the notion of experience; and it has appeared in the course of these investigations that in the last analysis the fault of that style of thinking which effects a divorce between the relative and the absolute, and then reduces the former to a dialectic of appearance without reality and the latter to a self-isolating and therefore unapproachable thing in itself, has its root in a false or inadequate notion of experience. Let us adopt that concept of experience which makes it inclusive of all reality as its content and we will be able to find ample scope within this concept for both relative and absolute, and for a firm grounding of their distinction and relation. And this will make it possible for us to lay the groundwork of a theory of knowledge that will be in some measure adequate and satisfactory.

The second proposition, that the world is through and through rational, is, when we understand the situation, a necessary assumption of both science and philosophy, for when we submit the methods of investigation that are employed in the explanation of any content to analysis, we find that they set out upon the presumption that some sort of orderly connection prevails among its parts which has the effect of reducing it to system, and thus renders it open to inquiry. The notion of system, in germinal form at least and hypothetically affirmed, is the norm of all investigation, and it is also, as we have abundantly shown, the norm of rationality. The proposition that the world is through and through rational is only another way of saying that it is internally and through and through systematic. But the notion of system is unintelligible apart from the concept of experience. There is no concept of the world that can render the hypothetical assumption of system with which science starts either plausible or tenable except that of experience. The notion of system is in its essence that of an organized whole of reality, and an organized whole of reality is unthinkable except as an organized content of experience. The concept of experience is basal, therefore, and is necessary to the grounding of the notion of system, and, in the last analysis, the notion of rationality. We have seen how the principle of rationality takes its highest form as a statement of the identity of the whole content of absolute experience, in relation to the categories of the true and good. The notion of experience is therefore fundamental, and that of rationality grows immediately out of the inter-relations of its content as a whole.

The relation of knowledge to experience is in the last resort analogous to that of rationality to experience. *The notion of knowledge is that of the internal rationality of experience as a whole and in all its parts*, and an adequate theory of knowledge will involve the systematic exhibition in detail of this rationality, by the reduction of every part of the known and knowable to a basis of fundamental principles in experience.

We know only as we are able to define content in terms of experience and to exhibit its congruity with the fundamental principle of rationality. So conceived, knowledge includes every form of intelligibility, and there is no sphere of reality that can cut itself off from the possibility, at least, of being reduced to an intelligible form. Whatever limit knowledge may strike must be come upon in the effort to know, and should a real limit be found it would no doubt present itself as something altogether opaque and impenetrable, and therefore neglectible in a rational scheme. That the possibility of knowledge cannot be limited except in the effort to know follows from the relation of knowledge to the more fundamental concept of experience. The activity of knowing must be conceived as internal to the broader activity of experience, and it may be regarded as the effort to define the content of experience directly or indirectly by means of presentation, concept, and symbol, to the end that this content may be not only real but intelligible. How is it possible then to dogmatize about the limit of this effort, or to fix any bounds that are not discovered in the process of knowing? The criteria of knowledge are also found, as we have seen, in principles of experience. This is not open to dispute in the sphere of what is called experimental inquiry, for a test in this field is simply the application of the determined in experience to the undetermined, in order to reduce it to the determinate form. It is not so generally recognized, however, that all the indirect and relative tests have a corresponding relation to experience. The test of necessity consists in general in bringing the principle of some whole of experience to bear on its parts in order to determine them, while in the last analysis the test of rationality itself, in its highest form, consists in the application to some content of finite experience of the unitary principle of an experience that is absolute and complete. The whole of knowledge then, including both its process and its criteria, is to be conceived as internal to experience.

There are, as we have endeavoured to make clear, two

fundamental modes of reducing the content of experience to intelligible form. The one we have called mechanical, the other teleological, or perhaps a better name for this species would be spiritual. Both modes are to be conceived as rational, and therefore as included modes of experience, and both are subject to the canons of rational necessity, but in a somewhat different way. Now, it is important that we should see that the mechanical and the spiritual modes of apprehension do not involve a different content of reality, but are rather different modes of conceiving a common content. It is the one world that is both mechanical and spiritual, and the mechanical and the spiritual are, therefore, alike aspects or modes of reality, and are grounded in the nature of the real. The world is mechanical in so far as we are able to conceive it under the categories of quantity and the form of externally acting causal agency, and also in so far as its ultimate elements are representable in the terms of those *individua minima* investigated in a former chapter.¹ The concept of the world that we call mechanical is completed, as we have seen, in the notion of an absolute whole of experience, in which the parts and elements are conceived to bear a common relation to some unitary principle, the inter-relations of the parts and elements themselves being conceived as quantitative and external. The mechanical mode of organization is therefore that of composition, and the notion of a pure mechanism would no doubt be achieved by the application of the mathematical calculus to the notion of a composition of forces. That mechanism has any limit on its own plane must be denied. The mechanical aspect of the world is absolutely universal and coextensive with reality, and we may look in vain for gaps in its armour. If the spiritual must depend for its right to be, on the existence of crevices and gaps in mechanism then the spiritual is doomed, for it can safely be predicted that no such gaps will be found. The spiritual mode of conceiving

¹ Chap. VIII. Grounding of Relative Conceptions—Theme, Mechanism, and Teleology.

the real asserts itself in its own right, and is as universal an aspect of the world as mechanism itself. But it does not assert itself as a substitute for mechanism, but by way of qualitative transcendence. We do not reach the spiritual by co-ordinating it with the mechanical, but by recognizing that there is an internal qualitative difference by virtue of which we pass from the mechanical to the spiritual, which is a mode of conceiving the real that at the same time transcends and conserves the mechanical. For we have seen that the notion of the spiritual agency is, in the last analysis, that of internal agency which can be conceived only as a function of an internally conscious individual that is the bearer of a self-conscious activity of thought, volition, and love—an activity that is therefore, progressive and end-realizing, and that operates objectively under the principle of supreme rationality—the notion of the ultimate identity of the true and good. We may represent the form of individuality in which the spiritual activity is embodied and realized by the phrase *individua maxima*, and we may then say that mechanically the world falls into quantitative relations under the category of *individua minima*, while spiritually its relations become qualitative and including, under the category of *individua maxima*. But when we wish to conceive the world adequately, as an absolute whole of reality we must represent it under the notion of an experience in which the mechanical is ever finding itself transcended and comprehended in the spiritual, and in which the real must be conceived, therefore, as in the last resort spiritual.

The question of the criteria of knowledge may also, in the last analysis, be brought down to this dual basis. The tests of mechanical knowledge have already been well developed in the sciences and in formal logic, and the claim of the results of mechanical investigation to be regarded as knowledge, may be taken, as in the present time, uncontested. The truth is, that the tendency has been on the part of the mechanical to make exclusive claims and to deny the

possibility of a knowledge under spiritual categories. This exclusiveness we have resisted, and shall continue to resist. From the standpoint of controversy the whole effort of this volume may be regarded as a plea for the rights of the spiritual and for the reality of spiritual knowledge. But the fundamental motive of the effort here embodied has been constructive and comprehensive rather than controversial. The conviction of this book is that in an adequate concept of knowledge there is not only scope but need for both the mechanical and the spiritual categories, and when we affirm that the world is in the last analysis spiritual, we believe that we are affirming a proposition that mechanism, when it completely understands itself, will also affirm. And when in the development of the criteria of knowledge we reach the conclusion that the principle of all knowledge rests ultimately in the unity of the true and the good, we do not feel that we are uttering a partisan proposition, but rather one in which all true lovers of knowledge can join.

THE END.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE.

On the distinction between the that and the what, as bearing on the discussion of existence in Chapter IV., Part II.

It will be obvious that the discussion of existence in Chapter IV., Part II., has an important bearing on the now familiar distinction between the *that* and the *what*. If we rigidly separate the *that* from the *what* it will be found to be identical with bare existence; whereas, in so far as it seems to involve more than this, the added meaning will be found, on analysis, to be due to the unconscious reading into it of the meaning of the *what*. For it is clear that the question of the *what* is that of the *definition of content*, and if this be strictly abstracted from, there remains nothing for the *that* to signify but simple presence in either presentational or conceptual form. The presentation of content is inseparable, it is true, from some degree of definition, but this only proves that in reality no separation of the *that* from the *what* is possible. The problem of the *that* arises only when *bare presence* is abstracted from the process by which content is defined and determined, and the attempt is made to consider it by itself. Thus the question of bare existence which arises is a sheer abstraction without significance for reality, until it is restored to its connection with the concrete and becomes a question of determinate being.

Apart, then, from mere presence in presentational or conceptual form, the notion of the *that* has no meaning. It is only when the *what* is included in the consideration and the question becomes one of *determinate existence* that it acquires any import for reality. Thus, if we take for illustration the question of God's existence and shift the emphasis, the point of contention here will become clear. When the question of God's existence is mooted it may mean either "does God *exist*," or "does *God* exist?" The first form is purely and simply a logical paradox, since it involves the attempt to translate the presumptive point of the judging activity in general into the predicate of a special judgment. The criticism of the ontological proof has long since made it clear that bare existence cannot be a predicate. The second form alone has real significance, but it is a question of the *what*; of determinate being, rather than one of bare existence. Existence as presence in presentational or conceptual form is assumed as the presumptive point of the judgment, and the question in reality takes the following form: "Is the existent such that from some real point of view it may be defined as God?"

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